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BODILY IDENTITY IN SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY 
ABSTRACT 
At the core of this thesis is an examination of how Aquinas's materialistic 
understanding of resurrection shaped his thinking on human nature, individuality 
and bodily identity.   
Resurrection implied two things with respect to the individual body.  First: the 
union between soul and matter was intimate and essential.  Aquinas held that the soul 
is the only substantial, or nature-determining, form in a human being.  Second: the 
material part in a human was relatively independent from the soul.  Aquinas grounded 
the relative independence of body from soul on the accidental form 'dimensive 
quantity', which gave to the body its organic structure, individualised its matter, and 
supported its material continuity.  
Chapters 1 and 2 discuss Aquinas's Aristotelian and Averroan sources.  For 
Aristotle, although individuality had its basis in matter, all matter was exchangeable 
without prejudice to identity.  Problematically for the theologian working on 
resurrection, Aristotle offered no account of postmortem bodily continuity.  Averroes, 
crucially, imported Aristotle's geometrical notion of 'body' as a three-dimensional 
kind of quantity into his discussions of bodily identity.  Averroes thought that matter 
had a bodily structure of its own, supporting its continuing identity across radical 
change.  
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss Aquinas's thinking on the individual body and bodily 
identity.  Reflection on resurrection, it seems, pushed Aquinas towards adopting a 
position on the nature of matter similar to Averroes'.  
In the 1270s, critics (mostly Franciscan) of Aquinas's theory of human nature 
turned it on its head, argued that it threatened the body (with heretical consequences 
for the identity of Christ's corpse), and set off the late-thirteenth century's defining 
debate on human nature.   
Chapter 5 discusses the divergent ways in which the Dominicans Thomas of 
Sutton, Robert of Orford, and Richard Knapwell defended Aquinas's theory of 
human nature and its consequences for postmortem bodily continuity at Oxford 
during 1277-86.  It culminates in an examination of Knapwell's advanced work on 
the nature of matter, which built upon Averroes' and Aquinas's.  The thesis contends, 
furthermore, that these three Dominicans can still be grouped under the banner of 
the 'early Thomistic school' if the ground they share is understood to be primarily 
political, rather than primarily doctrinal.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In the thirteenth century, scholastic theologians' interpretation of the doctrine of 
the general resurrection was literal and materialistic.  It did not make sense to use the 
word resurrectio, Thomas Aquinas pointed out, unless the very same body that died 
would be that which rose again.1  Longstanding theological reasoning supported this 
interpretation of the general resurrection, as did the decrees of the great reforming 
Church councils of the thirteenth century: each individual would be justly judged or 
rewarded only in their sinning flesh; the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the 
Second Council of Lyons (1274), in the face of the threat of dualist heretics who 
taught that matter was evil, reaffirmed that every woman and man would rise again 
with their own body, a body that was identical to their mortal body.2  But in virtue of 
what would any person's risen body be the same as their mortal body?  Which flesh 
formerly belonging to them would need to rise, and how much of it?  And how, in 
any case, did an individual body's remains persist and remain the same after its death 
and decomposition?  Answering questions like these led theologians to develop 
complex analyses of bodily identity.  They discussed the development of the 
individual body in utero, the material transmission of characteristics across 
generations, and the physiology of growth and nutrition.  Questioning how the 
material particular to an individual body might survive across the body's decay, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 'Non enim resurrectio dici potest, nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat: quia resurrectio est iterata 
surrectio; ejusdem autem est surgere et cadere'.  Thomas Aquinas, In quattuor libros sententiarum 
(hereafter In Sent.) IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc.1, response, Opera omnia (ed.) R. Busa, 7 vols. (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), vol. 1, p. 635. 
2  Lateran IV: 'omnes cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus, quae nunc gestant, ut recipiant 
secundum opera sua, sive bona fuerint sive mala, illi cum diabolo poenam perpetuam, et isti cum 
Christo gloriam sempiternam'; Lyons II: 'in die iudicii omnes homines ante tribunal Christi cum suis 
corporibus comparebunt, reddituri de propriis factis rationem'.  H. Denzinger (ed.), Enchiridion 
Symbolorum. Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum (Freiburg: Herder, 1963), 429, 464 pp. 
200, 216.  On the early development of the doctrine see C. Setzer, Resurrection of the Body in Early 
Judaism and Christianity. Doctrine, Community and Self-Definition (Boston: Brill, 2004) and H. Chadwick, 
'Origen, Celsus and the Resurrection of the Body', Harvard Theological Review, 41 (1948), pp. 83-102.  
On the equivocal evidence in scripture for the materialistic interpretation of resurrection see R. M. 
Grant, 'The Resurrection of the Body', Journal of Religion, 28 (1948), pp. 120-30.  For a survey of the 
varying Christian interpretations of the resurrection from the Fathers through to the fourteenth 
century see C. W. Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity 200-1336 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995).   
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decomposition, and even being eaten by other humans, they analysed the nature of 
matter itself.  
The question of personal identity remains provocative and fertile in modern 
philosophical debate, of course.  In order to try to isolate the criteria for personal 
survival, modern analytical philosophers have devised thought experiments that 
invite us to imagine the possibility and consequences of two 'persons' coming to 
occupy one another's bodies, or the reaction that an individual might have to being 
told that they would on some future morning wake up with no memory, but in 
excruciating pain.  What would be the outcome for personal survival of transplanting 
brains between bodies, of dividing a brain and housing each half in a new body, or of 
transferring a 'brain state' from one individual to another, much like copying the 
hard-drive of a computer?  What if 'teletransportation', which figures in science 
fiction as a mode of travel, were actually possible, and a person could be destroyed on 
Earth and recreated in new matter on Mars, with the blueprint of each of their cells 
beamed across space at the speed of light in the intervening minutes?  Would this 
really be survival?3   
Behind thirteenth-century discussions of bodily identity, of course, was the 
fundamental assumption that, in addition to their immortal rational soul, an 
individual human's particular material part, their body, would be crucial to their 
identity at the resurrection, or to what made them the same as their mortal self: each 
individual would rise again the same person only if the body reconstructed for them 
was materially the same as their mortal body.   
Scholastic theologians devised bizarre thought experiments of their own, in order 
to demonstrate that several individuals might lay claim to the same material: what if a 
male cannibal were to eat another's flesh and then beget a child, or, even, live entirely 
off human fetuses and (assuming that his semen is constituted from superfluous 
nutriment) father a child?  At the resurrection, would the shared matter go to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 B. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: CUP, 1973), esp. 'Personal Identity and Individuation', 
pp. 1-18, and 'The Self and the Future', pp. 46-63; S. Shoemaker and R, Swinburne, Personal Identity 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), esp. Shoemaker's contribution, and p. 108-11 on the 'Brain-State Transfer 
Device'; R. Martin and J. Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), esp. R. Nozick, 
'Personal Identity Through Time', pp. 92-114, and D. Parfit, 'Why Our Identity Is Not What Matters', 
pp. 115-43; J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), esp. D. Parfit, 
'Personal Identity', pp. 199-223.  
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father, to the child, or to the fetuses themselves (whose bodies would rise again 
augmented by divine power)?4  
In his very earliest work on the resurrection, his commentary on Peter Lombard's 
Sentences (c.1252-56),5 the controversial Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas made 
an uncompromising intervention into scholastic debate on resurrection and bodily 
identity.  It is with this intervention and its consequences for scholastic thought on 
bodily identity that this thesis is concerned.   
Just as it implied that material identity was crucial to personal identity, the 
doctrine of the general resurrection implied, universally, that human nature was 
composite, comprising a body as well as an immortal soul.6  Thomas Aquinas 
claimed that a new theory of the composition of human nature that he himself had 
developed was the only (or at least by far the best available) theory that could preserve 
the body, in addition to the soul, as an essential component of human nature.  By 
extension, only this theory could preserve a true understanding of the general 
resurrection as the reunification of each individual human soul to its own body and 
no other body: only his own theory of human nature, Aquinas argued, implied that 
an individual's material identity was in fact crucial to their personal identity.  
This new theory, to put it into technical scholastic language, was of course 
Aquinas's famous idea that the immortal rational soul is the only substantial, or 
nature-determining, form in any human.  This study will refer to that theory as the 
'theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans'.  Any other form in the body, 
Aquinas argued, was an 'accidental' form that did not define its nature.  In Aquinas's 
conception of human nature, the rational soul and matter therefore combine in a 
distinctively intimate union.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 P. L. Reynolds, Food and the Body. Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 
see esp. pp. 304-5 (on Albertus Magnus's treatment of the problem), 313-4, 343-4 (on Bonaventure) 
and 391-5 (on Aquinas).  
5 The dating of Aquinas's works in this study follows the list in J. -P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 
1, The Person and His Work (trans.) R. Royal (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1996), pp. 330-61.    
6 Cf. Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, p. 256, where it is pointed out that whereas the early twelfth-
century theologians Hugh of St. Victor and Robert of Melun claimed that human is merely a soul 
using a body, no theologian by the mid thirteenth century argued this.  According to D. L. d'Avray, 
Death and the Prince (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 173-4, this particular reading of Hugh of St. 
Victor may even be wrong. 
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Although he insisted to his colleagues in the Theology faculty at Paris that only 
the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was concordant with the 
literal understanding of the general resurrection in the respect just outlined, the 
departure that Aquinas made in developing the theory seems to have represented a 
genuine intellectual impulse rather than an intentionally highly provocative move.  
Nonetheless, in the years following Aquinas's death in 1274, the theory of the unicity 
of substantial form in humans became the subject of the most impassioned debate 
about the composition of human nature in the high medieval period.   
Critics of Aquinas's philosophy, mostly members of the Franciscan Order, found 
it possible to interpret the theory in a very different way.  They claimed that the 
theory that the soul was the only nature-determining form in the human being in fact 
radically diminished the importance of the body as a component of human nature, and 
of the individual human.  Therefore, they argued, it had dangerous theological 
consequences.  If the soul was the body's only defining form, there could be no real 
bodily continuity across the soul's separation at death: Christ's dead body was not 
really His dead body, and the relic was not really the saint.   
Aquinas's critics advocated a different theory of the composition of human 
nature: that there was at least one other substantial form in each human body, 
namely a corporeal substantial form.  This thesis will refer to any such theory as a 
'pluralist' theory, or 'theory of the plurality of substantial forms in humans'.  Pluralists 
argued that the persistence of such a corporeal form in the corpse was necessary to 
guarantee any concrete identity between the body living and dead.   
Several scholars, mostly Dominicans, responded in defence of Aquinas's theory of 
the composition of human nature, explaining why it had no false theological 
consequences.  
Given that the educational system at the universities of the medieval west actively 
encouraged daily adversarial debate on almost all philosophical and theological 
issues, and given too that Aquinas had been a highly respected theologian whose 
faith could not really be doubted, the way in which the debate over the implications 
of Aquinas's new theory about the composition of human nature escalated was 
extraordinary.  The theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was implicitly 
targeted by the Dominican Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Kilwardby in a public 
	   	   	  12 
prohibition on the teaching of certain theses at Oxford on 18 March 1277; there 
were accusations of heresy from both sides; and the theory was condemned as 
heretical by Kilwardby's successor as Archbishop of Canterbury, the Franciscan John 
Peckham, on 30 April 1286.   
The aim of this thesis is twofold.  First, it aims to understand Aquinas's innovative 
thought on the individual body, bodily identity, postmortem bodily continuity, and 
bodily resurrection, in its own right.  Then, using this understanding as a basis from 
which to work, it aims to provide a close analysis of the reception of Aquinas's 
thought on these topics in this late thirteenth-century debate on the composition of 
human nature up to 1286, focussing on the work of three Dominicans, all at Oxford, 
who made significant contributions to the debate: Thomas of Sutton, Robert of 
Orford, and Richard Knapwell.  Pursuing these twin aims, the thesis in effect consists 
in two case studies, each in a different phenomenon that characterised medieval 
scholasticism.   
In the first instance, focusing just on Thomas Aquinas's thought, the thesis 
provides a case study in a phenomenon that in western intellectual history is peculiar 
to scholasticism: in the universities of the high-to-late medieval West, where 
Theology was the highest prestige subject and master discipline, all of the most 
cutting-edge scientific thinking was done in response to theological problems.7  The 
relevance of this point to scholastic thought about the resurrection was hinted at at 
the very outset.8  The thesis will discuss how reflection on the doctrine of bodily 
resurrection would shape Aquinas's innovative theory of the composition of human 
nature, and the analysis of the individual body and bodily identity that went with it, 
along with his thinking on postmortem bodily continuity and the nature of matter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 J. Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350).  An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 190, and quoted below, pp. 13-14; M. McCord Adams, Some Later Medieval 
Theories of the Eucharist (Oxford: OUP, 2010), chapter 10, entitled 'Theology Provoking Philosophy', at 
pp. 229-55.   
8 Cf. also P. L. Reynolds, Food and the Body.  Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology (Leiden: 
Brill, 1999), which was an important source of inspiration for this thesis, details how reflection on the 
resurrection and original sin provoked advanced speculation about sexual reproduction, digestion, 
nutrition and growth in scholastic theology up to Aquinas.  Whereas Reynolds' focus is primarily 
biological, the present study concerns the metaphysical issues associated with resurrection.  
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Insofar as it takes a close interest in the ways in which Dominicans interpreted and 
defended Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its 
theological consequences for bodily identity, the thesis will also provide a short case 
study in the emergence of intellectual schools at the end of the thirteenth century, 
and more precisely in emergence of the so-called 'early Thomistic school'.  The works 
that Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell produced in 
defence of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans display no 
homogenous understanding of its implications for the body and for bodily identity.  
The thesis will ask whether and in what sense, therefore, these three Dominicans can 
meaningfully be considered as representatives of an early Thomistic school.  
The close textual analysis provided in the chapters that follow will necessarily get 
quite technical: the short summary of Aquinas's theory of human nature that was 
given above is just where it starts.  Getting to grips with detail is worth the effort, 
though, because it enables a much fuller understanding of what was at stake in this 
outstanding scholastic debate on the composition of human nature, whose 
repercussions, there are strong indications, would continue to colour scholars' 
thought on theological questions touching upon the nature of the body for the 
remainder of the medieval period.   
The rest of this introduction, including the chapter layout below, will summarise 
the key ideas that will dominate the discussion of bodily identity in scholastic 
theology that builds over the five chapters of this study.   
Theology Driving Scientific Innovation  
It was John Marenbon in his Later Medieval Philosophy who made the point that the 
late medieval period is distinctive in western intellectual history because theologians 
were responsible for the most sophisticated and innovative scientific and 
philosophical thinking that emerged from universities: 
'Independence in speculation was usually the preserve of the 
theologians, both because they were more mature and highly trained, 
and because a good deal of the ancient and Arab texts was 
incompatible with their doctrinal aims and presuppositions...  Most 
important thinkers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were 
theologians; most of their important works were treatises on theology.  
Not only did thinkers like Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and 
	   	   	  14 
Ockham presuppose the articles of faith, their main aim was to 
understand them better and elaborate their consequences'.9  
Thomas Aquinas's work on the general resurrection neatly bears out this 
characterisation of the aims and achievements of scholastic theologians.  Aquinas had 
in hand the account of the general resurrection found in Peter Lombard's theological 
textbook the Sentences (1154-57), an account with only rudimentary scientific content 
and limited explanatory power.  As a bachelor in Theology, completing the 
commentary on the Sentences that was compulsory for any scholar at that stage in his 
career, Aquinas questioned and analysed the implications of the doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body, aiming to improve upon the Lombard's account in order to 
understand as precisely as possible what it might involve, thereby elucidating fully its 
consequences for the workings of nature full-stop.   
As a basis from which to work, Aquinas used his advanced knowledge of 
Aristotle's encyclopaedic works on natural philosophy, prescribed reading on the Arts 
syllabus in Paris in 1255,10 and newly available in a more reliable translation, directly 
from the Greek, courtesy of William of Moerbeke, in the 1260s and 1270s.11  
Training in the Arts was the necessary preparation for tackling the most advanced 
scientific problems, like providing an analysis of what bodily resurrection would 
involve, that were reserved for the most outstanding minds at the universities' 
Theology faculties.  And by common consensus, Aristotle's works contained the most 
comprehensive and accurate analysis of nature that humankind had yet produced.  
Although Aristotle was simply 'the Philosopher' to Aquinas and his contemporaries, 
however, he was still a pagan without access to revealed truth, and scholastic 
theologians did not expect him to have all of the answers that they sought, all of the 
time.  Aristotle had made mistakes: claims that contradicted what the articles of faith 
implied about the created world.  In correcting these mistakes, a theologian's job was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 190.  
10 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (eds.) H. Denifle and A. Chatelain (Paris: Culture et Civilisation, 
1964), vol. 1, n. 246, pp. 277-9.  
11 For a table of medieval translations of Greek and Arabic works into Latin, see M. Trizio, D. Gutas, 
C. Burnett, J. A. Demetracopoulos and M. Zonta, 'Appendix B: Medieval Translations' in R. Pasnau 
and C. van Dyke (eds.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy vol. 2, (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), at 
pp. 793-822.  This replaces Bernard G. Dod's table in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg and E. 
Stump (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), pp. 74-9.  
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to speculate and to improve upon the most sophisticated scientific knowledge 
available in order to demonstrate the harmony that he believed to obtain between 
truths about nature discoverable by reason and the truth contained in the articles of 
faith.12   
Aquinas's new ideas about the composition of human nature, the individual body 
and bodily identity, postmortem bodily continuity, and the nature of matter, then, 
were the outcome of his attempt to improve upon Peter Lombard's account of the 
body and its resurrection using Aristotle's cutting-edge scientific concepts, to thereby 
reconcile the Lombard's account with the most up-to-date science, and furthermore 
to suggest new scientific solutions where Aristotle either had been wrong or simply 
could not help.13   
Resurrection in the Sentences: The "Truth of Human Nature"  
Peter Lombard had discussed the general resurrection in two places in the 
Sentences, even if the doctrine was dealt with directly only in his treatment of the 'last 
things' at the very end of book IV.  There, verbatim quotations from St. Augustine's 
works dominated the Lombard's treatment of postmortem bodily continuity and 
resurrection.  Augustine had, in chapter 23 of his Enchiridion, provided a 
straightforward account of the reconstruction of individual bodies by an omnipotent 
God, informed by an atomist physics.  God would simply find the material particles 
belonging to each individual body, wherever they might have been scattered, and 
whatever other animal bodies they might have been incorporated into, and return 
them to their proper body.  In cases of cannibalism, implying that two people could 
lay claim to the same material, the shared flesh would be returned to the body in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Cf. Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 70-1, 78; Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 13-18.   
13 Scholastic theologians explored individuality and individuation through several other theological 
topics, including the Trinity, original sin, the immortality of the soul and the nature of angels. See J. J. 
E. Gracia, 'Prologue' in J. J. E. Gracia (ed.), Individuation in Scholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and the 
Counter-Reformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. ix-x.  Gracia's work on 
individuation in medieval philosophy has opened up the field for historians of scholasticism.  See also 
J. J. E. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (München-Wien: 
Philosophia Verlag, 1984) and Individuality. An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988); and K. F. Barber and J. J. E. Gracia (eds.), Individuation and 
Identity in Early Modern Philosophy.  Descartes to Kant (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).   
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which it was first animated.14  Each body would rise whole, with all of its parts,15 and, 
as Augustine explained in De civitate Dei book XXII, each would rise at the perfect 
age, the age at which Christ Himself had died and was resurrected.  God would 
supply any deficiencies and remove deformities and superfluities.16   
Surely not all of the matter that had ever subsisted in an individual body would 
rise in it, so which of the particles formerly belonging to each body would have 
priority?  In a discussion of original sin in book II of the Sentences, the Lombard 
suggested that there was a distinct set of particles in each individual body that served 
as the material basis for its continuing identity during mortal life and at the 
resurrection.  The Lombard called this flesh the 'truth of human nature' (veritas 
humanae naturae) particular to each body.17  This special kind of flesh had been passed 
down through the generations of humans since Adam, and was augmented and 
multiplied 'in itself' (in se) when fomented by food.18  It never mixed with the other 
kind of flesh in the individual human body, namely the flesh that was built up from 
food, and each resurrected body, the Lombard supposed, would comprise only its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 'Non enim perit Deo terrena materies, de qua mortalium creatur caro; sed in quemlibet pulverem 
cineremve solvatur, in quoslibet halitus aurasque diffugiat, in quamcumque aliorum corporum 
substantiam vel in ipsa elementa vertatur, in quorumcumque animalium, etiam hominum, cibum 
carnemque mutetur, illi animae puncto temporis redit, quae illam primitus... animavit'.  Peter 
Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae (hereafter Sententiae), IV, d. 44, chapter 2.1 (ed.) Collegium S. 
Bonaventurae, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-1981), vol. 2, 
p. 517.  Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, chapter 23.8 (ed.) M. Evans, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 46 
(Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1969), pp. 96-7.  For more on cannibalism in 
connection with the resurrection in Augustine's thought see Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 53-4, 
which discusses De civitate Dei, Book XXII, chapter 20.  
15 Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, d. 44, chapter 2.3 (ed.) Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 2, p. 518.  Cf. 
Augustine, Enchiridion, chapter 23.89 (ed.) M. Evans, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 46, p. 97.  
16 Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, d. 44, chapter 1.3 (ed.) Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 2, p. 517.  Cf. 
Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XXII, chs. 14-15, 19 (eds.) B. Dombart and A. Kalb, Corpus 
Christianorum Series Latina, 48 (Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1955), p. 833-4, 837-
9.  
17 The Lombard's proximate source for this particular concept of the 'truth of human nature' was the 
anonymous Summa sententiarum, another theological textbook.  The latter's source for the phrase was 
Anselm of Canterbury's Cur Deus homo in which 'the truth of human nature' meant something quite 
different: it was just what was included in the definition of human beings; since humans were destined 
to become immortal, mortality could not belong to the 'truth of human nature'.  In the hands of the 
author or the Summa sententiarum the concept of the immortal 'truth of human nature' was conflated 
with an idea from a Laon treatise, the Deus summe atque ineffabiliter bonus, which spoke of original 
material from Adam, which did not mix with food, and which would rise again.  See Reynolds, Food 
and the Body, pp. 54-6.  
18 Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 30, chapter 14.2 (ed.) Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 1, p. 504.   
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own 'truth of human nature'.19  The concept of the 'truth of human nature' on the 
one hand, and the topic of the general resurrection, on the other, became very closely 
linked thereafter in Sentences commentaries: some theologians would discuss the 'truth 
of human nature' only in their commentaries on book IV.20 
After Aristotle: Bodily Resurrection "idem numero"  
New concepts and axioms from Aristotelian science would challenge this 
relatively uncomplicated account of the body and its resurrection.  The way in which 
Aristotle's science all at once shaped theologians' handling of the topic of resurrection 
and challenged their understanding of it, providing them with sophisticated concepts 
with which to think whilst creating the need for philosophical clarification in order to 
resolve apparent tensions between reason and faith, can be grasped swiftly through 
reflection on the impact of one particular Aristotelian axiom on scholarly discussion 
of resurrection.  This axiom would become a standard objection to the very possibility 
of resurrection in theological quaestiones.  
At the end of the last chapter of De generatione et corruptione, Aristotle had contrasted 
the circular motion of heavenly bodies (the planets and stars) with the cycles of 
generation and corruption we find in the sublunar world.  Heavenly bodies, Aristotle 
noted, were incorruptible and moved in orbits, always returning, identical, to exactly 
the same place.  Corruptible substances such as water also moved through cycles of a 
sort: water evaporated to become air; this air condensed in the atmosphere; water fell 
again as rain.  But the second lot of water was not identical to the first lot or, in 
technical language, whereas any corruptible substance, having been corrupted, could 
'repeat' or return (reiterare) the same in species or kind (idem specie), it could not return 
the same 'in number' (idem numero) or as exactly the same individual.21   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 'Non infitiatur tamen quin cibi et humores in carnem et sanguinem transeant, sed non in veritatem 
humanae naturae quae a primis descendit parentibus; quae sola in resurrectione erit.  Reliqua vero 
caro, in quam cibi transeunt, tanquam superflua in resurrectione deponetur'.  Peter Lombard, 
Sententiae II, d. 30, chapter 15.2 (ed.) Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 1, p. 505.  
20 Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 50.   
21 'Quorum quidem igitur incorruptibilis substantia mota, manifestum quoniam et numero eadem 
erunt: motus enim sequitur quod movetur; quorum autem non, sed corruptibilis, necesse specie, 
numero autem non reiterare.  Ideo aqua ex aere et aer ex aqua specie idem, non numero'.  Aristotle, 
De generatione et corruptione (hereafter DGEC) 338b14-18, Translatio vetus, (ed.) J. Judycka, Aristoteles Latinus, 
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This passage, in scholastic theologians' eyes, was of obvious relevance to an 
analysis of bodily resurrection.  Aristotle might well deny that the very same 
individual human body, as a corruptible substance, could return naturally, but 
scholastic theologians knew that the resurrection would be brought about by divine 
power.  And they now had a new, technical way of expressing the result of bodily 
resurrection: each resurrected body would be the 'same in number' (idem numero) it was 
in mortal life.  
Unpacking the technical notion that a resurrected human body would be idem 
numero as it was before death, we get to the two topics within Aquinas's thought on 
human nature that will provide the focus for the first four chapters of the present 
study: individuality and bodily identity.   
First, the body resurrected idem numero would be an individual, or one thing, or a 
numerical unit.  A thing's individuality is that intrinsic feature or set of features in 
virtue of which it is unique and set apart from all other things, including members of 
the same species or kind.22  Medieval theologians found several different ways of 
conceptualising individuality, 23  but Aquinas would think of any one thing's 
individuality primarily in terms of its distinction from others of the same species or 
kind, or in terms of intra-specific differences.   
Second, the body resurrected idem numero would be the same (idem) as it had been 
in life.  An individual thing’s identity in a metaphysical context is understood to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
IX. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), p. 81.  This is found distilled into axiomatic form in the widely circulated 
thirteenth-century philosophical florilegium the Auctoritates Aristotelis: 'Quorum substantia deperit, non 
redeunt eodem humero, sed specie'.  J. Hamesse (ed.), Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un Florège Médiéval: étude 
historique et édition critique, Philosophes Médiévaux, 17 (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1974), p. 171 
(50).   
22 The word individualitas is a later medieval Latin word; theologians used the word individuum in some 
contexts to refer to this feature of a thing, and the word individuatio in others.  The use of the latter 
term is this sense is a little confusing for the modern interpreter, because individuatio in medieval Latin 
usually just meant the process by which something acquired its individuality: 'individuation', which is 
also the most natural English translation of the word.  Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation, 
pp. 19-20.  
23 Gracia sets out five different ways in which scholastic theologians thought about individuality: 
indivisibility, distinction, division of the species, identity, impredicability, and noninstantiability.  See a 
J. J. E. Gracia, 'Introduction: The Problem of Individuation', in Gracia (ed.), Individuation in 
Scholasticism, pp. 3-6.  A recent survey of major theologians' approaches to individuality and 
individuation in the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries is M. Pickavé, 'The Controversy 
over the Principle of Individuation in Quodlibeta (1277-CA. 1320): A Forest Map' in C. Schabel (ed.), 
Theological Quodlibeta in Middle Ages.  The Fourteenth Century (Brill: Leiden, 2007), pp. 17-79. 
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that feature of a thing by which it continues to be itself over time and in spite of 
change: it presupposes that the thing in question is an individual distinct from 
others.24   
And so, in accordance with his literal, materialistic understanding of resurrectio 
drawn from the Sentences and Augustine's texts, Aquinas would develop an analysis of 
the human body that assumed that the matter particular to it was crucial both to its 
individuality and to its identity (and therefore to the individuality and identity of the 
human to which that body belonged).  Moreover, he would radically revise Peter 
Lombard's concept of the 'truth of human nature' by refining his thinking on the 
individual body and bodily identity using further relevant concepts and ideas from 
Aristotle's scientific texts.   
Aristotle's suggestion in De generatione et corruptione that a thing's identity implied its 
continuity or uninterruptedness squared well with Augustine's assumption that the 
matter particular to individual bodies would be continuous across their death and 
resurrection.  Aquinas, too, assumed that, even if the body as a whole might corrupt, 
its constituent parts would survive to be reunited by God.  He took up the challenge of 
providing a revised scientific explanation for how the remains of an individual body 
could lie in wait to be reintegrated by divine power.  
Chapters 1 and 2 will set out the Aristotelian scientific background necessary to 
appreciate Aquinas's own work on the individual body and bodily identity, to be 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4.  The first four chapters between them furnish the 
background for chapter 5's discussion of the way in which Aquinas's thought on the 
body and bodily continuity was received and interpreted by Thomas of Sutton, 
Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, themselves also, of course, working from 
Aristotle's texts.   
The Aristotelian texts referred to in chapters 1 and 2, as in the passage quoted 
above from De generatione et corruptione, will be the medieval translations into Latin, 
since these were the versions that Thomas Aquinas, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of 
Orford and Richard Knapwell were using.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Gracia, 'Introduction: The Problem of Individuation', p. 5; Gracia, Individuality, pp. 38-41. 
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Aristotle on the Individual Body   
Chapter 1 will cover two fundamental Aristotelian principles upon which 
Aquinas would base his account of the individual human body.  First, there is the 
principle that, in any composite, matter and form necessarily bore a proportionate 
relationship to one another.  Each kind of form, for Aristotle, had its appropriate 
matter, or 'proper matter' (materia propria).  Second, there is Aristotle's concept of the 
material cause in natural generation.  For Aristotle, certain material conditions 
needed to be in place in order that a certain kind of substantial, or species-
determining, form could manifest itself in matter: in this sense, matter represented 
necessity in causation. Furthermore, Aristotle held that the particular material 
conditions obtaining in a certain case of generation constrained the precise way in 
which the particular substantial form could manifest itself in that case.   Material 
conditions, in other words, accounted for the natural differences (both formal and 
material) that we observe in things, on the level below the species.  On the basis of 
Aristotle's texts, then, Aquinas could straightforwardly develop an account of the 
material part in a human being according to which it was not only crucial to, but 
indeed the very root of, their individuality.  
Aristotle and Averroes on Bodily Identity   
Chapter 2 will examine Aristotle's texts on bodily identity, which proved rather 
more difficult to square with what the doctrine of bodily resurrection entailed.  A 
passage on growth in De generatione et corruptione directly contradicted Peter Lombard 
by suggesting that an organic body might remain the same thing over the course of 
its lifetime despite the exchange of all of its matter.  If this position were correct, why 
would any resurrected body need to be recovered from any matter in particular?  In 
other words, was Aristotle saying that the continuing identity of the body, and 
therefore of the whole human individual, depended on the soul alone?   
Moreover, Aristotle's scientific texts were almost silent when it came to the topic 
of postmortem bodily identity and material continuity.  In his work on substantial 
generation and corruption, Aristotle had focussed on formal change rather than the 
material substratum for that change.  And Aristotle's physics was continuist, not 
atomist or corpuscular.  It could not provide for the idea that a body had particles, let 
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alone that the particles belonging to a particular body might persist across its death 
and resurrection despite being scattered, eaten and incorporated into other bodies.  
Insights provided by Aristotle's twelfth-century Arabic commentator Averroes 
(1126-98) would prove to be particularly helpful to Aquinas, as he developed an 
account of bodily identity and postmortem bodily continuity in line with the 
implications of the doctrine of bodily resurrection.  Averroes was simply 'the 
Commentator' to scholastic theologians: his expositions of the Stagirite's work were 
the standard gloss for thirteenth-century scholars.25  
Crucially, there was a second concept of the body in Aristotle's works (in addition 
to the idea that the body is the soul's proportionate material subject), which was 
central to Averroes' analysis of bodily identity.  Aristotle had, in several places, defined 
'body' in a mathematical way, as a three-dimensional solid structure, comprising 
parts arranged in a particular way, divisible in three dimensions, and divided by its 
boundaries or limits from its surroundings.   
Such geometrical structures, for Aristotle, were immanent in natural bodies.  
Averroes thought that each natural body's three-dimensional structure was an 
'accidental' form, or a property of that body, rather than a 'substantial' form defining 
its species.  In technical terms, this three-dimensional bodily structure was an 
accidental form in the category of 'quantity' (quantitas).  It directly underpinned that 
body's three-dimensional shape (figura): another accidental form belonging to the 
body.  And Averroes had noted that the body's physical shape or figura (and therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Cf. S. P. Marrone, 'The rise of the universities', in R. Pasnau and C. van Dyke (eds.), The Cambridge 
History of Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) pp. 52-3.  For an introduction to the 
contribution of Arabic texts to the curriculum of Aristotelian philosophy in the West, see C. Burnett, 
'Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic Philosophy into Western Europe' in P. Adamson and R. C. 
Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), pp. 370-404, esp. 
pp. 372-6.  On the transmission of Averroes' works in particular, and Naples as a centre of their 
translation, see C. Burnett, 'The "Sons of Averroes with the Emperor Frederick" and the Transmission 
of the Philosophical Works by Ibn Rushd' in G. Endress and J. A. Aertsen (eds.), Averroes and the 
Aristotelian Tradition.  Sources, Constitution and the Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198).  
Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996) (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 259-99, esp. pp. 
269-75.  On the earliest uses of Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophy, in 
philosophical works associated with England, see C. Burnett, 'The Introduction of Arabic Learning 
into British Schools' in C. E. Butterworth and B. A. Kessel (eds.), The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into 
Europe (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 40-57, at pp. 54-7.  For a general introduction to Averroes' life and 
writings, see R. C. Taylor, 'Averroes: religious dialectic and Aristotelian philosophical thought' in 
Adamson and Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, pp. 180-200.  
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its quantitative structure), and not just its soul, remained the same in it across bodily 
growth and material flux, supporting its continuing identity.   
Then there was the question of postmortem bodily continuity.  Averroes argued 
that the Aristotle's scientific framework for generation and corruption in fact required 
that matter, if not a collection of atoms, be invested with a physical structure of its 
own, giving it extension, location, and partibility or divisibility: the material 
substratum for natural change, in itself, needed to take on some of the features that 
Aristotle had ascribed to a mathematical body.  Averroes, then, came up with a 
theory that matter had its own accidental structuring form (really distinct from the 
accidental structuring forms belonging to individual bodies).  He would explicitly use 
this structuring form and the features it gave to matter as a means of explaining how 
any particular part of matter could remain the same thing in itself, even as it took on 
a succession of forms in different bodies across various changes.   
Aquinas on the Individual Body   
Chapter 3 will focus on Aquinas's thought on individuality and the individual 
body.  This discussion is separated from chapter 4's discussion of Aquinas's work on 
bodily identity in order to make transparent exactly how Aquinas used and 
developed upon Aristotle's ideas.  Of course, the kind of reasoning all scholastic 
theologians did was distinctively holistic or 'simultaneous', rather than linear, 
involving 'a system held before a mind as a whole rather than a successive sequence 
of parts'.26  The analyses of the individual body and of bodily identity evident in 
Aquinas's writings on the general resurrection and anywhere else in his work were 
already complete in his mind, and had already been informed by his understanding 
of that article of the faith, before he started composing his commentary on book IV 
of the Sentences.  
For Aquinas, the doctrine of bodily resurrection implied two things with respect 
to the individual human body: first, that the union between individual soul and 
individual body should be intimate and essential; second, that, nonetheless, the body 
should be relatively independent from the soul, as a component of the human being.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 D. L. d'Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities.  A Weberian Analysis (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), pp. 39-40. 
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 Aquinas objected to the notion that there should be a corporeal substantial form 
in the human being in addition to the soul, intervening between the soul and matter, 
because this additional substantial form would render the union between an 
individual soul and particular matter merely incidental: as a result, a human soul 
could in theory be reincarnated in any animal body.  Whereas the vast majority of 
Aquinas's predecessors had advocated (somewhat metaphysically vague) pluralist 
theories of human nature,27 Aquinas argued that only a theory according to which the 
soul is the body's only form, having a proper material subject proportionate to it 
(after Aristotle), could preserve the true doctrine of bodily resurrection.  According to 
Aquinas, the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was one of Aristotle's 
'true principles of philosophy' (vera philosophie principia): Aristotle had held, Aquinas 
wrote, that in virtue of a single form a human was human, animal, living and a body, 
both in substance, and in being.  He traced the philosophical origins of the pluralist 
theories of the composition of human nature held by his contemporaries back to a 
Platonist position advocated, in particular, by the Jewish Neoplatonist philosopher 
Avicebron.28   
A distinction should be drawn at this stage between the problem of whether a 
human being has one soul or several (rational, sensitive, and vegetative), and the 
problem of the unicity or plurality of substantial forms in a human.  On the one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 On the body-soul relationship in scholastic thought immediately before Aquinas, see R. C. Dales, 
The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1995), especially chapters 3-5, and 
summary at pp. 193-5.  Additionally, A. C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth 
Century (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1934) remains an excellent introduction 
to Aquinas's position on the soul in context, including surveys of Albertus Magnus's and Bonaventure's 
respective positions.  
28 See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis (hereafter DSC), a. 3, response, passage 
beginning, 'Set tunc dubium restat quid sit proprium subiectum anime, quod comparetur ad ipsam 
sicut materia ad formam.  Circa hoc enim est duplex opinio: quidam enim dicunt quod sunt multe 
forme substantiales in eodem individuo... Alia opinio est quod in uno individuo non est nisi una forma 
substantialis: et secundum hoc oportet dicere quod per formam substantialem, quae est anima 
humana, habet hoc individuum non solum quod sit homo, sed quod sit animal, et quod sit vivum, et 
quod sit corpus, et substantia et ens... et hoc [the pluralist position] fuit proprium Platonicorum... et 
hoc [the position that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being] fuit proprium philosophe 
Aristotilis... et hec [the pluralist position] est positio Avicebron in libro Fontis vite... Set hec positio 
secundum vera philosophie principia que consideravit Aristotelis est impossibilis'.  Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 24, 2 (Rome and Paris: Commissio Leonina and Les éditions du Cerf, 2000), pp. 39-42.  
Aquinas adhered to this position throughout his career.  See J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of 
Thomas Aquinas. From Finite to Uncreated Being (Washington, D. C.: CUA Press, 2000), pp. 327-51 for an 
extended discussion of this and other passages in which Aquinas sets out his position on the unicity of 
form, and see esp. pp. 346-51, including works of Zavalloni and Roland-Gosselin cited at p. 347 n. 
197, regarding the modern debate on the clarity of Aquinas's position in his early work.  
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hand, committing oneself to a plurality of souls will certainly mean committing 
oneself to a pluralist theory of the composition of human nature; on the other hand, 
it is quite possible to hold that there is only one soul that is at once rational, sensitive 
and vegetative, and still maintain a pluralist position according to which there are 
further substantial forms in a human being, including one or more corporeal 
substantial forms distinct from the soul.   
Earlier thirteenth-century debate on the question of the unicity or plurality of 
forms in humans, indeed, had focussed on the problem of the unicity or plurality of 
the soul.  Aquinas transformed this debate in psychology into an all-encompassing 
metaphysical debate by integrating the theory of the unity of the soul into a more 
general theory of the substantial unity of the human being, and indeed the unity of 
any substance composed of matter and form.  Whereas previous theories advocating 
the unity of the soul had still viewed the soul, somewhat ambiguously, as the body's 
perfection, Sander de Boer explains, 'Aquinas is the first who truly considers the soul to 
be a substantial form, rather than a perfection'.29  
There has been much discussion among modern interpreters of scholastic 
thought on the problem of the unicity or plurality of forms in humans, over which 
authorities in the Aristotelian commentary tradition were the precursors to 
thirteenth-century pluralist theories of human nature, either pre- or post-Aquinas 
(the notion of a forma corporeitatis does not originate with St. Augustine, whatever 
Aquinas's late thirteenth-century pluralist critics might claim).  Whereas historians 
agree over the position of Avicebron, they disagree regarding Avicenna's position.  
The latter did in fact posit a bodily form distinct from the soul in a human being, and 
view the soul as the body's 'perfection'.30  In any case, Aquinas's pluralist critics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 S. W. de Boer, The Science of the Soul.  The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De anima, c. 1260-c.1360 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013), pp. 38-40, at p. 40.   
30 Daniel Callus held that the textual origins of the late thirteenth century debate lay in Dominicus 
Gundissalinus' translations in the latter half of the twelfth century of Avicenna's Liber sex naturalium (for 
the unicity of form) and Avicebron's Fons vitae (for the pluralist position).  D. A. Callus, 'The Origins of 
the Problem of the Unity of Form', The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 24 (1961), pp. 270-1.  
Roberto Zavalloni disagreed, arguing that Avicenna was a true precursor to pluralist theory, despite 
Aquinas's frequent citation of him as an advocate of the theory of the unicity of form, see his Richard de 
Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes. Textes inédits et étude critique (Louvain: Editions de 
L’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1951), pp. 420-9.  John Marenbon cites Avicenna's De anima to 
demonstrate that Avicenna 'assumes that the ensouled body has as its form, not the soul itself, but a 
forma complexionatis which is suitable for the soul', Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 103.  Cf. also the more 
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refined their own theories of the composition of human nature primarily in response 
to technical issues that he himself had clarified in re-defining the debate over the 
number of substantial forms in a human being in the mid-thirteenth century.  And 
both Aquinas's defenders and his detractors would claim that the full range of 
philosophical and theological authorities, including the Philosopher himself, were 
advocates for their own position.  
With the unity of the human being taken care of, then, Aquinas maintained the 
relative independence of the body from the soul within the human individual not 
only by maintaining that its matter admitted of a certain complexity, or proportion, 
to the soul which was its only substantial form, but also by grounding the relative 
independence of the material part of the human being upon an accidental form which, 
taking on the attributes that Aristotle had ascribed to a geometrical body, gave to the 
human body its three-dimensional physical structure.   
Aquinas habitually referred to this form as 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas 
dimensiva), and he described it as being 'close to substance'.  Etienne Gilson, in his 
summary of the late thirteenth-century debate over the unicity or plurality of 
substantial forms in humans, supposed that it was the Augustinian Friar Giles of 
Rome who had first put forward the idea that this accidental quantitative form could 
serve as a substitute for a pluralist's corporeal form;31 Marylin McCord Adams in her 
recent book on transubstantiation in scholastic thought identified the importance of 
the body's quantitative structuring form in Aquinas's thought on that particular 
theological topic;32 the present study will address the full significance of quantitas 
dimensiva in Aquinas's thought on resurrection, individuality, and bodily identity.  
For Aquinas, the body's quantitas dimensiva was the only form in it that was capable 
of individualising its matter, dividing its matter from other matter and making it this 
matter.  The consequence of this was that, in Aquinas's view, all of the matter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recent summary of the modern debate in I. Iribarren, '"Responsio secundum Thomam" and the 
Search for an Early Thomistic School', Vivarium, 39 (2001), pp. 271-7.  
31 E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 418.  
32 McCord Adams, Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist, see esp. comments at pp. 14, 18, and 
discussion in chapter 4.   
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subsisting under the body's quantitative form intimately belonged to its material 
'truth of human nature'.   
Aquinas on Bodily Identity  
Accordingly, as will become clear in chapter 4, Aquinas grounded the material 
continuity of the mortal body over growth and the gradual replacement of its matter 
upon its accidental quantitative structure, quantitas dimensiva.  Up to Aquinas, 
theologians had assumed (after Peter Lombard) that there must be some fixed or 
non-exchangeable ingredient in the flesh of each human in order to account for its 
material identity over time.33  
Aquinas's thought on the topic of the postmortem continuity of the matter particular 
to an individual body was rather more obscure, although he was sure that his 
explanation of bodily continuity across death and resurrection at least had the 
advantage, over any pluralist theory, of being able to clearly account for the 
continuity of the body's substantial form (since this was the same thing as the immortal 
soul).  Aquinas's basic account of the corpse merely said that it was the same as the 
living body with respect to its matter (secundum materiam).  Looking beyond the point of 
bodily decay, Aquinas sought to construct an account of material continuity in the 
spirit of and with reference to St. Augustine's Enchiridion.    
In every one of his systematic treatments of resurrection, Aquinas tried to argue 
that traces of the individual body's quantitas dimensiva, which had individualised its 
matter over the course of its lifetime, would continue to particularise and identify that 
matter as belonging to that body across death and resurrection.  But there was a 
tension within this account of material continuity that cannot have escaped Aquinas.  
His work on the resurrection might well provide the best available system for fitting a 
particular set of theological and philosophical puzzle-pieces together (at least in his 
own eyes), but gaps remained even so.  And although he appeared, in his work on the 
resurrection, to be moving towards the position that matter was invested with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 431, see also pp. 297-303 for Albertus Magnus's thought on this 
point and pp. 325-31 for Bonaventure's.  
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corporeal structure of its own, Aquinas was never quite able to openly and fully adopt 
a position similar to the Commentator's on matter.   
Averroes' position on matter had contravened a basic axiom in Aristotle's 
metaphysical apparatus, which Aquinas himself had upheld consistently and 
unequivocally in his writings on topics other than the resurrection: that a substance is 
ontologically prior to its accidents.  Aquinas never provided an explanation for how 
he could simultaneously uphold this axiom, on the one hand, and claim that traces of 
the body's accidental quantitative structure could remain in the matter particular to it 
across the substantial corruption of the body at death, on the other.   
At this juncture, a historiographical point needs briefly to be addressed.  There is 
a certain confusion in modern scholarship regarding Aquinas's account of 
postmortem material continuity, arising from the fact that he refers directly to 
Averroes' theory of matter as invested with its own quantitative structure in his early 
Sentences commentary, but drops all reference to the Commentator's work in his 
mature accounts of resurrection in his Summa contra Gentiles (completed 1264-65) and 
Compendium theologiae (1265-67).   
Scholars have assumed that Aquinas subscribed to Averroes' theory of matter to 
begin with, and later changed his mind, either because he had finally identified the 
philosophical tension between Averroes' theory and the principle of the priority of 
substance to accident,34 or because Averroes had become completely discredited in 
Aquinas's eyes during the 'Averroist' controversy at the University of Paris during 
1265-70.  This controversy had been triggered by the Arts master Siger of Brabant's 
adoption of a particular reading of Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's De anima, 
namely that there was a single intellect for all humans, and Siger's claim that this was 
the correct reading of the Stagirite's text.35  The notion of the unique intellect was 
condemned in 1270, and, writing his De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas in the same 
year, Aquinas pointed out not only that Siger's was an inaccurate reading of Aristotle, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For this argument see M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Le "De Ente et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: 
Vrin, 1948), pp. 109-13; Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes, p. 263.  
35 For a summary account of these events see Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 68-9.  On the 
writings produced during the Averroist or 'monopsychism' controversy see Dales, The Problem of the 
Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century, chapters 6 and 7.  
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but also that Averroes was (at least in respect of his work on the intellect) a 'corruptor' 
(depravator) of Peripatetic philosophy.36  
There is no concrete textual evidence, however, to support the view that Aquinas 
ever fully subscribed to Averroes' theory of matter, and none, either, suggest that 
Aquinas was ever blind to the basic Aristotelian axiom that a substance is 
ontologically prior to its accidents.  Furthermore, even if Aquinas did not directly cite 
the Commentator in his more mature accounts of resurrection, he continued to 
argue that there were persistent structural principles in the matter belonging an 
individual human body, which could account for the individuality and sameness of 
that matter across death and resurrection.  The tension between the account of 
material continuity that Aquinas wanted to give, on the one hand, and the 
Aristotelian principle of the ontological priority of substance to accident, on the other 
hand, is present in all of his systematic treatments of the resurrection.   
And Aquinas did not seek to rid his work of the influence of Averroes' thought, 
simply because of the controversial way in which certain Arts masters at Paris had 
interpreted the Commentator's writings on the intellect.  Aquinas had written against 
the idea of the unique intellect for all humans from very early on in his career, all the 
time continuing to call upon Averroes' authority with respect in other contexts: the 
Commentator could surely be right about anything else.  In 1270, Aquinas was 
writing primarily against the so-called Averroists, not Averroes himself.  Averroes' 
commentaries remained the standard gloss on Aristotle's works during 1265-70 and 
afterwards, and Aquinas continued to explicitly rely on proofs from Averroes in his 
mature writings.37  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Francis E. Kelley makes this argument in the introduction to his edition of Thomas of Sutton's 
continuation of Aquinas's commentary on De generatione et corruptione, with specific reference to 
Aquinas's use of Averroes work on material continuity: 'In the judgement of Aquinas, Averroes was no 
longer a guide in interpreting Aristotle; rather the Commentator was now taken to be a "Peripatetice 
Philosophiae depravator"... Any reference to him henceforth could only muddy the waters of proper 
understanding'.  Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis In libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione.  Continuatio 
per Thomam de Sutona (ed.) F. E. Kelley (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
1976), editor's introduction, p. 27, n. 2.  For the original comment from Aquinas, see Aquinas, De 
unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, c. 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 43 (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 
1976), p. 302. 
37 Edward Booth has put this point forcibly: 'It is all too easy to take the strong language used by 
Thomas about Ibn Rushd in the controversy over his position that there was a single potential intellect 
for all men, as referring to the whole of his philosophy... The frequent respectful references which 
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It is certainly possible that Aquinas simply did not want to sound like Averroes 
when the Averroist controversy was still in full swing.  It was one thing for Aquinas to 
have taken on his colleagues in the name of Aristotle, to suggest a radical overhaul of 
their understanding of the metaphysical composition of human nature.  It would 
have been quite another to have championed Averroes' authority in connection to 
any major theological topic at a time when others who did so were under extreme 
suspicion of unorthodoxy.   
There was probably a deeper reason why Aquinas's account of material 
continuity across death and resurrection remained imperfectly transparent, or why, 
in other words, he failed to be explicit about the degree to which he agreed with the 
Commentator.  Creative thinking is ultimately limited by the concepts that serve as 
its basis.  The pure process of logic was clearly not the only factor involved in 
Aquinas's work on resurrection and the nature of matter: the tension between what 
he wanted to say and the traditional Aristotelian conceptual apparatus created a drag 
effect on his thought.  To an extent, perhaps, Aquinas was in denial about the need 
to make the break from an idea that seemed so ingrained in Aristotle's science, in 
order to make it perfectly clear how he intended his argument for material continuity 
across death and resurrection to work philosophically.  His particular irenicist 
tendencies would have made it more difficult still for Aquinas to make this break, and 
therefore to advance his thinking on the nature of matter much further down the 
path it had already been pushed by reflection on problems associated with the 
doctrine of the general resurrection.  
Bodily Identity in Dominican Thought at Oxford up to 1286  
Chapter 5 will detail how, in debate at Oxford during 1277-86,38 the Dominicans 
Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell defended Aquinas's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[Aquinas] made to the opinions of the 'Commentator' and the absorption on a number of his theses 
into the metaphysical figure he arrived at as a means of receiving the Greek and Arab peripatetic 
tradition, must discount such a facile assumption, which can only be substantiated by the (impossible) 
demonstration that the Averroan involvement in his ideas was, with these words, expunged'.  E. 
Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), pp. 252-3 
(my insertion).  
38 For a general survey of the study of Theology at Oxford in the thirteenth century, including 
reference to the work of these three Dominicans, see J. I. Catto, 'Theology and Theologians 1220-
1320' in J. I. Catto (ed.) History of the University of Oxford, vol. 1: Early Oxford Schools (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), pp. 471-517, esp. pp. 498-503; A. G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, c. 
	   	   	  30 
theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological repercussions 
in the area of postmortem bodily continuity.  They did so in deeply divergent ways.   
Thomas of Sutton's work was heavily critical of pluralist theory, on both 
philosophical and theological grounds.  It focussed on demonstrating that the 
pluralists had also to admit discontinuity in the body across its death, and 
furthermore that their philosophy was incompatible with the doctrine of the general 
resurrection.  Robert of Orford took a conciliatory approach to the debate, aiming to 
give a strong account of postmortem bodily continuity that could match the 
pluralists'.  Of the three, Knapwell alone would identify the significance of Aquinas's 
advanced speculation on the nature of matter, and indeed go much further than 
Aquinas, developing a full philosophical account of the postmortem continuity of the 
matter particular to individual bodies.  Beneath these very different treatments of the 
topic of postmortem bodily identity lay three very different interpretations of the 
implications of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans for the 
individual body.   
The present study is certainly not the first discussion of these Dominican works 
and the debate to which they contributed, and not even the only recent one, but it is 
distinctive in that uses a very close engagement with Aquinas's texts in their own right 
as a basis from which to clarify where the ideas of these three Dominican theologians 
diverged both from Aquinas's and from one another.39  Additionally, the reading that 
it provides of the work of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
AD. 1292-1302 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), a detailed study of MS. Assisi 158 and Worcester 
Cathedral Library MS. Q. 99, which between them contain a wide range of disputed questions 
surviving from Oxford during this period.   
39 A. Boureau, Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle: le cas de Jean Peckham (Paris: Les belles lettres, 
1999) provides a more subtle reading of Aquinas's philosophy than most modern accounts of the 
debate (see p. 39 where the matter into which the soul is infused is referred to as 'structurée') but 
discusses the content of Dominican works produced in Aquinas's defence only briefly, at pp. 83, 209-
13.  The present study disagrees with Boureau's presentation at pp. 210-11 of Thomas of Sutton's 
work as more representative of Aquinas's thought than that of Richard Knapwell; Boureau relies here 
on Francis Kelley (cited above, n. 36), who thinks that Aquinas completely rejected Averroes' insights 
into the nature of matter in his mature work.  Boureau's book replaces Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla 
et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes as the major modern account of the philosophical arguments on 
either side of the debate.  Zavalloni provided only a very broad outline of the theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans some of its implications (pp. 261-71), exploring none of the subtleties 
within Aquinas's thought on the body that would become important to his Dominican interpreters, 
and dismissing their work as unoriginal, without discussing its content, on the premise that the theory 
of the unicity of substantial form in humans was so clearly defined by Aquinas that it was impossible 
for Dominican thinking on the composition of human nature to evolve (pp. 278-87, see esp. p. 287).  
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Knapwell, responds to Frederick Roensch and Francis Kelley, the two scholars who 
have worked most closely on the reception of the theory of the unicity of substantial 
form in humans in the thought of these three Dominicans.  Both Roensch and Kelley 
group Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell under the banner 
of the 'early Thomistic school', on the precise grounds that they did understand the 
exact meaning and implications of Aquinas's innovative work.40   
So, even despite the evident doctrinal heterogeneity in their work, which the 
present study will bring into view, can these three Dominicans still be considered to 
be members of an 'early Thomistic school'?  Stephen Marrone, in a groundbreaking 
discussion of intellectual schools in the introduction to his extended study of medieval 
theories of knowledge, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and the Knowledge of God in the 
Thirteenth Century, 41  points out that any attempt to detect in (or indeed to 
retrospectively impose upon), the work of any group of scholastic theologians a 
common and uniform subscription to a rigidly defined set of doctrines is bound to 
fail.   
For more than a century, Marrone notes, historians of scholasticism have tried to 
write its history by identifying doctrinally defined intellectual schools.  Franz Ehrle 
delineated Aquinas's 'Aristotelianism' from Franciscan 'Augustinianism' in the 1880s; 
Pierre Mandonnet added another school, 'Latin Averroism' a decade later; in the 
1920s, Etienne Gilson distinguished between the 'Aristotelianism' advocated by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 F. J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1964), chapter 5, and p. 19: 
'...early Dominicans not only defended St. Thomas, but understood his teaching in exactly the same 
way as he did himself'.  The topic of postmortem bodily continuity is touched upon briefly at pp. 205, 
225-6, 228-9.  Roensch's work as completed before Francis Kelley's edited Knapwell's Quaestio disputata 
de unitate formae and does not discuss this important work.  Francis Kelley refers to an 'early Oxford 
Thomist school' whose representatives understood the 'meaning and implications' of the 'Thomist 
innovations' at pp. 1, 4 of his study The Thomists and their opponents at Oxford in the last part of the thirteenth 
century (unpublished D. Phil thesis, Oxford Univ., 1977), MS. Bodleian D. Phil. d. 6258.  Part I, 
chapter 4, of this Kelley's thesis, entiled 'Oxford Thomists on the Unity of Form' (pp. 79-162) is 
reproduced verbatim across his widely available published works: Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis In 
libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione.  Continuatio per Thomam de Sutona (ed.) Kelley, editor's 
introduction (full citation above, n. 36); Richard Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae (ed.) F. E. 
Kelley (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982); F. E. Kelley, 'The Egidian Influence in Robert of Orford's Doctrine on 
Form', The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 47 (1983), pp. 77-99.  Kelley discusses postmortem 
bodily continuity in the thought of Thomas of Sutton and Richard Knapwell, and in particular their 
respective interpretations of Averroes' doctrine of a quantitative structure in matter.  The present 
study disagrees with Kelley's analysis of Aquinas's attitude towards Averroes' work on material 
continuity: see above, n. 36.  
41 S. P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden: 
Brill, 2001), 2 vols, see esp. vol. 1, pp. 1-25.   
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Aquinas and those who followed him from an 'Aristotelianising Augustinianism' 
(which still influenced Aquinas) and an 'Avicennising Augustinianism' which was 
closer to Neoplatonism; Maurice De Wulf in the 1900s and again in the 1930s 
argued that almost all scholastic debate fell under the umbrella of 'Aristotelianism', 
within which there was 'Augustinianism', 'Thomism', 'Scotism' and 'Averroism', but 
that there was also a distinct brand of Neoplatonic thought; finally, Fernand Van 
Steenberghen in the 1940s argued that a philosophically unsystematic 
'Neoplatonising Aristotelianism' of the pre-1250s was succeeded by three 
philosophically rigorous schools after 1250: there was Aquinas's moderate 
Aristotelianism, and the radical or heterodox Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant, 
and, then, in reaction to both of these schools there emerged a systematic 'Neo-
Augustinianism', which was not a throwback to a more traditional theological school, 
but in fact the first Augustinian philosophical school of the high medieval period.42   
Given, however, that we know the scholastic environment to have been one of 
'progressive intellectual metamorphosis' in the continuing search for truth, where 
regent masters remained in their posts for very short periods, where intellectual 
innovation was rewarded and where the substantive topics of primary intellectual 
interest could shift, it is difficult to imagine how schools defined by a common 
subscription to determined sets of doctrine could have maintained themselves for 
long.43  
And yet, Marrone argues, there is no need to abandon completely the notion of 
intellectual schools.  That is to say, it is still possible for historians of scholasticism to 
meaningfully delineate medieval intellectual schools, but only if they employ criteria 
that are primarily non-doctrinal.   
Medieval intellectual schools, according to Marrone, were primarily defined by 
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42 ibid., pp. 1-3, 6-7.  
43 See ibid., pp. 13-14, W. J. Courtenay, 'Theology and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif' in J. I. 
Catto and T. A. R Evans (eds.) The History of the University of Oxford vol. 2, Late Medieval Oxford (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 9-11; Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), pp. 190-2.  
44 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, vol. 1, p. 17.  
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ground binding together members of an intellectual school is at least 'as much 
political as philosophical or formally intellectual', the identity of an intellectual school 
can 'subsist to that degree more in the intentions and sometimes unconscious 
motivations of scholastics engaged in their work, and the reactions of readers poring 
over their writings, than in the actual substance of the theories or doctrines 
propounded'.  In any ideological debate, he argues, arguments advanced either for or 
against any idea 'conjure up in the mind of contemporary readers and listeners tacit 
sympathies with or antipathies to familiar groups of allies or opponents'.  Moreover, 
these 'concomitants of political affinity' have a concrete effect on doctrine, pointing 
towards 'a limited range of doctrinal options', though the specifics might change from 
thinker to thinker.45  
With Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell's work in 
defence of Aquinas's work on the body and bodily identity, admittedly, we have only 
a very limited case study in the new beginnings of a potential intellectual school, 
during a period in which scholars at Paris and Oxford were under a particular 
pressure to show their political allegiance.   
Dominicans took Franciscan criticism of Aquinas's philosophy as an affront to the 
Dominican Order itself.  The impassioned debate over the unicity or plurality of 
substantial forms in humans that ensued was seminal in a process, lasting from the 
late 1270s to the mid 1280s, by which the intellectual lines between the two major 
mendicant orders, who had always had distinct programmes of study at their 
respective studia generalia, solidifed.46   In the 1280s, in response to the debate, the 
Dominican and Franciscan Orders' respective governing bodies sought to build up 
their respective corporate identities in opposition to one another, through the active 
promotion of distinct theological traditions.  It was set down in statute that 
Franciscan scholars were, in effect, to treat Aquinas's philosophy with extreme 
caution, and Dominicans were to defend it.47   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, vol. 2, p. 572.  
46 The major study of Dominican education in this period is M. M. Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in 
Study..." Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Medieval Studies, 1998).   
47 For general comment on the role of late thirteenth-century intellectual developments in shaping 
Dominican corporate identity, see discussion in R. L. Friedman 'The Sentences Commentary, 1250-
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Whatever the differences in their respective interpretations of Aquinas's theory of 
the unicity of substantial form in humans, it is sufficiently clear, at least, that Thomas 
of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, shared a common political 
allegiance to their Order and a basic motivation, therefore, to defend the theory.  
Their grouping under the banner of the 'early Thomistic school' will be discussed 
further at the end of chapter 5.  Whether, and if so, how the politics of inter-order 
rivalry affected Dominican, and indeed Franciscan, thought on the composition of 
human nature and related theological questions in the longer term is a very 
interesting question.  
Caroline Walker Bynum on the 'Thomistic Solution to the Identity 
Problem'  
The final thing to point out by way of introduction is that the present study will 
dramatically revise Caroline Walker Bynum's influential interpretation of Aquinas's 
theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, the criticism it attracted in the 
late thirteenth century, and its reception by Dominicans.  Bynum's essay 'Material 
Continuity, Personal Survival and the Resurrection of the Body: A Scholastic 
Discussion in its Medieval and Modern Contexts' (which highlights the potential for 
comparison between medieval and modern philosophical thinking on personal 
identity that was noted at the outset of this chapter)48 and her book The Resurrection of 
the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336,49 are likely still to provide the starting point 
for any historian of medieval culture interested in this area, in the English-speaking 
world at least.  Bynum's work was a significant source of inspiration for the research 
behind this thesis.  
The great success of Bynum's treatment of resurrection and bodily continuity in 
medieval thought is to locate thirteenth-century scholastic debate on postmortem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1320, General Trends, The Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination', in 
G. R. Evans (ed.), Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2002) pp. 
116-8; Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 79; and also Hinnebusch, The History of the Dominican Order, 
(New York: Alba House, 1965, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 154-71.  These developments will be discussed in 
more detail in the conclusion to chapter 5, and the Epilogue.  
48 In C. W. Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion 
(New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp. 239-97 and 393-417.    
49 Full citation above, n. 2.   
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bodily continuity in the context of a broader assumption in medieval culture that 
material continuity is crucial to identity.  To cite a few of her examples, this 
assumption was reflected not only in the relic cult and in concern for proper burial 
practice (both in the prohibition that Boniface VIII's bull Detestande feritatis placed on 
the cutting up of dead bodies on the battlefield to ease their transportation, and in 
the continued practice of noble men and women of having their dead bodies 
partitioned for burial near to more than one saint); it was also expressed in 
hagiographical tales of saints healing and temporarily resurrecting corpses, or of 
simply collecting together their dismembered parts; in the folk wisdom according to 
which corpses would bleed to accuse their murderers; and in medical treatises on the 
growth of hair and fingernails in corpses after their death.50   
This thesis contends, however, that Bynum misinterprets the implications of 
Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans.  Bynum advances two 
conclusions, in particular, that will be revised over the chapters that follow.   
First, Bynum's narrative supposes that Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only 
substantial form in a human being did necessarily, and even intentionally, diminish 
the body as a component of the human individual.51  It could not, therefore, really 
provide any concrete account of postmortem bodily continuity and was condemned 
for its inherently scandalous implications: strictly following Aquinas's theory of 
human nature, according to Bynum, Christ's dead body was not really the same 
thing as His living body and the relic was not really the saint.52  Bynum relies for this 
interpretation of Aquinas's thought upon 'a few perceptive Catholic philosophers', 
who have argued that 'what Aquinas's teaching actually threatens is body, since, in 
denying the plurality of forms, Aquinas must assert that the soul (our only form) is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Bynum, 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the Resurrection of the Body', pp. 265-96.  Cf. 
also E. A. R. Brown, 'Death and the Human Body in the Later Middle Ages: The Legislation of 
Boniface VIII on the Division of the Corpse', Viator, 12 (1981), pp. 221-70.   
51 Others have pointed out Bynum's misreading of Aquinas.  Cf. d'Avray, Death and the Prince, p. 174, n. 
61; Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 399; and E. C. Sweeney, 'Individuation and the Body in Aquinas' in 
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 24, Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 
pp. 178-96, at pp. 178-181; see esp. p. 178 n. 4, where Sweeney notes Bynum's misreading the works 
of Luyten and Bazán upon which she relies for her interpretation of Aquinas's thought (for which see 
n. 53 below).   
52 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 261, 263-4, 271-6.  
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form of our bodiliness, too, reducing what is left over to mere primary matter or 
potency'.53   
For scholastic theologians, primary matter, or 'prime' matter (materia prima) was 
understood to be completely featureless: nature's ultimate and undifferentiated 
material substratum.  If the body left behind at death were just featureless prime 
matter, then it was no body at all, let alone the body of anyone in particular.  The 
conclusion that the body in itself might be mere prime matter was in fact the very 
conclusion drawn from Aquinas's philosophy by the Franciscan William de la Mare 
in his Correctorium fratris Thomae, which was the sweeping critique of Aquinas's writings 
that ignited the debate over the theological repercussions of his theory of the unicity 
of substantial form in humans.  It was intended to be a completely absurd conclusion, 
and was certainly not one, according to the argument of the present study, that 
Aquinas intended to be drawn from his philosophical principles.  
Bynum supposes that Aquinas continued to speak as if Christ's dead body and the 
saint's relic were materially (secundum materiam) the same as their respective living 
bodies, then, out of a preference for 'philosophical inconsistency' over 'scandalising 
the faithful'. 54   Her somewhat chronologically confused argument is that John 
Peckham condemned Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans 
in 1286 for its necessarily scandalous implications before these were fully understood, 
that is, before, according to Bynum, certain Dominican thinkers, this time, had finally 
spelled out what she calls the 'Thomistic solution to the identity problem' by drawing 
Aquinas's thought on human nature to what was, as she sees it, its logical 
conclusion.55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Bynum, 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the Resurrection of the Body', p. 255.  She 
cites N. Luyten, 'The Significance of the Body in a Thomistic Anthropology', Philosophy Today, 7 
(1963), pp. 175-9; B. C. Bazán, "La Corporalité selon saint Thomas', Revue philosophique de Louvain, 81, 4 
ser. 49 (1983), pp. 369-409; J. Giles Milhaven, 'Physical Experience: Contrasting Appraisals by Male 
Theologians and Women Mystics in the Middle Ages', paper given at the Holy Cross Symposium 
"The Word Becomes Flesh", November 9, 1985; R. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 299-306, esp. n. 9.        
54 Bynum, 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the Resurrection of the Body', pp. 262-3; 
Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 263-4. 
55 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 261, 271.  
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This brings us to the second conclusion in Bynum's work that this thesis revises, 
namely that there was a single, distinctive, 'Thomistic solution to the identity 
problem' (primarily, in Bynum's narrative, the problem of how numerically identical 
bodies can return at the resurrection), that emerged in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries as the logical conclusion of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans.   
This 'purely formal' theory of identity, Bynum writes, 'packed' the body into the 
soul, meaning that the resurrected body need not be recovered from any particular 
matter.56  Aquinas himself had merely 'adumbrated' such a theory when he initially 
developed the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans,57 according to 
Bynum's account.  He had continued to speak in such a way as to imply that concrete 
material continuity across death and resurrection was necessary, perhaps (improbable 
as this may seem) failing to understand the implications of his own ideas.58  Such a 
'purely formal' theory of identity was indeed spelled out in the Sentences commentaries 
of two Dominicans to whom Bynum refers:59 John of Paris, whose work on the 
Sentences originates from 1292-95, and Durandus of St. Pourçain, who produced three 
reactions of his Sentences commentary in the early fourteenth century (first redaction 
1304-07; second redaction 1310-11; final redaction 1317-27).60   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 259-60; Bynum, 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the 
Resurrection of the Body', pp. 258-9.  
57 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, p. 262; Bynum, 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the 
Resurrection of the Body', p. 259.  
58 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 260-1, 270.  Bynum, 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and 
the Resurrection of the Body', p. 260.   
59 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 259-60; Bynum, 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the 
Resurrection of the Body', pp. 258-60.  Bynum is particularly reliant on H. J. Weber, Die Lehre von der 
Auferstehung der Toten in den Haupttraktaten det scholatischen Theologie von Alexander von Hales zu Duns Skotus 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1973) and see also works of Greshake and Segarra cited in Resurrection of the Body, p. 
260, n. 123.  
60 In their respective Sentences commentaries, these two Dominicans imagine the consequences if Peter's 
soul were to be united to Paul's matter or ashes (or to any other ashes) at the resurrection, and both 
conclude that Peter would be the same, body and soul, on account of the identity of his soul.  John of 
Paris writes: 'Sed tamen dico, quod si anima Petri in resurrectione acciperet cineres Pauli, adhuc 
tamen idem esset Petrus in numero propter unitatem formae', In Sententias, IV, d. 45, response, edited 
in Weber, Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten, p. 377.  Durandus of St Pourcain writes in his Sentences 
commentary, Book IV, d. 44, q. 1, response (6): 'dicendum est quod cuicunque materiae uniatur 
anima Petri in resurrectione, ex quo est eadem forma secundum numerum, per consequens erit idem 
Petrus secundum numerum'.  Durandi de Santo Porciano Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum, Buch IV, dd. 
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Now, as we will see in chapter 5, John Peckham condemned the theory of the 
unicity of substantial form in humans in 1286 from an isolated position: there was 
certainly no consensus in either Oxford or Paris as to its scandalous or heretical 
implications.  Furthermore, leaving to one side the fact that the 'Thomistic solution to 
the identity problem' that Bynum describes was neither Aquinas's own, nor a 
necessary logical conclusion of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans 
as he had articulated it, it will become abundantly clear in the same chapter that, 
among the Dominicans who actively developed their own work on postmortem 
bodily continuity with reference to Aquinas's, there was no single solution to the 
problem of postmortem bodily continuity.    
It is worth remaining with the writings of John of Paris and Durandus of St. 
Pourçain just for a moment, however, because the circumstances of the censures of 
their respective works suggest that the scholastic consensus, even on a major 
theological topic such as the resurrection, could shift.  Bynum points out that, 
whereas John of Paris was criticised for having advocated a formal theory of identity 
in connection with the resurrection when his Sentences commentary was censured in 
1295,61 Durandus of St. Pourçain's censors in the second decade of the fourteenth 
century overlooked his own formal theory of bodily identity.62   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43-50 (ed.) T. Jeschke (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), p. 71.  On the dating of these commentaries, see 
Friedman, 'The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320', pp. 58, 71.   
61 On these events, see brief comments in J. Dunbabin, 'The Commentary of John of Paris (Quidort) 
on the Sentences', in Evans (ed.), Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 1, pp. 131-2; J. 
M. M. H. Thijssen, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
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P. Glorieux, 'Un mémoire justificatif de Bernard de Trilia', Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 
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not enough matter available for a particular body, God could transform any other matter into matter 
suitable for that body.  Giles of Rome's argument was not that the soul alone would guarantee the 
identity of the entire human being, body, or matter, and soul.  See K. Nolan, The Immortality of the Soul 
and the Resurrection of the Body according to Giles of Rome (Rome: Studium Theologicum "Augustinianum", 
1967), see esp. q. 1, response, arg. 2, ad 2, and ad 3, and q. 2, ad 6, pp. 70-4, 96.  According to 
Bynum's narrative Giles of Rome, along with Aquinas, was one who 'adumbrated' a formal theory of 
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It is strange, of course, to see Durandus of St. Pourçain identified as Aquinas's 
direct intellectual descendent in any respect at all.  He is infamous for having been 
criticised by the other leading Dominican intellectuals of his time for straying too far 
from Aquinas's teachings.  His Sentences commentary was investigated and censured 
by his Dominican colleagues twice in the early fourteenth century, the first time on 
the grounds that his teachings deviated from doctrinal truth (in 1314, 93 articles were 
identified as 'false, erroneous or heretical'), and the second time on the grounds that 
his teachings deviated too far from Aquinas's (in 1317, 235 articles were highlighted 
by Durandus's censors for this reason).63  That Durandus's censors passed over his 
work on the general resurrection without comment both times, then, suggests a 
waning concern to preserve the literal understanding of bodily resurrection 
emphasised in scholarship from Augustine to Aquinas.  Durandus' deviation from 
Aquinas on that particular theological point was not their priority.   
This apparent shift of the scholarly consensus, in the early fourteenth century, 
away from the literal and materialistic understanding of the doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body, along with the potential implications of this shift for 
scholastic thought on bodily identity, either within or without Dominican intellectual 
tradition, is, however, a story beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bodily identity: see Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, p. 260 and 'Material Continuity, Personal Survival 
and the Resurrection of the Body', p. 258. 
62 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 275, 277.  
63 Edited, respectively, as 'Articuli nonaginta tres extracti ex Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. primo 
scripto super Sententia et examinati per magistros et baccalarios Ordinis' and 'Articuli in quibus 
magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae' in J. Koch, Kleine 
Schriften (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1973), pp. 53-118.  The definitive study of these events 
is now I. Iribarren, Durandus of St Pourçain.  A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 
2005), see esp. pp. 183-5, 235-8 on the two censures of Durandus's work.    
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CHAPTER 1 
ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND (I): INDIVIDUALITY 
AND THE INDIVIDUAL BODY 
Introduction 
Thomas Aquinas would develop his innovative analysis of human nature, 
individuality, and the individual human body, working from his understanding of the 
implications of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.  This chapter will 
uncover the Aristotelian foundations of Aquinas's thought on individuality and the 
individual body: Aristotle's scientific writings on these topics would confirm Aquinas's 
presupposition that the material part in any human individual had to be crucial to 
their individuality. 
Aristotle's own account of the individual body can be approached, in outline, 
through his understanding of the individual substance.  For Aristotle, an individual is 
numerically one, one thing, or a unity, inasmuch as it is physically continuous.  An 
individual that is one thing naturally, such as an animal possessing a form that 
defines the species, or kind, into which it falls, is one in the fullest sense: it is 
continuous by virtue of its very nature, and not just put together artificially, like a 
table, for instance.64  Several individual substances can possess the same kind of 
nature-determining form and, therefore, belong to the same species or kind.  But of 
course natural individuals, such as individual humans, exhibit differences on the level 
below the species, or intra-specific differences.  So what accounts for these differences? 
Each individual human is a unity with a material aspect (a body) and a formal 
aspect (a rational soul).  And every human, Aristotle holds, is human in an absolute 
way: he makes it clear in the Categoriae that one human cannot be a member of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Aristotle, Metaphysica (hereafter Met.), 1052a15-30.  
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human species to a greater or lesser extent than another.65  Put another way, in 
virtue of possessing the same kind of form, all humans possess the same set of features 
essential to the species, and are equally human: form accounts for the similarities 
between humans; differences on the level below the species cannot originate with 
form.  Crucially, the natural inequalities which distinguish one human from the next 
have material origins: the unique material aspect, the unique body, belonging to each 
human is ultimately responsible for the exact way in which the features essential to 
the species are realised in his or her particular case.  In the Metaphysica, then, Aristotle 
states again that a substance does not admit of variation (or admit of 'more or less') 
with respect to its form or species (since forms, like numbers, cannot vary in 
themselves); he suggests that it is 'with matter' that intra-specific differences arise.66 
Aquinas, following Aristotle, would understand the individuality of any human 
primarily in terms of what differentiated him or her from other humans.  Aquinas, then, 
would find Aristotle's idea that the individual body, with its unique material features, 
was the very basis of any human's individuality to be obvious concord with what the 
doctrine of the resurrection implied: if each would rise again the very individual that 
they were in mortal life by recovering the particular body that they had had then, 
then any human's material part must be crucial to their individuality, or to what 
made him or her unique. 
In order to fully take in and understand the influence of Aristotle's work on the 
individual body on Aquinas's, two fundamental and closely interrelated Aristotelian 
scientific principles, which would become deeply ingrained in Aquinas's own 
scientific thinking, need to be grasped.  The first principle is that the matter and form 
of any composite substance necessarily bear a proportion to one another: each kind 
of soul, for Aristotle, requires a particular kind of complex material subject (its 
'proper' matter).  Aristotle himself explicitly applies this principle only on the level of 
the species.  The second principle is that matter represents necessity in causation: in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Aristotle, Categoriae (hereafter Cat.), 3b30-4a10.  
66 'Et quemadmodum nec numerus habet magis aut minus, nec que secundum speciem substantia, sed 
siquidem, que cum materia'.  Met., 1044a10-11, Metaphysica, lib. I-XIV. Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de 
Morbeka (ed.) G. Vuillemin-Diem, Aristoteles Latinus, XXV 3.2  (Leiden: Brill, 1995), p. 174.  Cf. J. G. 
Lennox, Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology. Studies in the Origins of Life Science (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), pp. 
164-5.  
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order for a certain kind of form to manifest itself in animal generation, certain 
material conditions, namely that form's 'proper' matter, need to have developed and 
therefore to be in place.  And Aristotle did describe the role of the material cause in 
generation on the level below the species: the particular material conditions obtaining 
in an individual case of animal generation, he thinks, are a limiting factor on the 
operations of the form that emerges in that individual case. 
As will become clear in chapter 3, Aquinas would take Aristotle's thinking on 
individuality one step further: knowing that each human soul would be reunited only 
to its own matter at the resurrection, and that each individual human soul and its 
particular material body must bear a unique relationship to one another, Aquinas 
proposed that each soul had an intrinsic specification for or bore a unique 
proportional relationship to its own particular, complex material complement: its 
own body.  Looking forward to chapter 5, certain late thirteenth-century defenders of 
Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only substantial, or nature-defining form in a 
human individual would develop upon the idea that the individual body is a 
particular soul's complex material subject in order to counter Franciscan pluralist 
arguments that Aquinas's theory of human nature reduced the body to mere, 
featureless, prime matter. 
For now, it will be enough to set out in a little more detail the passages in 
Aristotle's natural scientific works that would most closely influence Aquinas's 
account of the individual human body.  Aristotle's works on animals and animal 
generation, and book VII of his Metaphysica, in which he explores individuality by 
way of a discussion of the universalisable characteristics in things, would prove to be 
particularly important. 
1. The Basics (I): Body and Soul as 'Proper Matter' and 'Proper Form' 
We get to Aristotle's account of the individual body through his understanding of 
the human body as the rational soul's 'proper matter' or appropriate material subject, 
and we get to that, in turn, through Aristotle's ideas about matter itself.  Aristotle's 
theory of matter replaces atoms with a material principle.  The material principle can 
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only be understood in relation to the forms that manifest themselves in it.67  The 
material aspect of any substance is related to its formal aspect as potency is related to 
the actualisation of that potency.  And so, in any composite substance, matter and 
form are thus necessarily in proportion to one another: any act, or form, naturally 
comes into being only in its proper matter (propria materia), or potency.68 
Aristotle explicitly applies this thinking to the case of body and soul in his De 
anima.  In De anima II.1, he describes living things as composite substances:69 each is 
composed of a body and a soul.  Body and soul are related as matter and form, or 
potency and act, respectively.  Aristotle defines the soul in three ways: first as the 
form (species) of a natural body having life potentially within it, where the body is the 
'subject or matter';70 second as an actuality, of the first kind, of a natural body having 
life potentially within it where such a body is a body with organs; and finally as an 
actuality, of the first kind, of a natural body with organs.71  It is clear that Aristotle 
understands these descriptions to be equivalent in meaning.  When he says that the 
soul is the body's 'actuality of the first kind', Aristotle means that it is in virtue of the 
soul that the body possesses the capacity to perform the functions proper to its nature 
as a living thing.  The soul, Aristotle holds, is neither separate from the body, nor the 
same thing as the body, but something belonging to the body.72 
A soul, then, does not belong to just any sort of body: there is a necessary 
correspondence between the material make-up of a living body and its capacity for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Aristotle, Physica (hereafter Phys.), 191a9-11. 
68 'uniuscuiusque enim actus in potentia existente et in propria materia aptus natus est fieri'.  Aristotle, 
De anima (hereafter DA), 414a25-27, edited in Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri de anima (hereafter In DA), 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1 (Rome and Paris: Commissio Leonina and Vrin, 1984), p. 82.  
69 'Quare omne corpus phisicum participans vita substancia erit, substancia autem sic sicut composita'.  
DA, 412a15-16, in Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 67.  
70 'corpus... sicut subiectum et materia est.  Necesse est ergo animam substanciam esse, sicut speciem 
corporis phisici potentia uitam habentis., DA., 412a18-20, in Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 45, 1, p. 67. 
71 'Unde anima est primus actus corporis phisici potentia vitam habentis.  Tale autem quodcunque 
organicum', 'anima... erit... actus primus corporis physici organici'.  DA, 412a27-28, 412b4-6, in 
Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 67.  An adaptation of the first of these last two 
definitions became as a standard definition of the soul in the philosophical florilegium the Auctoritates 
Aristotelis: 'Anima est actus corporis organici physici vitam habentis in potentia, scilicet ad opera vitae'.  
Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed.) Hamesse, p. 177 (41).      
72 DA, 414a19-21.  
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the functions of life.  Only an appropriate, that is to say, an organic, body can be 
endowed with this capacity: even plants, the simplest living things, have organs.73  It 
seems ridiculous to Aristotle that Plato and the Pythagoreans attempted to examine 
the soul without specifying anything about the conditions required in the body of 
which it is the form, or explaining how or why body and soul are joined together.74  
The concept of the body as the soul's proper, or appropriate matter thus goes hand in 
hand with Aristotle's emphatic account of the unity of substance: if the soul is the 
very form and act of the body, Aristotle states, then it is unnecessary to ask whether 
(and how) they constitute a single substance, just as it is unnecessary to ask whether 
wax and an impression made upon it are united to one another.75 
And so, body and soul are not related simply as matter and form respectively, but 
more precisely, as proper matter and proper form.76   Aristotle's definition of the 
appropriate material subject for a soul in De anima II.1 covers any soul: plant, animal 
or human.  In a few places in the Metaphysica, Aristotle notes that the human 'species' 
is always made manifest with a certain kind of material composition: 'flesh, bone, and 
other such parts'.77  Thomas Aquinas would, therefore, sometimes use the label 'flesh 
and bone' to point to human proper matter. 
1.1. Substance and Accident 
This last reference from the Metaphysica in fact provides a good occasion to 
introduce the scholastic distinction between substantial and accidental forms.  
Scholastic theologians would take the word 'species' in Latin translations of Aristotle's 
works to refer to what they called a 'substantial form', that is, a nature- or species- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 DA, 412a28-b 1.  
74 'Hii autem solum conantur dicere quale quid sit anima, de susceptivo autem corpore nichil autem 
determinant, tanquam contingens sit secundum pictagoricas fabulas quamlibet animam quodlibet 
corpus ingredi.  Videtur enim unumquodque propriam habere speciem et formam'.  DA, 407b20-24, 
in Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 37.  Cf. also 414a21-28.   
75 DA, 412b6-9.  
76 See above, nn. 68 and 74. 
77 'Ut hominis species semper in carnibus apparet et ossibus et talibus partibus'.  Met., 1036b4-5 (ed.) 
Vuillemin-Diem, p. 153.  Cf. also 1035a30-b 1, 1036b10-11.   
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defining form, in passages where it seemed obvious to them that Aristotle was 
referring to such a form. 
The term forma substantialis does not occur in the Latin Aristotle, but the Stagirite 
himself does make clear the crucial point that it is the formal component in a 
composite substance, such as a soul in the case of a human being, which defines it as 
a substance of a certain species or kind, or, in Aristotle’s words, as a 'this something' 
(hoc aliquid).  'Form' (forma et species), he states, 'is that in virtue of which a thing is called 
a "this something"'.78 
Furthermore, Aristotle had distinguished between things that have a primary 
kind of existence (substances), human beings, for example, and the things that 
depend on, or 'happen to' these primary entities, and therefore exist in a secondary or 
derivative way (accidents), a human's hair colour, for example.79  A basic tenet in 
Aristotle's metaphysical apparatus is the primacy of substance and its ontological 
priority to its accidents.  The classic statement of this axiom can be found at 
Metaphysica VII.1.80 
Though, again, the term forma accidentalis is not found in the Latin Aristotle, 
scholastic theologians would call 'accidental forms' other forms which did not define a 
substance's species or kind, but which governed the various 'accidental' features - its 
shape, size, colour, and so on - that belonged to it and depended on it for their being. 
2. The Basics (II): Human Generation, the Material Principle, and 
Necessity in Causation 
Pushing onwards in the direction of his account of the individual human body, 
the next piece to be added to the puzzle is Aristotle's understanding of the role of the 
material cause in human generation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 'Dicimus itaque unum quoddam genus eorum que sunt substanciam.  Huius autem aliud quidem 
sicut materiam, quod secundum se quidem non est hoc aliquid, aliud autem formam et speciem 
secundum secundum quod dicitur iam hoc aliquid'.  DA, 412a6-9, in Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 67.  
79 Cf. J. Barnes, 'Metaphysics' in J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: CUP, 
1995), p. 77.  
80 Met., 1028a21-1028b2.  
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As established, Aristotle holds that a form naturally comes into being only in its 
proper matter, or proper potency, even if, as he writes in the Metaphysica, there is one 
material principle from which all things come into being.81  Given this, it is not 
surprising that Aristotle's material principle, understood as a material cause, is crucial 
in his general framework of causation in natural change, and to his analysis of human 
generation in particular.  Matter, along with the changes that occur in it, takes on the 
role of necessity in Aristotle’s framework of causation and change:82 insofar as matter 
is the stuff out of which things are made, certain material conditions are a necessary 
prerequisite in order that a certain kind of thing can come into being. 
A grasp of the role of matter in Aristotle's account of natural generation 
eventually leads to an understanding of his conception of the individual body: this 
latter is brought into view most clearly in passages in which Aristotle applies his 
analysis of material causation in human generation on the level below the species.  
Aristotle is interested in the way in which the precise material conditions involved in 
individual cases of animal generation, including human generation, restrict, or 
constrain the outcomes of those processes of development.  He thinks that the 
particular material conditions obtaining in an individual body, resulting from the 
precise circumstances of its generation in utero, prove to be a limiting factor on the 
way in which its soul operates: matter accounts for natural differences on the level 
below the species. 
Before exploring Aristotle's thought on human generation and the individual 
body more fully, it will be helpful to situate it within the broader context of the 
relationship between the material cause and the final cause in Aristotle's framework 
of causation and change.  As anyone familiar with Aristotle's work on animals will 
know, his teleological83 approach to analysing the composition of natural things 
entails a particular emphasis on their final causes - the purposes for which animals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 'De materiali autem substantia oportet non latere quia et si ex eodem omnia primo aut eisdem ut 
primis et materia ut principium hiis que fiunt, est tamen aliqua propria materia cuiuslibet'.  Met., 
1044a15-29 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 174.  Cf. Phys., 194b8-9.  
82 'Manifestum igitur est quoniam necessarium in phisicis quod sicut materia dicitur et motus ipsius'.  
Phys., 200a31, Physica. Translatio vetus (eds.) F. Bossier and J. Brams, Aristoteles Latinus, VII 1.2 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1990), p. 94.  
83 For a modern version of this approach by a leading philosopher, see T. Nagel, Mind and Cosmos.  
Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (Oxford: OUP, 2012).   
	   	   	  47 
bodies are put together in a certain ways, or the goals towards which their particular 
generative processes tend - rather than on their material causes. 
So whilst Aristotle does acknowledge that when we refer to a thing’s nature, we 
can refer either to its matter, or to its form,84 he criticises natural scientists who try to 
study nature by looking exclusively at matter, or at necessity in natural processes.85  
Forms, as final causes, being the reasons for which composites of matter and form are 
as they are,86 are obviously far more important than matter to the natural scientist, 
who asks why things are as they are.87  A human body’s soul is to be understood not 
only as its formal cause, that which defines what species or kind of thing it is,88 but also 
as its final cause.89  If we want to understand why the human body is constructed in 
the way that it is, Aristotle thinks, we should direct our attention to the soul, for the 
sake of whose functions and operations it exists.  This approach is reflected in 
Aristotle's analysis of how the human body differs from the bodies of other animals, 
and it is worth dwelling on that analysis for a moment because it would inform 
Thomas Aquinas's distinctive conception of the perfection of the human body, which 
will be discussed further in chapter 3. 
Aristotle has much to say about how the human body is constructed in the best 
possible way for the sake of the functions of its rational soul.  The human soul is at 
the pinnacle of the hierarchy of the kinds of soul found in living things.90  In De 
generatione animalium, Aristotle explains that all animated bodies are 'more divine' than 
non-animated bodies.  But souls differ in nobility (honorabilitas).  Not surprisingly, 
given that he thinks that matter and form necessarily bear a proportion to one 
another, Aristotle holds that the more noble the soul is, or the more elevated and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Phys., 194a12-13.  
85 Phys., 194a18ff, 198b10-16.     
86 Phys., 199a30-33. 
87 Aristotle, De partibus animalium (hereafter DPA), 640b25-29, 641a26-31.  
88 Phys., 194b26-29.   
89 Phys., 199a30-32.   
90 DA, 414b27-415a13.   
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varied its powers are, the more noble the nature of its required body, its required 
matter, will be.91 
He illustrates this point further in various passages in his De partibus animalium 
(particularly in II.10 and IV.10), explaining that humans participate in a higher kind 
of life than other animals because they are rational, and that the human body is, 
therefore, structured in an appropriate way.  Among the animal bodies, Aristotle 
notes, human bodies alone are upright, with their parts holding their natural 
position: the upper part of the human body is turned towards the upper part of the 
universe.92  This stance is made possible because the human body's upper part, 
reaching from the mouth to the seat, is duly proportioned to its lower, weight-bearing 
part.  Other animals’ bodies have disproportionately weighty upper sections, 
meaning that they walk on all fours.  Such weighty bodies burden the senses, 
impeding their operations.  In contrast, humans' senses, and their intellects, function 
freely: humans’ erect stance is designed for the sake of the god-like operation of the 
rational soul (operatio membri divini).93 
Further, Aristotle notes, humans, not requiring forefeet, are naturally endowed 
with hands instead.  It is because humans are the most intelligent animals, and can 
acquire manifold skills, that nature has given them members capable of making any 
number of further instruments to put to a variety of different uses.  Those natural 
scientists who say that the human design is inferior to the design of other animal 
bodies, insofar as it lacks natural armour and forms of defense, are mistaken: humans 
have the advantage of being undetermined to a particular form of defense, and can 
make for themselves whatever weapons they choose.94 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 'Omnis quidem igitur anime virtus altero corpore visa est participare, et diviniore vocatis elementis: 
ut autem differunt honorabilitate anime et vilitate invicem, sic et talis differt natura'.  Aristotle, De 
generatione animalium (hereafter DGA), 736b30-34.  De generatione animalium.  Translatio Guillelmi de Morbeka, 
(ed.) H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, Aristoteles Latinus, XVII 2.v (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966), p. 
54.   
92 DPA, 656a6-13.  
93 DPA, 686a25- 686b10.  Michael Scot’s Arabic-Latin translation of De partibus animalium is edited in 
A. M. I. van Oppenraaij (ed.), Aristotle, De animalibus. Michael Scot’s Arabic-Latin Translation, vol 2: Part 
Two, Books XI-XIV: Parts of Animals (Leiden: Brill, 1998), the passage discussed in this paragraph is at 
pp. 186-7.  
94 DPA, 687a5-b24.  
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Particular parts of animals' bodies, with particular, complex material properties, 
exist for the purpose of carrying out particular functions.95  Among animal bodies, 
human bodies have the greatest diversity in their parts, to accommodate the most 
advanced animal operations.  Since humans, uniquely, have the higher faculty of 
speech, which requires the articulation of complex sounds, human lips are soft and 
capable of a range of movements, and the human tongue is free in its movement in a 
way that other animals' tongues are not.96  Human teeth, in respect of their number 
and shape, are also designed according to the requirements of speech.97 
It is Aristotle's focus on final causation in his analysis of nature that lies behind 
these striking passages on the superiority of the human body to other animal bodies.  
Remarkable as these passages are, however, their formal perspective should not be 
allowed to occlude the extent to which Aristotle is interested in the material make up 
of animal bodies. 
Aristotle, as is well known, favoured craft analogies, and in particular house-
building analogies, when illustrating the relationship between types of causes.  Setting 
out his framework for understanding causation in Physica II.3-9, Aristotle explains 
that nature’s designs are like those of a skilful craftsman, orientated purposefully 
toward what is best.  Like a craftsman, nature works in a particular way, the best way 
relative to the job at hand, and does nothing superfluously.98  It is because the plan of 
a house has such and such a form that it is constructed in a particular manner.99  
Such analogies, it is true, are particularly useful for highlighting the importance of 
final causation, or the teleological aspect of natural processes.  But Aristotle explicitly 
holds that it is a builder's job to know about the bricks and planks from which a 
house is built, as well as its plan.100 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 DPA, 646b10-25.   
96 DPA, 659b29- 660a8, 17-30.   
97 DPA, 661b13-15.   
98 Phys., 198b7-9; cf. also 199a8-25, DGA, 731a25ff., 738b1, 739b19-20, DPA, 640a15-17.  
99 DPA, 640a17-20.     
100 Phys., 194a12ff; cf. DA, 403b1-15, Met., 1037a10-20.   
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When he does take a more material (or 'bottom up') perspective on animal 
bodies, then, Aristotle distinguishes three degrees of complexity in the material make-
up of the parts of animals.  Body parts are ultimately constructed from the four 
elements, or the elementary qualities: hot, cold, wet, and dry.  Other material 
qualities or properties, such as density or rarity, roughness or smoothness, are 
secondary to these.  Then, homogenous, or uniform parts (such as flesh and bone) are 
constituted from the elements, along with these qualities.  Finally, heterogeneous or 
non-uniform bodily parts, the hands, the face, and so on, are constituted from the 
homogenous parts.101  (This is of course an analytical, and not a temporal sequence). 
But it is only in his work on the generation of humans and other animals that the 
significance of matter and of material causation in Aristotle's thought on natural 
bodies is really brought into sharp relief.  In this context, Aristotle notes that the 
order of nature, or the order of logical existence, is always the inverse of the order of 
actual development.  The purpose of a process, the form to be generated, is logically 
prior to the process through which it comes into being: we cannot define, or 
understand, a process unless we can appreciate the end towards which it aims.  
Nonetheless, in the temporal sequence of development, that which is prior is the 
thing most remote from the goal of the process or the thing to be generated.102 
The human soul, then, requires its proper matter, or an appropriate material 
subject, but this material does not spring up all of a sudden.  Its development has to 
take place in a certain sequence, with each prior stage of material development 
necessary in order to entail a potentiality for the next.  If a house has been built, then 
its foundations must necessarily have come into being first; since its foundations have 
come into being, then the clay from which they are made must have come into being 
before them, and so on.103  Aristotle draws a distinction between human proper 
matter, which is the proximate material cause of a human, and the mother's menstrual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 DPA, 646a13-24.   
102 DPA, 646a25-b5.    
103  'Si igitur quod prius necesse est generari, si quod posterius erit, verbi gratia si domus, 
fundamentum, si vero hoc, lutum'.  DGEC, 337b14-15ff.  Cf. also DPA, 639b34-640a5.  A highly 
compressed comment in the Physica applies this model to human development: 'Manifestum est igitur 
quoniam necessarium in phisicis quod sicut materia dicitur et motus ipsius... quoniam domus talis est, 
hec oportet fieri ex necessitate et esse; sic et si homo hoc est, hec inquam; si autem hec, hec sane'.  
Phys., 200a31-b4 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 95.  
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fluid, 104 which might be labelled the 'remote' material cause of a human.  The course 
of the process of material development in human generation from remote to 
proximate matter will be sketched out next; as indicated, it is through an 
understanding of this course of development in individual cases that we get the 
clearest picture of Aristotle's understanding of the individual human body. 
Completing the framework of causation in human generation, then, in which the 
formal and final cause (the rational soul), and a material cause (remote and 
proximate) are already in place, is the fourth kind of cause in Aristotle's schema: the 
efficient, or agent cause (or the craftsman himself in Aristotle's housebuilding 
analogy).  Male semen is the agent cause of material developments in utero.105  It is 
responsible for setting in motion the precise sequence of changes involved in the 
development of menstrual fluid into a material subject appropriate for a rational soul.  
In an individual case of human generation, as we will see, it is the way in which a 
particular seminal power from the male parent acts upon particular material 
provided by the female parent that results in the set of material conditions unique to 
the individual human body. 
As Aristotle explains in De generatione animalium II, then, the material provided by 
the female parent in animal generation has the differentiated potential to become the 
body parts specific to the kind of animal to be generated.106  Just as a craftsman 
cannot make a saw from wood or wool,107 Aristotle explains, in a passage on material 
causation from the Metaphysica, the agent cause in human generation cannot make a 
human body from just any matter.108 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 'Ut hominis que causa ut materia?  Equidem menstrua... Oportet autem proximas causas dicere.  
Que materia?  Non ignem aut terram sed propriam'.  Met., 1044a35-b3 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 175.   
105 Phys., 194b30-32, Met., 1044a34.   
106 'Et enim illud superfluum [femelle] omnes partes habet potentia, actu autem nullam'.  DGA, 
737a23-25 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 55.   
107 Met., 1044a25-1044b1.  
108 'Qualiter autem quidem unumquodque fit, hinc oportet sumere, principium facientes primo 
quidem igitur quia quecumque natura aut arte, ab actu existente fiunt, ex ente potentia tali'.  DGA, 
734b20-23 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 49.   
	   	   	  52 
The precise formative properties possessed by human male semen are also 
confined to the species: humans generate and are generated by humans alone.109  
Male semen, then, has within it a power, or movement, which initiates and governs 
the material development of the embryo, making its parts.110  This power is not a 
definite object (hoc aliquid); Aristotle refers to it as a principle (principium) and a motion 
(motum) that semen has with respect to the formation of the body’s particular parts,111 
or just as a power (virtus) in semen.112  Like someone who initiates a movement in an 
automatic machine, the father’s generative power initiates this movement in his 
semen, and like the movement in the machine, the movement in semen continues in 
separation from its originator. 113   Borrowing a powerful simile from a poem 
attributed to Orpheus, Aristotle notes that an animal comes into being like the 
knitting of a net: its organs are formed not all at once, or at random, but in an exact 
order of succession.114 
As soon as each of the body’s parts comes into being, having been configured by 
the active ingredient in semen at a precise stage in the sequence of the body’s 
development, it does so as a living, animated, part.115  In this way, the soul emerges 
from the body, or from prior material developments in utero.  Accordingly, Aristotle 
explains, if it is the female parent who provides the body in animal generation, then, 
in setting up the motion that configures the animal body, the male parent provides its 
soul.116 
The latter part of this statement requires unpicking.  The father's semen does not 
actually contain a soul.  But, since animals' parts are constructed in a living state by a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 DPA, 640a20-26, 641b25-30.  
110 DGA, 734b22-24.  
111 DGA, 734b23-25 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 49.   
112 DPA, 640a23 (ed.) van Oppenraaij, vol. 2, p. 6.    
113 DGA, 734b10-17, 737a20-23.   
114 DGA, 734a17-25.    
115 'Sperma quidem igitur tale, et habet motum et principium tale, ut cessante motu fiat unaqueque 
particularum et animatum'.  DGA, 734a22-24 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 49.    
116 'Est autem corpus quidem ex femella, anima autem ex masculo'.  DGA, 738b25-27 (ed.) Drossaart 
Lulofs, p. 58.    
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power in semen, the life imparted to the animal body must come from semen.  
Aristotle reasons that semen 'has or is soul, virtually' or potentially.117  Even so, he 
does not necessarily seem to think that paternal semen can provide the rational soul in 
human generation. 
In human generation, then, the embryo, in accordance with the necessary 
sequence in which its organs are configured, first possesses a vegetative, or plant-like 
soul, then a sensitive, or animal soul, and finally a rational, or human soul.  All 
animals, Aristotle explains, acquire a non-specific animal soul before they acquire the 
exact kind of soul that defines their species.118  The acquisition of each prior kind of 
soul is necessary for the acquisition of the next in the sequence, and each kind of soul 
is possessed potentially before it is actually possessed.119  It is clear that the formative 
motion in human male semen can bring the embryo as far as the stage at which it is 
an appropriate material subject for a rational soul.  Yet the question of how humans 
come to possess reason, Aristotle explains, raises acute problems.120  Whereas it is not 
difficult to appreciate that the nutritive and sensitive souls come into being in the 
embryo when the embryo develops the precise bodily parts that these kinds of souls 
require to function, intellectual operations, in themselves, have no necessary 
connection with bodily processes.  In a deeply enigmatic passage, Aristotle claims 
that the intellect is 'divine' and arrives at the embryo from 'outside'.121 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 'Utrum autem habet anima sperma aut non?... et habet et est virtute'.  DGA, 735a5 (ed.) Drossaart 
Lulofs, p. 50.     
118 'procedentia autem [habent] et sensitivam secundum quam animal.  Non enim simul fit animal et 
homo, neque animal et equus, similiter autem et in aliis animalibus: postremo enim fit finis, proprium 
autem est quod generationis uniuscuiusque finis'.  DGA, 736b1-5 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 53.       
119 'Nutritivam quidem igitur animam spermata et fetus separabiles palam quia virtute quidem 
habentia ponendum, actu autem non habentia... Consequenter autem palam quia et de sensitiva 
dicendum anima, et de activa et de intellectiva: omnes enim necessarium potentia prius habere quam 
actu'.  DGA, 736b9-16 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 53.    
120 'Propter quod et de intellectu, quando et quomodo accipiunt et unde participantia hoc principio, 
habet dubitationem plurimam, et oportet intendere secundum virtutem accipere et secundum 
quantum contingit'.  DGA, 736b5-9 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 53.      
121  'Quorumcumque enim principiorum est operatio corporalis, palam quia hec sine corpore 
impossibile existere, ut ambulare sine pedibus; quare et deformis ingredi impossibile: neque enim ipsas 
secundum ipsas ingredi possibile inseparabiles existentes, neque in corpore ingredi... Relinquitur 
autem intellectum solum deformis advenire et divinum esse solum: nichil enim ipsius operationi 
communicat corporalis operatio'.  DGA, 736b23-30 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, pp. 53-4.  
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Before moving on to explain how Aristotle understands this sequence of material 
development in utero to play out on the level below the species, it is worth pointing 
out a certain difficulty with interpreting the Stagirite's account of human generation.  
His commentators would disagree as to how any form's differentiated proper matter 
should be conceived. 
Some argued that the role of proper matter in generation must be played by 
something that, in itself, already possesses a form.  This interpretation was put 
forward, at the latest, by John Philoponus, a Greek philosopher educated in the 
Neoplatonist tradition, in his Contra Proclum (composed c. 529 AD). 122   In the 
thirteenth century, advocates of the theory of the plurality of substantial forms in 
human beings, too, would maintain, on the basis of Aristotle's texts on substantial 
change and embryonic development, that the rational soul's proper matter must 
already be informed by a corporeal substantial form of its own. 123   Roberto 
Zavalloni's work remains the best starting point for pluralist position on proper 
matter and human generation;124 the topic will not be discussed in any detail in 
chapter 5, which focuses on postmortem bodily continuity. 
An alternative conception of proper matter, consistent in theory with Aquinas's 
position that the soul is the only substantial form in the body, is found in Averroes' 
commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysica XII.2, in which the Stagirite, analysing 
substance, again states that different things have different matter, and raises the 
question of what kind of non-being (non ente), it is from which things come into 
being.125  Aristotle's idea that generation proceeds from non-being to being will be 
discussed further in chapter 2.  In this commentary on this passage, Averroes takes it 
that 'prime' matter, that is, an entirely featureless substratum common to all material 
things, and surviving across all cases of natural change, is a fundamental feature in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 F. A. J. de Haas, John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter. Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism 
and the Ancient Commentary Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 256-7.   
123 The key difference between John Philoponus's exact position and that of those late thirteenth 
century philosophers who argued for a distinct corporeal form in each human was that Philoponus 
argued that proper matter should not be conceived as a composite of matter and form (whereas pluralists 
held that it could), but should be understood as something one and simple in itself.  ibid., p. 257.   
124 Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes, pp. 459-72.  
125 'Omnia vero materiam habent quecumque transmutantur, sed aliam... Dubitabit autem utique 
aliquis ex quali non ente est generatio'.  Met. 1069b24-28 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 248.   
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Aristotle's natural scientific schema.  The concept of prime matter, along with the 
question of whether it was in fact present in Aristotle's thought, need not be explored 
further now; it will be covered in chapter 2, along with the more technical aspects of 
Aristotle's account of substantial generation. 
The important point for now is that, for Averroes, although prime matter is a 
single substratum, it is also 'several' (multa) with respect to its potency, or its ability 
(habilitas) to serve as a substrate for several different kinds of forms: each form, or act, 
comes into being in its proper potency.  According to Averroes, prime matter possesses 
several potencies, or habilitates, which bear an order to one another such that, in 
natural generation, the potency proper to the form to be generated develops through 
certain necessary stages of increasing complexity.  Averroes holds that the forms 
generated at earlier stages in the process mediate the development of this proper 
potency,126 but it is the development of this proper potency itself that remains the 
focus of his analysis. 
So the Commentator provides a head-on discussion of proper matter, not viewed 
through the lens of substantial form but confronted in its own right, as characterised 
by being in a complex or highly differentiated state of potency.  It will be argued in 
chapter 3 that Aquinas adopted a position similar to Averroes' in this area. 
2.1. The Generation of the Individual Body 
In book IV of De generatione animalium, Aristotle applies this framework for human 
generation on the level below the species.  In every case of human generation, the 
paternal seminal power that is the agent of the generation of the individual body 
works up the matter provided by the mother in a unique way. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 'non enim quodlibet ens fit ex qualibet potentia, sec unumquodque entium fit ex eo quod est in 
potentia illud, quod fit, id est ex potentia propria... Et dicit hoc, quia opinatur, quod prima materia est 
unum secundum subiectum, & multa secundum habilitates.  Primo enim habet habilitates ad 
recipiendum primas contrarietates, scilicet formas omnium quatuor elementorum, secundo vero habet 
potentias consimilium partium mediantibus formis quatuor elementorum.  & istae potentiae 
diversantur secundum diversitatem mixtionis quatuor elementorum, ita quod ex hoc diversantur 
formae generabilium'.  Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis, 
Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis vol. VIII (ed.) Venetiis apud Junctas 1562-74 (repr. Frankfurt 
am Main: Minerva, 1962), Book XII, comment 11, f. 297r, E-F.  
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Every part and organ of an individual human body is fashioned in a particular 
way and is characterised by features inherited over the course of its unique process of 
material development in utero.127  Since Aristotle holds that all of the soul's operations, 
apart from those of the intellect, take place in bodily organs, it is not surprising that 
he should state that a child resembles its parents with respect to the particular quality 
of its soul's operations, too, such as in the characteristic way in which it moves 
(secundum motum) or in the particular sound of its voice (secundum vocem).128  In each case 
of human generation, then, unique material conditions constrain the way in which 
the formal characteristics associated with a species are realised in the individual. 
Seeking to explain in De generatione animalium IV how children can inherit 
characteristics from either one or both of their parents, and even from their 
grandparents and more remote ancestors, Aristotle rejects the theory of panspermia, 
which posits that semen is like a liquid mixed from many different kinds of juice.  A 
portion taken at random from that liquid would not be an even mixture of all the 
constituent juices, but would have more of one than another, or some of one and 
none at all of another, and so on.  In the same way, so the theory goes, depending on 
the precise make-up of the semen from which he or she is generated, a child 
resembles one parent more than the other, or one grandparent more than the other, 
and so on.  It is the lack of precision in this theory to which Aristotle objects.129  In 
his own account of the fashioning of the individual body in utero, the Stagirite posits 
that the overall formative movement that shapes the foetus, though governed by the 
formative power, is in fact the intricately complex result of the precise interplay of 
several different movements. 
There are several efficient movements, so Aristotle thinks, that originate in the 
formative power in male semen.  Some communicate individual (singulare) 
characteristics, whilst others communicate specific and generic characteristics: the 
characteristics tied just to being human and an animal respectively.  The movements 
that communicate individual characteristics have more force in the generative 
process than those that communicate common characteristics.  This is because the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 DGA, 769a5.  
128 DGA, 722a1-6 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, pp. 18-9.   
129 DGA, 769a25-769b1.   
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primary way in which Socrates exists is as the individual Socrates, not as a human or 
as an animal.130 
The material provided by the mother limits the way in which these different 
movements in the seminal agent act.  Aristotle still holds that the only movements 
involved in an actual way in the complex formative movement that fashions the 
individual body are those originating in the formative power in semen.  But he thinks 
that 'movements' originating from the material provided by the mother are involved 
in a potential way.131  The interplay between the paternal and maternal contributions 
to the generative process is analogous to the way in which a knife is blunted by what 
it cuts, or the way in a heating agent is cooled by what it heats, so Aristotle thinks.  
Every moving or efficient cause receives some motion from that which it moves, he 
explains, and any force that pushes is itself pushed back in return.132 
A movement originating on the paternal side, then, can be conquered (victum) by 
its opposite on the maternal side, or vice versa.  Movements able to communicate the 
individual characteristics of more remote ancestors, from either the maternal or the 
paternal line, are also potential contributors to the overall formative movement.  
Aristotle holds that the relevant movement on whichever side, maternal or paternal, 
which prevails with respect to the communication of a particular characteristic, can 
still be 'resolved' (solutum) into another taking its origin from somewhere else in the 
ancestral line.  Depending on the extent to which a movement is resolved, Aristotle 
posits, the movement into which it is resolved is more or less remote in the ancestral 
line.133  Taking the case of physical appearance, he explains that, if the movement 
that communicates the father’s individual likeness prevails but is resolved (solvitur) to a 
lesser extent, it changes into a movement which communicates the likeness of the 
father’s father, the offspring's paternal grandfather.  If it prevails and is resolved to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 DGA, 767b27-768a1 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, pp. 128-9.   
131   'Insunt autem hii quidem motuum actu, hii autem potentia: actu quidem generantis et 
universalium, puta hominis et animalis, potentia autem qui femelle et progenitorum'.  DGA, 768a12-
15, p. 129.  
132 DGA, 768b15-20.   
133 DGA, 768b5-11, (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 130.  
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greater extent, it changes into a movement communicating the likeness of the 
offspring's paternal grandfather's father, and so on.134 
It is possible for the various intricate movements that shape the body's individual 
parts to be so confused together (confunduntur) that the individual offspring bears no 
easily discernible resemblance to either of its parents or any of their parents or 
ancestors.  In this extreme case of the complex interplay of movements the only 
definite characteristic that remains is that shared by all: the characteristic of being 
human. 135   This point demonstrates Aristotle’s claim that the movement 
communicating the characteristics that are tied simply to being human is distinct 
from those movements that confer various purely individual characteristics.  In 
addition, there are cases in which human parents generate offspring that does not 
appear to be human at all and appears instead to be just some kind of animal (animal 
aliquod).  Such offspring are called monstrosities (monstra),136 and result from an 
extreme resolution of seminal movements: only the movement that communicates 
the most universal characteristic of all, that of being an animal, prevails over the 
embryo's matter.137  Such cases, Aristotle supposes, can arise either due to some 
defect in the material the mother provides, or due to some defect in the seminal 
power.138 
In Aristotle’s De generatione animalium, then, Thomas Aquinas had in hand a 
detailed analysis of the origins of the intra-specific differences amongst humans.  The 
individuality of any human had its very basis in the precise material conditions 
obtaining in their individual body, inherited in a complex manner over the course of 
its development in the womb.  This bore out Aquinas's basic presupposition that the 
particular body was crucial to, or made an independent contribution to, the 
individuality of the human being to whom it belonged. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 DGA, 768a15ff.   
135 DGA, 768b1-15 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 130.  
136 DGA, 769b5-10 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 132.   
137 DGA, 769b10-15 (ed.) Drossaart Lulofs, p. 133.  
138 DGA, 770a5-10.  Cf. Phys., 199b5-6.       
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3. The Individual Body and its Intellect in De anima 
As will become clear in the discussion of individuality in Aristotle's Metaphysica 
that concludes this chapter, the Stagirite, for epistemological reasons, struggled with 
the idea that each human soul might be intrinsically unique.  Aquinas, in contrast, 
would posit that individual souls were intrinsically characterised by intra-specific 
differences, resulting from their creation in individual bodies. 
And Aquinas would use a particular passage in Aristotle's De anima as a proof text 
for his position that each human soul was intrinsically limited and shaped, even in 
respect of its intellectual nature, according to the body in which it was created.  It 
was clearly Aristotle's view that intellectual acts did not take place in any bodily 
organ,139 but the Stagirite had also explained that the act of understanding was 
dependent on operations that did occur in bodily organs insofar as it involved the 
imagination,140 which, in turn, was dependent upon sense perception.141 
The key passage was in De anima II.9.  There, Aristotle notes that even if many 
animals seems to outstrip humans in the sharpness of their sense powers, the 
exception to this rule is the human sense of touch, which is far more accurate than 
that of any other animal.  (He explains further, in De partibus animalium II.1, that 
touch is the most complex of the sense organs because it is correlated with a wide 
range of sensory objects, and is finely tuned to recognise a variety of kinds of 
contrasts: hot and cold, solidity and fluidity, and so on142).  The accuracy of the 
human sense of touch, Aristotle goes on, is the reason why humans are the most 
intelligent of all the animals.  Crucially, his evidence for this correlation between the 
sense of touch and intelligence is drawn from an observation about differences on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 DGA, 736b21-29.     
140 DA, 403a7-10.   
141 DA, 428b10ff.  
142 DPA, 647a15-20.    
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level below the species: among humans those who have softer skin (and therefore a 
sharper sense of touch) have greater intellectual ability.143 
De partibus animalium IV.10, discussed above, is in tension with this passage.  
There, of course, Aristotle had stated that quadripedal animals' weighty upper bodies 
in fact impeded their sensory operations.  Aquinas's reconciliation of these two passages 
will be explained in chapter 3. 
4. Essence and Individuality in the Metaphysica 
Aquinas's final Aristotelian source on the topic of individuality would be the 
Metaphysica.  Here, approaching the topic of individuality from an entirely different 
perspective, Aristotle again confirms that humans are differentiated from one another 
in virtue of their unique, individual bodies. 
In the Metaphysica, Aristotle is preoccupied with explaining the real presence of 
universality in the particular things we encounter in the natural world.  The approach 
to individuality that he takes is the very inverse of the approach that discussions of 
individuality in medieval metaphysics tended to take, as Edward Booth's close study 
of Aristotle's thought on the topic has demonstrated.144  Scholastic theologians would 
enquire about what they called the 'principle of individuation' (principium 
individuationis): what principle or metaphysical constituent of a thing was responsible 
for its individuality?145  Aristotle's own treatment of individuality was an extended 
critique of Plato's metaphysics on the grounds that it relegated individual material 
objects to a realm of unreal things, separated from a realm of the real, inhabited by 
universal, paradigmatic Forms.  Conversely, individuals, for Aristotle, were the starting 
point. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 'tactus... hunc autem habet homo sensum certissimum; in aliis enim deficiat ab animalibus multis, 
secundum autem tactum differenter certificat.  Unde et prudentissimum animalium est; signum autem 
est in genere hominum secundum sensum hunc ingeniosos esse et non ingeniosos, secundum alium 
autem nullum.  Duri enim carne, inepti mente, molles autem carne, bene apti'.  DA 421a19-25, edited 
in Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 147. 
144 E. Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, full citation above, n. 37.  The understanding of Metaphysica 
VII demonstrated here is heavily indebted to Booth's research.   
145 Cf. Gracia, 'Introduction: The Problem of Individuation', pp. 1-2, 13-16.  
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But this metaphysical reorientation created its own urgent problem.  Aristotle was 
convinced that certainty in natural scientific knowledge could only be guaranteed in 
the same way that certainty in mathematical knowledge is guaranteed, that is, by the 
systematisation of that knowledge in abstract and universal terms.146  The difficulty, as 
Aristotle saw it, was not that the intellect might not be accurate in its development of 
the abstract concepts to be used in scientific expression.  His concern was rather that 
a science based on such abstractions might not really be a science of the concrete 
individual inhabitants of the natural world, individuals characterised by intra-specific 
differences, after all. 
So unless Aristotle could formulate an ontological model in which the immanent 
principles of concrete individuals were themselves in fact universal, a gap threatened to 
open up between the reality of the natural world and the knowledge that humans 
develop about it.  This was a desperately difficult problem, which Aristotle described 
at one point in his Metaphysica as the greatest he faced in metaphysics.147 
Book VII of the Metaphysica contains the results of Aristotle's sustained effort to 
formulate a model to solve it.  Aristotle discusses individuals, such as humans, as 
composites, but not simply composites of matter and form.  In this particular 
analysis, Aristotle is more concerned to discuss essence, or what it is to be a thing (quod 
quid erat esse), or that which would be captured in the definition of a thing, than form as 
such.  After all, a thing's essence, precisely as that which would be captured in its 
definition, is also that which would be relevant to a scientific account of it. 
In Metaphysica VII, then, Aristotle frequently substitutes essence in place of form 
(or 'substantial form'), and of course in place of soul when he is discussing living 
bodies.148  So, for Aristotle, it is important to note, essence is form, but form 
considered precisely as that single principle constitutive of a thing that comprehends 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 See Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, pp. 1-5.   
147 ibid., p. 6 which cites Met. 1087a10-13.  It was precisely the rejection of Plato’s Forms which 
provoked Aristotle’s close reflection on individuality and universality in things, pace Gracia: ‘the 
ancients paid little attention to individuality... Aristotle was so concerned to attack his former teacher’s 
view that he seems often to have forgotten about this fundamental feature of the world’.  Gracia, 
Introduction to the Problem of Individuation, p. 259.   
148 ‘Quoniam vero animalium anima (hoc enim substantia est animati)... est species et quod quid erat 
esse tali corpori’.  Met. 1035b15-16 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 150.   
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the complex of universalisable characteristics to be found in the thing in question.149  
For example, 'animal' is one such universal nature, found in a human, which we use 
to define a human.  As comprehended in their essences (or forms), for Aristotle, 
universals become intrinsic to things. 
In Metaphysica VII.6, Aristotle puts forward a model in which a particular thing is 
completely identified with its essence as a means of closing the gap between 
knowledge and reality.150  But where does this model leave the real individuality of 
the particular thing? 
Aristotle developed two models that would resonate in Aquinas's own work on 
individuality and the individual body.  The first is found in Metaphysica VII.8, a 
discussion of the generation of substances.151  Plato's Forms cannot explain natural 
generation, Aristotle explains here; a form manifests itself in matter at the end of a 
process of generation, which is driven by an efficient cause.  He models the union of 
universal with individual in the composite product of human generation as the union 
of form (or essence) with matter: 
'Omnis uero iam talis species in hiis carnibus et ossibus, Callias et 
Socrates; et diversa quidem propter materiam (namque diversa) idem 
uero specie; nam indiuidua species'.152 
Socrates and Callias are alike with respect to their 'undivided' species, a word that 
scholastic theologians would read to mean substantial form, in this context.  So the 
same essence is present in Callias and Socrates.  The difference between them (or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, p. 3 (which cites Metaphysica 1038b17-18), and pp. 9-10.   
150 ‘Ex hiis itaque rationibus unum et idem non secundum accidens ipsum unumquodque et quod 
quid erat esse, et quod scire unumquodque horum est quod quid erat esse scire; quare secundum 
expositionem necesse unum aliquod esse ambo’.  Met., 1031b19-20 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 141.  Cf. 
Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, p. 13.  
151 For commentary on these two models, see Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, pp. 13-14.   
152 Met., 1034a5-10 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 147.     
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individuality of each) is due to, and, in this model, is confined to, their respective 
material aspects.  Each has his particular flesh and bones: these.153 
The second model, outlined in Metaphysica VII.10, is more nuanced.  Aristotle 
suggests that, in an individual composite, we can identify universalisable aspects of its 
composition as well as its individuality.  When we apply a general or universal term 
such as 'man' or 'horse' to an individual, we are not talking about that individual 
substance as such but a kind of whole (totum quoddam) composed of a particular 
account or definition (hac ratio), and particular matter (hac materia), regarded as 
universal.  And yet, he continues, individuals such as Socrates are singular things due 
to 'ultimate matter'.154  There are a couple of obscurities in this passage.  We may 
wonder what Aristotle means by particular matter regarded as universal, since in this 
enquiry he equates universals strictly with formal or defining elements in things.  
Conversely, how can the definition or account of something be particular?  This model 
is consistent with the previous one at least in its suggestion that matter is the basis of 
individuality in things that belong to the same species. 
This extended discussion in Metaphysica VII was, for Aristotle, the close 
exploration of a difficulty, rather than the working through of a final solution to it.155  
Any conclusion Aristotle might have reached is far less important for the purposes of 
the present study than the way in which Aquinas used the Stagirite's work to develop 
an account of the individual body, and the individual human, in light of his 
understanding of what resurrection would involve.  The way in which Aquinas did so 
can be illustrated briefly with a swift glance forward at two passages from his Summa 
Theologiae. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Modern commentators have seen this passage as confirmation that matter is the principle of 
individuation in Aristotle's philosophy.  As stated above, it seems unlikely that Aristotle thought it 
necessary to find a principle of individuation.  For the modern debate on what if anything was the 
principium individuationis for Aristotle, including extensive discussion of Metaphysica 1034a 5-10, see J. 
Lukasiewicz, E. Anscombe, K. Popper, 'The Principle of Individuation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volumes, 27 (1953), pp. 69-120, A. C. Lloyd 'Aristotle’s Principle of Individuation', 
Mind, 79 (1970), pp. 519-29, W. Charlton 'Aristotle and the Principle of Individuation', Phronesis, 17 
(1972), pp. 239-49 and E. Regis, Jr., 'Aristotle's "Principle of Individuation"', Phronesis, 21 (1976), pp. 
157-66.  
154 ‘Homo uero et equus et que ita in singularibus, universaliter autem, non sunt substantia sed simul 
totum quoddam ex hac ratione et hac materia universaliter.  Singulare uero ex ultima materia 
Socrates iam est, et in aliis similiter’.  Met. 1035b27-32, (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 151.    
155 Metaphysica VII was an 'aporetic initiation' to the topic.  Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, p. 20.   
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The first passage is Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2, wherein Aquinas explores the 
difference between 'person' and 'essence'.  Properly speaking, he writes, essence is 
what is captured in a definition.  Unlike Aristotle, however, Aquinas holds that the 
essence of a material substance is composite.  It captures not only the form that places 
the substance in its species, but also the distinctive material pattern shared by all 
members of that species.  Here, Aquinas refers to that material pattern as 'common 
matter' (common, that is, to members of the species). 
Aquinas calls the form and matter that compose the essence of a human being, 
the 'principles of the species': the formal principle is 'soul' (or rational soul), and the 
material principle is 'flesh and bone'.  A person, or an individual substance, on the 
other hand, is composed of 'individual principles'.  Their formal individual principle 
is this form, or this soul, and their material individual principle is this matter, or this 
flesh and this bone.  In the concrete individual, these 'individual principles' capture 
characteristics additional to what is captured by the essence, or in other words what 
is universal in humans.  The essence cannot, therefore, be identified with the 
individual.156  The gap thus threatening to open up between knowledge and reality 
did not trouble Aquinas, as it did Aristotle: the formula Aristotle offered in 
Metaphysica VII.6, as a means of closing that gap, is rejected outright by Aquinas. 
Aquinas's model for relating universality and individuality in things is also 
different from that which Aristotle offers in Metaphysica VII.8.  There, Aristotle's text 
implies that Socrates and Callias differ only materially.  Aquinas, in contrast, would 
emphasise that each has an individual formal principle, this soul, as well as an 
individual material principle, this flesh and this bone.  Aquinas's denial that an essence 
can be identified absolutely either with an individual, or just with the formal principle 
in an individual, does not, in his view, amount to a denial that essences are immanent 
in things, however. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 'dicendum quod essentia proprie est id quod significatur per definitionem.  Definitio autem 
complectitur principia speciei, non autem principia individualia.  Unde in rebus compositis ex materia 
et forma, essentia significat non solum formam, nec solum materiam, sed compositum ex materia et 
forma communi, prout sunt principia speciei.  Sed compositum ex hac materia et ex hac forma, habet 
rationem hypostasis et personae: anima enim et caro et os sunt de ratione hominis, sed haec anima et 
haec caro et hoc os sunt de ratione huius hominis.  Et ideo hypostasis et persona addunt supra 
rationem essentiae principia individualia; neque sunt idem cum essentia in compositis ex materia et 
forma'.   Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter ST) I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 4 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888), p. 330.  
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Set alongside Metaphysica VII.10, Aquinas' essence looks fairly similar to Aristotle's 
'kind of whole' composed of a particular account of something and its particular 
matter, insofar as they can be regarded as universal.  For Aquinas, the features in an 
individual that are common to all members of its species are still real characteristics 
of that individual.  They just do not exhaust the features in that individual: in order 
to grasp the individual, we have to note the precise ways in which these common 
characteristics are realised in his or her particular case. 
The second passage is Aquinas's discussion of the 'truth of human nature', in 
Summa Theologiae I, q. 119, a. 1.  This article brings into clear view the way in which 
Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's work on the relationship between essence and 
the individual was shaped by his thinking on resurrection.  To recap, as it appeared 
in Peter Lombard's Sentences, the 'truth of human nature' in a human individual was a 
core of material particular to their body, upon which the material aspect of their 
individuality (and identity) in mortal life was founded, and from which their 
resurrected body would necessarily be reconstituted.157 
As Aquinas sees it, however, whatever enters into the constitution of something 
belongs to the 'truth' of its nature.  We can consider nature in general, as it 
corresponds to the essence of the species, or alternatively as it is found in a particular 
individual.158  Understood in the first way, the truth of human nature comprises the 
human form and matter considered in a common way, as soul and body (or as 
'principles of the species').  Understood in the second way, the 'truth of human 
nature' in the individual human Peter, that from which he will be reconstituted at the 
resurrection, has both a material component, this body and this soul, or 'individual, 
signate matter' (matter that can be pointed to as belonging to them) and a formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 See above, pp. 15-17. 
158 'Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius.  Sed 
natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, 
secundum quod est in hoc individuo'.  ST I, q. 119, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5 
(Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1889), p. 571.  
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component, the form that is 'individuated by that matter': Peter's 'individual 
principles', in the language of Summa Theologica I, q. 29, a. 2.159 
Setting these passages from the Summa Theologica alongside Aristotle's discussion of 
individuality in the Metaphysica not only highlights the way in which Aquinas used 
Aristotle's work to confirm his presupposition that the material part unique to each 
individual human was crucial to their individuality.  It also begins to bring into view 
the theological reasoning that led Aquinas to emphatically accept an idea that 
Aristotle, for epistemological reasons, would not: that each human's soul is 
intrinsically unique. 
Chapter 3's discussion of Aquinas's thought on individuality and the individual 
body will set Aquinas's concept of the composite human essence within the context of 
his writings on bodily resurrection.  It will also explore in much more detail Aquinas's 
idea that there is a unique, proportionate relationship (a commensuratio) obtaining 
between each soul and its own matter, such that individual souls remain diverse 
following their separation from their bodies, and such that it is not possible for a 
particular soul to be reunited with any matter other than its own at the resurrection. 
Conclusions 
Thomas Aquinas would not see the need to change much about Aristotle's 
scientific analysis of individuality within the human species in light of the 
implications, for individuality and the individual body, of the doctrine of bodily 
resurrection.  Aristotle's thinking, whether in biology or metaphysics, confirmed time 
and again the presupposition that an individual human's particular material part, 
their body, made a crucial contribution to his or her individuality: it was the very 
basis of his or her individuality. 
Aquinas, then, would adopt Aristotle's account of the material origins of 
individuality in generation and of the development of the individual human body.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 'Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in 
communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia 
individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata.  Sicut de veritate humanae 
naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et 
Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus'.  ibid.    
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He would adopt, too, Aristotle's suggestion that, just as matter and form, or body and 
soul, necessarily bore a proportion to one another considered on the level of the 
species, so the complex and unique material state belonging to each individual body 
necessarily posed limits or constraints on the actual operations of its soul.  But he 
would draw the additional conclusion, for precise theological reasons, that the very 
inner nature of each human soul is unique. 
As will become clear in the next chapter, Aristotle's writings on bodily identity did 
not sit nearly so easily with what the doctrine of the literal resurrection of the body 
implied with respect to the crucial significance of matter both to human nature and 
in the make-up of individual humans.  His thought on the identity of the mortal body 
seemed to pull the rug from beneath the emphasis put on matter in his writings on 
individuality.  Aristotle appeared to think that the material part in a human being 
made no crucial or independent contribution to its continuing identity: the 
conclusion to be drawn from Aristotle's writings seemed to be that a living body 
could remain the same individual thing over the course of its lifetime despite the 
exchange of all of its matter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND (II): BODILY 
IDENTITY 
Introduction 
A superficial glance at Aristotle's work on the concept of identity in the 
Metaphysica would suggest that, like his writings on individuality, his thought on bodily 
identity was in basic agreement with what a literal interpretation of the resurrection 
of the body implied, namely that in order to be the same individual at the 
resurrection, each individual human being would have to recover the material 
particular to them: material sameness was crucial to personal identity.  
Aristotle outlines three ways in which sameness is talked about in a brief passage 
in Metaphysica X.3.  First, he notes, there is sameness in number (secundum numerum) or 
numerical identity, to which we refer whenever we say simply that something is itself.  
Then there is sameness both in definition or account (ratio) and in number (numero), 
when something is one with itself both in species (or form) and in matter.  Finally, 
sometimes we say that things that share a definition or account (ratio), such as two 
equal straight lines, are the same.160  This third kind of sameness is simply sameness 
in species, or kind.   
This short discussion in fact implies that the numerical identity of any composite 
substance, such as a human being, the kind of identity in virtue of which it is the 
same only as itself (and not the same as anything else in its species), is grounded only 
in its material sameness.  As explained in the previous chapter, Aristotle, in certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 'Dicto uero eodem multipliciter.  Uno quidem modo secundum numerum, quod dicimus aliquando 
ipsum.  Hoc autem si ratione et numero unum fuerit, ut tu tibi ipsi et specie et materia unum.  
Amplius autem si ratio prime substantie unum fuerit, ut equales linee recte eedem'.  Met., 1054a34-b2 
(ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 202 (my emphasis).   
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passages in the Metaphysica, looks upon form (or essence) as a nature which individuals 
hold in common with others of their kind: in Metaphysica VII.8, he wants to argue that 
Socrates and Callias are the same with respect to their forms; the way in which each 
is like himself and no other (the way in which each is numerically the same as himself) 
is restricted to his possession of his own flesh and bones: this matter, and no other 
matter.161 
Even so, other passages in Aristotle's works, pertinent more precisely to the 
question of bodily identity over time and across change, were, in two respects, in tension 
with the idea that the resurrection of the very same individual body as that which 
formerly lived would, or even could, necessarily involve the gathering together of the 
material particular to it.  
First, Aristotle's discussion of growth at De generatione et corruptione I.5 implied that 
the identity of a human's body throughout his or her life was completely independent of 
the exchange of its matter, and was instead dependent on form.  This contradicted 
the account of nutrition and growth in Peter Lombard's Sentences, which posited that 
each individual body had a collection of particles within it (its 'truth of human 
nature') which served as the material core of its continuing individuality and identity 
during mortal life, and from which it would be constituted at the resurrection.162  If 
Aristotle's account of growth were right, and an individual's material part made no 
necessary contribution to his or her continuing identity over a lifetime, why would his 
or her bodily identity at the resurrection depend on the recovery of any matter in 
particular?   
Second, Aristotle's account of the dead body seemed to leave little room for any 
sense in which an individual human's matter could remain the same thing, their 
matter, after their death and after, subsequently, having been scattered and 
incorporated into the bodies of other living things.  This second point of tension was 
created in part by the fact that Aristotle's physics was continuist rather than atomist 
or corpuscular.  If matter is a collection of particles or atoms, each a thing in itself, 
then it is intuitively appreciable that a set of particles belonging to a particular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Met., 1034a5-10.   
162 See above, pp. 15-17. 
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person's body might each remain the same thing across the period of time separating 
their death from their resurrection.  But if, as in Aristotle's science, the underlying 
structure of the physical world is a material continuum, or a material principle subject 
to various substantial forms, it is not obvious how a particular body's matter can, in 
itself, remain the same thing across a sequence of changes through which it serves as 
the subject of different substantial forms in succession.   
This chapter will set out the passages in Aristotle's texts that created these two key 
points of tension with the literal understanding of the doctrine of bodily resurrection 
to which Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries subscribed.  Aquinas would 
attempt to resolve them, building upon Aristotle's science in order to demonstrate 
that the correct application of reason would reach conclusions about the conditions 
for bodily identity and postmortem bodily continuity that were in harmony with the 
implications of the faith.  Doing this would require Aquinas to innovate, and in doing 
so he would draw upon certain insights he found in the work of the Commentator 
Averroes on bodily identity.  
The key to resolving each of these points of tension would be Aristotle's 
mathematical concept of 'body', which the Commentator had made central to his own 
work on bodily identity.  Chapter 1 introduced Aristotle's idea that the human body 
is the 'proper matter' for, or the material subject with an organic constitution 
appropriate for, a rational soul, and that the individual human body is still such a 
material subject, but with its own unique material characteristics.  In his natural 
philosophical works, Aristotle also gives a geometrical definition of 'body': it is a 
particular kind of 'quantity', namely a three-dimensional structure.  Averroes, and 
Aquinas following him, would deduce that any natural body, including any human 
body, had a three-dimensional structure particular to it.  This physical structure was 
not a substantial form, but an accidental form.   
In his commentary on Aristotle's work on growth, Averroes simply indicated that 
the body's structuring form remains in it, and stays the same, as it grows and 
diminishes across material exchange.  As we will see in chapter 4, Aquinas would 
argue, furthermore, that the continuing identity of the body's quantitative structure 
underpinned its material continuity during mortal life.  
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The bulk of the present chapter's discussion will be devoted to discussing the 
second point of tension between Aristotle's texts and the implications of the faith, in 
the area of postmortem bodily identity and material continuity.  Averroes held, for 
reasons to do with the logic of Aristotle's account of substantial generation and 
corruption, that the material principle in an Aristotelian physics had to be invested 
with a bodily structure of its own.  This structure could account for the identity of 
any particular section of matter, rendering it this matter, even as it served as the 
substratum for a series of radical substantial changes (of which bodily death was one 
example).  Chapter 4 of this thesis will argue that, in his discussions of the general 
resurrection, Aquinas was advancing towards a position on the nature of matter 
similar to that of the Commentator.   
1. Body as a Kind of Quantity 
Aristotle's mathematical concept of 'body', then, provides the jumping-off point.  
Aristotle offers mathematical definitions of 'body' in several places.  In the Categoriae, 
after completing his exposition on substance, he discusses, in turn, the various 
categories of what scholastic theologians would call 'accidents' or the features 
belonging to substances and ontologically dependent on them.  First in line among 
the accidental categories is quantity.  Quantity (quantum), Aristotle writes, can be 
either discrete, like number, or continuous, like lines, surfaces, and bodies, time and 
place.163  
Aristotle outlines features that differentiate body, and other the continua which 
comprise it, namely lines and surfaces, from other kinds of quantity.  Bodies (and 
their lines and surfaces in turn) have parts which join at common boundaries: the 
parts of a line join at a point; the parts of a surface join at a line; the parts of a body 
join at a line or along a surface.  Each part of a body (or line or surface) has a relative 
position to other parts within the whole: each part is situated somewhere, and it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Cat., 4b20-25.  
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possible to distinguish it, say where it is in relation to the whole, and explain to which 
other parts it is contiguous.164   
Aristotle's geometrical definition of body in De caelo is put differently, but is 
consistent with that in the Categoriae.  The basic understanding, again, is that a body is 
a geometrical solid.  In De caelo I.1, a body is defined as a magnitude, which is 
continuous in (or spatially extended in) or in other words, can be divided in, three 
dimensions.  A line is continuous in only one direction or dimension, and a surface 
only in two.  Since it is three dimensional, and is thus spatially extended in every 
possible direction, Aristotle explains, body alone is a 'complete' (perfecta) magnitude.165   
Defining quantity (quantum) in his lexicon of philosophical terms in Metaphysica V, 
Aristotle draws together aspects of the definitions of body in the Categoriae and De 
caelo.  He explains that a quantity is anything that is divisible into intrinsic parts, each 
of which has its own kind of unity and can be pointed to as a 'this something’ (hoc 
aliquid).  There are two basic sorts of quantity.  On the one hand there are 
'multitudes', or countable quantities.  A countable quantity is just a set or group of 
things, whose parts are not physically continuous with one another (like a pile of 
books).  On the other hand there are 'magnitudes', whose potential parts, or the parts 
into which they might be divided, are continuous with one another.  A magnitude 
that is continuous in one dimension is called a length, one that is continuous in two 
dimensions is called a breadth and one that is continuous in three dimensions is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 'Similter autem et in corpore habebis utique accipere communem terminum, lineam et superficiem, 
ad quem corporis partes copulantur', 'locum enim quendam corporis partes optinent, que ad quendam 
communem terminum copulantur', 'partes quidem linee positionem habent ad invicem (quelibet enim 
ipsarum iacet alicubi, et habebis utique percipere et assignare ubi quelibet iacet in plano et ad quam 
partem reliquarum copulantur); similter autem et partes plani positionem quandam habent (similiter 
enim uitque assignabitur ubi quelibet iacet, et que copulantur ad invicem).  Similter autem et que 
solidi...'.  Cat. 5a5-24, Categoriae vel Praedicamenta.  Translatio Boethii.  Editio composita.  Translatio Guillelmi de 
Moerbeka, (ed.) L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus, I 1-5 (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 3. 
Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, pp. 93-4.     
165  'Continuum quidem igitur est, quod divisibile in semper divisibilia: Corpus autem, quod 
omniaquaque divisibile.  Magnitudinis autem quae quidem ad unum, linea; quae autem ad duo, 
planum; quae autem ad tria, corpus', 'corpus utique erit solum e magnitudinibus perfecta. Solum enim 
determinatum est tribus; hoc autem est omne.  Terquaque aute, existens divisible, omniquaque est 
divisible', 'Quaecumque quidem igitur divisibiles magnitudines sunt, et continuae haec sunt '.  
Aristotle, De caelo (hereafter DC), 268a5-10, 22-27, edited in Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in libros 
Aristotelis de caelo et mundo, de generatione et corruptione et meteologicorum, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 3 (Rome: 
Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1886), p. 5.  For similar definitions of body, see also Aristotle, Topica, 
142b24, Phys., 204b20, Met., 1016b28, 1066b31.     
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called a depth.  A finite length is called a line, a finite breadth is called a surface, and 
a finite depth is called a body.166   
According to Aristotle, then, 'body' considered in a mathematical way, or body as 
defined in the category of quantity, is a finite structure, spatially extended and 
divisible in three dimensions, with parts that are distinguishable from and continuous 
with one another, each of which has a definite position relative to other parts within 
the whole.   
Furthermore, in the Categoriae, Aristotle draws a distinction between quantity, or 
mathematical structure, on the one hand, and shape (figura), or what he calls the 
external form of a thing (circa unumquodque existens forma), on the other.  This external 
form, figura or shape, Aristotle states, is a kind of quality, not a kind of quantity: he 
would draw a distinction, however fine, between the internal structure of a body and 
the external shape that follows upon that structure.  A surface, for example, is a two-
dimensional continuous quantity, or mathematical structure, and Aristotle would 
point out that we qualify it as being a certain shape: triangular, or quadrangular for 
example.167   
The same would go for a three-dimensional body: we could discuss its intrinsic 
structure and the arrangement of its parts and surfaces; to say that it has a particular 
overall shape as its external form would be to point directly to a different, if closely 
related, aspect of it.  Thomas Aquinas would treat quantitative structure, on the one 
hand, and shape or figura, on the other hand, as really distinct, but very closely 
related accidental forms.  He would describe figura as a quality, or form, literally 
'surrounding quantity' (forma circa quantitatem): for Aquinas, figura consists in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 'Quantum igitur quod est diuisible in ea que insunt, quorum utrumque aut singulum unum aliquid 
et hoc aliquid natum est esse.  Multitudo ergo quantum aliquid si numerabilis fuerit, magnitudo autem 
si mensurabilis fuerit.  Dicitur autem multitudo quidem diuisible potestate in non continua, magnitudo 
autem quod in contina, magnitudinis vero que quidem ad unum continua longitudo, que autem ad 
duo latitudo, que autem ad tria profunditas.  Horum autem... finita... longitudo linea et latitudo 
superficies et profundum corpus'.  Met., 1020a5-15 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 110.  Cf. Met., 1066b23 
and Phys., 204b5.   
167 'Quartum autem genus qualitatis figure et circa unumquodque existens forma, adhuc autem cum 
hiis rectitudo et curvitas, et si quid aliud simile est hiis; unumquodque enim horum quale aliquid 
dicitur; eo enim quod triangulare vel quadrangulare sit, quale aliquid dicitur, et eo quod rectum vel 
curvum.  Et secundum formam autem unumquodque quale aliquid dicitur'.  Cat., 10a11-16 (ed.) L. 
Minio-Paluello, 3. Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, p. 104.    
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'bounding' or in the physical limits (terminatio) of the underlying quantitative 
structure.168    
Now, Aristotle explicitly holds that mathematical structures are intrinsic to 
natural bodies.  He explains in the Physica that natural bodies contain surfaces, lines, 
and points, which are the subject matter of mathematics.  Since Aristotle's physics is 
continuist, geometry, the very science that studies continuous magnitudes, can be 
applied to nature.169  Aristotle thinks that both natural philosopher and the geometer 
treat of these mathematical objects, but unlike the natural philosopher the geometer 
treats of them only in the abstract, not insofar as they occur in physical bodies.170  He 
does not, however, thoroughly and explicitly import a discussion of the role of 
quantitative structure into his various physical and metaphysical analyses of natural 
bodies and the changes they undergo in the same way that both Averroes or Aquinas 
later would.    
2. The Identity of the Mortal Body: Growth and Material Exchange 
The Commentator Averroes brought the natural body's quantitative structure 
into play in order to shed light on an area of obscurity that he identified in Aristotle's 
discussion of growth at De generatione et corruptione I.5.  This was the passage in which 
Aristotle introduced the idea, problematic for any theologian subscribing to the 
traditional understanding of bodily resurrection as the gathering together of the 
matter particular to a body, that a living body could remain the same thing across 
growth despite the exchange of potentially all of its matter.  
In De generatione et corruptione I.5, then, Aristotle defines growth (augmentatio) and its 
opposite diminution (diminutio) as changes with respect to the size (circa magnitudinem) of 
something.  He makes it clear that the thing that grows must already possess some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 'figura, quae consistit in terminatione quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem', ST I , q. 7, 
a. 1, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 4, p. 72.  Cf. also ST I, q. 78, a. 3, ad 2, and ST III, q. 63, a. 2 
ad 1.   
169 Cf. R. Glasner, Averroes’ Physics: A Turning Point in Medieval Natural Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p. 
172.   
170 Phys., 193b21-194a12.  Cf. also DC, 268a1ff, and for comment on this point, R. Sorabji, Matter, 
Space and Motion.  Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel (London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 16.   
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physical size.171  He elaborates upon this definition: for a case of growth to occur, 
three criteria must be met.  First, each part of the growing thing must increase in size 
(every part of flesh if the thing which is growing is flesh), or, in other words, that 
which grows does so proportionately; second, something must be added to the thing 
that grows (that is, new matter); finally, the thing which grows must be preserved and 
remain the same throughout the change, even if its size does not remain the same.172  
By noting that that which grows will be precisely that which remains the same 
throughout this change, Aristotle’s analysis promises an account of the basis for 
bodily identity across change.  
So what, according to Aristotle, is the basis for the sameness of a body despite 
changes in its size and the accession of new material to it?  Aristotle first sets out that 
the body’s heterogeneous parts such as its hands, feet, head and so on (anomiomerea) 
grow only because the homogenous parts (omiomerea), the flesh and bone from which 
these heterogeneous parts are composed, themselves grow.173   
The focus of the discussion having been shifted to focus squarely on the 
homogenous parts, flesh and bone, Aristotle goes on to explain that there is one 
aspect from which we can see that flesh and bone are in flux, and another aspect 
from which we can see that they remain the same across this change.  Flesh and bone 
are composites of matter and form: the words 'flesh' and 'bone' can be applied both to 
the material (the materia) and to the formal aspect (the species) of these parts.174  The 
first and second phenomena involved in growth, that every part of the thing grows 
and that something accedes to the thing that grows, Aristotle continues, can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 'Augmentatio enim est existentis magnitudinis additamentum, diminutio autem minoramentum: 
ideo oportet habere aliquam magnitudinem quod augetur'.  DGEC, 320b30-34 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 27-8.     
172 'Oportet enim salvare ratione existentia eius quod augetur et diminutur.  Hec autem tria sunt, 
quorum unum quidem est quamcumque partem maiorem esse eius quod augetur magnitudinis, verbi 
gratia si caro carnis; et adveniente aliquo, et tertium, ut salvetur quod augetur et maneat... cum autem 
[aliquid]... aut augetur aut diminutur manet idem quod augetur aut alteratur, sed... magnitudo eadem 
non manet'.  DGEC, 321a18-26 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 28-9 (my insertion).     
173 'anomiomerea augetur cum omiomerea augetur (componitur enim ex his unumquodque)'.  DGEC, 
321b18-19 (ed.) Judycka, p. 30.  On the homogenous and heterogeneous parts of the body cf. above, 
p. 50.   
174 'caro et os et unaqueque talium partium est duplex, quemadmodum et aliorum in materia speciem 
habentium: et enim materia dicitur et species caro aut os'.  DGEC, 321b19-21 (ed.) Judycka, p. 30.  
	   	   	  76 
present in flesh and bone according to their formal aspect (secundum speciem) but not 
according to their material aspect (secundum materiam).175   
He illustrates this using a somewhat obscure image of a measuring vessel being 
used to measure out water: the water that comes to be in the measuring vessel is 
constantly changing.  Aristotle intends the water to represent the material aspect of 
flesh.  When flesh grows, it is not the case that the flesh's matter itself is added to with 
respect to each and every one of its parts, it is rather the case that, during growth, 
matter is in flux: some matter flows out of the bodily member and new matter flows 
in.  What is added to in all of its parts when flesh grows and therefore, we may 
assume, what is also the very thing that remains the same when flesh grows, is its form 
(forma et species).176  Aristotle captures, using a different image, the way in which new 
matter is incorporated into flesh: when wood is consumed by fire, the formal aspects 
of fire are imparted to the wood’s matter.  As new logs are placed on a burning fire, it 
is fed and it grows (this is not to be confused with a situation in which a fire is generated 
anew when wood suddenly catches light).177   
Now, Averroes notes in his 'middle' commentary on De generatione et corruptione that 
Aristotle's claim that flesh remains the same and grows in all of its parts with respect 
to its form or species is far from straightforward.  As mentioned in chapter 1, the term 
species, as found in the Aristoteles Latinus, was usually read by Aristotle's interpreters as 
referring to a nature-defining, 'substantial' form.178  In that case the form with respect 
to which flesh would be understood to grow would be the soul, which, for Aristotle, is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 'Quamcumque igitur partem augmentari et adveniente aliquo, secundum quidem speciem est 
contingens, secundum autem materiam non est'.  DGEC, 321b23-25 (ed.) Judycka, p. 30.  
176 'Oportet autem intelligere, quemadmodum si quis mensurabit eadem mensura aquam: semper 
enim aliud et aliud quod generatur.  Sic utique augmentatur materia carnis, sed non cuicumque parti 
omni adgeneratur, sed hoc quiden defluit, hoc autem advenit, forme autem et speciei cuicumque 
particule', 'Quapropter est quidem sic quodcumque carnis auctum est, est autem sic non: secundum 
speciem quidem enim cuicumque advenit, secundum materiam autem non'.  DGEC, 321b24-27, 33-
35 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 30-1.    
177 'Maius quidem totum generatum est adveniente quidem aliquo, quod vocatur cibus et contrarium, 
transmutante autem in eadem speciem', 'Quemadmodum ignis tangens urenda ita in eo quod augetur 
et ente actu caro, inens augible adveniente potentia carne fecit actu carnem.  Igitur simul ente; si enim 
seorsum, generatio.  Est quidem enim ita ignem facere in existente adiungentem ligna.  Sed sic 
quidem augmentatio est.  Quando autem ipsa ligna incendutur, generatio'.  DGEC, 321b35-322a2, 
322a11-17 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 31-2.   
178 See above, chapter 1, section 1.1. 
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just the body's 'first actuality', its capacity to perform the functions of life.179  And yet 
it makes no sense to say that the soul increases in size, since only things with physical 
size can grow, as Aristotle himself establishes at the outset of this discussion on 
growth.180  
Given this, Averroes offers an alternative suggestion for what the form or species, 
with respect to which flesh and bone grow, might be.  He interprets Aristotle’s 
measuring vessel as a leather bottle, which expands and contracts depending on the 
volume of water poured into it.  The water, as in Aristotle’s text, represents matter in 
flux in the bodily member.  The bottle represents the form of the bodily member, 
which remains the same as the member grows or diminishes.  Crucially, Averroes 
clarifies that the form in question is an accidental form: the bottle’s (or the member’s) 
physical, three-dimensional shape (figura).181  We can imagine the relationship between 
form and matter in growth, Averroes' account suggests, as follows.  The bodily 
member's (three-dimensional) shape or in other words, its proportions remain (that is, 
something accedes to every part of its shape); the body's size and the matter from 
which it is composed are those things that change.   
Averroes' identification of the form that persists as a body part grows as its figura 
squares well with another passage in Aristotle’s account of growth.  Aristotle thinks 
that his theory that the phenomena of growth belong to the formal (and not to the 
material) aspects of bodily members is easier to grasp when attention is turned 
towards the body’s heterogeneous parts.  The difference between the formal (and 
permanent) and material (and fluid) aspects of a hand, for example, is easy to point 
out.  We can see exactly what remains with respect to the hand across this change: it 
retains its proportions, growing according to a consistent pattern.  The soul’s operations 
with respect to growth are thus manifest in it.  Of course, Aristotle maintains that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See above, p. 43.  
180 Cf. further discussion on this point in Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 93-6.  
181 'si imaginaris unum mensurans, quod aliquando crescit per illud, quod intrat in ipsum, & aliquando 
diminuitur, conservando figura eius, tunc imaginaberis dispositionem formae in suo cremento in 
respectu materiae.  Et hoc recte imaginaberis, quando imaginaberis utrem corii, quod quando intrat 
in ipsum aqua pauca diminuitur, quando autem multa crescit, & in utroque conservat figuram suam'.  
Aristotelis De coelo, De Generatione & Corruptione, Meteorologicorum, De Plantis cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in 
eosdem commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, Vol. V, Book I, comment 36, f. 358r, A-B 
(my emphasis).  
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exactly the same distinction obtains between permanent and fluid aspects of flesh 
itself as it grows in a proportionate way (holding, as he does, that the hand grows in a 
proportionate way precisely because the flesh and bone from which it is compose 
grow in a proportionate way), but he is ready to concede that this is not immediately 
appreciable, as it is in the case of the hand.182  
Averroes explains that if it is said that the phenomena of growth are present in 
the body’s parts secundum formam (substituted, in his commentary, for speciem), and 
substantial form is meant, then such a statement cannot mean that the substantial form 
itself grows: it must be maintained that growth can only happen with respect to 
physical size (secundum magnitudinem), to something already possessing size.  Such a 
statement, therefore, would have to mean that the body considered insofar as it 
possessed of size and structure (the quantum) grows insofar as it has a substantial form 
endowing it with the capacity for growth.183  
And so, in Averroes' commentary on De generatione et corruptione I.5 Aquinas would 
find a convincing argument that the Stagirite's account did not actually mean to imply 
that bodily identity across growth and material exchange was dependent only on the 
identity of the soul, even if Aristotle held that all of a body's matter was in theory 
exchangeable.  Crucially, the Commentator had noted that what was continuous in 
the body in addition to the soul, and what remained the same as the body grew was 
its shape or figura (and therefore the structure underlying that shape).   
With the doctrine of general resurrection in mind, Aquinas would, in refining his 
own analysis of growth and bodily identity, follow the Commentator and go one step 
further.  As indicated, not only would Aquinas argue that the individual body's 
quantitative structure remains the same in it across its growth, he would also argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 'In anomiomereis autem hoc magis manifestum, verbi gratia manu, quoniam proportionaliter 
auctum est; materia enim alia ens manifesta magis specie hic quam in carne et omiomereis'.  DGEC, 
321b27-34 (ed.) Judycka, pp. 30-1.  
183 'Manifestum est, si aliquis dicat augmentum esse secundum formam, quod non vult dicere formam 
augmentari, secundum quod est forma; augmentum enim est secundum magnitudinem... sed illud, 
quod augetur in omnibus partibus, non augetur, in eo quod est quantum, sed in eo quod est quantum 
habens formam.  Quod autem augmentum in omnibus partibus non est, nisi inquantum partes habent 
formam, manifestum est'.  Aristotelis... De Generatione & Corruptione... cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem 
commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, Vol. V, Book I, comment 37, f. 358v, G.   
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that the individual body's persistent structural form would be responsible for 
guaranteeing its material identity across material exchange.  
3. The Identity of the Corpse   
So much for the identity of the mortal body.  What did Aristotle have to say 
about postmortem bodily and material continuity?  The answer is, very little.  Aristotle's 
account of the dead body focuses on the formal change it has undergone.  He 
evidently saw no reason to address in any detail a philosophical question that would 
be of direct interest to Aquinas in his work on the resurrection, namely the question of 
how the matter particular to an individual body might remain the same thing in 
itself, even as it served as the subject for a succession of different substantial forms.   
And it is difficult to see how Aristotle's account of substantial change leaves room 
for this possibility, not least because Aristotle eschewed the idea that matter is a 
collection of atoms which could potentially be scattered and regathered (as in 
Augustine's account of bodily resurrection184) in favour of the idea that matter is a 
principle in which various forms manifest themselves.  
Starting with his account of the corpse, the Stagirite states, uncompromisingly, 
that a dead body is radically different from the living body that has corrupted into it.  
In De anima II.1, having set out his theory that soul is the body's defining (substantial) 
form and first actuality, Aristotle explains a corollary of the theory.  Taking as his 
starting point a part of a living animal body with a particular capacity, an eye with its 
capacity for sight, Aristotle states that if the eye were an animal, then sight would be 
its soul.  When sight leaves an eye, he continues, that eye is not really an eye at all; it 
is an eye only equivocally, in the same way that a stone or painted eye is an 'eye'.  In 
very first sentences of his Categoriae, indeed, Aristotle had explained that a word is 
used equivocally when it is applied to two things that differ in their definition (and 
therefore in terms of their nature or real substance), like a man and a 'man' in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 See above, pp. 15-16. 
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painting.185  What goes for the heterogeneous parts of the body, of course, also goes 
for the homogenous parts from which they are constituted.  The word 'flesh' can be 
applied only equivocally to the material of the dead body.  Just as an eye, properly 
speaking, is the site of a soul's operation, so is flesh.186  In De anima II.1, Aristotle 
extends his analysis to the whole body.  The relation between a part of perception 
(such as sight) and a part of the perceiving body (such as the eye) is the same as that 
between all of perception and the whole perceiving body: a dead body, lacking its 
soul, and therefore lacking the capacities and functions of a living thing, is just as 
different from a living body as a stone eye is different from a living eye.187   
Furthermore, when a body dies, Aristotle holds, not only formal change (the loss 
of a soul), but also material change, occurs.  Something that has cast away its soul (a 
corpse) is not potentially alive, whereas something that has a soul (a living body) is 
potentially alive,188 or the appropriate material subject for a soul.  In other words, to 
revive the terminology introduced in chapter 1, the matter comprising a corpse is no 
longer a soul's 'proper' matter.   
And yet, looking closely at Aristotle's important discussion of the concept of 
proper matter at Metaphysica VIII.4-5, he does provide at least an outline of an 
account of postmortem bodily continuity.  Aristotle explains that all things capable of 
undergoing transformation into one another share matter.  When it comes to 
changes that we couch more readily in terms of corruption than of generation, such 
as animal death or the souring of wine into vinegar, we do not tend to say that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 'Equivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune, que vero secundum nomen ratio substantie 
altera, puta animal homo et quod pingitur'.  Cat., 1a 1-5 (ed.) L. Minio-Paluello, 3. Translatio Guillelmi 
de Moerbeka, p. 85.     
186 DGA, 734b24-26.  
187 'Considerare autem in partibus oportet quod dictum est.  Si enim esset oculus animal, anima utique 
ipsius, uisus esset: hic autem substancia oculi que secundum rationem, oculus autem materia uisus est, 
quo deficiente non est adhuc oculus nisi equivoce, sicut lapideus aut depictus.  Oportet igitur accipere 
quod est in parte in toto uiuente corpore; proportionaliter namque habet sicut pars ad partem, totus 
senses ad totum corpus sensitiuum secundum quod huiusmodi'.  DA, 412b17-25, edited in Aquinas, In 
DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 74.  The application of this kind of analysis to the body and 
its components is found in several other places in Aristotle’s works.  See R. Sorabji, 'Body and Soul in 
Aristotle', Philosophy, 49 (1974) p. 87, and n. 67, on the primary importance in Aristotle's thought of 
function, over structure, when defining a thing. 
188 'Est autem non abiciens animam potencia ens ut vivat, set quod habens'.  DA, 412b25-26, edited in 
Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 74.   
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animal is potentially dead or that the wine is potentially vinegar, even though the 
dead body comes from the living and vinegar from wine.  But in fact, matter of a 
living animal’s body, as that body undergoes corruption, should be understood to be in 
(proper) potency to, and as the (proper) matter of, a corpse: a dead body comes from 
a living body, Aristotle notes, as naturally as night comes from day.189   
So the living body and the dead share a material subject which is in some sense 
the same thing, according to Aristotle, notwithstanding its deterioration from a state 
in which it is the appropriate material subject for a soul into one in which it is the 
proper matter for a corpse.    
4. Substantial Change and Material Continuity  
In order to fully explain the implications of the doctrine of the resurrection of the 
body for the nature of matter, or in order to construct a convincing account of the 
continuity of matter particular to individual bodies across death and resurrection, it 
would not be enough simply to point to Aristotle's view that the material principle is 
the continuant of any natural change in which one substantial form is lost and 
another gained.  Aquinas would want to give an account of how the matter particular 
to an individual human body could remain the same thing across any possible case of 
substantial change, for which it might serve as the substratum, after the death of that 
body, and prior to its resurrection.   
This was a deeply difficult task, particularly because Aquinas understood the 
ultimate continuant of any case of substantial change to be prime matter (materia 
prima).  Here, he was following a long tradition of Neoplatonist interpreters of 
Aristotle's texts, who had attached the name 'prime matter' to the matter understood 
to be found at the most primitive level in Aristotle's physical universe, the matter that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 'De materiali autem substantia oportet non latere quia... si ex... eadem materia ut principium hiis 
que fiunt, est tamen aliqua propria cuiuslibet', 'Nec omnis materia est sed quorum generatio est et 
transmutatio in invicem.  Quecumque autem sine transmutari sunt aut non, non est horum materia... 
Dubitatio autem quedam est et quare vinum non materia aceti nec potentia acetum (quamvis fiat ex 
ipso acetum) et vivens potentia mortuus... Animalis uero materia hec secundum corruptionem mortui 
potentia et materia...; fit enim ex hiis ut ex die nox'.  Met., 1044a15-19, 1044b27-30, 1044b34-1045a4 
(ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, pp. 174, 176.   
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served as the substratum for change between the elements, or the very simplest 
bodies.190   
This traditional notion of prime matter was, it is likely, the product of an attempt 
to harmonise Aristotle's thought with Plato's: scholars were looking in Aristotle's 
writings for an equivalent of the material receptacle from Plato's Timaeus, which was 
conceived as being able to receive all forms, or as the common matter for all 
forms. 191   This concept of prime matter, then, became a standard fixture in 
interpretations of Aristotle: scholars at western medieval universities absorbed the 
concept of prime matter through various influential commentaries on or summaries 
of Aristotle's and Plato's works, both Neoplatonist commentaries originating in late 
antiquity, and the eleventh- and twelfth-century writings of Avicenna and Averroes 
respectively.192   
Aristotle's own referent for prote hyle (which would translate into Latin as materia 
prima), in fact, was not the material substratum of transformation between the 
elements.  The expression is ambiguous in his writings and can point either to a 
thing's proper matter (the bronze of a bronze sculpture), or directly to an element 
constitutive of a thing (water in the case of soluble things).193   
Modern scholarly debate about whether or not the traditional concept of 'prime 
matter' is detectable in Aristotle’s account of natural change, therefore, turns on the 
question of whether any such primitive material level, serving as the ultimate 
continuant of all possible cases of substantial change, is in fact a present and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 What Aristotle calls 'simple bodies' are in fact different from the elements.  Aristotle holds that the 
'air' and 'fire' that we observe in nature are not in fact the same as the simple bodies themselves; each 
of the 'elements' that we are familiar with is in fact a mixed body, though of course a mixture 
dominated by the simple body to which it corresponds.  DGEC, 330b22-25.      
191 de Haas, John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter, pp. xi, 255.    
192 H. R. King, 'Aristotle without Prima Materia', Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1956), pp. 388-9, W. 
Charlton (trans.), Aristotle’s Physics, Books I and II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), Appendix: Did 
Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter?, pp. 141-5. 
193 See Aristotle’s discussion of the term 'nature' in Metaphysica V.  'Nature' can mean 'first matter': 
'Natura autem materia prima; et hec dupliciter, aut que ad ipsum prima aut omnino prima, ut 
operum ereorum ad ipsa quidem primum es, totaliter vero forsan aqua, si omnia liquabilia aqua'.  
Met., 1015a 7-11 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 97.  For commentary on this passage see King, 'Aristotle 
without Prima Materia', pp. 371-372.  On Aristotle’s few uses of the expression prote hyle, see Charlton 
(trans.), Aristotle’s Physics, Appendix: Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter?, pp. 129-31.    
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conceptually necessary aspect of Aristotle's physics.194  Those modern commentators 
who deny that such an ultimate material substratum is present and conceptually 
necessary instead hold that, for Aristotle, the elements themselves occupy the lowest 
or least developed level on the material scale in the natural world.195   
The important point to grasp for now is why Aquinas's acceptance of prime 
matter, conceived in line with the Aristotlelian commentary tradition as the only 
continuant of all possible cases of substantial change, made the problem of 
accounting for the continuity of matter particular to individual human bodies 
particularly demanding.  Prime matter, precisely because it occupied this very lowest 
level in the physical universe, was understood to be completely featureless in itself.   
Aristotle's ancient and medieval interpreters found a description for what they 
called prime matter in his Metaphysica VII.3.  Here, Aristotle, discussing the nature of 
substance, approaches the material principle not through a physical analysis, as the 
substratum of change, but through a logical and metaphysical analysis: stripping all 
forms from it, he considers it as the ultimate subject of determination by forms.  
Matter considered in this way, to which, just in itself, none of the predicates that we 
use to describe actual entities apply, cannot be substance or a 'this'.  The conclusion 
of the passage reads as follows:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 The debate can be followed through the following articles: King, 'Aristotle without Prima Materia'; 
Charlton (trans.), Aristotle’s Physics: Appendix: Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter?, W. Charlton, 
'Prime Matter: A Rejoinder', Phronesis, 28 (1983), pp. 197-211; F. Solmsen, 'Aristotle and Prime 
Matter: A Reply to Hugh R. King', Journal of the History of Ideas, 19 (1958), pp. 243-52; A. R. Lacey, 
'The Eleatics and Aristotle on some Problems of Change', Journal of the History of Ideas, 26 (1965), pp. 
451-68; H. M. Robinson, 'Prime Matter in Aristotle', Phronesis, 19 (1974), pp. 168-88; B. Jones, 
'Aristotle's Introduction of Matter', The Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), pp. 474-500; R. Dancy 'On 
Some of Aristotle’s Second Thoughts About Substances: Matter', The Philosophical Review, 87 (1978), 
pp. 372-413; C. J. F. Williams (trans.), Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 
Appendix: Prime Matter in De generatione et corruptione, pp. 211-9; D. W. Graham, 'The Paradox of 
Prime Matter' Journal of the History of Philosophy, 25 (1987), pp. 475-90; K. C. Cook, 'The Underlying 
Thing, the Underlying Nature and Matter. Aristotle's Analogy in Phys. I.7', Apeiron, 22 (1989), pp. 
105-19.  
195  Further aspects of the traditional interpretation of Aristotle are therefore also rejected as 
retrospective distortions (such as the notion that the elemental bodies are composites in the traditional 
sense, comprising matter and substantial form), see King, 'Aristotle without Prima Materia', pp. 377-87, 
or misleading assumptions (such as the notion that for Aristotle the substratum of change in every case 
remained across it, see Charlton (trans.), Aristotle’s Physics, Appendix: Did Aristotle Believe in Prime 
Matter?, pp. 131-2.  A reply to Charlton on the latter point is A. Code, 'The Persistence of Aristotelian 
Matter', Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 29 (1976), pp. 
357-67, see esp. pp. 363-5. 
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'Dico autem materiam que secundum se neque quid neque quantitas 
neque aliud aliquid dicitur quibus ens est determinatum'.196   
This passage from Metaphysica VII.3 would become the standard definition of 
prime matter (materia prima) for scholastic theologians, as the following except from a 
widely circulated late thirteenth-century philosophical florilegium, the Auctoritates 
Aristotelis, illustrates:   
'Materia prima nec est quid, nec est quantum, nec quale, nec aliquid 
aliorum quibus ens est determinatum'.197 
So the crux of the problem facing Aquinas can now be appreciated with some 
clarity.  If the matter particular to an individual human body would remain the same 
stuff, across death and resurrection, only on the level of prime matter, then by 
definition this would preclude that it might at the same time retain any identifying 
features.   
Aquinas would find a way out of this difficulty in Averroes' analysis of substantial 
change.  The Commentator developed a theory that prime matter itself must be 
invested with some of the formal features that Aristotle had ascribed to a 
mathematical body.  Aquinas would move towards adopting a similar position for 
theological reasons, but Averroes' reasons for positing that more than a featureless 
substratum needed to persist across any case of substantial change were purely 
philosophical.  They were based on a close unpicking of the logic of Aristotle's own 
writings on substantial generation and corruption: matter needed to possess a 
structure of its own, in the Averroes' eyes, for Aristotle's account of substantial change 
to make sense.  In order to follow Averroes' reasoning, it will be helpful to set out his 
theory of matter in the very way in which it was developed, that is to say, as a 
commentary on Aristotle's own account of substantial change. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Met., 1029a20-23 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 135.  
197 Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed.) Hamesse, p. 128 (161).   
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4.1. Aristotle on Substantial Change    
Aristotle's biological account of substantial change was discussed in chapter 1: 
human generation is a complex case of substantial change; the manifestation of 
several intermediate substantial forms is required en route to the emergence of the final 
substantial form, the rational soul.  Aristotle's interpreters read his work on the 
generation of animals in light of his two major presentations of the general 
framework for substantial change, Physica I.6-9, and De generatione et corruptione I.3-4, 
which are both rather more technical.  These two accounts of substantial change are 
structurally similar to one another, and consistent with one another, but differ 
somewhat in respect of their emphasis and the terminology they employ.198   
In the Physica, Aristotle argues that all changes or instances of generation, be they 
natural or artificial, conform to the same model: there are three principles involved in 
every change.  Two of these principles are the 'opposites' or contraries between 
which change takes place: form and its 'privation' (privatio, the lack of that very 
form).199  Form is acquired in generation, and the privation of that form is lost.  In De 
generatione et corruptione, the contraries between which change takes place are 
understood, instead, as two forms that are 'similar in genus but dissimilar in 
species'.200  Averroes would square the Physica and De generatione et corruptione on this 
point by stating that the contraries as described in De generatione et corruptione are in fact 
reducible to the 'primary contrariety' of privation of the form to be acquired (non-
being, or non esse) and that very form.201 
Reasoning, in the Physica, that nothing can itself change into or produce its 
opposite, Aristotle installs a third principle of change: in every change there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 For a brief technical comparison of the two accounts, see Williams (trans.), Aristotle’s De generatione et 
corruptione, commentary section at pp. 83-4.  
199 'unum [principium] autem est ratio, amplius autem contrarium huic privatio est'.  Phys., 191a13-15 
(eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 35.  The word ratio, here meaning definition or account, is read to mean 
form, isasmuch as the latter it is that in virtue of which a thing is defined.     
200 'genere quidem eadem et similia, specie autem dissimilia, talia autem contraria... sunt'.  DGEC, 
324a5-7 (ed.) Judycka, p. 37.   
201 'Amplius invenitur necessario esse illud, ex quod est factio rei, & ad quod est, esse contraria, & 
habere idem genus.  Et quod illa contrarietas reducitur ad primam contrarietatem, scilicet non esse, & 
forma'.  Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. IX, ch. 
1, f. 3v, K.   
	   	   	  86 
underlying thing or substratum which is first subject to the privation of the form to be 
acquired and then to that form.202  When change is merely accidental, substance 
itself serves as the underlying thing: we say that a substance comes to be 'so and so', 
as it undergoes, for example, changes with respect to quantity (or size, as happens in 
growth), quality, relation, time, or place.203   
Only substances come to be or are generated in an unqualified sense (simpliciter).  
The substratum for substantial change, of course, is matter.  Matter is that from 
which a substance comes to be and which persists as a component of the generated 
composite;204 it is conserved across change insofar as it is in potency to form (secundum 
potentiam), and cannot, itself, be generated or corrupted.205   
Aristotle's account of the material substratum for substantial change in De 
generatione et corruptione is slightly different.  This time, Aristotle emphasises not the 
sense in which the substratum remains constant, but the sense in which it changes.206  
The idea that matter itself changes across substantial change has just been touched 
upon in the discussion of Aristotle's analysis of the corpse, and, as noted, the idea 
makes sense in light of Aristotle's concept of proper matter: matter will change from a 
state in which it is the proper matter of one substantial form to a state in which it is 
the proper matter of another.  In accidental change (here called alteration), Aristotle 
explains, a perceptible substratum (or a substance) persists, whereas in substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 'Unde est quidem sicut duo dicenda esse principia, est autem sicut tria; et est quidem sicut 
contraria... est sicut autem non; ab alterutris enim pati contraria inpossible est.  Solvitur autem et hoc 
propterea quod alius est subiectum; hoc enim non est contrarium... Quecumque quidem igitur 
principia circa generationem physicorum, et quomodo tot sint, dictum est; et ostensum est quoniam 
oportet subici aliquid contrariis et contraria duo esse'.  Phys., 190b29-191a5 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, 
pp. 33-4.   
203 'Multipliciter autem cum dicatur fieri, et horum quidem non fieri sed hoc aliquid fieri, simpliciter 
autem fieri substantiarum solum, secundum quidem alia manifestum est quoniam necesse est subici 
aliquid quod fit; et enim quantum et quale et ad alterum et aliquando et ubi fiunt subiecto aliquo'.  
Phys., 190a31-35 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 31-2.   
204 'dico enim materiam primum subiectum unicuique, ex quo fit aliquid cum insit non secundum 
accidens'.  Phys., 192a30-32 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 40.   
205 '[materia] in quantum autem est secundum potentiam... incorruptibilem et ingenitam necesse est 
ipsam esse'.  Phys., 192a27-30 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 40 (my insertion). 
206 'igitur est aliquid subiectum et aliud passio que de subiecto innata est dici, et est transmutatione 
utriusque horum'.  DGEC, 319b8-10 (ed.) Judycka, p. 23.  
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change (here called generation simpliciter), 'the whole' changes: semen changes into 
blood; air condenses into water.207  
One absolutely crucial point must be made clear: for Aristotle, there is never an 
instant in which the material substrate of change is without one (substantial) form or 
another.  It should be remembered that, for Aristotle, the material principle can only 
be grasped in relation to the forms that manifest themselves in it.208  The matter 
subject to the privation of the form that emerges in generation is, at that time, also 
subject to another substantial form, which will be lost in that change.  Substantial 
change is instantaneous; there is no distinct first instant of change; at the very instant 
in which something is changing, it has already changed.209  As Aristotle puts it in De 
generatione et corruptione, the generation of one substance is the corruption of another, 
and vice versa.210 
Aristotle takes it that his model for substantial change resolves difficulties raised 
by earlier thinkers who, denying that something could come to be from 'what is not' 
(that is to say, they held that there must always be some substratum for change), did 
away altogether with the idea that substances could come into being in an 
unqualified way.211  He preserves an account of substantial generation, of the 
fundamental changes we see in nature, then, without making the claim that such 
changes are completely discontinuous, or that something can come to be from 
nothing.  In the Physica he explains that since privation is in its very nature 'non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 'alteratio quidem est, quando manente subiecto sensato ente transmutat in eius passionibus aut 
contrariis aut mediis... Quando autem totum transmutat non manente aliquo sensato ut subiecto 
eodem, sed quasi ex semine sanguis toto aut ex aqua aer aut ex aere omni aqua, generato iam hoc 
tale'.  DGEC, 319b10-18 (ed.) Judycka, p. 24.       
208 Phys., 191a9-11.    
209 This is demonstrated in Phys. VI.5, see esp. 235b30ff.   
210 'De... simpliciter generari... dictum est, et quoniam generationem esse continue causa ut materia 
subiectum, quoniam transmutativum in contraria; et est alterius generatio semper in substantiis 
alterius corruptio et alterius corruptio alterius generatio'.  DGEC, 319a17-23 (ed.) Judycka, p. 22.      
211 This is slightly over-simplified.  In fact, these earlier thinkers had supposed that whatever comes to 
be must come to be either from what is (in which case it is in being already) or from what is not (which 
they took to be an unacceptable thesis): 'Quod autem singulariter sic solvitur et antiquorum defectus, 
dicimus post hec.  Querentes enim secundum philosophiam primi veritatem et naturam rerum... 
dicunt neque fieri neque nullum neque corrumpi, propter id quod necessarium est fieri quod aut ex eo 
quod est aut ex eo quod non est, ex his autem utriusque inpossible est esse; neque enim quod est fieri 
(esse enim iam) et ex eo quod non est nichil utique fieri; subici enim aliquid oportet'.  Phys. 191a23- 32 
(eds.) Bossier and Brams, pp. 35-6.   
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being' and does not remain after generation, and since therefore a thing is 
understood to come to be, in a way, from its privation, there is a qualified sense (ut 
secundum accidens) in which a thing can be understood as coming to be from what is 
not.212  But given the persistence of matter, we are not left with the uncomfortable 
conclusion that something could come into being from nothing absolutely.   
In De generatione et corruptione I.3-4, which does not include the concept of privation 
in its analysis, Aristotle offers an alternative solution (consistent with the solution in 
the Physica): in every case of substantial generation, that which comes to be 
necessarily pre-exists potentially (so what comes to be does not come from nothing) if not 
actually (so what comes to be does, in a way, come from non-being). This, of course, is 
the same idea we encounter in Aristotle’s biological account of the generation of 
animals: a body which potentially possesses a certain kind of soul necessarily pre-
exists both the acquisition of that soul, and therefore the body which actually 
possesses that kind soul (the substance which comes into being simpliciter).  
4.2. Averroes on Substantial Change and Corporeal Structure 
Based on the framework for substantial change just outlined, Averroes is able to 
reach the conclusion that prime matter is invested with a quantitative structure that 
gives to it some of the attributes of a mathematical body.  While the Commentator's 
fullest discussion of this key idea is found in his De substantia orbis, his direct 
commentary on Aristotle's account of substantial change in the Physica would provide 
Aquinas with a second authoritative text on the topic.213   
Averroes admits, in De substantia orbis, that some of the details belonging to the 
model of substantial change he himself offers cannot be found in Aristotle’s texts.  
Even so, he argues, his findings follow so closely from what Aristotle had proved that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 'Nos autem et ipsi dicimus fieri quidem simpliciter nichil ex eo quod non est, sed tamen fieri ex eo 
quod non est ut secundum accidens; ex privatione enim, quod est per se quod non est, non ex eo quod 
est fit'.  Phys. 191b12-16 (eds.) Bossier and Brams, p. 37.    
213 Silvia Donati's work is the best starting point for studying the influence of Averroes' doctrine on 
matter on medieval physics.  See S. Donati, 'The Notion of Dimensiones Indeterminatae in the 
Commentary Tradition of the Physics in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century', in C. 
Leijenhorst, C. Lüthy, and J. M. M. H. Thijssen (eds.) The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from 
Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century (Brill: Leiden, 2002), pp. 189-223, which offers a summary of Averroes' 
position on the corporeal structure in matter at pp. 190-1.   
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the Stagirite himself must have documented those results in a work since lost.214  
Averroes therefore tends to present his own deductions on this topic as if they are 
Aristotle's own.   
There are three strands to the Commentator's argument as to why, according to 
Aristotle's account of substantial change, corporeal structure must persist across every 
imaginable case of it.  
4.2.1. Corporeal Structure as Incorruptible  
First, Averroes makes the basic argument that there must be an incorruptible 
corporeal structure in matter.  As explained, Aristotle held that substantial generation 
and corruption take place between contraries or opposites: privation and form.  Yet, 
as a long line of commentators on Aristotle's texts had in fact noted, all material 
substances subject to generation and corruption are bodies.  If change between 
contraries involved one kind of body being generated and another corrupted, then 
'body' in itself remained across this change or, in order words, was incorruptible: no 
case of generation, as several eminent interpreters of Aristotle observed, proceeded 
from a privation of 'body' (or 'non-body') to 'body'.    
What was this incorruptible 'body'?  Commentators reasoned that it could not be 
prime matter.  Prime matter was featureless and therefore incorporeal, whereas the 
body that persisted across any case of substantial change possessed the characteristic 
properties constant in all material bodies.   
By the sixth century, borrowing vocabulary from Stoic philosophy, Neoplatonist 
commentators on Aristotle's work on substantial change commonly referred to an 
'unqualified body' that persisted across substantial change.  The basic defining feature 
of 'unqualified body' was understood to be extension in three dimensions.215   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 'non tamen omnia, quae diximus, invenimus ea declarata in libris, qui pervenerunt ad nos ex verbis 
Arist. sed aliqua eorum invenimus in eis ab eo declarata, & aliqua sequuntur ex dictis eius.  Apparet 
tamen ex verbis Arist. quod iam declaravit omnia ista in libris, qui non pervenerunt ad nos'.  Averroes 
Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. IX, chapter 1, f. 5v, K.  
215 On these developments, see de Haas, John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter, esp. ch 2.  
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Long before Averroes composed his own scientific works, then, several 
commentators had already drawn upon Aristotle's mathematical definition of body, 
as three-dimensional continuous quantity, in order to theorise that prime matter was 
invested with a basic mathematical structure comprising extension in three 
dimensions (but without determined limits in any direction or dimension).  This 
'unqualified body' was distinct from prime matter, and was conceived as the 
metaphysical layer immediately above it, or, in other words, as the immediate 
substratum for the transformation of the simplest bodies, the elements, into one 
another.216   
Aristotle himself had denied, in De generatione et corruptione, that there was a 'body 
common to everything'.217  Notwithstanding this, his commentators carefully used 
other passages in his works to carve out a position within an Aristotelian 
metaphysical schema for their 'unqualified body', situated above the level of prime 
matter, but below, or prior to, any other kind of formal determination.   
In Metaphysica VII.3, the passage mentioned above in connection with the 
scholastic definition of prime matter, Aristotle analytically 'strips away' every formal 
determination of matter to leave a featureless substratrum ('prime matter' to his 
interpreters).  The Neoplatonist commentary tradition accorded significance to the 
fact that Aristotle, in this analytical exercise, treated the three dimensions, length, 
breadth and depth, as more fundamental than any other property: the Stagirite, 
according to their reading of his text, had stated that prime matter was what was left 
when three-dimensional structure, finally, was taken away.218   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 This simplified account suffices for present purposes.  Commentators discussed other properties 
common to all material bodies (bulk, cohesion, and so on).  For more detail, see de Haas, John 
Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter; F. A. J. de Haas, 'Aristotle's fourteenth aporia and the three 
dimensions in later Neoplatonism' in J. J. Cleary, (ed.) The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 1997), pp. 347-68; H. A. Wolfson Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1929), pp, 579-81; A. Hyman, 'Aristotle’s "First Matter" and Avicenna’s 
and Averroes' "Corporeal Form"', Harry A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem: American Academy for 
Jewish Research, 1965), pp. 385-406; A. D. Stone, 'Simplicius and Avicenna on the Essential 
Corporeity of Material Substance' in R. Wisnovsky (ed.), Aspects of Avicenna (Princeton, NJ: Markus 
Wiener, 2001), pp. 73-130.   
217 'corpus commune enim nullum'.  DGEC 320b23 (ed.) Judycka, p. 27.    
218 de Haas, John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter, pp. 60-3, cf. also pp. 69, 79-80 (for reference 
to a 'traditional abstraction series'), and 85.   
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With reference to Metaphysica VII.3, Neoplatonist commentaries on the Categoriae 
would commonly argue that Aristotle had treated the category of quantity 
immediately after his discussion of substance precisely because three-dimensional 
structure was more fundamental than, and prior to, any of the accidental qualities.219   
Aristotle's commentators, not surprisingly, found various original ways of 
conceiving and analysing the notion of 'unqualified body'.  Only Averroes' work is of 
direct concern here.   
In De substantia orbis, Averroes gives the label 'indeterminate dimensions' 
(dimensiones non terminatae or dimensiones interminatae interchangeably), or simply 'absolute 
body' (corpus simpliciter), to a mathematical structure, whose nature is simply three-
dimensional extension, and which persists in prime matter across all cases of 
substantial change.    
Crucially, for Averroes, this structure, with which prime matter is invested, is really 
distinct from, and defined in contrast to, the 'determinate dimensions' (dimensiones 
terminatae) which comprise the actual, spatially limited, structure, or the quantitative 
accidental form, possessed by the complete individual composite substance comprising 
both matter and substantial form.  
In De substantia orbis Averroes writes that, 'since Aristotle found that all forms [or 
substances] share indeterminate dimensions, he knew that prime matter is never 
stripped of them' or, to translate this into more accessible language, Aristotle knew, 
according to Averroes, that prime matter is never denuded of the most basic kind of 
corporeal structure: extension in three dimensions.  (Averroes also refers to this basic 
structure, in this passage, as 'corporeal form').  If matter were stripped of these 
dimensions, or this extension, Averroes continues, then body would come into being 
from 'non-body' and dimension from 'non-dimension', a notion that Averroes takes to 
be self-evidently absurd, since clearly all material substances between which 
generation and corruption occur are, in fact, three-dimensional bodies.220   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 ibid., p. 99.  
220 Words in square brackets are my insertion.  'Et, quia invenit omnes formas communicari in 
dimensionibus non terminatis, scivit quod prima materia numquam denudatur a dimensionibus non 
terminatis.  Quia, si denudaretur, tunc corpus esset ex non corpore, & dimensio ex non dimensione, & 
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Aristotle also recognised, Averroes continues in De substantia orbis, that if all 
substantial forms (or substances) have this basic mathematical structure consisting of 
extension in three dimensions, or 'indeterminate dimensions', in common, then each 
form (or substance) has its 'proper determinate quantity'.  What he means is that 
certain 'determinate dimensions' follow ontologically on, or a certain spatially limited 
physical structure in act (again, really distinct from the structure with which matter 
itself is invested), follows ontologically on, a certain substantial form in act.  This 
spatially limited structure, 'determinate dimensions', takes an individual substance as 
its subject, just like all other individual accidental forms in act.221   
To illustrate these interrelationships, Averroes cites a simple case of substantial 
change between the elements, to which any natural scientist might bear witness: the 
evaporation of water.  What we see when a body of water is heated (assuming that no 
new matter enters the system222), he writes, is that the water undergoes an increase in 
the spatial limits of its (determinate) dimensions, such that these limits approach the 
(determinate) dimensions of air.  When water reaches the maximum 'quantity of 
dimensions' (that is, determinate dimensions) proper to it, then the subject of the 
substantial change (prime matter) is divested of the substantial form of water, and the 
'quantity of dimensions' (again, determinate dimensions) proper to it, and receives the 
substantial form of air and the 'quantity of dimensions' (determinate dimensions once 
more) proper to air.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tunc formae corporales essent contrariae, & succedentes sibi in hoc subiecto sicut est dispositio de 
forma substantialis'.  Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, 
vol. IX, ch. 1, f. 4r, B-C.  NB. Later in ch. 1 of De substantia orbis this basic structure is referred to as 
dimensiones interminatae (ibid., f. 5r C).  It is clear from the context that both forms of the expression have 
the same referent.   
221 'Et, cum invenit in eis dimensionibus communicari formas omnes, quarum quaelibet habet 
quantitatem terminatam propriam, scivit dimensiones terminatas ultimo actu non posse esse, nisi 
postquam forma substantialis est in eo, sicut est dispositio de aliis accidentibus in actu.  Invenit etiam 
quod subiecta omnium accidentium sunt individua substantiae, quae sunt in actu'.  Averroes Cordubensis 
Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. IX, ch. 1, f. 4r, A.    
222 Our intuitive understanding of rarefaction and condensation tells us that these changes occur 
without any new matter entering the system.  Neither Aristotle nor Averroes, however, had a 
descriptive term to point to the amount of matter that is assumed to remain constant across change in 
the volume that it occupies.  Cf. discussion in Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 84-5.  In the 1270s, in 
his work on the Eucharist, Giles of Rome would introduce a notion of an amount of matter (tanta 
materia), equivalent to our modern concept of mass, distinct from volume.  In fact, the structure in 
virtue of which matter admits of sheer amounts is precisely what Giles of Rome means by 'dimensiones 
indeterminatae'.  See Donati, ‘The Notion of Dimensiones Indeterminatae' in the Commentary Tradition 
of the Physics in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century’, p. 202.   
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If, in the Latin translation, the terminology with which Averroes' point is 
illustrated (in particular the phrase 'quantity of dimensions') is a little awkward, then 
the Commentator's basic point is absolutely clear.  The actual accidental form that is 
the proper structure of a body of water might well corrupt, along with the substantial 
form of water, when the substantial form of air is generated, and the actual 
accidental form that is the proper structure of air arrives.  But the 'absolute' 
dimensions, or the 'indeterminate dimensions', which consist just in three-
dimensional extension, are not stripped from prime matter, the ultimate substrate for 
this change.  They remain; 'absolute body' remains; matter itself continues to be 
structured in such a way that it is extended in three dimensions across this case of 
substantial change, as it does across all cases of substantial change.223    
With respect to this last passage, there is one other point to be highlighted for 
now, which would become relevant to Aquinas's work on growth and bodily identity.  
As Averroes sees it, the actual three-dimensional structure proper to a particular 
body (or 'determinate dimensions'), can admit, in itself, of a certain range or latitude: 
it can remain the same form across changes in its size.224  
4.2.2. Corporeal Structure as Divisible   
The second major strand of Averroes' argument sets out that prime matter must 
be invested with its own corporeal structure, because only such a structure could 
render matter divisible.  Averroes, then, understands Aristotle's account of substantial 
change to make the prior assumption that the substrate for any and all cases of 
substantial change is divisible.  This point emerges in a relatively convoluted way in 
De substantia orbis chapter 1, and the clearest way in which to represent Averroes' 
thinking is as follows.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 'Et hoc totum convenit sensui.  Videtur enim forma caliditatis agente in aqua, aqua augeri, & 
crescere in dimensionibus, & vicinari in dimensionibus aeris; cum igitur pervenit ad maximam 
quantitatem aquae propria tunc subiectum eius denudatur a forma aqua, & quantitate dimensionum 
aquae propria, et recipit forma aeris, & quantitatem dimensionum propriarum formae aeris... 
Dimensiones igitur simpliciter, quae appellantur corpus simpliciter, non denudatur a prima materia'.  
ibid., ch. 1, f. 4r, C-D.   
224 Cf. commentary in A. Hyman (ed.), Averroes’ De Substantia Orbis (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
Jerusalem, 1986), p. 54, n. 39.  
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Generation and corruption occur between contraries: one substantial form is 
gained and another lost.  The nature of the ultimate substrate for all cases of 
substantial change, prime matter, is undetermined and in potency to many different 
forms (Averroes' conception of prime matter as 'several' with respect to its potency 
was noted in chapter 1).225   
If prime matter did not have this nature, it would not be capable of gaining and 
losing different contrary forms in generation and corruption: it could only ever be the 
subject of one form.  And the fact that prime matter loses one form and gains another 
in substantial change implies, in addition, that it is the subject for more than one 
form at once.  This is because there is, in every case of substantial change, an agent (or 
efficient cause) that brings about change.  When water is heated and undergoes 
evaporation, for example, the form belonging to the substance that is the heating 
agent simultaneously exists along with the form of water.  These two forms share prime 
matter as their common subject.226   
If prime matter has to be capable of receiving more than one form at once, then 
the ultimate substratum for substantial change, in an Aristotelian framework, must be 
divisible.  And Averroes takes it that quantitative structure, precisely, is the natural 
form responsible for divisibility.  In De caelo, as explained above, Aristotle had defined 
mathematical body as a magnitude divisible in three dimensions.  In addition, in a 
discussion of the infinite in the Physica, Aristotle had stated that what is divisible must 
be a kind of quantity, whether it be a continuous magnitude (such as a line, surface or 
body) or an aggregate (a countable, or discrete quantity).227  Averroes comments on 
this passage that only quantity is per se divisible; other items, whether substances or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 See above, p. 55 and n.126. 
226 'Declaratum est igitur quod causa corruptionis entium, & factionis eorum est contrarietas existens 
in suis formis, & commune subiectum, quod... est potentia recipiens... formas diversas in specie', 
'immo impossibile est a subiecto denudare formam, vel subiectum denudari a forma, nisi per formae 
destructionem, neque etiam est possibile ipsam fieri in subiecto, nisi per agens extrahens illa de 
potentia ad actum.  Unde necesse est has formas esse contrarias, adeo quod altera corrumpat suam 
contrariam'.  Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. 
IX, ch. 1, f. 4r, D-F (my emphasis).  
227 Phys., 204a8-12.  
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accidental forms, are divisible only per accidens, or in virtue of divisibility of their 
mathematical structure.228   
Setting completed substances to one side, and returning to focus on prime matter, 
in his De substantia orbis Averroes' argument is that it is in virtue of the incorruptible 
indeterminate dimensions with which prime matter is invested that prime matter has the 
characteristic of being divisible into different parts, in order to receive different forms 
in different places.229  Substantial form, according to Averroes at least, then actually 
divides the divisible substratum.230 
So 'indeterminate dimensions' are, or 'absolute body' is, the first form existing in 
prime matter.231  Averroes writes that prime matter's reception of this structure is 
prior to its reception of substantial form, and prime matter receives substantial form by 
means of this structure.232   'Indeterminate dimensions' are ontologically prior to 
substantial form.  Since all of the events of substantial change occur in a single 
instant, there is no such thing as the temporal priority or posteriority in substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 'Omnia ista sunt divisibilia, aut per se, ut est quantum, aut per accidens, ut sunt reliqua'.  Aristotelis 
de Physico Auditu, libri octo, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem Commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois 
Commentariis, vol. IV, Book I, comment 18, f. 14r, C.  
229 'impossibile sit hoc subiectum recipere duas earum [i.e. two substantial forms] in eadem parte', 
'divisio autem non est huic subiecto nisi inquantum habet quantitatem, scivit [i.e. Aristotle knew] quod 
primum eorum, quae existunt in hoc, sunt tres dimensiones, quae sunt corpus'.  Averroes summarises 
his position as follows: 'Et causa huius totius est, quod hoc subiectum recipit primitus dimensiones 
interminatas, & quia est multum in potentia.  Quoniam, si non haberet dimensionem, non reciperet 
simul formas diversas numero neque formas diversas specie, sed in eodem tempore non invenitur, nisi 
una forma.  Et cum hoc quod eius materia est una numero, si non esset multa potentia, non 
denudaretur ab illa una forma, quam reciperet, & esset forma in substantia illius subiecti, & istud 
subiectum esset impossibile ut denudaretur a sua forma omnino, aut corrumperetur illa forma, & alia 
forma generaretur'.  Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, 
vol. IX, respectively: ch. 1, f. 4r, D (my insertion), ff. 3v, M- 4r, A (my insertion), ff. 4r, F- 4v, G.     
230 Averroes' position is that indeterminate dimensions render both matter divisible by substantial 
form, and, in turn, render substantial forms themselves divisible by virtue of the divisibility of the 
matter in which they inhere.  Prime matter as a subject 'divisible secundum formam', he writes and 
substantial form is 'divisibilis secundum eius [matter's] dimensiones'.  ibid., chapter 1, f. 4v, H (my 
insertion).  
231 'illa forma, scilicet dimensiones non terminatae existit in prima materia primitus'.  ibid., ch. 1, f. 4r, 
D. 
232 In the context of a comparison between the forms of celestial and terrestrial bodies, Averroes 
writes, 'formas eorum [i.e. of the celestial bodies] non esse in subiecto mediantibus dimensionibus', 
'neque possunt [i.e. the celestial bodies] recipere formas mediantibus dimensionibus interminatis, sicut 
est dispositio de formis generabilibus et corruptibilibus', ibid., ch 1, f. 4v, M, f. 5r, C (my insertion and 
emphasis). 
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generation and corruption.233  Nor, accordingly, are the 'indeterminate dimensions' a 
structure which matter itself receives in time: as Averroes sees it, prime matter is 
never stripped of this structure, and has never been without it.   
4.2.3. Corporeal Structure and Material Identity 
Averroes' direct commentary on Aristotle's Physica I.6-9 contains the third and 
final strand in his argument for the persistence of a corporeal structure in matter 
across any case of substantial change.  There, the Commentator's point is that since, 
perceptibly, the particular material subject of any case of substantial change remains 
one and the same thing, in the same place, across that change, it must be the case 
that absolute, or unqualified body persists in matter.  The key idea behind this final 
strand of Averroes' argument, which is assumed rather than spelled out in the text of 
the Physica commentary, is that three-dimensional mathematical structure (as defined 
in the Categoriae) is responsible for distinguishing matter into parts, each of which 
occupies a certain position.234   
Averroes starts by identifying a basic similarity between substantial change, on 
the one hand, and accidental change, on the other.  Both kinds of change consist in 
the alteration of the same thing from one quality or disposition to another.235  
Averroes thus approaches the subject of substantial change from a completely 
different angle to Aristotle; rather than focusing on formal difference, the 
Commentator promises a head-on discussion of the identity of the material substratum 
across a case of substantial generation and corruption.  
Now, the crucial distinction between accidental alteration and substantial change, 
Averroes notes, is that whereas, with the former, a thing's disposition changes in such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Referring to the arrival of substantial form in matter after indeterminate dimensions, Averroës 
writes, 'Et intelligo post, secundum esse, non post, secundum tempus'.  ibid., ch. 1, f. 4v, I.   
234 For more on Aristotle's concept of place, see C. Trifogli, Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (CA. 
1250-1270) (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 133-7.   
235  'Et apparet per inductionem quod generatio indiget necessario subiecto... Et hae duae 
transmutationes, scilicet quae est in accidentibus rei & quae est in substantia, conveniunt in hoc, 
quoniam sunt alteratio eiusdem rei de una qualitate in aliam & de una dispositio in aliam'.  Aristotelis de 
Physico Auditu, libri octo, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem Commentariis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois 
Commentariis, vol. IV, Book I, comment 63, f. 37v L-M.   
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a way that neither its name nor its definition changes, in contrast, with the latter, a 
thing changes with respect to its dispositions in such a way that its name and 
definition do change: it changes with respect to its 'substantial dispositions'.236  Yet, 
Averroes continues, the subject which 'bears' or 'carries' (defert) the transmutation in 
each of the two types of change remains the same in number across the change as a 
corpus demonstratum: a body that one can point to.237   
In cases of substantial change, what we observe is the same body in the same place 
undergoing change in its name or definition, even in cases where the substantial 
dispositions of the material subject change so radically that it undergoes 
transmutation from a fleshy nature, to an earthy nature, to a plant-like nature, and so 
on.238   
So how does Averroes analyse the identity of the material subject that persists 
across substantial change?  The bodily subject which undergoes accidental alteration, 
for example from being white to being black, is the same thing in number in virtue of 
its persistent substantial disposition, Averroes notes, according to which it has an 
unchanging name and definition.  That much seems clear.239  It cannot of course be 
claimed that the subject that undergoes substantial transmutation is one and the same 
in virtue of some substantial disposition.240  If this subject had a persistent substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 'Sed quia viderunt quod, quando res transmutatur in quibusdam istis dispositionibus, statim 
nomen, & definitio eius transmutabuntur, & in quibusdam non, vocaverunt primum modum 
transmutationem in substantiam... & vocaverunt istas dispositiones substantiales.  Secundum vero 
transmutationem, in qua neque nomen rei neque eius definitionem transmutantur, vocaverunt 
alterationem accidentalem', ibid., Book I, comment 63, ff. 37v, M- 38r, A.     
237 'Et, cum consideraverunt illud, quod defert utraque transmutationem, inveniunt ipsum idem 
numero, & est corpus demonstratum'.  ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, A (my emphasis).  
238  'Videmus enim idem corpus in idem loco transferri de carneitate in terrestreitatem, & de 
terrestreitate in vegetabilitatem, & mutabitur nomen eius & definitio'.  ibid (my emphasis).    
239 'Videmus etiam ipsum [corpus] transferri de albedine in nigredinem, sed non amittit nomen et 
definitionem, et ex hoc scitur, quod corpus, quod est subiectum isti transmutationem, permanet in 
nomine et definitione, et quod est eius dispositio substantialis, qua fit unum numero'.  ibid., Book I, 
comment 63, f. 38r, A-B (my insertion).    
240 'Corpus autem, cuius nomen, & definitio mutantur per transmutationem dispositionum, non est 
unum per dispositio existentem in ipso, dantem ei nomen & definitionem propriam'.  ibid., Book I, 
comment 63, f. 38r, B.  
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form, then there would be no such thing as substantial change at all: all change 
would be accidental.241   
The subject in question, the ultimate subject of any case of substantial change is, 
of course, prime matter.  Prime matter has no form or definition just in itself, but 
clearly something must account for the fact that it remains 'one', in Averroes' words, 
or the same individual subject, across substantial change.  Something must explain 
the observed fact upon which Averroes is building his entire analysis: that in 
substantial change what we see is the same body of material, in the same place, 
undergoing a change in its substantial nature.242   
It is therefore necessary, Averroes argues, that the three dimensions (tres 
dimensiones), which seem (videntur) to be inseparable from prime matter, the dimensions 
that are called 'body', should themselves be one, or the same in number across 
substantial change.  This three-dimensional structure, extending across prime matter 
and extending prime matter, as it exists in a particular part of prime matter, makes 
that part of the ultimate material substratum 'one in number' across any case of 
substantial change, or gives that part of prime matter its continuing identity.  Though 
Averroes' use of vocabulary is different, it is sufficiently clear from the context that 
this 'body' consisting of 'three dimensions', which is said in the Physica commentary to 
be inseparable from prime matter, is the same thing as the basic incorruptible 
corporeal structure, the 'absolute body' consisting of 'indeterminate dimensions' 
discussed in De substantia orbis.243  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 'Non enim est subiectum habens formam substantialem, quoniam, si essent de dispositionibus 
substantiae, non mutaretur nomen istius subiecti, neque eius eius definitio per mutationem alicuius 
dispositionis eius, & esset tota transmutatio in accidentibus'.  ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, C.  
242 'Unde necesse est ut istud subiectum sit unum, quia non habet formam dantem nomen & 
definitionem unam'.  ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r B (my emphasis).   
243 'Et est necesse etiam ut tres dimensiones, quae videntur inseparabiles ab ipso, & eadem numero, 
quae dicuntur corpus, sint... unum, quia subiectum eorum non habet nomen neque definitionem 
unam numero’. ‘Et, cum ita sit, est igitur unum subiectum numero, non habens dispositionem 
substantialem, sed habens natura recipiendi istas dispositiones substantiales.  Est igitur in potentia ens 
omnes dispositiones substantiales, & accidentales, & haec dicitur prima materia, & prima hyle.  Et 
manifestum est quod ista materia non denudatur a corporeitate'.  ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, B-
D (my emphasis).  
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4.2.4. 'Indeterminate Dimensions': an Accidental Form sui generis  
Averroes confirms explicitly, in his commentary on the Physica, that this basic 
corporeal structure is an accident, or that these three dimensions are accidental 
properties244 (and not some kind of substantial form), having described 'absolute 
body', 'indeterminate dimensions' or the three-dimensional extension with which 
prime matter is invested simply as 'corporeal form' in De substantia orbis.   
This is hardly surprising: Aristotle himself placed body as a geometrical solid into 
the accidental category of quantity.  But as Silvia Donati has pointed out in her work 
on Averroes' concept of 'indeterminate dimensions', this incorruptible mathematical 
structure is an accident sui generis, insofar as it is conceived by Averroes in partial 
violation of one of the basic tenets in the conceptual apparatus of Aristotle's 
metaphysics.  This is, of course, the axiom, spelled out in Metaphysica VII.1, and set 
out above (chapter 1, section 1.1), that any substance is prior to its accidents: 
accidents depend on substances for their existence. 
The violation is only partial, Donati notes, because 'indeterminate dimensions' 
are ontologically prior only to one of the two principles of substance, namely 
substantial form. 245   Additionally, it may be maintained that the violation of 
Aristotle's principles is only a partial one because, as we have seen, Averroes still 
holds explicitly that all accidents in act are posterior to and ontologically dependent 
on individual substances composed of matter and form.  In his De substantia orbis, he 
points out that 'indeterminate dimensions', in contrast to other accidents, exist only in 
potency.246   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 'Et est necesse etiam ut tres dimensiones, quae videntur inseparabiles ab ipso, & eadem numero, 
quae dicuntur corpus, sint accidentia'.  ibid., Book I, comment 63, f. 38r, B-C.  
245 S. Donati, 'Materia e dimensioni tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle dimensiones indeterminatae', 
Quaestio, 7 (2007), p. 393: 'Elemento caratteristico della dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate, sia 
nella formulazione originale elaborata da Averroè, sia in interpretazioni successive, come per esempio 
quella egidiana, è l'idea delle dimensioni come un accidente sui generis, con una posizione privilegiata 
nella struttura metafisica della sostanza: le dimensioni costituiscono una parziale violazione del 
principio aristotelico del primato della sostanza sull'accidente, in quanto, precedendo la forma 
sostanziale, precedono uno dei due principi costitutivi della sostanza'.  
246 Comparing the matter of celestial bodies to that of corruptible bodies, Averroes writes, 'materia 
eorum [i.e. of the celestial bodies] non recipit formas mediantibus dimensionibus existentibus in eis in 
potentia, scilicet non terminatis, sicut est dispositio in dimensionibus quae sunt in prima materia'.  
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Stepping back from the detail of Averroes' account of substantial change, the 
Commentator's innovations seem rather more wide-ranging.  It has already been 
noted that Averroes' account of substantial change employs a concept of prime 
matter that was not clearly evident in Aristotle's own work on natural change.  
Averroes' own analysis of prime matter is slightly more technically nuanced than has 
hitherto been suggested.  For the sake of completing this account of the 
Commentator's work on substantial change, these nuances should be briefly noted.   
Averroes holds that it is the very nature of prime matter to admit of a potentiality 
to substantial forms, but does not think that prime matter can be adequately 
described just in terms of its potentiality.  This is because prime matter's potentiality 
is always predicated of it with regard to a particular form, and therefore falls into the 
category of relation.  Averroes, then, supposes that prime matter, as something in itself of 
which this relation to forms is predicated, can be described as a kind of substance 
(albeit not a substance in act).  This is another reason why, for the Commentator, 
prime matter must possess a form of its own.247   
Conclusions  
Crudely put, this chapter's argument has been that Thomas Aquinas's work on 
bodily identity would draw even more on Averroes' than it would on Aristotle's.  The 
Commentator had identified and explored certain obscure areas within the Stagirite's 
respective accounts of identity of the mortal body, and bodily continuity across 
substantial change.  And in the event, Aquinas would find the Commentator's 
findings to be highly relevant to his theological analysis of bodily identity.   
Aquinas would pin the individual body's material continuity across growth upon 
the persistence of the body's accidental structuring form (which he would call 
'dimensive quantity').  And he would intend to use the Commentator's work on the 
structure belonging to prime matter to explain the continuity of the matter belonging 
to particular bodies across their death and resurrection.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Averroes Cordubensis Sermo de Substantia Orbis, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. IX, chapter 1, f. 
5r, D (my emphasis). 
247 See discussion in Hyman (ed.), Averroes' De Substantia Orbis, editor's introduction, p. 30.  
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Even so, as will become clear in chapter 4, notwithstanding his evident reliance 
upon and respect for the Commentator's insights, Aquinas would struggle to accept 
that, in order to make full and explicit use of Averroes' theory of material identity 
across substantial change in his work on the general resurrection, he too would need 
to partially break away from, or at least modify his understanding of, the basic 
Aristotelian principle that a substance is ontologically prior to its accidents.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THOMAS AQUINAS (I): INDIVIDUALITY AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL BODY 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 concluded by setting out how Thomas Aquinas, based on his reading 
of Aristotle's writings on individuality and the individual body, completely reworked 
Peter Lombard's concept of the 'truth of human nature'.  For the Lombard, again, 
the 'truth of human nature' in an individual was a fixed and non-exchangeable set of 
particles in their body, which accounted for the body's individuality and identity 
during mortal life, and from which it would be reconstituted at the resurrection.248  
Aquinas explains at Summa Theologiae I (c.1266-68), q. 119, a. 1, in contrast, that the 
totality of an individual human's material part, all of their 'individual, signate matter' 
(matter that can be pointed to as being theirs) entered into his or her material truth of 
human nature.  In addition, as Aquinas sees it, there is a formal aspect to the truth of 
human nature in each individual: the form individuated by their particular matter, 
or, in other words, his or her particular immortal soul.249  So the resurrection of an 
individual human, for Aquinas, involves the reunification of these formal and material 
aspects of their 'truth of human nature': their soul, and their individual matter.   
The present chapter's discussion will unpick the thinking behind Summa Theologiae 
I, q. 119, a. 1.  It will illustrate the ways in which Aquinas's literal and materialistic 
understanding of the doctrine of bodily resurrection shaped his thought on the 
composition of human nature, and of the human individual.  It will demonstrate how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 See above, pp. 15-17.  
249 'ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, 
et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata'.  ST I, q. 119, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 5, p. 571.  
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Aquinas thoroughly integrated certain Aristotelian ideas about the composition of the 
individual body, explored in chapters 1 and 2, into his own thinking on this topic.  
The analysis will be split into four sections.  The first section concerns Aquinas's 
innovative theory that the soul is the only substantial, or nature-determining form in 
a human being, or, in other words, his theory of the unicity of substantial form in 
humans.  For Aquinas, the doctrine of bodily resurrection implies that the union 
between individual soul and individual matter in human being is essential and 
intimate, such that the soul is incomplete without its particular material complement.  
Aquinas thinks that only this theory of human nature, and not a pluralist theory, or a 
theory that would posit any additional, corporeal form in a human body prior to the 
soul, can guarantee this intimate union between the soul and matter in human 
nature.  
The doctrine of the resurrection of the body, literally understood, entails, at the 
same time, that the body should maintain a relative independence from the soul as a 
component of the human individual.  If the resurrection of an individual necessarily 
involves the gathering together of a person's 'individual matter', then the particular 
material component in an individual makes a crucial and independent contribution 
to their individuality.   
Later in the thirteenth century, critics of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans would effectively maintain that he could not have it both 
ways: if there was to be the closest possible union between matter and the soul in a 
human being, then body could not retain any independence from soul.  The 
individual body must, pluralists argued, be reduced to mere prime matter.  This 
pluralist critique has informed certain modern philosophical and historical accounts 
of Aquinas's thought on the body and its resurrection, including Caroline Walker 
Bynum's, which claims that Aquinas 'packed' the body into the soul.250   
As will become clear, however, for Aquinas, following Aristotle, the material part 
of a human being is not mere prime matter, but the differentiated, proper and 
proportionate material subject for a rational soul.  And notwithstanding that he makes 
the soul the body's only substantial, or nature-determining form, Aquinas still thinks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 See above, pp. 35-7. 
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there is a corporeal form in each human body other than its soul.  It is just not a 
substantial form.  Adopting Aristotle's mathematical conception of 'body' as a kind of 
quantitative structure,251 Aquinas grounds the body's relative independence from the 
soul on the accidental form 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva), a form which, 
Aquinas says, is close to substance.    
This chapter's second section, then, will set out Aquinas's account of the 
metaphysical composition of the body, bringing the role of the accidental corporeal 
form, quantitas dimensiva, to centre stage.  It is this form that immediately underpins 
the human body's organic structure; indeed, according to Aquinas, it is this very form 
upon which the particular structural beauty that characterises the human body, 
among the animal bodies, is grounded.  
With his basic account of the composition of the human body and its relative 
independence from the soul in hand, the third section of the chapter's analysis will 
approach Aquinas's thought on the individual body through his work on human 
generation.  Closely basing his thinking in this area on Aristotle's, Aquinas holds that 
the matter in which each individual soul is created has a unique 'capacity', depending 
on the precise make up of the body in which it is created, which in turn depends on 
prior, natural, material developments in utero.  God then creates each individual soul 
intrinsically unique, Aquinas thinks, in proportion to its own body.   
The fourth and final section addresses Aquinas's technical concept of 'individual 
matter', or 'signate matter', by way of a discussion of his thought on the principle of 
individuation.  Again, Aquinas's strong account of the relative independence of the 
individual body from the individual soul will be thrown into sharp relief.  As noted in 
chapter 2, it was the Commentator Averroes' view that substantial forms are actually 
responsible for dividing one part of matter from another (matter having already been 
rendered divisible by its own corporeal structure).252  Aquinas, in contrast, thinks that 
the only form in an individual body that is equipped to actually divide its matter from 
any other matter is its dimensive quantity.  It is dimensive quantity, and not the soul, 
for Aquinas, which makes the matter belonging to an individual body this matter.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See above, chapter 2, section 1.  
252 See above, chapter 1, section 4.2.2. 
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1. The Basics (I): Substantial Form and Matter in Human Nature  
In Aquinas's view, only his theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a 
human being is concordant with the idea that, at the resurrection, an individual soul 
will reunited to a human body, let alone its own body.  This section will illustrate why, 
by drawing upon a selection of passages from Aquinas's work on the basic 
metaphysical composition of human nature.  Some of these are taken directly from 
his work on the resurrection in book IV of his Sentences commentary (c.1252-56), book 
IV of his Summa contra Gentiles (completed 1264-65) and part I, chapters 153-4 of his 
Compendium theologiae (1265-67).  The specifics of Aquinas's account of bodily and 
personal identity at the resurrection will be addressed head-on in chapter 4.  
1.1. Essence and Esse  
Aquinas thinks that if there were an additional corporeal substantial form 
intervening between the soul and matter, this would necessarily mean that soul and 
body were united only accidentally, or incidentally, and not as essential parts of a 
unified human nature.  This in turn would allow for alternative, heretical 
interpretations of the afterlife, including the reincarnation of human souls into 
different human bodies, or even animal bodies.  Leading Aquinas to this conclusion is 
his understanding, basic in his metaphysics, of the relationship between essence, on 
the one hand, and esse (existence, or act of being) in any composite substance, 
including any human being, on the other hand.   
We saw at the end of chapter 1 that, for Aquinas, the human essence itself is 
composite: human nature comprises not only the soul, but also the body.253  Aquinas's 
concept of the composite human essence will be unpicked shortly.  For now, the first 
point to grasp is that Aquinas thinks that there is a second level of composition in any 
human, in addition to that between matter and form.  The entire composite essence 
enters into composition with its esse, or act of existence. 254   Like matter and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 See above, pp. 64-5. 
254 On the real composition and distinction of essence and esse in Aquinas's thought, see Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 132-7 (for the modern debate concerning whether Aquinas 
does in fact defends a real distinction, as well as real composition, between essence and esse, see esp. p. 
136, n. 11).  
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substantial form, essence and esse are related as potency and act respectively.  And 
substantial form is the principle in any composite that gives or communicates esse, or 
the composite's act of existence, to matter (as Aquinas puts it, form 'perfects matter 
by giving it existence'255), and therefore to the whole composite.   
More precisely, Aquinas understands the relationship between matter and form, 
on the one hand, and essence and existence, on the other hand, in terms of potency 
and act obtaining on two levels.  First, matter is in potency to form, and form is its 
actuality, just as a soul is the act of a body.  Then, the nature or essence composed of 
matter and substantial form, or body and soul, for example, can be understood as 
being in potency to its act of being (esse) insofar as it receives that act of being.256  It is 
not, then, that there are two distinct acts: substantial form is matter’s act precisely 
because it is through substantial form that matter participates in esse, the composite’s 
single act of being.  Taken as a component of a material thing’s essence, however, 
substantial form is in potency to the esse which is distinct from that essence, and 
which it communicates to the composite.  Substantial form is not identical to esse.    
The second point to grasp is Aquinas's position that unity is a transcendental 
property or characteristic of being.257  Unity is distinct from being only conceptually: 
unity in this sense is not something really added to being (inasmuch as unity here 
means just a negation or privation of division); rather it is interchangeable with being.258   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 'Forma enim, inquantum perficit materiam dando ei esse...'.  ST I, q. 14, a. 2, ad. 1, Opera omnia 
iussu Leonis XIII, 4, p. 168.  
256 'In natura igitur rerum corporearum materia non per se participat ipsum esse, sed per formam; 
forma enim adveniens materiae facit ipsam esse actu, sicut anima corpori.  Unde in rebus compositis 
est considerare duplicem actum, et duplicem potentiam.  Nam primo quidem materia est ut potentia 
respectu formae, et forma est actus eius; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma, est ut 
potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva eius'.  DSC, a.1, response, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 24, 2, p. 14.   
257 On transcendentals in Aquinas’s thought see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 
192-4.   
258 'unum convertitur cum ente' or phrases of equivalent meaning can be found in several places in 
Aquinas’ corpus.  See, for example, 'Unum enim quod cum ente convertitur, ipsum ens designat, 
superaddens indivisionis rationem, quae, cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti 
additam.  Et sic in nullo differt ab ente secundum rem, sed solum ratione'.  Thomas Aquinas, In 
Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, (hereafter In Met.) IV, lect. 2, n. 560 (ed.) M. -R. Cathala (Taurini: 
Marietti, 1935), p. 187.  
	   	   	  107 
And so, because a composite's existence as a unit, one substance, follows upon its 
being, then there can only be one substantial form, if there is to be a single, essentially 
unified, composite substance.  Two substantial forms, each communicating a 
substantial act of being (esse), would give two composite unities, or two substances.  As 
Aquinas puts it, if it were permitted that there should be two substantial forms in a 
substance, no such substance would be one absolutely, or unconditionally (simpliciter): 
it is not from two acts that something is one simpliciter, Aquinas writes; a single thing 
results from potency being brought into act.  Such a substance, then, would be one 
only accidentally, incidentally, or in a relative way (secundum quid). 259   Hence, 
according to Aquinas's principles at least, an additional substantial form in the 
human body would ensure that the union between body and soul was a purely 
incidental one.   
So a substantial form, for Aquinas, gives absolute substantial being (esse simpliciter) 
to a composite.  In this respect, a substantial form differs from an accidential form, 
which only gives being 'of such a kind' (tale), for example, the accidental form 'heat' 
makes its substantial subject hot.260   
It is in accordance with the fact that it communicates an absolute act of substantial 
being (esse) to the composite to which it belongs, then, that a substantial form, for 
Aquinas, is the absolute determining principle of that composite's nature.  It is the 
single source of all of the composite's natural perfections and operations: it is from a 
single form, the soul, that a human being is human, animal, living, a body, a 
substance and a being (ens).261  For Aquinas, following a dictum from Aristotle's 
Metaphysica, substantial forms do not admit of grades or degrees or any kind of growth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 'Quidam enim dicunt, quod sunt multae formae substantiales in eodem individuo... Sed haec 
positio... est impossibilis.  Primo quidem, quia nullum individuum substantiae esset simpliciter unum.  
Non enim fit simpliciter unum ex duobus actibus, sed ex potentia et actu, in quantum id quod est 
potentia fit actu... Manifestum est ergo, quod si multiplicarentur multae formae substantiales in uno 
individuo substantiae, individuum substantiae non esset unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut 
homo albus'.  DSC, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, pp. 39, 42-3.  
260 'considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma 
accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, 
sed esse calidum'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 4, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 224. 
261 See above, n. 28.  
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or intensification in themselves: each substantial form has an absolute nature, like a 
discrete number.262 
1.2. The Composite Human Essence   
As for any thirteenth-century scholastic theologian, so for Aquinas, human nature 
had to be composite, comprising both a rational soul and a human body, because that 
was what the doctrine of bodily resurrection implied.  Whereas Aristotle had 
identified human nature, or essence, or what it is to be human, with form alone,263 
Aquinas understands the universal human nature or essence to comprise 'common 
soul' (or rational soul) and 'common matter', each of which, as we saw in chapter 1, 
he calls a 'principle of the species' at Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2.264   
In Aquinas's view, just as only the theory of the unicity of substantial form in 
humans preserves the unity of the human being, so, accordingly, it is the only 
available theory of the composition of human nature that really preserves the idea 
that the human essence is composite.  This is because the theory that the soul is the 
body's substantial form (and its only substantial form) entails that the soul is the form 
of the body (or of the material part of the human) according to its very nature.265  
Given that it is in the soul's very nature to be united (or to be capable of being united) 
to the body, or to matter, the soul cannot be a complete nature in itself: human 
nature must, therefore, be composite.266  The soul's union with the body is a natural 
good, Aquinas thinks, and was from the beginning God's perfect design for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 'species comparantur numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaph.: quorum species per additionem et 
subtractionem unitatis variantur'.  DSC, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, p. 44.  Cf. 
Met. 1044a9-10.   
263 See above, pp. 61-2. 
264 Text quoted above at n. 156.  Cf. also, 'materia communis per se pertinent ad speciem'.  In Met. 
VII, lect. 9, n. 1473 (ed.) Cathala, p. 433, and similar statement at In Met. VII, lect 10, n. 1497 and n. 
1500 and ST I, q. 75, a. 4, response.  
265 'anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis forma'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 4, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 5, p. 210 (NB. essentia here is used loosely, just to point to the soul's nature).   
266 'anima ex natura suae essentiae habet quod sit corpori unibilis.  Unde nec proprie anima est in 
specie; sed compositum'.  ST I, q. 75, a. 7, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 207 (species here is 
synonymous with human essence or nature).   
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human species: the soul is created in the body, and does not possess the fulness of its 
natural perfection unless it is presently united to the body.267   
To be separated from the body, conversely, is contrary to the very nature of the 
soul.  Human death, or the separation of body and soul, is natural, but only 
considering the corruptible nature of the mortal human body.268  Aquinas explains 
that when the soul is separated from the body, it retains its natural inclination to be 
reunited to the body, in the same way that a light body retains its light nature when 
removed from its proper atmospheric resting place, and thus retains its inclination to 
return to that proper place (to use a modern example: a weighted-down helium 
balloon will float back upwards if released).269  Since what is contrary to nature 
cannot be perpetual, and since the immortal soul itself does not naturally pass away, 
it follows therefore that the soul must be destined for reunion with matter at some 
point in the future (even if the reunion itself cannot happen naturally).270  The 
resurrection of the body, then, will restore to the soul its complete nature, just as it 
will restore the totality of human nature.   
According to the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, of course, it 
is not in the nature of a rational soul as the substantial form of a human body to be 
united, or reunited, to just any matter, but only to appropriate matter or to a 
proportionate material subject.  This matter is the matter that is the other part of 
human essence, or the material principle of the human species, to which Aquinas in 
fact refers either as (human) 'common matter' (a principle of the common or universal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 'Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum 
quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari', 'Sed quia naturaliter 
est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore'.  ST I, q. 90, a. 4, response, 
and ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, pp. 388-9.  
268 Thomas Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae (hereafter CT) I, c. 152.  
269 'dicendum quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri, sicut secundum se convenit corpori 
levi esse sursum.  Et sicut corpus leve manet quidem leve cum a loco proprio fuerit separatum, cum 
aptitudine tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a 
corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem'.  ST I, q. 76, 
a. 1, ad 6, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 210  
270 CT I, c. 151, Summa contra Gentiles (hereafter SCG), IV, 79.   
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human nature) or, employing Aristotle's terminology,271 as (human) 'proper matter' 
(appropriate for a human soul).   
Asking whether the soul will resume the very same body at the resurrection in 
Book IV, distinction 44 of his Sentences commentary, indeed, Aquinas introduces the 
theory is the soul is the body's substantial form (and its only substantial form), and its 
consequence that human nature is composed of rational soul and human body, as the 
orthodox antidote to alternative conceptions of the afterlife advocated by ancient 
philosophers and, more recently, by certain heretics.  According to these erroneous 
positions, souls would be reunited to bodies that were not human.  His initial 
(unnamed) target is Plato,272 who had thought that the souls of the unrighteous would 
reincarnated into different bodies, either into different human bodies, or into 
whatever animal bodies were fitting in light of the particular nature of their vicious 
lifestyles (a violent person, Aquinas notes, would find themselves reincarnated into a 
lion's body).273   
Aquinas goes on to explain that this view of the afterlife follows from an account 
of human nature that says that the soul is not joined to the body essentially, as form to 
matter, but only accidentally, or incidentally, as a person to their clothing, or as a 
mover to what it moves.274  He elsewhere explicitly criticises Plato's theory of human 
nature for positing that human nature consisted of the soul alone, and that the soul 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 See above, chapter 1, section 1.  
272 For more on Plato's theory of reincarnation and Aquinas's critique of it, see M. I. George, 'Aquinas 
on Reincarnation', The Thomist: A Speculative Theological Review, 60 (1996), pp. 33-52, esp. pp. 35-8. 
273 'circa hanc quaestionem et philosophi erraverunt, et quidam moderni haeretici errant.  quidam 
enim philosophi posuerunt animas a corpore separatas iterato corporibus conjungi... sed... primo... 
ponebant animam separatam corpori iterum conjungi naturaliter per viam generationis"... secundo... 
ponebant... quod secunda conjunctio non erat ad idem corpus quod per mortem depositum fuit, sed 
ad aliud: quandoque quidem enim specie, quandoque autem diversum; ad diversum quidem quando 
anima in corpore existens praeter rationis ordinem vitam duxerat bestialem, unde transibat post 
mortem de corpore hominis in corpus alterius animalis cuius moribus vivendo se conformavi, sicut... 
in corpus leonis propter rapinam et violentiam, et sic de aliis'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, 
response, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.   
274 'Sed haec opinio ex... falsis radicibus venit: quarum prima est, quia anima non conjungitur corpori 
essentialiter sicut forma materiae, sed solum accidentaliter, sicut motor mobili, aut homo vestimento; 
et ideo ponere poterant quod anima praeexistebat antequam corpori generato infunderetur in 
generatione naturali; et iterum quod diversis corporibus uniretur'.  ibid.  
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merely uses the body like a sailor a ship, or a man his clothes.275  That soul and body 
are united only incidentally or accidentally, and not essentially, of course, is also, in 
Aquinas's view, the necessary consequence of any pluralist account of the composition 
of human nature that posits a substantial form in the human being prior to the soul.  
It was not usual practice, during the period spanning Aquinas's career at least, for 
theologians to directly criticise the work of their contemporaries in theological 
commentaries.  In any case, we have already seen that Aquinas does explicitly 
associate the pluralist theory of human nature against which he explicitly sets up his 
own theory with followers of Plato.276   
Falling under the sway of the Plato's account of human nature, Aquinas goes on 
to explain in Book IV, distinction 44 of his Sentences commentary, certain heretics 
have suggested that human souls would be rejoined to bodies that were celestial 
(quite literally, that is, to heavenly spheres), or ethereal.   
Again, Aquinas does not directly name his targets, but their identity is sufficiently 
clear from other passages in which he writes about Plato's legacy for thought on the 
union of body and soul.  In his Summa contra Gentiles II, 83, discussing whether the soul 
begins to exist when the body does, Aquinas identifies Plato's intellectual successors 
as, on the one hand, Origen (c.185-254), who thought that the souls of all humans 
were created apart from their bodies at the same time as the angels, before the 
material world, and thereafter bound to bodies as a punishment for sin, and, on the 
other hand, the Manichaean heretics who teach reincarnation 'today'.277   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 'Set ulterius posuit Plato quod anima... haberet in se completam naturam speciei... diffiniens 
hominem non aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, set animam corpore utentem, ut sit 
comparatio anime ad corpus sicut naute ad nauem, uel sicut induti ad uestem'.  Thomas Aquinas, 
Quaestiones disputatae de anima (hereafter QDA), q.1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1 (Rome 
and Paris: Commissio Leonina and Les éditions du Cerf, 2000), pp. 8-9.  Cf.  ST I, q. 75, a. 4, 
response.   
276 See above, n. 28. 
277 'qui posuerunt animas humana in sui multitudine esse immortales, scilicet Platonici, posuerunt 
easdem ab aeterno fuisse, et nunc quidem corporibus uniri, nunc autem a corporibus absolvi, hac 
vicissitudine secundum determinata corporibus absolvi, hac vicissitudine secundum determinata 
annorum curricula observata... Quidam vero Catholicam fidem profitentes, Platonicorum doctrinis 
imbuti, viam mediam tenuerunt.  Quia enim, secundum fidem Catholicam, nihil est aeternum prater 
Deum, humana quidem animas aeternas non posuerunt, sed eas cum mundo, sive potius antu 
mundum visibilem, creatas fuisse, et tamen eas de novo corporibus alligari.  Quam quidem positionem 
primus inter Christianae fidei professores Origenes posuisse invenitur, et post plures ipsum sequentes.  
Quae quidem opinio usque hodie apud haereticos manet: quorum Manichaei eas etiam aeternas 
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Origen had certainly held that resurrected bodies would be ethereal, angelic 
bodies, and in 543, prior to the Second Council of Constantinople, a council of 
bishops in Constantinople had indeed condemned Origen's work for apparently 
teaching that resurrected bodies would be spherical like celestial bodies.278  The 
'Cathars', the Manichean heretics contemporary to Aquinas, taught that souls were 
utterly incompatible with the evil material world: human souls had been trapped in 
matter by Satan, or the evil God.  According to Cathar teachings, souls would 
remain trapped, reincarnated into animal or human bodies over and over again, 
until they were purified by the rite known as the consolamentum.  Then, they could 
return to the heaven created by the good God, from which they had been snatched at 
the 'Fall'.279  The Cathars, of course, had been the principal target of the canons of 
the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), and the Second Council of Lyons (1274), that 
had confirmed the literal interpretation of resurrection as individuals' recovery of the 
very same bodies they had in mortal life.280   
The theory that the soul is united to the body essentially and as its form, Aquinas 
concludes in Book IV, distinction 44 of his Sentences commentary, 'destroys' and firmly 
locks out all of these alternative heretical interpretations of the afterlife (with which, 
he clearly thinks, a pluralist theory of human nature is basically compatible).281  At 
Compendium Theologiae I, c. 153, he writes, accordingly, that since the soul is united to 
the body as its form, and since each form corresponds to its proper matter, the soul 
will be reunited, not to a celestial or ethereal body, or some other animal body, but to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
asserunt, cum Platone, et de corpore ad corpus transire'.  SCG II, 83, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13 
(Rome: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918), p. 520.  For Aquinas's critique of Origen's position on human 
nature see also ST I, q. 42, a. 2, response and q. 90, a. 4, response.   
278 Cf. Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body, p. 67.  This was probably a later interpolation by the group 
of Egyptian monks who came to be known as Origenists.  See Chadwick, 'Origen, Celsus and the 
Resurrection of the Body', pp. 94-102.  
279 For an introduction to Cathar doctrine, see M. D. Lambert, Medieval Heresy.  Popular Movements from 
the Gregorian Reform to the Reformation, 3rd edn, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 131-7.  
280 See above, n. 2. 
281 'Sed praedictae... radices destruuntur a philosopho, in Lib. de anima; quibus destructis, patet 
falsitas praedictae positionis.  Et simili modo destruuntur errores quorumdam haereticorum: quorum 
quidam in praedictas positiones inciderunt; quidam autem posuerunt animam iterato conjungi 
corporibus caelestibus, vel etiam corporibus in modum venti subtilibus... non enim resurrectio dici 
potest nisi anima ad idem corpori redeat'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, response, Opera omnia (ed.) 
Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.  
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a body of the same species as that which it laid down at death: a human body 
composed of flesh, bones and organs.282  
 At this point, an obscurity within Aquinas's work on the human body should be 
highlighted: Aquinas never provides a penetrating metaphysical analysis of what the 
human soul's proper matter really is.  A concrete resurrected body, like a concrete 
mortal body, will certainly comprise flesh, bone, and other human organs.  At Summa 
Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2 and elsewhere, Aquinas describes the 'common matter' that is 
the material principle of the human species as 'flesh and bone'.283  In other places, he 
can be found to refer to the human soul's proper matter either as 'flesh and bone', or, 
in terms lifted from Aristotle's De anima II.1, as an organic body.284  At Summa 
Theologiae I, q. 119, a. 1, he even points to the material part of the human essence 
simply as 'body'.285   
These labels are problematic because they appear to point to matter already 
informed, whereas Aquinas clearly means to treat the matter and the form that enter 
into human essence as two distinct components of human nature.286  And it is 
impossible, according to Aquinas's metaphysical schema, that any accidental form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 'Cum autem anima corpori uniatur ut forma, unicuique autem formae propria materia respondeat, 
necesse est quod corpus cui iterato anima unietur sit eiusdem rationis et speciei cum corpore quod 
deponit per mortem.  Non enim resumet anima in resurrectione corpus caeleste vel aereum, vel 
corpus alicuius alterius animalis, ut quidam fabulantur, sed corpus humanum ex carnibus et ossibus 
compositum, organicum eisdem organis ex quibus nunc consistit'.  CT I, c. 153, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 42 (Rome: Editori de San Tommaso, 1979), p. 139.  Cf. also SCG IV, 84.    
283 See abive, n. 156, and cf. 'materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus... materia communis... ita de 
ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus'.  ST I, q. 75, a. 4, response, Opera omnia 
iussu Leonis, 5, p. 200.    
284 'Uniuscuiusque enim speciei sunt determinata essentialia principia, materiam dico et formam... 
sicut caro humana et os et huiusmodi sunt materia propria hominis...'.  SCG IV, 30, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 15 (Rome: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1930), p. 113.  'nam et in definitione formarum 
ponuntur propriae materiae... sicut cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici'.  
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (hereafter QDP), q. 7, a. 2, ad. 9, Opera Omnia (ed.) 
Busa, vol. 3, p. 241.  Cf. above, chapter 1, section 1.  
285 ' Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei... 
Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus'.  ST I, q. 119, a.1, 
response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1889), p. 571.  
286 ‘in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, essentia significat non solum formam, nec solum 
materiam, sed compositum ex materia et forma communi'.  ST I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 4, p. 330.   
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should enter into essence to give definition to its material part, since essence and its 
parts or principles are categorically distinct from any accident.287 
Actually, it is not particularly surprising that Aquinas's presentation of human 
essence should contain this obscurity.  Robert Pasnau, in particular, has done much 
to bring to light scholastic theologians' general pessimism regarding humans' ability 
to grasp essences, which are the inner natures of things.288   
Human beings reach their understanding of essences by starting with sensory 
impressions that directly capture only the accidental features of things, and Aquinas 
thinks that the human intellect, at best, grasps even the simplest essences in an 
incomplete way.  'Our cognition is so weak', he writes, 'that no philosopher can ever 
perfectly investigate the nature of a single fly'.289  Aquinas explains that this weakness 
is directly reflected in the way in which philosophers formulate the definitions that 
they use to capture the essences of things.  Since they have to rely on sense-
perceptible, accidental features of things in order to learn about their essences, 
philosophers frequently use words that capture the accidental attributes that follow 
from that nature in order to point to the hidden substantial differentiae that in fact 
comprise the essences of species.290   
In the definition of 'human' as 'rational animal', or of the human soul as the 
'rational soul', for example, the difference 'rational', insofar as it refers to a power of 
the soul, actually names an accidental attribute.  The description of the formal 
component of human essence as 'soul'291 or 'common form', of course, tells us little 
more about the inner nature of human soul than the description of the material 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Cf. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 268.  
288 R. Pasnau, 'Science and Certainty' in R. Pasnau and C. van Dyke (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), pp. 357-68, esp. pp. 363-4; Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Nature (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), pp. 165-6.   
289 'cognitio nostra est adeo debilis quod nullus philosophus potuit unquam perfecte investigare 
naturam unius muscae'.  Thomas Aquinas, Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum, prooemium, Opera omnia 
(ed.) R. Busa, vol. 6, p. 16.  
290  'in genere substantiae frequenter accipiuntur differentiae accidentales loco substantialium, 
inquantum per eas designantur principia essentialia'.  ST Ia-IIae, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 6, p. 312.  Cf. also ST I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 3.   
291 e.g. at ST I, q. 75, a. 4, response, and ST I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3.  
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component of human essence as 'flesh and bone' tells us about the inner nature and 
pattern of the material arrangement appropriate for such a soul.  Following Aristotle, 
indeed, Aquinas thinks that the nature of matter in itself is unknowable: it has to be 
grasped by analogy, in virtue of the proportional relationship it bears to the form 
whose subject it is.292   
The crucial idea that the rational soul's proper matter is a highly differentiated 
material arrangement does, however, come across clearly in Aquinas's texts.  In his 
commentary on Aristotle's important discussion of proper matter at Metaphysica 
VIII.4-5 (composed c. 1270-71), Aquinas discusses the 'proper matters' which are 
'different for different things' in explicit contradistinction to featureless prime matter, 
which is 'common to all things'.293  
The discussion so far has operated purely on the level of the species.  As explained 
at the end of chapter 1, although he thinks that the human essence cannot be 
identified with the individual, Aquinas still thinks that the universal essence is really 
present in the individual.  In his work on the resurrection, as we will see in chapter 4, 
Aquinas refers to the composite human essence 'humanity', as the 'form of the whole' 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 In his Physica commentary, Aquinas applies this idea precisely to prime matter.  Elsewhere he applies 
it simply to matter.  See Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (hereafter In 
Phys.), I, lect. 13, n. 118 (9), Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 2 (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta, 1884), p. 
46, passage beginning 'Et dicit quod natura quae primo subiicitur mutationi, idest materia prima, non 
potest sciri per seipsam...'.  Cf.  'materia autem secundum se sit ignota... Est autem cognoscibilis 
dupliciter: uno modo per analogiam sive per proportionem, ut dicitur in I physicorum... alio modo 
cognoscitur per formam, per quam habet esse in actu'.  Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium de Trinitate 
(hereafter In BDT), q. 4, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50 (Rome and Paris: Commissio 
Leonina and Les éditions du Cerf, 1992), p. 123.  For Aristotle's position, see above, pp. 42-3, and n. 
67. 
293 'Quia vero, licet materia prima sit communis omnibus, tamen materiae propriae sunt diversae 
diversorum'.  In Met. VIII, lect. 4, n. 1735 (ed.) Cathala, p. 503.  Some commentators nonetheless 
assume that it is mere prime matter that enters into essence.  See A. Maurer, 'Form and Essence in the 
Philosophy of St Thomas', Mediaeval Studies, 13 (1951), p. 175 and Wippel Metaphysical Thought p. 331.  
Others appear to take at face value Aquinas's ambiguous suggestion that the material principle of the 
species is matter already informed.  See P. King, 'the Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages', 
Theoria, 66 (2000), p. 11, 'What kind of matter is "included"?  Here Aquinas treads carefully: if we 
speak of an animal, not just any matter will do; animals are not composed of, say, granite blocks.  
Rather, they are composed of flesh and blood and bones. The particular arrangement of flesh and 
bones defines the kind of animal... The pattern of material composition is thus part of the form of the 
whole'. 
	   	   	  116 
(forma totius), and treats it as a 'form' that is reintegrated when a human being is 
resurrected.294   
The formula 'forma totius' for designating the human essence arises again in 
Aquinas's commentary on Metaphysica VII.10, wherein he again outlines the 
relationship between the human essence and the human individual.295  An individual 
can be taken as both universal and singular, Aquinas explains: when we consider 
Socrates just insofar as he is a man, we are referring to the fact that he possesses body 
and soul; when we consider him as a singular object we refer to him as a composite of 
this body, or 'individual matter' (Aquinas's interpretation of what Aristotle calls 
'ultimate matter' in that passage296 ), and this soul,297  or, in other words, as a 
composite of the individualised components which enter into Socrates' 'truth of human 
nature'.   
Therefore, the individual human possesses (rather than is) the essence 'humanity', 
because he or she has individual differentiating characteristics in addition to those 
which he or she shares with other humans: 'humanity' itself (or the forma totius) 
therefore captures or signifies only a part of the individual human.298 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 See below, chapter 4, section 2.4.  
295 In this passage, Aquinas discusses the positions of Aristotle, Averroes, and Avicenna on essence.  
According to Aquinas, Averroes identified human essence (or forma totius) with soul alone.  On this 
point Averroes is of course in agreement with Aristotle.  Aquinas massages Aristotle's text, however, 
and he reads the Stagirite as being in agreement with both Avicenna, and himself, regarding the fact 
that essence is composite.  See In Met. VII, lect. 9, nn. 1467-9, and for further commentary, see 
Maurer, 'Form and Essence' pp. 165-8, 171.  Avicenna's position is in fact more nuanced Avicenna's 
composite essence, or 'quiddity in itself', is entirely neutral with respect to individuality and 
universality.  Universality, for Avicenna, attaches to essence as an accident.  On essence or quiddity in 
Avicenna’s philosophy see A. Bäck, 'The Islamic Background: Avicenna (b. 980; d. 1037) and 
Averroes (b. 1126; d. 1198)', in Gracia (ed.), Individuation in Scholasticism, pp. 42-5, and Booth, Aristotelian 
Aporetic Ontology, pp. 115-22. 
296 See above, n. 154. 
297 'Sciendum tamen, quod hoc compositum, quod est animal vel homo, potest dupliciter sumi: vel 
sicut universale, vel sicut singulare.  Sicut universale quidem, sicut homo et animal.  Sicut singulare, ut 
Socrates et Callias...  Homo enim dicit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, non autem ex hac 
anima et hoc corpore.  Sed singulare dicit aliquid compositum ex ultima materia, idest materia 
individuali.  Est enim Socrates aliquid compositum ex hac anima et hoc corpore... Compositum autem 
est tam universale quam singulare'.  In Met. VII, lect. 10, nn. 1490-1 (ed.) Cathala, p. 438.  
298 'homo dicatur qui humanitatem habet, per hoc vero quod humanitatem habet, non excluditur quin 
alia habeat... unde homo significat per modum totius, humanitas vero per modum partis, nec de 
homine praedicatur'.  CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, pp. 140-1.  For further comment 
on this point see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 205-6.  
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1.3. Commensuratio between Individual Soul and Individual Body  
Aquinas's more detailed thinking on the individuality of body and soul will be set 
out in sections 3 and 4 below.  To round off this basic introduction to Aquinas's 
thought on the metaphysical composition of human nature, it is at least possible to 
briefly illustrate the way in which Aquinas applies, on the level below the species, and 
within the context of discussing life after death, his distinctive vision of a human 
being as a unity in which matter completes the soul just as much as the soul 
completes the body.    
At Summa contra Gentiles II, 80-81, Aquinas refutes the idea that souls cannot out-
survive the corruption of their bodies.  If they were to survive, one objection 
contends, they would have to do so as diverse substances.  But how do souls retain 
their diversity once they have departed from their bodies?  Aquinas answers that, if it 
is in the nature of the rational soul to be the form of a human body, then each 
individual human soul is, according to its particular nature or substance, the form of a 
particular body.  In other words, each soul is, intrinsically, 'commensurate' 
(commensurata) with its own body, and this, not surprisingly, is because each soul is 
united to its particular body, or to its particular matter, not merely accidentally, but 
as its substantial form.299   
Aquinas makes it explicit that each soul, beyond the fixtures of its nature that it 
shares with other members of the species, has its own, individual substantial nature.  
And so, 'this soul is commensurate to this body and not that', Aquinas reasons; 'that 
soul is commensurate to another body, and so on for all souls'.300   
Human souls, then, remain a diverse group after their separation from their 
bodies, because each retains its unique commensuratio to its particular body, or to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 'Sunt enim animae secundum substantias suas formae corporum: alias accidentaliter corpori 
unirentur, et sic ex anima et corpore non fieret unum per se, sed unum per accidens.  Inquantum 
autem formae sunt, oportet eas esse corporibus commensuratas'.  SCG II, 80-81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 13, p. 505. 
300 'Multitudo igitur animarum a corporibus separatarum consequitur quidem diversitatem formarum 
secundum substantiam, quia alia est substantia huius animae et illius: non tamen ista diversitas 
procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium ipsius animae, nec est secundum diversam rationem 
animae; sed est secundum diversam commensurationem animarum ad corpora; haec enim anima est 
commensurata huic corpori et non illi, illa autem alii, et sic de omnibus'.  ibid. 
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particular matter.301  Resurrection, precisely, will restore the complete nature of each 
individual soul as the substantial form of a particular body, reuniting it with its own matter.  
This is the thinking behind Aquinas's argument at Compendium Theologiae c. 153, that, 
according to the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, it is not possible 
for any soul to be reunited with any body, or matter, other than the very same matter 
that was particular to its individual body, or the same matter 'in number' (eadem 
materia secundum numerum).302 
2. The Basics (II): Dimensive Quantity as the Body's Accidental 
Corporeal Form   
The material and immaterial parts of the human being might well interpenetrate 
and complete one another's very natures, but in the concrete, for Aquinas, the 
relative independence of body from soul within the human being is grounded upon the 
accidental form giving to the body its physical structure, which he calls 'dimensive 
quantity' (quantitas dimensiva).  Dimensive quantity, in Aquinas's thought, takes on the 
attributes that Aristotle had ascribed to 'body' considered as a geometrical solid, or as 
it fell into the accidental category of 'quantity'.303  As was explained in chapter 2, 
Aristotle himself had indicated that such geometrical structures were immanent in 
natural bodies.  
When Aquinas says that the rational soul is the human body's only substantial 
form, then, he means that the soul determines the body's specific nature, imparts 
absolute substantial being (esse) to it, and is the source of the body's actions and 
operations.  He does not mean that the soul is a physical shape.  It is the quantitative 
structure in each human body that accounts for the physical organisation of its organic 
parts, and its overall shape as a result of that organisation.  The substance of a body 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 'Huiusmodi autem commensurationes remanent in animabus etiam pereuntibus corporibus'.  ibid. 
302 In order to illustrate this point regarding the individuality of human souls, Aquinas uses the 
somewhat confusing example, arguing that one cow's soul cannot become the soul of another cow.  
'sicut eidem formae secundum speciem debetur eadem materia secundum speciem, ita eidem formae 
secundum numerum debetur eadem materia secundum numerum: sicut enim anima bovis non potest 
esse anima corporis equi, ita anima huius non potest esse anima alterius bovis.  Oportet igitur quod 
cum eadem numero anima rationalis remaneat, quod corpori eidem numero in resurrectione rursus 
uniatur'.  CT I, c. 153, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, pp. 139-40 (my emphasis).   
303 See above, chapter 2, section 1.  
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and its quantitative structure, then, are not the same thing: bodily substance, matter 
and substantial form (insofar as it informs matter), has an accidental form giving it 
physical structure; physical structure is found in bodily substance. 
At Summa Theologiae I, q. 18, a. 2, Aquinas defines bodily substances as 'things in 
which three dimensions are found', or in which a three-dimensional structure is 
found, a definition which he introduces as if it is commonplace, and for which he 
could in fact find support from Augustine, as well as Aristotle.304  Yet, sometimes, he 
notes, the word 'body' is applied directly to those three dimensions themselves (or to 
that three-dimensional structure itself), in reference to the fact that three-dimensional 
bodily structures fall into the accidental category of quantity.305   
The remainder of the present section will expose the crucial role that the body's 
accidental corporeal form, its dimensive quantity, has to play in Aquinas's metaphysical 
account of bodily composition.  To highlight the role of dimensive quantity, it will 
illustrate the involvement of the body's structural form in the vivid picture that 
Aquinas paints of the human body's remarkable beauty and nobility in his work on 
the Creation and on the union between body and soul.  
Although the explication of Aquinas's thought will again remain at the level of the 
species for now, what Aquinas has to say about the role of the human body's 
accidental corporeal form is of course meant to apply to the basic design found in any 
individual body.  Moreover, the discussion will serve as the immediate springboard 
for the analysis contained in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter, on the construction of 
individual human bodies in generation, and Aquinas's concept of 'individual matter' 
respectively.  
2.1. Dimensive Quantity and Organic Structure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Cf. R. Pasnau, 'Mind and Extension (Descartes, Hobbes and More)', in H. Lagerlund ed. Forming 
the Mind.  Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 283, which cites Augustine, De trinitate X.vii.9.  
305  'Sicut patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam genus 
substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen 
corpus ad significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur species Quantitatis'.  ST I, 
q.18, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 4, p. 226.  
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In Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 8, which concludes his discussion of the union of 
body and soul in humans in that particular work, Aquinas delineates the way in 
which the soul, on the one hand, and the accidental form giving to the body its 
physical and organic structure, on the other hand, are present in the human body.  
Since the soul is united to the body as its substantial form, Aquinas writes, it is 
whole in each part of the body, according to the totality of its perfection and 'essence' 
(or nature); it defines each part as human, and it is the act of the whole body and 
each part of the body.  This is the case even if certain powers of the soul manifest 
themselves only in certain parts of the body (as hearing occurs only in the ear, for 
example).306   
The other forma totius present in the human body (that is, the other form of the 
whole body, not to be confused with the forma totius which Aquinas elsewhere identifies 
with essence) is a 'quantitative whole' (totalitas quantitativa) divisible into 'quantitative 
parts' (partes quantitativas).  It is an accidental form, consisting in the composition and 
order (compositio et ordo) of the body’s parts.  Demonstrating his characteristic weakness 
in providing good illustrative examples, Aquinas compares this accidental form to the 
form of a house.307  This accidental corporeal form, in contrast to the soul as 
substantial form, is whole in the whole body and part in each of its parts.308   
Aquinas thinks, then, that it is in the nature of the human body's quantitative 
form to be spatially extended, and therefore to extend matter in three dimensions, 
and to have distinct and determinate parts, and therefore to serve as the basis for 
structural distinctions in the body's matter.  Parts in any quantitative structure attach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 'Respondeo dicendum quod... quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in 
qualibet parte corporis... enim est forma... substantialis.  Substantialis autem forma non solum est 
perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis... oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum totius, sed cuiuslibet 
partis... sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis 
et essentiae; non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis.  Quia non secundum quamlibet suam 
potentiam est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, secundum auditum in aure, et 
sic de aliis'.  ST I, q. 76 a. 8, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, pp. 232-3.  
307 'Cum enim totum consistat ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus corporis, 
est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus: et talis forma est accidentalis', 'quoddam 
totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut... totum corpus... [est] totalitas quantitativa'.  ST I, 
q. 76, a. 8, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 232 (my insertion).  
308  Aquinas makes this explicit elsewhere: 'si accipiatur totum per comparationem ad partes 
quantitativas... non est tota in qualibet parte, sed tota in toto, et pars in parte'.  QDA, q. 10, response,  
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, p. 91.  
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to one another in a certain order.  As the comparison with the form of a house would 
also suggest, the relative proportions of the body's organic parts are also founded on 
its quantitative structure.  Aquinas makes it explicit, in a discussion of how Christ’s 
body is present in the sacrament, that the structural detail in an organic body, the 
'determinate distances' of the body's organs from one another, the distance of eye 
from eye and eye from ear, are based upon that body's accidental corporeal form, its 
quantitas dimensiva.309  
Insofar as it accounts for its proportions, the body's quantitas dimensiva directly 
underlies its three-dimensional shape, or figura.  As was noted in chapter 2, it is 
Aquinas's view that quantitas dimensiva and figura are distinct, but closely related 
forms.310  The body's figura is the overall effect of the various parts of the underlying 
structure being arranged and proportioned relative to one another in a precise way, 
and Aquinas confirms that 'figura... est qualitas circa quantitatem': the very concept (ratio) 
of shape or figura consists in the limitation or bounding of the bulk of the body's three-
dimensional structure (in terminatione magnitidinis), he explains,311 and bodily shape 
'follows directly' on quantitative structure (figura... consequitur quantitatem).312  
Aquinas uses the technical term 'disposition' (dispositio) to refer to the order or 
relative positioning of parts essential to the body's quantitative structure.  Dispositio is 
discussed in Aristotle’s lexicon of philosophical terms in the Metaphysica, precisely at 
Metaphysica V.19.  There, the Stagirite explains that the term dispositio refers to the 
order of that which has parts 'either as to place, potentiality, or species'.313  Aquinas's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 'Corpus Christi, cum sit organicum, habet partes determinate distantes, est enim de ratione 
organici corporis determinata distantia singularum partium ad invicem, sicut oculi ab oculo, et oculi 
ab aure', 'determinata distantia partium in corpore organico fundatur super quantitatem dimensivam 
ipsius'.  ST III, q. 76, a. 3, arg. 2 and ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12 (Rome: Ex Typographia 
Polyglotta, 1906), pp. 182-3.  
310 See above, pp. 73-4. 
311  'Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione 
magnitudinis'.  ST I, q. 78, a. 3, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 254.  Cf. 'figuratio est quaedam 
terminatio quantitatis'.  ST III, q. 63, a. 2 ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 32; 'figura, quae 
consistit in terminatione quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem'.  ST I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 2, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 4, p. 72.      
312 ST Ia-IIae, q. 52, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 6, p. 331.  The context for this 
discussion of accidental forms is the question of whether habits can admit of increase (augmentum).  
313  'Dispositio dicitur habentis partes ordo aut secundum locum aut secundum potentiam aut 
secundum speciem'.  Met., 1022b1-3 (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 116.   
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commentary on this passage illustrates that the word species in the Latin Aristotle was 
not always understood by him to mean substantial form.  He takes species here to be 
synonymous with figura: so dispositio can be used to refer to the ordering of parts as 
considered within the shape or overall structure of the whole.314 
There is potential for confusion over Aquinas's use of the term dispositio when 
analysing the fabric of the human body because he also refers to dimensive quantity 
itself as being the 'first disposition' of the body's matter (prima dispositio materiae).  
Aquinas frequently characterises quantitative structure in this way in his discussions 
of transubstantiation, the miracle in which the substance of the sacramental bread 
and wine is transformed whilst their visible physical features or accidents remain.  
Dimensive quantity, in Aquinas's view, is naturally or ontologically prior (though not 
prior in time) to any other accidental form inhering in matter, or in bodily substance.  
Other accidents inhere in substance, or in matter, with this structure acting as a 
medium or proximate subject (proximum subiectum) for them.315 
So, as this characterisation of quantitative structure as the first disposition of 
matter suggests, Aquinas also uses the term dispositio in a broader way to refer to 
other properties of the body.  The dispositio that is found in other accidental features 
consists in their particular ordering or mutual adjustment (commensuratio) relative to 
one another, which can vary from one individual body to the next.  Health and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 'Tertius modus est, prout ordo partium attenditur secundum speciem et figuram totius; et sic 
dispositio sive situs ponitur differentia in genere quantitatis.  Dicitur enim quod quantitas alia est 
habens positionem, ut linea, superficies, corpus et locus'.  In Met. V, lect. 20, n. 1060 (ed.) Cathala, p. 
330.  
315 'Sciendum autem, quod substantia corporalis habet quod sit subjectum accidentium ex materia sua, 
cui primo inest subjici alteri.  Prima autem dispositio materiae est quantitas... Unde omnia alia 
accidentia mediante quantitate in substantia fundantur, et quantitas est prior eis naturaliter'.  In Sent. 
IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 3, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 484; 'Inter accidentia vero 
quidam ordo considerandus est. Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhaeret substantiae 
quantitas dimensiva. Deinde qualitates in substantia recipiuntur quantitate mediante'.  SCG IV, 63, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 201; 'quia prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva... Et 
quia primum subiectum est materia, consequens est quod omnia alia accidentia referantur ad 
subiectum mediante quantitate dimensiva...' ST III, q. 77, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 
12, p. 196; 'Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae'.  ST I, q. 78, a. 3 ad 2, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 254 (the context in this final case is a discussion of sense perception).  
For more on dimensive quantity in Aquinas's work on transubstantiation, see McCord Adams, Some 
Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist, ch. 4. 
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beauty, for example, are dispositions each of which consists in a certain ordering of 
different accidental features.316   
Aquinas underlines the fundamental role that the body's quantitative structure 
and figura have to play in its metaphysical make-up in a discussion on the topic of 
accidental alteration in his Physica commentary (1268-69).  He explains that, among a 
material thing's accidents, its figura will most clearly indicate the species, or kind, into 
which it falls.  The reason for this is that while quantity, among the accidents, is most 
closely related to substance (presumably in virtue of the fact that it acts as a 
proximate subject for all other accidents in matter), figura, the external shape 
following directly upon quantitative structure, is the accident most closely related to 
substantial form.  It is for this reason that some philosophers have confused 
quantitative structure with substance, on the one hand, and the figura that follows 
upon it with substantial form, on the other hand.  These are both, in fact, accidental 
forms.317     
2.2. The Human Body as 'optime dispositus'  
The extraordinary passages on the Creation and on the union of body and soul in 
which Aquinas explains how the human body exceeds all other animal bodies in 
respect of the beauty and nobility of its design refer to the human body as being, 
precisely, 'optimally disposed'.  A key text in this regard is Summa Theologiae I, q. 91, a. 
3,318 where Aquinas asks whether the human body was created with a 'fitting 
disposition' (conveniens dispositio).  Even if it has become subject to death and prone to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 'dicimus autem dispositiones... sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia huiusmodi, quae important 
quandam commensurationem plurium quae diversis modis commensurari possunt'.  ST Ia-IIae, q. 49, 
a. 4, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 6 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1891), p. 315.   
317 'considerandum est, quod inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime consequuntur et demonstrant 
speciem rerum.  Quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo certiori iudicio diversitas 
specierum diiudicari potest, quam diversitate figurarum.  Et hoc ideo, quia sicut quantitas 
propinquissime se habet ad substantiam inter alia accidentia, ita figura, quae est qualitas circa 
quantitatem, propinquissime se habet ad formam substantiae.  Unde sicut posuerunt aliqui 
dimensiones esse substantiam rerum, ita posuerunt aliqui figuras esse substantiales formas'.  In Phys., 
VII, lect. 5, n. 917 (5), Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 2, p. 339 (my emphasis).    
318 Cf. also ST I, q. 76, a. 5 (Utrum anima intellectiva convenienter tali corpori uniatur); SCG II, 90 (Quod nulli 
alii corpori nisi humano unitur substantia intellectualis ut forma); QDA, q. 8 (Utrum anima rationalis tali corpori 
debuerit uniri quale est corpus humanum); In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5 (Utrum anima humana tali corpori debuerit 
uniri).  
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defects as a result of the Fall,319 Aquinas holds, the human body retains all of the 
perfections belonging to its natural physical constitution.320  Summa Theologiae I, q. 91, 
a. 3, then, provides ample illustration of the significance of dimensive quantity in 
Aquinas's thought on the human body.  As will become obvious, Aquinas's 
understanding of the perfection of the human body is here dependent upon 
Aristotle's De partibus animalium in particular.321  
Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that the soul is the body's final cause, the 
purpose for which it exists.  God, nature's craftsman, has designed the human body 
with the best possible disposition (in optima dispositione) so that it is the fitting subject for 
the rational soul and its operations.  Put another way, the human body has been 
designed so as to be in proportion to such a soul and its operations.322  Of course, 
disposition of the human body is absolutely the best disposition in comparison to the 
respective dispositions of other kinds of living bodies.  The human body is designed 
as the proportionate subject of the most perfect kind of soul immersed in matter, the 
rational soul: the more noble the form, the more noble the body whose form it is.323  
Aquinas analyses the various perfections belonging to the organic structure of the 
human body.  He notes that the human being's distinctive upright stature means that, 
unlike plants and other animals, it is disposed in the best possible way (optime dispositus) 
with respect to the surrounding universe.324  Like Aristotle, Aquinas highlights that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 ST Ia-IIae, q. 85, a. 5.   
320 ST Ia-IIae, q. 85, articles 1 and 4.  
321 See above, pp. 48-9.  
322 'Respondeo dicendum quod omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina, unde sunt 
quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei.  Quilibet autem artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam 
inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad finem... Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali 
dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem... 
Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius, materia enim est 
propter formam... Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum 
convenientiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes.  Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani 
corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea 
quae requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes'.  ST I, 
q. 91, a. 3, response; Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 393 (my emphasis).  
323 'nobilioris corporis sit nobilior forma... nobilissima forma... est anima intellectiva’.  SCG II, 90, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 549.  
324 'Nam homo habet superius sui, idest caput, versus superius mundi, et inferius sui versus inferius 
mundi: et ideo est optime dispositus secundum dispositionem totius.  Plantae vero habent superius sui 
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humans, as upright, have hands.  So they might not have a fixed form of defence 
against predators like other animals, but instead they have the practical creative 
freedom that befits an intellect capable of conceiving an infinite number of ideas.325  
In virtue of their erect stance, humans do not have to take food straight into their 
mouths from the ground, as other animals do.  So the human tongue and human lips 
are softer than those of other animals, permitting the speech proper to a rational 
animal.326  The fact that the human stands with his or her face erect is also fitting: the 
sense organs are principally located in the face, and, in contrast to other animals 
(whose faces are turned to the ground), humans enjoy the beauty of their natural 
surroundings for its own sake, and were given senses for the purpose of uncovering 
intelligible truths about earth and the heavens.327   
At De partibus animalium IV.10, Aristotle had claimed that humans' upright stature 
permitted their senses to operate more freely than those of other animals.  Aquinas 
himself restricts the application of this idea to what he takes to be the four interior 
sense powers (the common sense, imagination, memory, and estimative power) 
which, drawing upon Avicenna's advances on Aristotle's work, he takes to be the 
powers that process the raw data gained from the five external senses.  Aquinas 
thinks that these interior senses are located in the brain, and, in humans, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
versus inferius mundi (nam radices sunt ori proportionales), inferius autem sui versus superius mundi.  
Animalia vero bruta medio modo: nam superius animalis est pars qua accipit alimentum, inferius 
autem est pars qua emittit superfluum'.  ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 394.  
325 'cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo 
pilorum aut plumarum... homini non competebant.  Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus 
potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis... Et hoc etiam magis 
competebat rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita 
instrumenta sibi parandi', 'si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus loco anteriorum 
pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret'.  ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 2 and ad 3, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 394  
326 'si homo haberet pronam staturam... ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, et linguam 
etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus.  Et talis dispositio omnino 
impediret locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis'.  ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 5, p. 394.  
327 'sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam 
ad cognoscendum... solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam.  Et 
ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram... homo 
vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et praecipue per visum, qui est subtilior et plures differentias 
rerum ostendit, libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus 
intelligibilem colligat veritatem'.  ibid.  
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elevation of the brain above the rest of the body, and the relatively large size of the 
brain, enable these powers to operate more freely, as befits a rational animal.328   
Aquinas sees the fulness of the human body's nobility and perfection in the sheer 
diversity of its parts and the diversity of dispositions found in these parts.  Due to its 
perfection, Aquinas writes, the rational soul is manifold in its power, performing 
more varied operations than any other kind of animal soul, and therefore it requires 
an organic body with a greater variety of parts than any other kind of animal body, 
with each part disposed in a different way to perform the operation proper to it.329  
The more perfect the living body, Aquinas explains in his Quaestiones disputatae de anima 
(1265-66), a. 10, the greater the diversity of parts it has.330  Hence, in a manner of 
speaking, humans are perfected by the parts proper and intrinsic to them.331 
At Summa Theologiae I q. 91 a. 3, and in every one of his other major discussions of 
human bodily perfection, Aquinas highlights the distinctive composition of human 
flesh.  Amongst the animal bodies, human bodies have the most temperate 
complexion (temperatissima complexio) or a perfectly equable one (perfecta complexionis 
aequalitas)332 in proportion, of course, to the rational soul as the most noble (nobilissima) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 'Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet maximum 
cerebrum... ut liberius in eo perficerentur operationes interiorum virium sensitivarum, quae sunt 
necessariae ad intellectus operationem', 'ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes habeant, dum 
cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis 
elevatum'.  ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 1 and ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, pp. 393-4.  The major 
modern study on the interior senses in scholastic theology is now J. Toivanen, Perception and the Internal 
Senses. Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013).  This was 
accessed during research for the present chapter as an unpublished PhD thesis, under the title Animal 
Consciousness. Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2009), 
wherein there is an exposition on Avicenna's contribution to the theory of the interior sense powers 
pp. 178-81.     
329 'Et hoc competit animae intellectivae, quae quamvis sit una secundum essentiam, tamen propter 
sui perfectionem est multiplex in virtute; et ideo, ad diversas operationes, indiget diversis 
dispositionibus in partibus corporis cui unitur.  Et propter hoc videmus quod maior est diversitas 
partium in animalibus perfectis quam in imperfectis, et in his quam in plantis'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 3, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 228.  
330 'Et quanto corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter maiorem perfectionem necesse est 
inveniri maiorem diversitatem in partibus'.  QDA, q. 9, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, p. 
82.   
331 'homo perficitur per proprias partes'.  ST I, q. 70, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 
117.   
332 In Sent. II, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 167; ST I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 1, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 393.  
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kind of animal form.333  There is a most perfect or harmonious combination of 
elements (perfectissimum commixtionis modum),334 in human skin, the organ of touch.  
This means that the complexion of the organ is a perfect medium between the 
contraries that it perceives.  Although certain of the other external senses are much 
weaker in humans than on other animals, such as the sense of smell, still, of the five 
external sense powers, it is the sensitivity of touch alone that correlates with 
intelligence in animals.  Aquinas's basic authority for this idea is, of course, Aristotle's 
De anima II.9.335  So Aquinas tacitly dissolves the tension (noted in chapter 1) between 
De anima II.9 and De partibus animalium IV.10, by taking the former text to be a 
discussion of the external sense powers, and the latter to the interior sense powers.336  
Being remote from unstable contrary qualities, Aquinas concludes, the human body 
resembles a celestial body and therefore has a particular dignity.337  
3. Human Generation and the Shaping of Individuals  
As for Aristotle, so for Aquinas, the best way to approach his account of the 
individual body is through his account of its generation.  Unlike Aristotle's, however, 
Aquinas's direct discussions of human generation are almost entirely confined to the 
level of the species.  In any case, Aquinas's understanding of the construction of the 
human body in utero follows Aristotle's closely, and, as with the Stagirite's work, an 
appreciation of the general framework is a prerequisite for understanding how 
generation plays out in individual cases.  As we will see, the human body, for 
Aquinas, is constructed independently in utero by the agent power in paternal semen, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 'cum videamus tanto corpora mixta nobiliores formas habere quanto magis ad temperamentum 
mixtionis perveniunt; et sic, quod habet formam nobilissimam, utpote substantiam intellectualem, si sit 
corpus mixtum, oportet esse temperatissimum... Complexio autem maxime aequalis est complexio 
corporis humani'.  SCG II, 90, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 549. 
334 QDA, q. 8, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, p. 68.  
335 'tactus... est perfectior in homine quam in aliquo alio animali... quantum ad aliquos exteriores 
sensus, homo ab aliis animalibus deficiat.  Sicut homo, inter monia animalia, habet pessimum 
olfactum'.  ST I, q. 91, a. 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 394; 'Unde etiam videmus quod mollities 
carnis et bonitas tactus, quae aequalitatem complexionis demonstrant, sunt signa boni intellectus'.  
SCG II 90.  Cf. also ST I, q. 76, a. 5, response, which makes explicit reference to De anima II.9. 
336 See above, pp. 48 and 59. 
337 'Habet autem hoc corpus aequaliter complexionatum quandam dignitatem, per hoc quod est 
remotum a contrariis; in quo quodammodo assimilatur corpori caelesti'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 2, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 228.   
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which (following his teacher Albertus Magnus338), Aquinas refers to as the 'formative 
power' (virtus formativa).  The virtus formativa acts upon the matter provided by the 
mother,339 and, once the body has reached a state of soul-readiness, God creates the 
soul in it.   
By way of an understanding of the precise work that the virtus formativa does, as we 
will see, it is possible to fully grasp what Aquinas means when he says that the 
numerical diversity, or individuality among human souls follows the varying 
dispositions of the bodies in which they are created.  And it is necessary to try to 
uncover what is going on on a purely material level in Aquinas's general account of 
human generation, in order to understand what he means when he says that each 
soul is created in its individual body according to the 'capacity' of its particular 
matter.   
Reading closely Aquinas's work on human generation, we learn much more 
about the unique and permanent commensuratio, or proportioning, that each soul 
receives in relation to its particular matter at the moment of its creation.  It is in virtue 
of this unique commensuratio that it bears towards its own, particular material 
complement, of course, that each soul can be reunited only with the matter particular 
to its own body at the general resurrection.  
3.1. Material Developments in Human Generation  
For Aquinas, given that he holds that there can by definition only ever be one 
substantial form in any composite, there can be no formal continuity across the entire 
process of a human foetus's development.  Even so, like Aristotle's, Aquinas's work on 
human generation and the union of body and soul focuses on the various forms gained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 L. Demaitre, L. and A. A. Travill, 'Human Embryology and Development in the Works of 
Albertus Magnus' in J. A. Weisheipl (ed.) Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: commemorative essays 1980 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1979), pp. 419-20.  Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, 
pp. 250-60.  
339 'dicendum quod in generatione hominis mater ministrat materiam corporis informem, formatur 
autem per virtutem formativam quae est in semine patris'.  ST IIa-IIae, q. 26, a. 10, ad 1, Opera omnia 
iussu Leonis XIII, 8 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1895), p. 220 (the context is a discussion of 
whether a child should love their mother more than their father); 'in naturali generatione animalium, 
principium activum est virtus formativa quae est in semine, in iis quae ex semine generantur'.  ST I, q. 
71, a. 1, ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 182.  
	   	   	  129 
and lost, rather than on the material principle as the continuant of change.  Since 
substantial change is instantaneous, of course, there is never a moment at which 
matter is without a substantial form.340  So it takes some careful excavatory work in 
order to attempt to reveal what is going on, just as far as matter is concerned, in 
Aquinas's account of human generation.  
Aquinas thinks that, on its path to a state of soul-readiness, the embryo acquires 
and loses a series of intermediate substantial forms, each more perfect than the 
last. 341   None of these intermediate substantial forms places the embryo in a 
'complete' species; they are generated purely because they are the means by which 
the goal of the process, the acquisition of the rational soul, is reached.342  Prior to the 
acquisition of the rational soul, then, the embryo is human only potentially; it 
becomes human the moment the soul is created in it by God.343  Since no substantial 
form endures across this process, neither does any accidental form.  Aquinas 
subscribes to the Aristotelian principle of the priority of substance to its accidents in 
his work on the union between body and soul: at each stage of in the process of the 
development of the embryo, the human body's accidental forms depend for their 
existence on the substance, matter and substantial form, in which they inhere.344   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 'materia nunquam denudatur ab omni forma, propter hoc quandocumque recipit unam formam, 
perdit aliam, et e converso'.  DSC, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, pp. 43-4.  
341 'dicendum est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod tam 
in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris: ita tamen 
quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius.  Et sic per multas generationes 
et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis 
animalibus'.  ST I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 567.  Cf. DSC, a. 3, ad 13.  
342 'Nec est inconveniens si aliquid intermediorum generatur et statim postmodum interrumpitur: quia 
intermedia non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut in via ad speciem; et ideo non generantur ut 
permaneant, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum perveniatur'.  SCG II, 89, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 13, p. 542.  
343 'Corpus igitur humanum, secundum quod est in potentia ad animam, utpote cum nondum habet 
animam, est prius tempore quam anima: tunc autem non est humanum actu, sed potentia tantum.  
Cum vero est humanum actu, quasi per animam humanam perfectum, non est prius neque posterius 
anima, sed simul cum ea'.  SCG II, 89, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 543.  
344 'Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter... Unde impossibile 
est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante formam substantialem; 
et per consequens neque ante animam'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 6, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 
229.  
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Yet, while substantial change is instantaneous, accidental alteration is a gradual 
'movement'.345  During the periods of time that separate the moments of acquisition 
(and loss) of intermediate substantial forms, the virtus formativa 'disposes' the 
developing body for the acquisition of the next substantial form in the sequence, by 
setting in motion various accidental alterations.  In the very instant in which the body 
is suitably disposed for the next substantial form in the sequence, it acquires, or 
better, has already acquired, that next substantial form.346   The virtus formativa has 
induced in the body the dispositions that befit that substantial form, and the previous 
accidental dispositions have corrupted, along with the previous substantial form.   
So the newly generated human being is composed of a divinely created immortal 
soul, and a material part disposed for the soul by the accidental forms introduced by 
the virtus formativa.  As Aquinas puts it, in the generation of a human, the natural 
agent, or virtus formativa, 'terminates at matter', or extends itself only to configuring 
and disposing the body, while and the divine agent 'terminates at form', or makes the 
rational soul.347   
So what, if anything, does Aquinas have to say about the development of the 
material principle in its own right?  The first thing to establish is that Aquinas does 
explicitly confirm that matter is the continuant of these substantial and accidental 
formal changes.348  But it is not the case that a certain thing can come from just any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 'Cum enim forma substantialis non continue vel successive in actum producatur, sed in instanti 
(alias oporteret esse motum in genere substantiae, sicut est in genere qualitatis)'.  QDP, q. 3, a. 9, ad 9, 
Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol.3, p. 205.  Cf. ST I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2.   
346 'in generatione aliorum hominum... successive corpus formatur et disponitur ad animam, unde 
primo, tanquam imperfecte dispositum, recipit animam imperfectam; et postmodum, quando perfecte 
est dispositum, recipit animam perfectam'.  ST III, q. 33, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 11, p. 
342.  (Aquinas is explaining how the in utero development of other human embryos differs from 
Christ’s incarnation).  On the work of the virtus formativa as 'dispositive': 'Sic enim homo sibi simile in 
specie generat, inquantum virtus seminis eius dispositive operatur ad ultimam formam, ex qua homo 
speciem sortitur'.  SCG II, 89, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 542.    
347 'duo agentia omnino disparata non possunt hoc modo se habere quod actio unius terminetur ad 
materiam, et alterius ad forma; hoc tamen contingit in duobus agentibus ordinatis, quorum unum est 
instrumentum alterius... Natura autem est sicut instrumentum quoddam divinae virtutis ut supra, 
ostensum est.  Unde non est inconveniens, si virtus divina sola faciat animam rationalem, actione 
naturae se extendente solum ad disponendum corpus'.  QDP, q. 3, a. 9, ad 21, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, 
vol. 3, p. 205.  Cf. SCG II, 89, ST I, q. 118, a. 1, ad 3.  
348 Aquinas explains that this was Aristotle's solution to the ancient problem of defining generation 
simpliciter without maintaining that something can come from nothing: 'cum enim generatio sit 
transmutatio de non esse in esse, id simpliciter generatur quod fit ens simpliciter loquendo, de non 
ente simpliciter... propter hoc omnes antiqui, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquid actu, ut 
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matter: following Aristotle, Aquinas thinks that certain matter is necessary in order that 
a certain substantial form can be acquired in generation.  The material substratum of 
human generation develops from a state in which it is what in one discussion of the 
incarnation Aquinas calls 'fitting', 'determinate' matter, provided by the mother,349 
into, of course, human proper matter, or the appropriate material subject for a rational 
soul.   
Nowhere, indeed, does Aquinas suggest that a featureless prime matter, alone, is 
the continuant of a complex case of substantial change such as human generation.  
He explicitly rejects this idea in his commentary on Aristotle's discussion of proper 
matter at Metaphysica VIII.4-5.  If prime matter, which is common to all things, were 
enough to serve as the material cause in any case of generation, then the diversity 
that we see in things would be entirely due to their efficient, or agent causes, and in 
no way due to the matter out of which they are made.  But, as Aristotle himself said, 
nobody could make a saw from wood: of necessity, Aquinas maintains, different 
things have diverse, 'proper matters'.350   
There are certain passages in Aquinas's work on substantial change in which he 
does shift his focus towards the development of material principle itself, even if he 
maintains that matter can only be grasped in relation to the forms that it takes on.  
Passages in which this shift of focus occurs help to cut through the ambiguity Aquinas 
introduces into his metaphysical account of the body by habitually using certain 
shorthand labels for proper matter, such as 'flesh and bone', which point to matter 
insofar as it is invested with accidental forms.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ignem, aerem aut aquam, aut aliquid medium, dixerunt quod fieri nihil erat nisi alterari; et Aristotiles 
eorum dubitationem solvit ponendo materiam esse in potentia tantum, quam dicit esse subiectum 
generationis et corruptionis simpliciter'.  DSC, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, p. 43 
(my emphasis).   
349 'cum enim generatio naturalis sit ex determinata materia, eo quod unusquisque actus in propria 
materia fit, sicut in 2 de anima dicit philosophus, oportet ut formatio prolis fiat ex materia convenienti, 
et non ex quacumque'.  In Sent. III, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 271.  
350 'Quia vero, licet materia prima sit communis omnibus, tamen materiae propriae sunt diversae 
diversorum: ideo ne aliquis totam diversitatem rerum attribueret moventi, et nullo modo materiali 
principio, subiungit quod in quibusdam diversorum ex necessitate est diversa materia, propria scilicet.  
Non enim quodlibet natum est fieri ex qualibet materia; sicut serra non fit ex ligno'.  In Met. VIII, lect. 
4, n. 1735; (ed.) Cathala, p. 503.  
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In his commentary on Metaphysica VIII.5, continuing the same discussion of 
proper matter, Aquinas analyses head-on the role of material principle in limiting the 
changes that can take place in nature.  'Whenever matter', he writes, 'is related to 
different forms in a certain order, it cannot be brought back from a subsequent state 
to the state which preceded it in that order'.  To reach that preceding state again, 
matter first has to be resolved back to the very least complex level, or to the level of 
prime matter.  Hence, Aquinas continues, in preparation for animal generation 
semen is generated in the body from blood, and blood from food, but this order of 
successive generations could not be reversed: everything has a 'determinate mode of 
generation', limited and constrained by the sequence in which the material principle 
can undergo development.351   
In chapter 1, Averroes' general account of complex cases of generation was set 
out.  Aquinas would of course have read it.  According to the Commentator, matter 
has several potencies or habilitates which are ordered to one another such that, in 
natural generation, the proper potency appropriate for the ultimate form to be acquired 
develops in a determinate sequence, with the development of this complex potency 
mediated by the intermediary forms acquired and lost.352   
Writing on the union between body and soul, and the proportionate relationship 
between the two, Aquinas himself treats interchangeably the ideas that 'a proper act 
comes into being in its proper matter', on the one hand, and 'a proper act comes to be 
in its proper potency', on the other.353  So does he think, along lines similar to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 'quandocumque materia se habet ad diversa secundum ordinem, non potest ex posteriori rediri in 
id quod praecedit secundum ordinem.  Sicut in generatione animalis ex cibo fit sanguis, et ex sanguine 
semen et menstruum, ex quibus generatur animal.  Non potest autem mutari ordo, scilicet ut ex 
semine fiat sanguis, aut ex sanguine cibus, nisi per resolutionem ad primam materiam, ex eo quod 
cuiuslibet rei est determinatus modus generationis'.  In Met. VIII, lect. 4, n. 1753 (ed.) Cathala, p. 506.  
352 See above, p. 55 and n. 125.  
353 'Praeterea, ut philosophus dicit in 2 de anima, actus proprius fit in propria materia; unde oportet 
perfectionem perfectibili proportionatam esse.  Sed anima rationalis, quae est perfectio corporis 
humani, secundum suam naturam incorruptibilis est...', 'Ad septimum dicendum, quod inter animam 
et corpus oportet esse proportionem, sicut potentiae ad actum'.  In Sent. II, d. 30, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 7 and 
ad 7, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, pp. 212; 'substantia intellectus unitur corpori humano ut forma.  
Impossibile est autem unam formam esse nisi unius materiae: proprius actus in propria potentia fit; 
sunt enim ad invicem proportionata'.  SCG II, 73, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13 (Rome: Typis 
Riccardi Garroni), p. 459.  Cf.  Aristotle, DA, 414a25-27: 'uniuscuiusque enim actus in potentia 
existente et in propria materia aptus natus est fieri', edited in Aquinas, In DA, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 45, 1, p. 82.    
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Commentator, that the material principle has a scale of potency within it, according 
to which the sequence of forms that can be acquired in it is determined and limited?  
It is true that Aquinas never directly refers to this passage in Averroes' commentary 
on the Metaphysica in his work on human generation.  But then, Aquinas does explicitly 
hold that matter is in potency to a range of forms of varying complexity; that, when 
in composition with those forms, it bears a proportionate relationship to them; and 
finally that, when matter is the proportionate subject of one form it is not is a further 
state of potency to any other form indiscriminately, but only to a certain other kind 
of form. 
And there are several places in Aquinas's work on generation and on the union of 
body and soul in humans that indicate that these are indeed the lines along which 
Aquinas would describe purely material developments in human generation.  In his 
Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 9, in an echo of his Metaphysica commentary, Aquinas 
writes that matter is in potency to forms only in a certain order: whatever is proper to 
a superior form can only be received in matter through the mediation of that which is 
proper to an inferior form.354   
Additionally, Aquinas discusses 'grades' or 'modes' according to which form 
perfects matter.  At Summa Theologiae I q. 76 a. 6, he writes that the same rational soul 
perfects matter according to 'diverse grades of perfection'.355  In his De spiritualibus 
creaturis (1267-68), a. 4, analysing the concept of proper matter in a response to an 
objection that suggests that, in order to sustain a concrete notion of proper matter, 
there must be some corporeal substantial form intervening between the soul and 
matter, Aquinas maintains that insofar as matter (itself) is already perfected in the 
'mode of perfection' according to which an inferior form was perfected it, it is propria 
materia for those perfections that a superior form adds to it.356   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354  'materia secundum ordinem est in potentia ad formas; non quod recipiat diversas formas 
substantiales ordinatim, sed quia id quod est proprium superioris formae non recipitur nisi mediante 
eo quod est proprium inferioris formae'.  QDA, q. 9, ad 9, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, pp. 84-5.  
355 'forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum.  Et ideo una et eadem 
existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus... materia praeintelligitur perfecta 
secundum esse ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 1, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 5, p. 229.  
356 'cum forma perfectissima det omnia quae dant formae imperfectiores, et adhuc amplius; materia, 
prout ab ea perficitur eo modo perfectionis quo perficitur a formis imperfectioribus, consideratur ut 
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Further, in his Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 9, Aquinas discusses the role of 
accidental dispositions induced in matter by the virtus formativa in the development of 
these grades of perfection.  He explains that the accidental dispositions which dispose 
matter for a substantial form, or which make matter the propria materia for that form, 
are not media intervening between matter and that very form in an absolute way.  
Analytically speaking, however, they are media between matter itself, considered 
insofar as it had already been perfected by a perfection of an inferior grade, that is, 
before it became the subject of the new form, and the (already) acquired form insofar 
as it brings matter into act at a higher grade of perfection.357  So accidental 
dispositions themselves are, in a qualified sense, media between substantial form and 
matter, because a substantial form cannot be acquired unless in matter that is already 
suitably disposed.  Again, it is worth repeating, a new substantial form is acquired in 
the very same instant that the dispositions which make matter the proper matter for 
that form are induced in matter by the virtus formativa.  The induced dispositions are 
neither temporally nor ontologically prior, in matter, to the new substantial form.    
In further passages from De spiritualibus creaturis that discuss the union between 
body and soul, Aquinas presents matter, or 'the body', as having a certain 'capacity' 
or internal 'proportion' (or scale) to it.  This capacity or proportion is, so to speak, 
filled up or exhausted by a rational soul, whose existence is certainly grounded in the 
body, but which, in virtue of the fact that its intellectual operations do not occur in 
any bodily organ, is not confined to matter but surpasses or exceeds it (supergreditur, 
excedit, superexcedit).358  The image of the soul grounded in matter, but overreaching 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
materia propria, etiam illiusmodi perfectionis quam addit perfectior forma super alias'.  DSC, a. 3, ad 
2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, p. 45.   
357 The stage of development with which Aquinas is concerned here is the infusion of the rational soul, 
hence the more perfect form in question brings matter into act not just according to a higher grade of 
perfection but according to the 'ultimate perfection': 'dispositiones accidentales quae faciunt materiam 
propriam ad aliquam formam, non sunt mediae totaliter inter formam et materiam; sed inter formam 
secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem, et materiam secundum quod iam est perfecta perfectione 
inferioris gradus'.  QDA, q. 9 ad 5, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, p. 83.    
358  'Perfectissima autem formarum, id est anima humana, quae est finis omnium formarum 
naturalium, habet operationem omnino excedentem materiam, quae non fit per organum corporale, 
scilicet intelligere... oportet quod esse animae humanae superexcedat materiam corporalem, et non sit 
totaliter comprehensum ab ipsa, sed tamen aliquo modo attingatur ab ea, in quantum igitur 
supergreditur esse materiae corporalis, potens per se subsistere et operari, anima humana est 
substantia spiritualis...', 'dicendum quod intelligere est operatio animae humanae secundum quod 
superexcedit proportionem materiae corporalis', 'anima... superexcedit corporis proportionem', 'virtus 
animae capacitatem corporis excedit'.  DSC, a. 2, response, ad 2 and ad 4, and a. 4, response, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 2, pp. 29-30, 53. 
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matter in its perfection and power, appears again at Summa Theologiae I q. 76 a. 1, also 
on the union between body and soul.  There, Aquinas writes that the more noble a 
form is, the more it dominates corporeal matter, the less it is 'immersed' (immergitur) in 
matter, and the more its power or operation 'exceeds' matter.  The human form, he 
again explains, is the highest and noblest kind of form designed to be immersed in 
matter, and a power that overreaches matter entirely: the intellect.359  
It should be assumed prima facie that there is no contradiction between the idea 
that the human soul comes into being in its proper potency, on the one hand, and 
another pillar of Aquinas's thought on the union of matter and form, namely that 'a 
substantial form does not arrive at a subject already existing in act, but one which 
exists in potency alone, that is, prime matter'.360  The soul is united immediately and 
intimately to its entire material subject, right down to the level of prime matter 
(analytically speaking, not in a temporal sequence), which, featureless in itself, is 
logically presupposed by any further degree of perfection.  The soul perfects its 
matter according to various degrees of perfection (again analytically speaking, and 
not in a temporal sequence): being, living, sensing and understanding361 (in this last 
respect in fact overreaching matter entirely).  
3.2. The Individual Body  
With this general framework for understanding the body's development, 
independent from the soul, in place, we reach Aquinas's account of the generation of 
the individual body.  Discussing, at Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (1265-66), q. 3, a. 9, 
whether the rational soul is transmitted to the body in paternal semen or whether it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359  'Sed considerandum est quod, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae 
corporali, et minus ei immergitur, et magis sua operatione vel virtute excedit eam... Anima autem 
humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum.  Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, 
quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis.  Et 
haec virtus dicitur intellectus'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 210.   
360 (My emphasis).  'Forma autem substancialis non advenit subiecto iam praeexistenti in actu, set 
existenti in potencia tantum, scilicet materie prime'.  In DA II, lect. 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 
1, p. 71.   
361 'dicendum quod in materia considerantur diversi gradus perfectionis, sicut esse, vivere, sentire, et 
intelligere.  Semper autem secundum superveniens priori perfectius est.  Forma ergo quae dat solum 
primum gradum perfectionis materiae est imperfectissima.  Sed forma quae dat primum et secundum 
et tertium et sic deinceps est perfectissima; et tamen materiae immediata'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 3, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 224.   
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created in the body by God, Aquinas briefly and suggestively notes that the 
'disposition of the soul follows the disposition of the body' in human generation.  In 
each individual case, the parents are directly responsible only for the disposition of the 
body, but God creates the soul in proportion to the individual body, which explains 
why children resemble their parents in features that pertain to their souls, as well as 
in their physical characteristics.362   
Aquinas thinks that inequality amongst humans is natural.  It would have 
obtained even in the state of innocence due to environmental factors, if not with 
respect to any deficiency in body or soul.363  He closely follows Aristotle's De generatione 
animalium IV in explaining post-lapsarian intra-specific differences among humans, 
and the origins of those differences in the material conditions of their generation, but, 
in order to get full confirmation of this picture, we have to look beyond Aquinas's 
writings directly in the area of human generation and the union between body and 
soul.  
At Summa Theologiae III, q. 74, a. 3 (1271-73), Aquinas asks whether the 
sacramental bread must be made of wheat, or whether it can instead be made of 
another grain that simply looks like wheat.  It is here that Aquinas makes it explicit 
that, in generation, the work of the virtus formativa accounts for the fact that a father 
generates offspring like himself in species, but that, beyond this, both the matter upon 
which it works and the strength of the virtus formativa itself are limiting factors with 
respect to the inheritance of characteristics in particular cases.364   
Illustrating contingency in nature in the context of various discussions of divine 
will and predestination, Aquinas notes that a strong virtus formativa will result in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 'quod ipsam dispositionem corporis sequitur dispositio animae rationalis... Et ex hoc est quod filii 
similantur parentibus etiam in his quae pertinent ad animam'.  QDP, q. 3, a. 9, ad 7, Opera Omina (ed.) 
Busa, vol. 3, p. 205.   
363 ST I, q. 96, a. 3, response.  For further comment see Sweeney, 'Individuation and the Body in 
Aquinas', p. 186.  
364 'generans generat sibi simile in specie, fit tamen aliquando aliqua dissimilitudo generantis ad 
genitum quantum ad accidentia, vel propter materiam, vel propter debilitatem virtutis generativae'.  
ST III, q. 74, a. 3 ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 147.  (The virtus generativa is the power of the 
father’s soul which is responsible for producing the virtus formativa).  On the mother’s contribution, 
'bona dispositio matricis operatur ad bonam dispositionem prolis'.  In Sent. III, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, response, 
Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 271. 
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generation of a son who is physically very similar to his father.  The weaker the virtus 
formativa, the weaker the resemblance will be.365  The goal of the virtus formativa is of 
course the perfect fitting-together (consummatio) of the body's members; 366 
characteristics such as corporeal agility can be inherited if the formativa is strong, we 
learn in a discussion of original sin,367 but if there are defects either in the material 
provided by the mother or in the virtus formativa, then epilepsy can result, and leprosy 
and gout can be inherited368 and in extreme cases 'monstrous offspring' can be 
generated.369   
At Summa Theologiae I, q. 85 a. 7, discussing whether one human can understand 
the same thing better than another soul can, Aquinas discusses the individuality of 
both body and soul.  He explains that any form, in this case any human soul, is 
received in matter according to the unique capacity of the available matter in a 
particular situation (secundum materiae capacitatem).370  In the same article, and more 
frequently elsewhere, Aquinas explains the origins of intra-specific diversity, or 
numerical diversity, among human souls simply in terms of differing accidental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 'Oportet enim patiens assimilari agenti: et si agens sit fortissimum, erit similitudo effectus ad 
causam agentem perfecta; si autem agens sit debile, erit similitudo imperfecta; sicut propter 
fortitudinem virtutis formativae in semine, filius assimilatur patri non solum in natura speciei, sed in 
multis aliis accidentibus; e contrario vero, propter debilitatem praedictae virtutis, annihilatur praedicta 
assimilatio, ut dicitur in Lib. de animalibus'.  Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (hereafter 
QDV), q. 23, a. 5, response, Opera omnia (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 3, p. 139.  
366 'videmus in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quorum virtutes quandoque deficiunt a propriis 
effectibus, ad quos sunt ordinatae sicut ad proprios fines, sicut virtus formativa quandoque deficit a 
perfecta consummatione membrorum...'.  QDV, q. 6, a. 3, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 
38.  
367 'si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad 
dispositionem naturae, sicut velocitas corporis'.  ST Ia-IIae, q. 81, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 7, p. 89.   
368  'corporis defectus traducuntur a parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et 
podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis'.  ST Ia-IIae, q. 81, a. 1, response, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 7, pp. 87-8.  See ST III, q. 14, a. 4, response, on the inheritance of 
epilepsy.  
369 'sciendum est, quod in qualibet actione est aliquid considerandum ex parte agentis, et aliquid ex 
parte recipientis... in operatione naturae... ex parte virtutis formativae, quae est in semine, est quod 
animal perfectum producatur, sed ex parte materiae recipientis... quandoque est indisposita, contingit 
quandoque quod non producitur perfectum animal, sicut contingit in partubus monstruosis'.  QDV, q. 
23, a. 2, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 136.   
370 See n. 372 below. 
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dispositions extant in the matter available in particular cases of generation, rather than 
referring directly to the capacity of the underlying matter itself.371  
And so one human’s intellect can have a greater power of understanding than that 
of another, Aquinas thinks, just as one human's power of sight can be more acute 
than that of another:372 the better the disposition of the body, the more intelligent the 
soul created in it will be.  Taking his lead from Aristotle’s De anima II.9, on the 
correlation of the acuity of touch and intelligence, Aquinas notes that a particular 
intellect's ability to understand is limited according to the complexion of the body of 
which it is the form.373  
Treating the individuality of body and soul together in a discussion of original sin, 
Aquinas reveals that defects of soul can be inherited in virtue of the inheritance of 
what he calls bodily 'indisposition': he observes that 'the stupid are sometimes 
generated by the stupid'.374  He also supposes that some humans are more prone to 
sinful acts than others, and that this disposition has a hereditary aspect to it.  The 
privation of original justice at the Fall does not admit of degrees and so affects all 
humans equally.  Nonetheless, Aquinas thinks that, due to inherited bodily 
dispositions, the powers of the soul in virtue of which humans are inclined to sinful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 'differentia formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositione materiae, non facit diversitatem 
secundum speciem, sed solum secundum numerum; sunt enim diversorum individuorum diversae 
formae, secundum materiam diversificatae'.  ST I, q. 85, a. 7, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 
344.    
372 'Et sic unus alio potest eandem rem melius intelligere, quia est melioris virtutis in intelligendo; sicut 
melius videt visione corporali rem aliquam qui est perfectioris virtutis, et in quo virtus visiva est 
perfectior'.  ST I, q. 85, a. 7, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 344.   
373 'Manifestum est enim quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto meliorem sortitur animam, 
quod manifeste apparet in his quae sunt secundum speciem diversa.  Cuius ratio est, quia actus et 
forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae capacitatem.  Unde cum etiam in hominibus quidam 
habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam maioris virtutis in intelligendo, unde dicitur in 
II de anima quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus'.  ibid.  
374 'Cum autem corpus sit proportionatum animae... dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente 
transeant in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex consequenti, propter corporis 
indispositionem, sicut interdum ex fatuis fatui generantur'.  ST Ia-IIae, q. 81, a. 1, response, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 7 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1892), p. 88. 
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acts (the irascible and concupiscible powers), are stronger in some individuals than in 
others.375  
Aquinas discusses at least one other particular power of the soul that is limited 
according to the state of the matter available at the moment of human generation.  A 
discussion of Christ’s incarnation at Summa Theologiae III, q. 33, a. 2 leads him to 
reveal that there must be an absolute minimum bulk of material comprising the 
human embryo for the creation of the rational soul in it to be possible, but beyond 
this there will be variation in the size of the embryo in individual cases.  The 
maximum size to which a human body will eventually grow in adult life is 
proportionate to the size it was when its soul was created in it (or, as Aquinas has it 
here, 'infused' into it).376  Hence from the outset of human life there is an intrinsic 
limit set on each soul’s augmentative power determined by the most basic material 
condition: the initial size of the individual body in which it is created.   
We now have in hand a much fuller understanding of Aquinas's concept of the 
individual soul, or of the formal aspect of the 'truth of human nature' in an 
individual.  Each human soul is intrinsically different because its individual nature is 
permanently limited according to the capacity and disposition of the matter to which 
it is joined, in the most intimate of unions, at the moment of its creation.  The 
outward sign of this inner natural diversity among human souls is that the same kind 
of power of the soul in any two humans operates differently.  
The individual body that is constructed by the natural agent of generation, on the 
other hand, consists of matter admitting of a unique capacity or complex potency, 
which has been developed sequentially by means of a series of formal changes taking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 'soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, 
unaquaeque vis animae tendit in suum proprium motum; et tanto vehementius, quanto fuerit fortior.  
Contingit autem vires aliquas animae esse fortiores in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis 
complexiones.  Quod ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est ratione 
peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aequaliter solvatur vinculum originalis iustitiae, et aequaliter in 
omnibus partes inferiores animae sibi relinquantur, sed accidit hoc ex diversa dispositione 
potentiarum, sicut dictum est'.  ST Ia-IIae, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 7, p. 99 (my 
emphasis).  Cf. also In Sent. II, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, response and ad 2.  
376 'anima requirit debitam quantitatem in materia cui infunditur, sed ista quantitas quandam 
latitudinem habet, quia et in maiori et minori quantitate salvatur.  Quantitas autem corporis quam 
habet cum primo sibi infunditur anima, proportionatur quantitati perfectae ad quam per augmentum 
perveniet, ita scilicet quod maiorum hominum maiorem quantitatem corpora habent in prima 
animatione'.  ST III, q. 33, a. 2, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 11, p. 342.  
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place in the womb prior to the soul's creation.  This matter is informed by a 
particular set of inherited accidental dispositions, which take the accidental form in 
the body that accounts for its basic physical structure, the dimensive quantity 
particular to that body, as their proximate subject.   
There is slightly more to say, however, about the material aspect of the 'truth of 
human nature' in each human individual.  Aquinas has a more technical explanation 
for how the matter particular to an individual body, the 'individual signate matter' to 
which he refers at Summa Theologiae I, q. 119, a. 1, and which he there says individuates 
the substantial form in each human, gets to be individual matter, or this matter, 
distinct from any other matter.  
4. Individual Matter   
It is in Aquinas's various discussions of the principle of individuation in material 
things that his concept of individual matter is most clearly brought into view.  When 
scholastic theologians enquired about the principle of individuation the basic 
question they were asking was, what is the metaphysical constituent or principle of a 
thing that accounts for its individuality?377   
There are two major discussions of the principle of individuation in Aquinas's 
writings.  Early in his career, in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, part 2, q. 
4, a. 2 (1257-58), Aquinas asks whether the cause of the plurality of individual things 
('numerical plurality', or pluralitas secundum numerum) is variation in their accidental 
forms.  At the end of his career, at Summa Theologiae III q. 77 a. 2 (1271-73), Aquinas 
discusses individuation at length again, this time in the context of a discussion of 
transubstantiation, responding to the question of whether dimensive quantity is the 
subject of the other accidents in material things (and concluding that it is their 
proximate subject).  In both places, Aquinas states that matter is the principle of 
individuation.  More precisely, matter is the principle of individuation insofar as 
matter is subject to quantitative structure.  As we will see, matter insofar as it is 
subject to quantitative structure, is precisely what Aquinas means by 'individual 
matter'.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Cf. Gracia, 'Introduction: The Problem of Individuation', pp. 1-2, 13-16.  
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So Aquinas's discussions of individuation provide one more occasion for him to 
explain how the body's quantitative structure guarantees its relative independence 
from the soul.  It is not the individual soul that makes the matter belonging to its 
body this individual matter, demarcating it and distinguishing it from other matter; it 
is rather the accidental corporeal form particular to that body.  Before proceeding to 
explain how the individual body's quantitative structure is responsible for making its 
matter individual, there are a few general points to clarify regarding Aquinas's 
account of individuation.   
In both major discussions of individuation, Aquinas defines the individual 
(individuum) as what is undivided in itself, and divided from everything else.378  In 
Aquinas's view, however, the core difficulty in the task of determining the principle of 
individuation is in explaining the latter characteristic of the individual.  As he puts it in 
his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, 'the principle of individuation is the 
principle of numerical diversity'.379  Numerical diversity obtains on the level below the 
species; the numerical distinction is that drawn between two individuals of the same 
species, and therefore also between an individual of one species and an individual of 
any other species.380 
In passages beyond these two major direct analyses of the concept of the 
individual and the principle of individuation, Aquinas refers to the principle of 
individuation in terms that presuppose an understanding of individuality as intra-
specific difference, and therefore an understanding of individuation as intra-specific 
diversification.  This is the case notwithstanding either the fact that there is another 
crucial characteristic of the individual as Aquinas has defined it (that it is undivided 
in itself) or the fact that the principle of individuation, as the principle of numerical 
diversity, will explain the basis of an individual's differences not only from others of 
its species, but also from any other thing belonging to any other species.  Given, in 
addition, Aquinas's view that material conditions are the root of the differences that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 'de ratione individui est quod sit in se indivisum et ab aliis ultima divisione divisum'.  In BDT, q. 4, 
a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125, and cf. the passage from ST III, q. 77, a. 2, response, 
quoted below, n. 405.    
379  (My emphasis).  'Sed illud, quod est principium individuationis, est principium diversitatis 
secundum numerum'.  In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, sc. 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 122.  
380 Gracia, 'Introduction: The Problem of Individuation', pp. 4-5.  
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distinguish one member of a species from the next, it is little surprise that in these 
passages he identifies matter as the principle of individuation.  He has no standard 
terminology for doing so, however.381   
In passages in which he discusses forms' reception in matter, for example, 
Aquinas can be found to refer to the principle of individuation simply as matter,382 as 
the disposition of matter,383 as 'from matter',384 or (in a discussion, precisely, of intra-
specific diversity) as the 'diversity of matter'.385  Where the context is the question of 
how the universal human essence is present in individuals, Aquinas's terminology 
varies again.  In De ente et essentia, c. 2 (1252-6), the principle of individuation in 
Socrates is identified with 'signate' or 'designated' matter (signata, designata), which, 
Aquinas writes, is matter considered as it is subject to 'determinate dimensions', or a 
particular quantitative structure.  'Signate' matter is also equated, in this passage, 
with this flesh and this bone.386  Making a similar point about the relationship 
between universality and individuality in things at Summa Theologiae I, q. 75, a. 4, 
Aquinas cites 'signate' matter, simply, as the principle of individuation.387  And we 
already know that, in his discussion of the 'truth of human nature' at Summa Theologiae 
I, q. 119, a.1, Aquinas identifies 'individual signate matter' as that which individuates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 For a more extended discussion of Aquinas’ principium individuationis in material things as it appears 
across his works, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomae Aquinas, pp. 351-75.   
382 ST I, q. 3, a. 2, arg. 3 and ad 3.  
383 In Sent II, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.  
384 QDP, q. 9, a. 3, ad 5.  
385 This Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysica VII.8, 1033b29-1038a8 (discussed in Chapter 
1) where it is stated that Socrates and Callias are alike in form, but differ according to their matter (this 
flesh and these bones): 'Omnis autem species, quae est in materia, scilicet in his carnibus et in his 
ossibus, est aliquod singulare, ut Callias et Socrates.  Et ista etiam species causans similitudinem 
speciei in generando est diversa a specie generati secundum numerum propter diversam materiam.  
Cuius diversitas est principium diversitatis individuorum in eadem specie.  Diversa namque est 
materia, in qua est forma hominis generantis et hominis generati.  Sed utraque forma est idem 
secundum speciem'.  In Met. VII, lect. 7, n. 1435 (ed.) Cathala, p. 421. 
386 ‘Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed 
solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus 
consideratur... hoc os et haec caro...’.  Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia (hereafter DEE), c.2, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 43 (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), p. 371.   
 387 ST I, q. 75, a. 4, response.  
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form.388  In his commentary on Aristotle’s extended discussion on the presence of 
essences in things at Metaphysica VII, furthermore, Aquinas points to the principle of 
individuation in material things variously as 'individual matter',389 'this individual 
matter... this flesh, and these bones'390 and 'designated matter' (in this last case directly 
attributing this position on individuation to Aristotle himself).391  Finally, in passages 
where he discusses the mind's abstraction of universal essences from concrete 
individuals, Aquinas refers to the principle of individuation as 'matter',392 'material 
and material conditions' (which he refers to as 'principles' of individuation),393 and 
'material and individuating conditions'. 394   Discussing the same topic, in his 
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (1256-59), in the very same article Aquinas characterises 
the principle of individuation both as 'matter and all material conditions'395 and as 
'signate' matter 'considered with a determination of dimensions, these for example, or 
those'.396  Again discussing the way in which the mind abstracts universals from 
individuals in his commentary on Aristotle's De anima (1267-68) Aquinas says that 
individuation in material things is 'from corporeal matter, contained under 
'determinate dimensions''.397  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 See above, n. 248. 
389 In Met. VII, lect. 11, n. 1535. 
390 ‘Socrates enim, quia non est ipsa sua humanitas, sed est habens humanitatem, ideo habet in se 
partes materiales quae non sunt partes speciei, sed quae sunt partes huius materiae individualis quae 
est individuationis principium, ut has carnes et haec ossa.  In Met. VII, lect. 11, n. 1521 (ed.) Cathala, 
p. 445.   
391 'est principium individuationis... materia designata, ut philosophus dixit'.  In Met. VII, lect. 15, n. 
1626; ibid., p. 470.  Aristotle almost certainly did not seek to identify a principle of individuation (see 
above, p. 60, and for the modern debate regarding the presence or not of the principle of 
individuation in Aristotle’s thought, see above, n.153). 
392 ST I, q. 85, a. 1, response, ST I, q. 86, a. 3, response, In Sent. IV, d. 50, q. 1, a. 3, response.   
393 SCG II, 82.   
394 SCG II, 100.  
395 QDV, q. 2, a. 6, response. 
396 'dico signatam secundum quod consideratur cum determinatione dimensionum, harum scilicet vel 
illarum; non signatam autem quae sine determinatione dimensionum consideratur. Secundum hoc 
igitur sciendum est, quod materia signata est individuationis principium'.  QDV, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, Opera 
Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 14.  
397 'Individuatio... est ex materia corporali sub determinatis dimensionibus contenta'.  In DA II, lect. 
12, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 115.  
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And yet, notwithstanding the differing terminology with which it is expressed, the 
basic thinking behind all of these statements is the same.  It is matter, and matter 
either simply as 'signate', or subject to quantitative structure, or further, matter as it is 
subject to other accidental forms or dispositions in addition to quantitative (in the 
case where Aquinas equates 'signate matter', further, with this flesh, and these bones, 
for example), which is the principle of individuation, or rather, in all these passages, 
first and foremost the principle of intra-specific diversity in material things.  In his 
commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, Aquinas draws an important 
distinction between the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the problem of 
finding the basis for individuality in material things.  While other accidents allow us 
to identify individuals, he notes, quantitative structure is the only accident really 
involved in individuation.398  The final thing to highlight, before moving on to 
explain exactly why this should be so, is that the terminology that Aquinas uses to 
refer to quantitative structure involved in individuation differs between his two major 
discussions of individuation.  
In his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, Aquinas refers to 
the structure involved in individuation using the label 'indeterminate dimensions' 
(dimensiones interminatae or indeterminatae interchangeably399).  This vocabulary is drawn 
from Averroes' work but, crucially, Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions' in 
this discussion is very different from the Commentator's.   
Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions' is not, as it was for Averroes, 
'unqualified' or 'absolute' body: a three-dimensional, accidental structure with which 
all of prime matter is invested.400  For Aquinas, in contrast, it is, rather, an individual 
accidental form belonging to a particular bodily substance.  More precisely, for 
Aquinas, the label 'indeterminate dimensions' refers to a body's particular 
quantitative structure considered from a certain perspective, namely, considered as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398  'Alia vero accidentia non sunt principium individuationis, sed sunt principium cognoscendi 
distinctionem individuorum'.  In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125.  For 
more on the distinction between the ontological and the epistemic approach to the problem of 
individuation see Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation, pp. 48-50.  
399 Cf. the following statement 'materia... est principium diversitatis secundum numerum, prout subest 
dimensionibus interminatis'.  In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125, and 
the passage quoted below, n. 400, which refers to 'dimensionibus indeterminatis'.     
400 See above, chapter 2, section 4.2 and subsections.  
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extended, and admitting of parts bearing a proportion to one another, or, in other 
words, with everything else that pertains to it, apart from the particular spatial limits of 
its extension, and its precise size, at any particular time.  Now, the same accidental 
structure or the same dimensions Aquinas, writes, can be considered in another way, 
namely 'according to their termination' (secundum earum terminationem): in other words 
the same accidental structure can be considered with reference to its precise spatial 
limits, or precise size and shape (secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram), at any 
particular point in time.   
It is evident from Aquinas's discussion of individuation in his commentary 
Boethius's De Trinitate, then, that he thinks that the principle of individuation is also 
the principle of identity over time.  (His thought on bodily identity over time will be 
discussed further in chapter 4).  Aquinas maintains that quantitative structure can be 
involved in individuation only insofar as it is considered as 'indeterminate', because, 
from this perspective, it is continuous over time: whilst the exact size and shape of 
bodily structure varies over time, everything else belonging to it remains constant.  So 
it is 'from these indeterminate dimensions', Aquinas writes, 'that matter is made this 
signate matter'.401  It was noted above that in Aquinas's Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 
written around the same time as the commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate, and his 
commentary on Aristotle's De anima, written afterwards, that Aquinas refers to the 
structure involved in individuation as 'determinate'.  But the precise issue of identity 
over time was not at all relevant in these discussions of the mind's abstraction of 
universals from singulars. 
In any case, from his Summa contra Gentiles (1264-65) onwards, Aquinas (with the 
exception of the passage quoted above from his commentary on Aristotle's De anima) 
drops the complicated vocabulary of 'determinate' versus 'indeterminate' dimensions, 
along with any associated consideration of distinct perspectives from which the actual 
individual quantitative structure belonging to a substance can be considered.  Where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401  ‘Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari.  Uno modo secundum earum 
terminationem; et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram...  Et sic non 
possunt esse principium individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio dimensionum varietur frequenter 
circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret semper idem numero.  Alio modo 
possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine 
aliqua determinatione esse possint...  Et ex his dimensionibus indeterminatis materia efficitur haec 
materia signata...’.  In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125. 
	   	   	  146 
he refers to an accidental structure involved in individuation, he calls it simply 
'dimensive quantitiy' (quantitas dimensiva).  
So why should quantitative structure be involved in individuation?  Aquinas 
identifies, both in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, and at 
Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, a. 2, two features exclusive to quantitative structure which 
make it uniquely equipped, among all the forms immersed in matter, both substantial 
and accidental, for the work individuating a material substance.  Both of these are 
features are drawn from Aristotle's discussion of 'body' insofar as it fell into the 
accidental category of quantity.402  In virtue of these two particular features essential 
to it, then, quantitative structure, and only quantitative structure, can make matter this 
matter, or make a person's individual matter their individual matter.   
First, Aristotle had said that divisibility is a feature essential to quantitative 
structure.  For Aquinas, anything in nature that is physically divisible or actually 
divided from other things is so in virtue of the accidental structure immanent in it.   
At Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, a. 2, Aquinas discusses the individuation of both 
substantial and accidental forms and elaborates upon his analysis of the concept of the 
individual (individuum).  An individual form is in one thing alone, he writes, not in 
many.403  Matter is the principle of individuation, therefore, because by virtue of 
being in one material subject, a form, substantial or accidental, cannot be in 
another.404   Dimensive quantity also enters into the principle of individuation, 
however, because for a form to be in one subject (a substantial form in a material 
subject, or an accidental form in its substantial subject: in Aquinas’s example, this 
accidental form 'whiteness' is in this bodily subject), that subject has to be undivided 
in itself, and divided from all other subjects.  Since only quantitative structure can 
divide one part of matter from another (so that substantial forms can be received in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 See above, chapter 1, section 1.  
403 'Est enim de ratione individui quod non possit in pluribus esse'.  ST III, q. 77, a. 2, response; Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 196.  
404 Continuing directly from the text in the previous footnote, 'Quod quidem contingit dupliciter.  Uno 
modo, quia non est natum in aliquo esse... Quantum igitur ad primum, materia est individuationis 
principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus, quia, cum huiusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae 
in aliquo esse sicut in subiecto, ex quo aliqua earum recipitur in materia, quae non est in alio, iam nec 
ipsa forma sic existens potest in alio esse'.  ibid.  
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distinct parts of it), and therefore one composite substance from another (so that 
accidental forms can be received in different composite substances), it is necessarily 
involved in individuation.405   
Aquinas makes the same point in his commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate: since 
division is proper to quantity alone, matter is divided into distinct parts only in virtue 
of quantitative structure.406  And in the course of a discussion of the difference 
between human and angelic natures at Summa Theologiae I, q. 75, a. 7, he puts the 
basic idea even more directly: 'matter can only be called this matter, distinct from 
that', he writes, 'according to quantitative division'.407  Only quantitative structure, 
then, can demarcate and divide the 'individual matter' particular to one person from 
any other matter.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 Picking up the thread again from the text in the previous footnote, 'Alio modo, ex eo quod forma 
substantialis vel accidentalis est quidem nata in aliquo esse, non tamen in pluribus, sicut haec albedo, 
quae est in hoc corpore... Quantum autem ad secundum, dicendum est quod individuationis 
principium est quantitas dimensiva.  Ex hoc enim aliquid est natum esse in uno solo, quod illud est in 
se indivisum et divisum ab omnibus aliis.  Divisio autem accidit substantiae ratione quantitatis, ut 
dicitur in I Physic.  Et ideo ipsa quantitas dimensiva est quoddam individuationis principium 
huiusmodi formis, inquantum scilicet diversae formae numero sunt in diversis partibus materiae'.  ST 
III, q. 77, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 196 (my emphasis).  Aquinas's Leonine 
editors make several suggestions regarding his source for this quotation from the Physica: there is no 
statement in the Aristoteles Latinus formulated in these exact terms, and yet Aquinas makes reference to 
it in seveval places beyond the passages discussed here.  Whereas the closest statement to that quoted 
as authoritative is found at Phys., 204a9-11 (that is, in book III: see above p. 94 and n. 227), Aquinas's 
teacher Albertus Magnus in his Sentences commentary also made reference to such a statement in 
Physica I, possibly pointing to 185a31-b5, 185b16-17 and/or 186b12-13 (see Opera Omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 25,1, p. 102).  At this stage an objection from Robert Pasnau should be noted.  Pasnau suggests 
that matter individuates not the whole composite substance, but just, and only initially, its substantial 
form.  Substantial form then takes on the role of directly individuating the substance ('it is more 
accurate to say that matter individuates the form, and that the form individuates the substance').  
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 391-2, quotation from p. 392.  But this interpretation 
cannot account for the full implications of ST III, q. 77, a. 2: it is explicitly stated here that any subject 
receptive of any form naturally found in matter is individuated by matter and the dimensive quantity 
which divides matter it from other things.  In Aquinas’ own example, quoted in the following footnote, 
the subject in question is a composite substance that receives an accident: this body (made this body by 
its matter being subject to dimensive quantity) is subject to this whiteness.  So, when a body undergoes 
any accidental change, the new accidental form or forms will be individuated in virtue of the 
substance's (structured) matter, which evidently, therefore, continues to play a crucial role in 
individuating the substance.   
406 'de ratione individui est quod sit in se indivisum et ab aliis ultima divisione divisum.  Nullum autem 
accidens habet ex se propriam rationem divisionis nisi quantitas'.  In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; Opera omnia 
iussu Leonis XIII, 50, p. 125  
407 'nec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa, nisi secundum divisionem quantitativam'.  ST I, q. 75, a. 7, 
response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 207.  
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Second, Aristotle had said that it was essential to quantitative bodily structure to 
have parts that occupy a particular position (to the exclusion of any other body).  It is 
precisely because it is in the very nature of the body's accidental structural form that 
it occupies a particular position, Aquinas notes in both of his major discussions of 
individuation, that each accidental structure naturally has individuality in and of 
itself.408  Again, this leaves structure uniquely equipped to make this individual matter 
this individual matter, and therefore this composite substance this composite 
substance, distinct from others.   
Aquinas does not explicitly unpick the other characteristic of the individual, 
namely that it is undivided in itself, in either of his extended discussions of 
individuation.  For absolute clarity, it should be noted that the lack of division to 
which Aquinas is referring in both discussions, as is clear from the context, is not the 
unity or lack of division that is interchangeable with the composite's act of being, or 
esse.   
It is quantitative structure, again, which accounts for the individual's indivision 
from itself: in every material thing, Aquinas thinks, there is a second kind of unity, or 
indivision, which is simply the result of the fact that it possesses a continuous 
quantitative structure.  Aquinas calls this second kind of unity, or indivision, the 
'principle of number' because it adds the 'concept of measure' to substance: it renders 
substance countable as a discrete unit, divided from the rest of the material 
continuum.409  Esse, it is true, retains a primary role in the ontological structure of the 
composite substance (without the act of existence there would be no actual substance, 
no dimensive quantity and no individuation).  But, for Aquinas, esse cannot be the 
principle of individuation in material things: it cannot perform the very precise work of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 'Unde ipsa quantitas dimensiva secundum se habet quandam individuationem, ita quod possumus 
imaginari plures lineas eiusdem speciei differentes positione, quae cadit in ratione quantitatis huius; 
convenit enim dimensioni quod sit quantitas positionem habens'.  ST III, q. 77, a. 2, response, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, pp. 196-7.  'dimensiones ex se ipsis habent quandam rationem 
individuationis secundum determinatum situm, prout situs est differentia quantitatis'.  In BDT, q. 4, a. 
2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 50, pp. 125-6.  
409 'Unum igitur quod est principium numeri, aliud est ab eo quod cum ente convertitur.  Unum enim 
quod cum ente convertitur... in nullo differt ab ente secundum rem, sed solum ratione... Unum vero 
quod est principium numeri addit supra substantiam, rationem mensurae, quae est propria passio 
quantitatis, et primo invenitur in unitate.  Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis, quae 
est secundum quantitatem continuam.  Nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur'.  In Met. IV, lect. 
2, n. 560 (ed.) Cathala, p. 187.  
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differentiating material substances from one another that the principle of individuation, 
in Aquinas's view, has to perform.410  Aquinas notes in his De ente et essentia that each 
human’s individual esse, or act of being, is itself individuated in the body, just as the 
soul is individuated in the body (even if the individuality of the soul, and its esse, 
outlast the death of the body).411  
Matter, then, is Aquinas's principle of individuation in material things, precisely 
insofar as it subsists under the body's accidental structural form.  The principle of 
individuation is therefore ultimately a principle of substance: Aquinas’s theory of 
individuation is not intended to imply the ontological priority of an accident to its 
substance.412  Dimensive quantity, as an accidental form, takes substance, and matter 
as a component of substance, as its subject: the structural form's existence is 
dependent on the substance in which it inheres.  Nor, for Aquinas, could there be 
any question of temporal priority or posteriority with respect to the individuation of the 
rational soul as it is received in matter.  Again, his account of individuation assumes 
that several things happen simultaneously: the acquisition of the soul in the moment of 
human generation and its differentiation from other souls, according to the capacity 
of the matter in which it is received, on the one hand, and the acquisition of all of the 
accidental forms belonging to the new human individual, including the induction of 
the new human body's accidental quantitative structure by the virtus formativa, the 
structure which makes the matter of that body this matter, on the other hand. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Joseph Owens argues that for Aquinas esse is the 'cause' of individuation, if not the principle of 
individuation.  J. Owens, 'Thomas Aquinas (B. CA. 1225; D. 1274)' in Gracia (ed.), Individuation in 
Scholasticism, pp. 173-94; see esp. p. 188 where Owens explains, 'Even in the area that came to be 
covered in tradition by the "principle of individuation", namely, material things, the first requirement 
was that the thing be an actual existent.  Only after that fundamental condition came matter and 
quantity'.  
411 'Et licet individuatio eius [animae humanae] ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui 
inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore, cuius est actus, non tamen 
oportet ut subtracto corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum, ex quo acquisitum 
est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet 
individuatum'.  DEE, c. 5, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 43, p. 378.   
412 Cf. McCord Adams, Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist, p. 18.  In the twelfth century, 
Abelard had criticised the notion that an accident or a 'bundle' of accidents alone could be the source 
of a substance's individuality since accident is ontologically posterior to substance.  After Abelard, any 
major scholastic thinker who preserved a role for accidents in individuation would involve other 
principles (in Aquinas's case matter, a principle of substance).  See Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of 
Individuation, pp. 127-8 (on the origin of the theory of individuation by accidents in Boethius' De 
Trinitate), and 208-10, 269, 276-7.  
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It is worth emphasising, again, that, unlike in Averroes' account of substantial 
generation, in Aquinas's account of generation there is simply no place given to an 
quantitative structure with which matter itself is invested, ontologically prior to any 
form, in virtue of which matter might be rendered divisible for the reception of 
different forms in different places.  As will be discussed in chapter 4, it is not in his 
work on generation or individuation, but in his work the postmortem continuity of 
individual matter and resurrection, that we see Aquinas pushed in the direction of 
arguing that the material principle is invested with structural features of its own.  
Aquinas would ground the continuing material identity of an individual body upon 
the continuity of its particular accidental corporeal form, quantitative structure, or 
quantitas dimensiva, and he would want to try to argue that traces of this individual 
structure continue to particularise the matter belonging to that body beyond the 
grave.   
Conclusions  
Guided by his materialistic understanding of what bodily resurrection would 
involve, Aquinas developed his innovative theory that the soul is the only substantial 
form in the individual human body.  This theory entailed that each person's soul and 
the matter particular to their body (which admitted of a unique and complex 
'capacity'), were naturally joined in the most intimate of unions: the individual soul 
would be incomplete in separation from the matter particular to its own body; matter 
completes the very individual nature of each soul, in Aquinas's view, just as each 
individual soul penetrates and completes the nature of its body, in virtue of being its 
only substantial form.  
Since the doctrine of bodily resurrection entailed both that individual soul and 
individual be so intimately united, and that each human's particular matter made a 
crucial contribution in its own right to their individuality, it was absolutely necessary 
that Aquinas should make room for a strong account of the relative autonomy of the 
body within the individual human being.  Aquinas struck the balance by theorising 
that each individual body had a distinct accidental (if not a distinct substantial) form, 
which was directly responsible both for its basic corporeal features, including its 
organic structure, and for the individuality of its matter.   
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Chapter 5's discussion will explain how Aquinas's Dominican defenders in the 
late thirteenth century drew upon and developed their own interpretations of 
different aspects of Aquinas's conception of the individual body, in order to counter 
the Franciscan pluralist argument that the theory of the unicity of substantial form 
reduced the individual body, in its own right, to mere, featureless, prime matter, and 
therefore had false theological consequences for the identity of Christ's corpse, and 
saints' relics.  
A fitting way to round off the present chapter, however, is with a reminder that 
the great historian of scholasticism Sir Richard Southern saw in Aquinas's work the 
very apogee of what he called 'scholastic humanism': Aquinas's exaltation of the 
perfection of human nature, soul and body was, according to Southern, unparalleled 
in the medieval period.  Southern wrote that Aquinas 'reversed the ancient opinion 
that the body is the ruined habitation of the soul, and held... that it is the basis of the 
soul's being.  Everywhere he points to the natural perfection of man... The dignity of 
human nature is not simply a poetic vision; it has become a central truth of 
philosophy'.413   
The more technical philosophical thinking behind the vivid picture of the dignity 
and nobility of humans in Aquinas's work to which Southern is referring has been 
clarified here.  Aquinas designed the theory that the soul is the body's only substantial 
form in order to ensure that the dignity of human nature, as the product of a natural 
union between body and soul wherein the soul naturally perfects the matter in which 
it is grounded and then exceeds it in respect of its purely intellectual nature, was a 
'central truth of philosophy'.  Each human body, for Aquinas, is the immediate and 
therefore the proportionate subject of the noblest kind of soul, the only kind of soul that 
'overreaches' matter.  Though individual human bodies are a diverse group, each in 
its own way is an example of the most beautiful bodily design in all creation.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford: OUP, 1970), p. 50.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THOMAS AQUINAS (II): BODILY IDENTITY 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore Aquinas's thought on the identity of the individual body 
during its mortal life, across the separation of its soul and its subsequent 
decomposition and decay, and at the resurrection.   
Aquinas evidently supposes that the resurrection of an individual body will 
literally involve the reintegration of the material belonging to it by God.  Not only 
does the notion of resurrectio makes sense only if the very same individual bodies that 
lived and died will rise again,414 to suggest otherwise, Aquinas writes, is heretical and 
goes against the truth of scripture.415  Job 19:25-26 provides the decisive proof: 'For I 
know that my redeemer lives, and on the last day I will rise out of the earth, and I 
will be clothed again in my own skin, and in my flesh I will see God'.416  Conversely, 
Aquinas does not take I Corinthians 15. 42-44, according to which the body was 
'sown in corruption' but would 'rise in incorruption', was 'sown a natural body' but 
would 'rise a spiritual body', and was 'sown in weakness' but would 'rise in power', to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 'non enim resurrectio dici potest, nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat: quia resurrectio est iterata 
surrectio; ejusdem autem est surgere et cadere... et ita, si non est idem corpus quod anima resumit, 
non dicetur resurrectio, sed magis novi corporis assumptio'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 1, 
response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.  
415 ‘ponere quod non sit idem numero qui resurget, est haereticum, derogans veritati Scripturae, quae 
resurrectionem praedicat’.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, 
p. 635.   
416 'Expresse etiam corporum resurrectio praenuntiatur a Iob.  Dicitur enim Iob XIX: Scio quod 
Redemptor meus vivit, et in novissimo die de terra surrecturus sum, et rursus circumdabor pelle mea, et in carne mea 
videbo Deum'.  SCG IV, 79, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 248 (editor's italics).  Cf. also Thomas 
Aquinas, Quaestiones de quodlibet (hereafter Quod.) XI, q. 6, sc., In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 1, sc. 1, In 
Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, sc. 1, and qc. 2, sc. 1.  
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be a statement on the resurrected body's identity.  Rather, he understands it to refer to 
the gifts given to glorified resurrected bodies: brightness, agility, and impassibility.417  
Aquinas, then, draws upon the traditional authority of Augustine's Enchiridion 
chapter 23 (which Peter Lombard had copied into his discussion of the resurrection 
in the Sentences418) to argue that God can keep track of the material, the 'ashes' or 
particles, belonging to each particular human body and return them to that body, 
despite the fact that each individual body decays after death and is resolved into 
elemental material, which is then scattered and converted into the flesh of other 
bodies.419 
It is important to highlight at this stage that the interpretation of Aquinas's 
thought on bodily identity that will be offered in this chapter sets itself at odds with 
other prominent interpretations of Aquinas's thought in this area, precisely because it 
takes it that a literal understanding of bodily resurrection is presupposed in, and shapes, 
Aquinas's work on human nature.  Caroline Walker Bynum's position (which follows 
that of Aquinas's late thirteenth-century pluralist critics) has already been discussed: 
Aquinas develops a 'purely formal' theory of bodily identity, which entails that the 
body is reduced to a featureless prime matter, and according to which, therefore, the 
continuing identity of the individual body depends on the identity of the individual 
soul, as its only substantial or nature-determining form.420  Furthermore, Robert 
Pasnau and Eleonore Stump have also concluded, each by way of their own 
philosophical analysis of his work on human nature, that, for Aquinas, the continuing 
identity of the human individual, body and soul, depends on the soul alone: material 
continuity does not matter.  Pasnau, indeed, states that Aquinas does not prove that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 SCG IV, 84 and 86.  Cf. also discussion in Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 233-5.   
418 See above, pp. 15-16. 
419 'Corpus humanum potest resolvi ad ipsa elementa, vel etiam in carnes aliorum animalium 
converti... patet per auctoritatem augistini in enchirid.: corpus humanum in quamcumque aliorum 
corporum substantiam, vel in ipsa elementa vertatur', 'ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae statuit illos 
cineres iterum animae conjungi... convenit quod illae partes elementorum iterato conjungantur'.  In 
Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, sc 1 and response, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 633.  
420 See above, pp. 35-7. 
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is necessary for each individual body to be recovered from the very same matter at 
the resurrection.421   
The objective here is not to offer direct, point-by-point responses to these modern 
philosophical analyses of Aquinas's thought bodily identity, although significant 
points of disagreement will be noted in the appropriate places.  The purpose of the 
present discussion is simply to demonstrate, building upon what has been established 
in the previous three chapters of this study, how Aquinas's prior assumption that the 
resurrection of a body will involve the regathering of the material particular to it by 
divine power, which (according to the approach adopted here, at least) was not 
something that, in itself, he ever sought to prove, informed his innovative scientific 
account of bodily identity and postmortem material continuity.  
At first glance, Aquinas's thought on bodily identity, and in particular on the 
material identity of the body, whether during its life or after its death, is less than 
perfectly transparent.  Aquinas follows Aristotle's account of growth in De generatione et 
corruptione 1.5, arguing that all of an individual body's matter can in theory be 
exchanged over the course of its lifetime without prejudice to its continuing identity.  
The question of how he can consistently hold that an individual resurrected body will 
necessarily be recovered from the matter particular to it, then, is a good one.  Again, 
with Aristotle, Aquinas argues that a living and a freshly dead body are the same only 
equivocally, or in name, and not really identical: how can he therefore argue that an 
individual body's particular material remains do in fact persist during the period 
separating its death from its resurrection?  
The first section of this chapter will address Aquinas's answer to the first of these 
two questions.  In order to grasp his account of the mortal body's material continuity, 
one needs to hold in front of the mind Aquinas's account of the relative autonomy of 
the individual body within the human being, set out in chapter 3.  As will become 
clear, Aquinas does thinks that the composite body's material continuity is crucial to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 'Aquinas has not proved that the soul "must be reunited at the resurrection to numerically the same 
body"'.  Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 392-3 (Pasnau is directly referring to CT, c. 153); 
'What is necessary and sufficient for something to be identical to Socrates is that its substantial form be 
identical to the substantial form of Socrates'.  E. Stump, 'Resurrection, Reassembly and 
Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul' in B. Niederbacher and E. Runggaldier (eds.) Die menschliche Seele: 
Brauchen wir den Dualismus? (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag, 2006), p. 161, repeated verbatim from E. Stump, 
Aquinas (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 46.   
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continuing sameness.  And it is not the soul, but the accidental form that gives to the 
body its physical structure, 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva) which, as we saw 
in chapter 3 section 4, is the only form in the body capable of rendering its matter 
physically distinct from any other matter, that is responsible for guaranteeing the 
body's material identity over the course of its mortal life.  
Aquinas's adherence to the literal and materialistic interpretation of bodily 
resurrection looks puzzling only if his theory that the soul is the human body's only 
substantial form is interpreted as implying that each soul is somehow directly 
responsible for guaranteeing the individuality and identity of the whole human being, 
including the whole body.  The second section of the chapter will illustrate more fully 
that this would be a misconception of the role of the soul in Aquinas's thought on 
bodily identity, by way of delineating clearly the precise role that the individual soul 
has to play in guaranteeing its body's identity at the resurrection.  Aristotle had 
written in De generatione et corruptione that a substance, once corrupted, could not return 
numerically the same, or the very same individual that it was.422  Aquinas would 
apply this axiom to any corruptible substantial form posited in the body, in addition to 
the soul.  With respect to bodily identity, what the immortal soul accounts for, as far 
as Aquinas is concerned, is precisely the identity of the body's substantial form, because it 
is the body's only substantial form.  
Aquinas's answer to the second of the two key questions set out above, his 
thinking in the area of postmortem material continuity, that is to say, is more obscure.  
His basic position on the corpse is that it is formally different from the living body that 
corrupts into it, but that it is still materially (secundum materiam) the same thing as that 
body in some sense.  Aristotle himself had not directly addressed the issue of the 
continuing identity of matter across substantial change, but, as was explained in 
chapter 2, the Commentator Averroes had addressed this issue head on and explored 
it thoroughly.  Averroes would appear to be the obvious authority upon whose work 
to draw in connection with the problem of material continuity across death and 
resurrection, and Aquinas would try to take advantage of the Commentator's 
insights, arguing that elements of an individual body's particular quantitative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 See above, pp. 17-18 and n. 21. 
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structure will continue to render the matter belonging to it distinguishable beyond 
the grave.   
Aquinas outlines his case for the postmortem continuity of the matter particular 
to individual bodies in all of his four systematic treatments of the topic of bodily 
resurrection: book IV of his Sentences commentary (c.1252-56); his Quodlibet XI, q. 6 
(Easter, 1259); book IV of his Summa contra Gentiles (1264-65); and the first part of his 
Compendium Theologiae (1265-67).  Quodlibet XI, q. 6 does not add anything significant 
to any of the three other discussions and in fact, as Philip Lyndon Reynolds notes in 
his own discussion of Aquinas's work on resurrection, the text of this Quodlibet is 
confused in places, and possibly corrupt.423  Comparisons between the Quodlibet and 
the other three texts will therefore be made only in footnotes. 
Finally, a presentation of Aquinas's writings on the continuing identity of Christ's 
corpse and saints' relics will provide a direct link forward to chapter 5's discussion of 
the reception and interpretation of Aquinas's work in this area by Dominicans.  
Aquinas's writings on those particular theological topics do not exhibit the same 
advanced thinking about postmortem bodily and material continuity that is evident 
in his work on the general resurrection.  But it would be upon the issue of 
postmortem bodily identity in the cases of Christ and the saints that Aquinas's 
Franciscan critics would initially focus the seminal late thirteenth-century scholastic 
debate on the theological repercussions of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans.  
1. Material Continuity and the Identity of the Mortal Body  
The major recent study of the ways on which reflection on the resurrection 
informed scholastic thought on bodily identity up to Aquinas is Philip Lyndon 
Reynolds' Food and the Body: Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology (1999).424  
The following analysis owes much to Reynolds' research.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 403.   
424 Full citation above, n. 8. 
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Given his literal interpretation of resurrection, then, Aquinas does assume that 
material continuity of some sort will be necessary in order to safeguard the continuing 
identity of the individual mortal human body.  But he does not think, with Peter 
Lombard, that there is a non-exchangeable core of material within each individual 
human body (the 'truth of human nature'), that serves as the material core of the 
continuing identity of that body throughout its mortal life, and at the resurrection.  
Nor does he agree with his predecessors and contemporaries at Paris (among them 
his own teacher Albertus Magnus, and Bonaventure, the greatest Franciscan thinker 
of Aquinas's generation), who thought that the 'truth of human nature', from which 
an individual body would be reconstructed at the resurrection comprised, primarily, 
a fixed, radical core of seminal material, and, secondarily, some of the flesh 
subsequently built up in the body from nutriment.425   
As indicated in chapter 3, Aquinas's own view is that the material 'truth of human 
nature' belonging to an individual comprises all of their 'individual, "signate" matter', 
that is to say, all of the matter subsisting under the accidental form, dimensive 
quantity, that is responsible for giving to their body its organic structure.426   
So all of the matter that subsists under this quantitative structure at any one time, 
for Aquinas, belongs to that individual's material 'truth of human nature'; there is no 
demarcated portion of flesh in an individual body which is in theory non-
exchangeable427 (although, in fact, there will never be a point in a body's lifetime at 
which it has lost all of the material which it had at the beginning428); and, since the 
full amount of matter that has belonged to the 'truth of human nature' in an 
individual during their lifetime will, of course, usually exceed the amount that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 431; see also pp. 297-304 and 310 on Albertus Magnus's thought, 
and pp. 325-42 on Bonaventure's.  On Aquinas's account of the 'truth of human nature' in the context 
of earlier theories see also W. H. Principe 'The 'Truth of Human Nature' according to Thomas 
Aquinas: theology and science in interaction', in Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of 
James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (ed.) R. J. Long (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1991), pp. 
161-77.  
426 See chapter 3, section 4.  
427 Aquinas says of his position, 'non distinguit aliquid materiale signatum permanens in homine toto 
tempore vitae eius'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 637 
(ll.125-150).  Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 380, and see pp. 361-71 for extended comment on 
Aquinas's presentation of contemporary views with which he disagrees.  
428 Aquinas makes this argument at In Sent. II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4.  Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 
380.  
	   	   	  158 
needed to reconstruct their body at the resurrection, not all of it need rise in their 
body.429  Aquinas thinks that only enough matter need rise in each part of the 
individual body, such that it can be reconstituted in its stature at the perfect age, the 
age at which Christ died.430   
In common with his contemporaries, Aquinas holds that, in order for the risen 
body to be the same as the mortal body, a particular part of matter will need to be 
returned to the same heterogeneous part of the body whose constitution it entered 
into in life (a piece of matter from the hand should return to the hand), though it 
need not return to the exact same part of the homogenous flesh, bone, nerve or so on 
which constituted that heterogeneous part (a piece of matter from the thumb’s flesh 
can return to the flesh of the middle finger).431  But since he refuses to delineate, as 
his contemporaries had, different ways in which the body's matter belongs to the 
'truth of human nature', it is somewhat incongruous (and perhaps, Reynolds notes, 
with some hesitation), that Aquinas also holds that the matter which was first 
animated by the rational soul will rise in it because it 'partakes of the perfection of the 
species' more perfectly (perfectius virtutem speciei participat) than flesh built up from 
food.432  
So what exactly does Aquinas have to say about the material continuity of the 
body across growth and the assimilation of new flesh built up from nutriment?  At 
Summa Theologica I, q. 119, a. 1, discussing whether food enters into the 'truth of 
human nature', Aquinas analyses head-on the concept of the 'identity of matter' 
(identitas materiae).  The fifth objection contends that, if everything in a human 
materially speaking is exchangeable, then they will not be the same in number, or 
exactly the same individual, throughout their lifetime.  In order for something to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 'non requiritur ad hoc quod resurgat homo numero idem, quod quicquid fuit materialiter in eo 
secundum totum tempus vitae suae resumatur'.  SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 254.  
Cf. In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response, CT I, c. 159.  
430 CT I, c. 160, SCG IV, 88, In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3.  
431 In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 3, response.  This was the common position of theologians at the 
time, including Bonaventure.  It was thought fitting that God should return matter to the same places 
in the body.  Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 335.   
432 In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 634.  Cf. Reynolds, Food and the 
Body, pp. 390-1.  
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numerically the same, so the objection goes, the identity of its matter (identitas materiae) 
is necessary.433   
Aquinas tacitly accepts this last premise, and in a brief response explains that 
there is a necessary material aspect to the individual body's continuing self-identity.  To 
illustrate this point, he refers to the distinction that Aristotle drew, in De generatione et 
corruptione, between the lighting of a new fire (analogous to substantial generation) and 
the 'feeding' of an existing fire (analogous to the events of growth).434  If an entire 
portion of material loses the form of fire all at once, and fire is generated elsewhere, 
then this will be an entirely new, and different fire.  If a body were to exchange all of 
its matter at once, then it would not remain the same body.  But if an existing fire is 
fed with new material, then it will remain the same fire, even once all of the material 
that was originally in it has been exchanged, because the new material will pass into 
(transit) material already comprising the fire.  So even though Aquinas thinks that all 
of a body's matter is (in theory) exchangeable over the course of an entire lifetime, he 
holds, still, that the body will remain the very same body during that period on the 
condition that its matter is exchanged only gradually (paulatim): the new material added 
forms a continuum with its existing material.435   
Of course, the quantitative structure particular to an individual body, or its 
quantitas dimensiva (which the present study has also referred to as the body's accidental 
corporeal form), is not only the form in the individual body in virtue of which its 
material is divided and distinguished from other matter, and made to be this matter, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 ‘cum ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae’.  ST I, q. 119, a. 1, arg. 
5, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 571.    
434 See above, p. 76 and n. 177.  
435 'dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in I de Generat., quando aliqua materia per se convertitur 
in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari: quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem 
praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri.  Unde si tota materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia 
convertatur in ignem, erit alius ignis numero.  Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, alius 
substitutatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumatur, semper remanet idem ignis numero: 
quia semper quod additur, transit in praeexistens.  Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus 
viventibus'.  ST I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 5, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 573.  Cf. Reynolds, Food and the 
Body, p. 381-2: 'Thomas points out that the individual as a whole - the body or the fire or whatever - 
remains through the exchange of matter because new matter is always united with matter that is 
already in place [...] Thus there is a material as well as a formal aspect of the body's continuing self-
identity'; and S. Edwards, 'Saint Thomas Aquinas on 'The Same Man'', The Southwestern Journal of 
Philosophy, 10.1 (1979), p. 92: 'The constant entering and departing of material particles must occur in 
an overlapping fashion, so that at no time are all the particles of matter entirely new and different 
from ones of the most recent time'.  
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belonging to this body, at any one time;436 it is also the very form in virtue of which 
the individual body is an unbroken material continuum.437  And so, it is not just that 
the individual body's permanent quantitative structure accounts for the individuality 
of its matter at any one point in time.  Insofar as it is directly responsible for the 
body's continuous organic structure, this form also provides the direct metaphysical 
support for the material aspect that Aquinas highlights as being crucial to that body's 
continuing self-identity.  
Now, prior to Aquinas, scholastic theologians had found a particular way of 
reconciling Aristotle’s account of growth and bodily identity in De generatione et 
corruptione I.5 with the notion that there was some radical and fixed component of 
flesh in the human body.  Aristotle himself, of course, had denied that there was a 
fixed material component in any individual body, and had simply distinguished two 
ways in which flesh, a homogenous part of a growing body, could be viewed: it could 
be considered with respect to what was permanent in it (secundum speciem), or it could 
be considered insofar as it was in flux (secundum materiam).438  Theologians had tended 
to read into Aristotle's text the idea that there were two different kinds of material in 
humans, identifying 'flesh according to form' (caro secundum speciem) with an enduring, 
radical collection of particles, on the one hand, and 'flesh according to matter' (caro 
secundum materiam) with flesh in flux, built up from food and subject to replacement, on 
the other.439   
Aquinas notes this as a misreading of Aristotle in his own commentary on De 
generatione et corruptione, explaining that the misreading in fact takes its origin from 
Alexander of Aphrodisias' interpretation of the Stagirite, a reading which Averroes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 See above, chapter 3, section 4. 
437 At this stage, it is worth reproducing a passage quoted in the chapter 3's discussion of individuation: 
'Unum vero quod est principium numeri addit supra substantiam, rationem mensurae, quae est 
propria passio quantitatis, et primo invenitur in unitate.  Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem 
divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuam.  Nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur'.  
In Met. IV, lect. 2, n. 560 (ed.) Cathala, p. 187 (my emphasis).  
438 See above, pp. 75-6 and nn. 175-6. 
439 Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 100-1, and pp. 328-31 on Bonaventure's position.    
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had corrected in his own commentary on the text.440  Aquinas's denial that there is 
any fixed material component in the body is therefore an attempt to correct an error 
in contemporary scientific writing and to bring scholars' understanding of bodily 
identity back into line with both the Philosopher and the Commentator.    
Aquinas's usual referent for caro secundum speciem, or flesh in the aspect in which it 
endures in an individual body, not surprisingly, is matter insofar as it is subject to the 
form that gives it its organic structure, dimensive quantity, and the other accidental 
forms making up the visible fabric of the body, which take dimensive quantity as 
their proximate subject.441  On this technical point Aquinas is in basic agreement 
with Averroes, who, as explained in chapter 2 section 2, identified the physical species 
or form according to which the body grew and remained the same with its figura or 
three-dimensional shape: the species in question was not, and indeed in context could 
not be, so Averroes argued, the soul.  Aquinas builds upon Averroes' thinking, as we 
have just seen, to argue the body's quantitative structure individualises its matter and 
guarantees the material aspect of its continuity throughout mortal life.442   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Passage beginning 'Et haec fuit opinio Alexandri, ut dicit Averroes in expositione huius loci'.  
Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in De generatione et corruptione (hereafter In DGEC), I, lect. 15, n. 2 (105), 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 3, p. 315.   
441 Cf. Edwards, 'Saint Thomas Aquinas on 'The Same Man', p. 92, 'The "species"... can only mean 
the dimensive quantity of an individual... Individual cells come and go, but the quantity and 
configuration of any two stages of the same body are continuous and similar'.  See also the distinction 
Chris Hughes draws in Aquinas's thought between 'thick matter', or 'flesh and bone', which is matter 
considered as 'permanent, essential, and individuating' and 'thin matter', which is matter considered as 
transient.  C. Hughes, 'Matter and Individuation in Aquinas', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 13 (1996), 
pp. 8-10. 
442 The correct translation of the word species in this context is therefore crucial.  Robert Pasnau 
translates secundum speciem to give the idea that the body's parts have to remain the same 'only 
specifically' over the course of its lifetime.  He argues, on this basis, that in order for the body to 
continue to be the same as itself over time 'there is therefore no need for the matter to remain the 
same, or even for its stages to be continuous', and therefore that Aquinas' argument for the 
resurrection of numerically the same body is unnecessary, or as he puts it in a footnote 'flat-out 
invalid': 'Since personal identity does not directly rest on the body's numerical identity, Aquinas need 
not explain how numerically the same body can be destroyed and then recreated.  The question of 
whether the resurrected body is the same body or merely a replica does not arise, because sameness of 
body is accounted for in terms of sameness of form... what preserves identity over time, through death 
and separation, is the incorruptible essence of the human soul, whose numerical sameness over time is 
unproblematic'.  This fits with Pasnau's view, noted in the last chapter (see above, n. 405) that, for 
Aquinas, substantial form directly individuates the body's matter, after having initially been individuated 
by that matter.  For these arguments, see Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 392-3 and p. 
462, n. 22.  Stump also thinks that 'for Aquinas, the individuation and identity of anything at all is 
provided by its substantial form.  And so the matter configuring Socrates' resurrected body is the same 
as the matter configuring Socrates' earthly body in virtue of the fact that it is configured by the same 
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At Summa Theologica I, q. 119, a. 1, then, Aquinas introduces, as the second 
objection, the notion that only a fixed and radical portion of 'flesh according to form' 
belongs to the material 'truth of human nature' in an individual body.  Any flesh in 
flux, or 'flesh according to matter' that is built up from food, so the objection goes, 
does not.443  Responding, Aquinas explains that by caro secundum speciem Aristotle 
meant flesh considered according to 'that which is formal in it', namely, the 'nature of 
flesh and its natural disposition'.444  It is the soul as the body's substantial form, it is 
true, which gives it the 'nature of flesh'.  But, for Aquinas, of course, the dispositio of 
flesh is first and foremost its dimensive quantity as the prima dispositio materiae giving it 
its physical structure, and then the other accidental dispositions that are proximately 
grounded upon that structure.445 
In other places, when he discusses to the aspect in which an individual body's 
flesh endures throughout its lifetime, Aquinas does not refer to the soul.  Instead, he 
talks simply of matter as it is subject to quantitative structure and the other accidental 
forms, in particular the shape (figura) of the body, which follow immediately upon that 
structure.   
In his commentary on De generatione et corruptione I.5, Aquinas again discusses the 
image of the fire that is 'fed' with new logs: Aristotle's metaphor for growth.  He notes 
that the species and figura of the fire remain, despite the fact that the matter in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particular substantial form which is the soul of Socrates'.  Stump, 'Resurrection, Reassembly and 
Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul', p. 170.  
443 'Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam, non autem caro secundum 
speciem.  Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius.  Ergo 
alimentum non transit in veritatem humanae naturae'.  ST I, q. 119, a. 1, arg 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 5, p. 571.  Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, See esp. pp. 361-71 for extended commentary on 
Aquinas's presentation of contemporary views with which he disagrees.  
444 'dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem 
carnis secundum diversam considerationem.  Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest 
secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et 
dispositio naturalis ipsius'.  ST I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 573. 
445 See above, pp. 121-2. 
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the fire burns is in flux.446  The term species here, if not synonymous with figura itself, 
could mean simply the external appearance of the fire.447 
In Book IV of his Sentences commentary, Aquinas asks whether everything that 
pertains to an individual's 'truth of human nature' will be resurrected in their body.  
He confirms that any matter that takes on an individual's 'form of flesh and bones' 
pertains to the 'truth of human nature' in them.  It becomes clear that Aquinas's 
referent for 'form of flesh and bones' is the body's particular quantitative structure, 
and that this structure is understood to remain the same across material flux, when 
he compares the material change that occurs in the parts of the mortal body to that 
which occurs in the professional population of a city (civitas).  The inhabitants who die 
and are replaced by others represent matter in flux; the interrelated offices, 
occupations and positions (officia et ordines) that are vacated and re-filled represent the 
city's persistent form.  Similarly, Aquinas's explanation continues, bodily parts sustain 
flux in respect of their matter, but remain with respect their shape and relative 
position (in eadem figura et in eodem situ).448  The relative positioning and proportioning 
of the body's parts, and also therefore its shape, of course, are grounded upon its 
quantitative structure.  
Again, when discussing resurrection and bodily identity in his Summa contra 
Gentiles, Aquinas explains that not everything which has ever been in an individual, 
materially speaking, need rise in it.  A fire remains one in number as it consumes 
logs, and others are put in their place, because its species persists; in the same way, a 
human body and a human being is one in number throughout mortal life because the 
species of its individual parts (forma et species singularium partium) remains throughout its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 ‘Simile est etiam in igne, cuius species et figura semper manet, licet ligna in quibus materialiter 
ignis ardet, consumantur, et iterum alia apponantur’.  In DGEC. I, lect. 15, n. 4 (107), p. 316.  
447 Aquinas took species to be synonymous with figura in his commentary on Metaphysica V. 19: see 
above, pp. 121-2. 
448 'ut ita etiam intelligamus contingere in partibus hominis unius sicut contingit in tota multitudine 
civitatis, quia singuli subtrahuntur a multitudine per mortem, aliis in locum eorum succedentibus; 
unde partes multitudinis fluunt et refluunt materialiter; sed formaliter manent, quia ad eadem officia 
et ordines substituuntur alii, a quibus priores subtrahebantur; unde respublica una numero manere 
dicitur.  Et similiter etiam dum quibusdam partibus fluentibus aliae reparantur in eadem figura et in 
eodem situ, omnes partes fluunt et refluunt secundum materiam, sed manent secundum speciem; 
manet nihilominus unus homo numero'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) 
Busa, vol. 1, p. 638 (my emphasis).  
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lifetime, even though those parts undergo material exchange.449  At first glance, the 
form being referred to could be the body's substantial form, but given the context of 
the rest of Aquinas's work in this area, it is most probable that Aquinas is here 
referring to dimensive quantity, the accidental form giving to the body its organic 
structure, as the very form that remains the same in the body across gradual material 
flux.  
1.1. The Identity of Dimensive Quantity across Growth 
There is a potential objection to be dealt with at this stage.  Aquinas's analysis of 
the mortal body's identity of course takes it that an individual body's accidental 
quantitative structure, as the form ultimately responsible for the individuality and 
continuity of its material part, can itself remain identical across the radical changes in 
its size and precise shape that it will undergo throughout life.  Not all of Aquinas's 
modern commentators agree that he did in fact maintain that the body's accidental 
quantitative structure has this ability, especially in his mature work.   
The confusion arises because, as we saw in chapter 3, in his commentary on 
Boethius' De Trinitate Aquinas refers to the structure that is involved in individuating 
the body's matter, and in guaranteeing its identity over time, as, precisely 'indeterminate 
dimensions'.  Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions' there, it is worth 
repeating, is not the same as Averroes': it is not a corporeal structure with which all of 
prime matter is invested.450  Rather, the label 'indeterminate dimensions' refers to the 
accidental quantitative structure particular to a body, considered with everything 
proper to it other than its precise spatial limits at any one time.  In the same discussion, 
the same structure is referred to as being 'terminated' according to its precise spatial 
limits (secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram) at any one point in time.  Since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 'In corpore autem hominis, quandiu vivit, non semper sunt eaedem partes secundum materiam, 
sed solum secundum speciem; secundum vero materiam partes fluunt et refluunt: nec propter hoc 
impeditur quin homo sit unus numero a principio vitae usque in finem.  Cuius exemplum accipi potest 
ex igne, qui, dum continue ardet, unus numero dicitur, propter hoc quod species eius manet, licet 
ligna consumantur et de novo apponantur.  Sic etiam est in humano corpore. Nam forma et species 
singularium partium eius continue manet per totam vitam: sed materia partium et resolvitur per 
actionem caloris naturalis, et de novo adgeneratur per alimentum.  Non est igitur alius numero homo 
secundum diversas aetates, quamvis non quicquid materialiter est in homine secundum unum statum 
sit in eo secundum alium'.  SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 254 (my emphasis).  
450 See above, chapter 2, section 4.2 and subsections.  
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structure considered as determinate in this way does not persist over time, so Aquinas's 
argument in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate goes, we have to fall back on 
our consideration of bodily structure as indeterminate in order to understand how the very 
same structure continues to individuate the body's matter, making it 'this signate 
matter', across physical change.451    
In his more mature works on individuation, and particularly from Summa contra 
Gentiles (1264-65) onwards, Aquinas drops all reference to the two ways in which the 
quantitative structure particular to an individual body can be considered.  He usually 
simply to dimensive quantity, but can be found to refer to the structure involved in 
individuation as 'determinate' in at least one mature discussion of individuation 
(namely his commentary on Aristotle's De anima, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
which dates from 1267-68).452   Jorge Gracia has assumed that this change in 
vocabulary reflects a change in Aquinas's position: when he stopped referring to the 
quantitative structure involved in individuation as 'indeterminate', Aquinas no longer 
thought that quantitative structure had any role in guaranteeing the body's 
continuing identity.453   
On a closer reading of Aquinas's texts, however, it becomes clear that his position 
regarding the role of quantity in guaranteeing bodily identity is unaltered in his 
mature work: dimensive quantity can indeed withstand changes in its size and yet 
remain the same form.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 For the sake of clarity, it is worth repeating this passage, which was also noted in the previous 
chapter: 'Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari.  Uno modo secundum earum 
terminationem; et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram... Et sic non 
possunt esse principium individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio dimensionum varietur frequenter 
circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret semper idem numero.  Alio modo 
possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine 
aliqua determinatione esse possint... Et ex his dimensionibus indeterminatis materia efficitur haec 
materia signata...'.  In BDT, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, response 7, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 4, p. 530 (my 
emphasis).   
452 See above, p. 143 and n. 397.  For further discussion on this point, see Wippel, The Metaphysical 
Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 368-71.  
453 J. J. E Gracia, 'Numerical Continuity in Material Substances: The Principle of Identity in 
Thomistic Metaphysics', The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1979), p. 80: '[Aquinas] seems to 
abandon this view [i.e. that structure regarded as 'indeterminate' is involved in individuation], and 
regard matter under determinate dimensions as the principle of individuation.  This second view is 
unacceptable as an answer to the problem of identity' (my insertions). 
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That the shift in Aquinas's writings on bodily identity is a mere shift in 
vocabulary, rather than a shift in position, can be illustrated by bringing together two 
further passages from Aquinas's works.  In his Quodlibet IX, q. 6, a. 1 (Advent 1257), 
produced around the same time as his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate, Aquinas 
writes that, in bodily growth, the 'essence of quantity' is not destroyed (non tollitur) 
because 'indeterminate dimension' (dimensio interminata) always remains, even if this 
structure takes on different actual limits as it grows.454  At Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, 
a. 8 (1271-73), Aquinas simply states that changes in its size 'diversify dimensive 
quantity, not with respect to its essence, but with respect to the determination of its 
measure'.455   
In any case, as discussed in chapter 3, Aquinas has no consistent vocabulary for 
referring to the principle of individuation across his works.  More to the point, on the 
rare occasion that he does refer to the structure involved in individuation as 
'determinate' after his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate, it is never in a context in 
which the question of identity over time is directly relevant.456 
It is important to remember, in all of these discussions of bodily identity, that 
Aquinas's use of the vocabulary of 'indeterminate' versus 'determinate' structure was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 'in augmento corporali ipsa essencia quantitatis non tollitur, cum semper maneat dimensio 
interminata, set secundum diversas terminationes quas recipit, fit mutatio de parvo in magnum, quae 
est augmentum'.  Quod. IX, q. 6, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 1, p. 114.  
455 (My emphasis). 'magnum et parvum diversificant quantitatem dimensivam non quantum ad eius 
essentiam, sed quantum ad determinationem mensurae'.  ST III, q. 77, a. 8, ad 4, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 12, p. 204.  
456 See above, p. 142, and comments in J. Bobik, 'Dimensions in the Individuation of Bodily 
Substances', Philosophical Studies, 4 (1954), p. 72: 'the difficulty of determined dimensions vs. 
unterminated dimensions in the writings of St. Thomas is not a difficulty at all.  To be sure, it appears 
a difficulty and even an inconsistency.  But this deceiving appearance... has its origin in a failure to 
remember that the characteristics of the bodily individual are many, and that St. Thomas is not 
concerned with explaining or accounting for all of these characteristics each time his thought turns to 
the problem of individuation.'  Indeed the notion that quantitative structure is 'determinate', in 
Aquinas's mature work, does not preclude that it has a certain 'elasticity' to it.  In a discussion of 
perfection in his commentary on Aristotle's lexicon of philosophical terms at Metaphysica V, Aquinas 
notes that the 'determinate' structure of a horse has 'latitude' within fixed limits.  'quaelibet res 
naturalis, habet determinatam mensuram naturalis magnitudinis secundum quantitatem continuam, 
ut dicitur in secundo de anima... Equus enim habet quantitatem dimensivam determinatam secundum 
naturam cum aliqua latitudine.  Est enim aliqua quantitas, ultra quam nullus equus protenditur in 
magnitudine.  Et similiter est aliqua quantitas, quam non transcendit in parvitate'.  In Met. V, lect 18, 
n. 1037 (ed.) Cathala, p. 324 (my emphasis).  Of course, Aquinas may well be referring to the structure 
of any horse, universally, here, rather than to an individual 'determinate dimensive quantity' belonging 
to an individual horse.  It is not entirely clear.  Even so, the passage still highlights the importance of 
contextualising his use of vocabulary when pointing to the body's quantitative structure.   
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not the same as the Commentator's.  Of course, we saw in chapter 2 that, in his De 
substantia orbis, Averroes himself had used the label 'determinate dimensions' to refer to 
an individual structure that could remain the same thing, despite changes in its size.457  
It will be particularly crucial to recall again below, in connection with Aquinas's work 
on postmortem bodily identity, that Aquinas uses the Commentator's vocabulary in a 
different way to that in which Averroes himself used it.  
2. Formal Continuity and Bodily Identity at the Resurrection   
Aquinas's treatment of the body's formal continuity across death and resurrection 
can be read as an attempt to improve upon the theory put forward by his Franciscan 
contemporary Bonaventure, who advocated a pluralist theory of human nature.  In 
light of the axiom from Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione that a substance, once 
corrupted, could not return identical, Bonaventure, in his own Sentences commentary 
(1253-57), saw the need to explain how the body's corporeal form could return idem 
numero, after it had corrupted into matter.    
To do so, the Franciscan had made use of Augustine's idea that matter is imbued 
with the seminal principles of corruptible forms, or rationes seminales.  This picture of 
the material principle had figured in Augustine's literal commentary on Genesis as a 
way of reconciling the idea that the world was created in an instant, on the one hand, 
with the idea that the various species of creatures came into being in a certain order, 
on the other.458  Augustine had said that matter was 'pregnant with all things', 
Bonaventure argued.  And bodily forms corrupted into the very rationes seminales from 
which they were produced: crucially, these forms did not corrupt entirely (omnino), but 
remained 'in some way' (aliquo modo) across death and resurrection.  Although no 
natural power could draw out (deducere) the very same forms from matter, God 
could.459  There were obscurities in this account of postmortem bodily continuity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 See above, pp. 92-3.  
458 Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 349, which cites Augustine, De genesi ad Litteram, VI. 33 and VI. 
10 (ed.) J. Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 28.1 (Vindobonae: F. Tempsky, 1894), pp. 
131-2, 182-3.  
459 'necesse est, aliquo modo formas naturales esse in materia, antequam producantur; et substantia 
materiae praegnans est omnibus: ergo rationes seminales omnium formarum sunt in ipsa...  Et sic dicit 
Augustinus; unde formas in materia ante productionem dicit esse quantum ad rationes seminales... 
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however: for one, rationes seminales were usually conceptualised as the formal 
principles of species or kinds, not of individuals.  It was unclear, therefore, how rationes 
seminales could account for the fact that each particular bodily form might retain its 
individuality.460   
Aquinas himself rejected the idea that the material principle was invested with 
seminal forms.461  Like Bonaventure, Aquinas assumes that the Aristotelian axiom on 
continuity and identity still applies to natural events.  That is to say, although 
resurrection can happen only by divine power,462 in order to be truly resurrected, the 
body's components need to survive somehow.  And even if he does not cite 
Bonaventure's or any similar argument for bodily continuity across death and 
resurrection directly in his own work, Aquinas undoubtedly sets up his own treatment 
of the problem pointedly to demonstrate the advantage of the theory that the soul is 
the body's only substantial form for an account of bodily identity at the resurrection.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nunc autem hoc dixisse sufficiat, quod omnes formae, cum corrumpuntur, non omnino 
corrumpuntur, sed manent aliquo modo...  Hoc praesupposito, dicendum, quod quamvis forma ibi sit 
aliquo modo post corruptionem, tamen natura non potest producere ad idem esse, quod habuit 
prius... sed Deus, qui potest ipsas rationes seminales... ad perfectum esse deducere, potest facere, quod 
sit idem...  Et sic patet, quod Deus potest reformare idem corpus secundum numerum'.  Bonaventure, 
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4, responsio, Opera Omnia, vol. 4 (Ad Claras 
Aquas: Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1889), p. 889 (my emphasis).    
460 As Reynolds puts it in his discussion of Bonaventure's work on bodily continuity and resurrection in 
Food and the Body, p. 354, 'even if God could educe the form without changing its identity, what is it 
supposed to be the same as?  It cannot be numerically identical with the seminal principle, for that is 
potentially an unlimited number of individuated substantial forms: its numerical, substantial identity is 
indeterminate.  When the actual form corrupted, so that the form reverted to its seminal state, it lost 
its substantial identity'.  For more detail on thirteenth-century discussion of rationes seminales as the 
principles of generic forms, and the ways in which rationes seminales were understood to 'evolve' into 
generated forms, see S. Donati, ‘The Anonymous Commentary on the Physics in Erfurt, Cod. 
Amplon. Q. 312 and Richard Rufus of Cornwall’, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, 72 
(2005), pp. 290-9. 
461 ST I, q. 115, a. 2.  
462 'Ea vero quae secundum substantiam corrumpuntur, non reiterantur eadem numero secundum 
operationem naturae, sed solum secundum speciem... Cum igitur corpus humanum per mortem 
substantialiter corrumpatur, non potest operatione naturae idem numero reparari... consequens est 
quod resurrectio hominum non fiet per actionem naturae... sed resurgentium reparatio sola virtute 
divina fiet'.  CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 140.  Cf. SCG IV, 81 and In Sent. IV, d. 
44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg. 1 (which directly cites De generatione et corruptione) and ad 1.  
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2.1. The Body's Uninterrupted Esse   
Now, in his work on the general resurrection, Aquinas treats the question of the 
continuity of the body's individual act of existence, or esse, in a distinct set of 
philosophical objections and responses.  It will be remembered from the previous 
chapter that, in Aquinas's metaphysical schema, each human has an individual act of 
existence (or esse), which enters into composition with their matter and their form.   
It is the rational soul that is responsible for communicating esse to the whole 
composite, and the individuated act of being, or esse, that the rational soul 
communicates, is not dependent on the soul's union with matter: the soul subsists in 
its own right (per se subsistens).  Unlike the souls of other animals, Aquinas explains, the 
human soul 'exceeds' or overreaches matter in its nature and its being.  Hence each 
human body's individuated act of existence remains, without interruption, with the 
soul across bodily dissolution, to be returned to the body's matter once more at the 
resurrection.463   
2.2. The Soul and the Body's Formal Identity 
Aquinas illustrates the full advantage of his theory that the immortal soul is the 
only substantial form in the human body for an account of resurrection by 
responding to a series of objections that suppose that there are additional substantial 
forms in the body.  Those additional substantial forms, so the various objections have 
it, are annihilated after bodily death and decomposition.  None of them, therefore, 
can return as exactly the same individual substantial form at the resurrection.  The 
resurrection of the body idem numero, therefore, is impossible.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 'aliorum generabilium et corruptibilium forma non est per se subsistens, ut post compositi 
corruptionem manere valeat, sicut est de anima rationali, quae esse, quod sibi in corpore acquiritur, 
etiam post corpus retinet, et in participationem illius esse corpus per resurrectionem adducitur, cum 
non sit aliud esse corporis et aliud animae in corpore... et sic nulla interruptio facta est in esse 
substantiali hominis, ut non possit idem numero redire propter interruptionem essendi, sicut accidit in 
aliis rebus corruptis, quarum esse omnino interrumpitur'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 1 (ed.) 
Busa, vol. 1, p. 635; 'Differt tamen quantum ad hoc anima rationalis ab aliis formis.  Nam esse aliarum 
formarum non est nisi in concretione ad materiam... Anima vero rationalis... excedit materiam... 
Unde... esse suum non est solum in concretione ad materiam.  Esse igitur eius, quod erat compositi, 
manet in ipsa corpore dissoluto: et reparato corpore in resurrectione, in idem esse reducitur quod 
remansit in anima'.  SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 253.  Cf. also above, n. 357 (on the 
soul ‘exceeding’ matter), and n. 410 on the soul's individuated esse outlasting the body.     
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Across Aquinas's various systematic discussions of resurrection, such objections 
posit that there is a substantial form of corporeity (corporeitas);464 a distinct substantial 
form of the mixture of elements (forma mixtionis or forma mixti); 465  and distinct 
substantial forms constituting the sensitive and nutritive souls respectively (which, 
according to the objections, cannot exist independently of bodily organs) in each 
human.466  His responses to such objections set out to clarify the distinction between 
certain accidental forms in the body, and the soul as its substantial form: the soul is an 
individual body's only substantial form and enters (with individual matter), into its 
substance or inner nature; then, there are various accidental forms in the body that 
follow on that substantial nature and are what indicate that nature to the senses.467   
Aquinas notes that, from one perspective, the bodily features referred to in these 
objections can be looked upon merely as accidental forms.  From this perspective, 
corporeitas is the body's accidental quantitative structure; the forma mixtionis is a certain 
composite quality the body possesses; the vegetative and sense powers are accidental 
forms belonging to the composite human being.468  He explains that the body's 
accidental forms, ontologically dependent on the human substance in which they 
inhere, will indeed corrupt at death.  None of them can therefore return the same in 
number in the resurrected body, in line with the Aristotelian axiom that that which 
corrupts cannot return the same in number.  Yet the resurrected body can still be the 
same thing as the mortal body in each case, Aquinas holds, even if its accidental forms 
are different.469  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 SCG IV, 80, CT I, c. 154. 
465 In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, arg. 4, SCG IV, 80.  
466 In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg. 3, SCG IV, 80, CT I, c. 154.   
467 See passages noted below, nn. 470-71.   
468 The intellect and will, which can operate independently of corporeal organs, actually remain in the 
separated soul.  The nutritive and sensitive powers, which take the composite of body and soul as their 
subject, corrupt at the separation of body and soul and remain in the soul only in a virtual way (virtute) 
insofar as the soul is their principle or root (sicut in principio vel radice).  ST I, q. 77, a. 8, response, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 249.   
469 'eadem ratio est de omnibus accidentibus, quorum diversitas identitatem secundum numerum non 
tollit'.  CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 141.  This Aquinas makes this argument in 
every one of his systematic discussions of resurrection.  Yet, as Philip Lyndon Reynolds has observed, 
at another point in CT I, c. 154 Aquinas seems to contradict this with another statement that tacitly 
concedes that a numerical difference of accidental forms in the risen body would impede its numerical 
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From another perspective, however, it is the rational soul, as the only substantial 
form in an individual human body, which is the formal principle determining its 
inner substantial nature as a body and as a mixed body.  The rational soul survives 
across death and resurrection and therefore guarantees the formal identity of the 
individual bodily substance it informs, both as a body, and as a mixed body, when it 
rises.470  Furthermore, Aquinas explains, the sensitive and vegetative souls are not 
corruptible souls, like animal souls, but are the same in substance as the immortal 
rational soul, which is the only substantial form in the body.471  As substantial natures, 
then, all of these supposed distinct forms are in fact comprehended within the nature 
of the immortal rational soul itself.  And so they survive across death and 
resurrection. 
Discussing the corruption or survival of the sensitive soul across death and 
resurrection in his Sentences commentary, Aquinas explains that the objection that that 
soul might corrupt at death, and therefore could not return the same at the 
resurrection, is the best argument (optime concludit) against those who hold that the 
sensitive soul is a substantial form really distinct from the rational soul in each 
human: those who posit that the rational and sensitive souls are one and the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
identity: since a human's sense powers corrupt at death (and cannot return numerically the same by 
nature), only divine power can restore a dead human to life.  See CT I, c. 154, passage beginning, 
'manifestum est quod sensus privati restitui non possunt per operationem naturae', Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 42, p. 140, and Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 425-6.  This particular ambiguity makes no 
great difference to the argument of the present chapter.  
470 'Neque etiam praedicta identitas secundum numerum impeditur ex hoc quod corporeitas non 
redeat eadem numero, cum corrupto corpore corrumpatur.  Nam si per corporeitatem intelligatur 
forma substantialis, per quam aliquid in genere substantiae corporeae ordinatur, cum non sit unius 
nisi una forma substantialis, talis corporeitas non est aliud quam anima... et sic corporeitas accepta 
eadem numero manet, rationali anima eadem existente.  Si vero corporeitatis nomine forma quaedam 
intelligatur, a qua denominatur corpus, quod ponitur in genere quantitatis, sic est quaedam forma 
accidentalis... Unde licet non eadem numero redeat, identitas subiecti non impeditur'. CT I, c. 154, 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 141 (my emphasis).  See also passage beginning 'Corporeitas autem 
dupliciter accipi potest', and passage beginning 'Similiter etiam forma mixti dupliciter accipi potest' in 
SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, pp. 252-3; and passage beginning 'forma mixtionis, quae 
est forma resultans ex qualitatibus simplicibus ad medium venientibus, non est substantialis forma 
corporis mixti, sed est accidens proprium'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 4, Opera Omnia (ed.) 
Busa, p. 635.  
471 'Sic etiam dicendum est et de parte nutritiva, et sensitiva.  Si enim per partem sensitivam et 
nutritivam intelligantur ipsae potentiae, quae sunt proprietates naturales animae, vel magis compositi, 
corrupto corpore corrumpuntur: nec tamen per hoc impeditur unitas resurgentis.  Si vero per partes 
praedictas intelligatur ipsa substantia animae sensitivae et nutritivae, utraque earum est eadem cum 
anima rationali.  Non enim sunt in homine tres animae, sed una tantum...'.  SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia 
iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 253.  Cf. CT I, c.154, passage beginning 'Similiter nec diversitas potentiarum...'; 
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 141.  See also In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 3, reproduced in 
next footnote.  
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substantial form simply do not have to face this difficulty in giving an account of the 
body's identity at the resurrection.472   
Plainly, however, Aquinas arranges his entire discussion of formal continuity and 
bodily identity at the resurrection in order to demonstrate that any version of the 
pluralist position on human nature, that is, any theory positing that the body has 
another, corruptible substantial form in addition to the soul, meets deep 
philosophical difficulties when it comes to giving a clear account of the body's formal 
identity at the resurrection.  
2.3. The Soul as the Body's Efficient Cause  
At one point in his account of the general resurrection in his Sentences 
commentary, Aquinas notes that the soul is not simply the body's formal cause (as its 
substantial form) or its final cause (as the purpose for which it exists) but also its 
efficient, or agent cause.  And so, he continues, 'a human cannot be complete' at the 
resurrection 'unless everything implicitly contained in the soul is exhibited in an 
exterior way in the body'.473  But Aquinas is not implying, here, that there is some 
sort of blueprint unfolding from the soul will literally shape the body at the 
resurrection.474  In order to grasp what it is that he is driving at, it is necessary to 
understand what Aquinas actually means when he says that each soul is its body's 
efficient cause.   
At Summa contra Gentiles II, 89, Aquinas directly addresses any potential 
misconception arising from Aristotle's use of the image of a seal stamped on wax in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 'ratio illa optime concludit contra illos qui ponebant animam sensibilem et rationalem divisas in 
homine esse: quia secundum hoc anima sensitiva in homine non esset incorruptibilis, sicut nec in aliis 
animalibus.  Unde in resurrectione non erit eadem anima sensibilis, et per consequens nec idem 
animal, nec idem homo.  Si autem ponamus quod eadem anima secundum substantiam in homine sit 
rationalis et sensibilis, nullas in hoc angustias patiemur'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 3, Opera 
Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 636 (my emphasis).    
473 'nec homo posset esse perfectus, nisi totum quod in anima implicite continetur, exterius in corpore 
explicetur'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2 qc. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 637.  
474 Pace Bynum, who writes, in reference to this passage, 'Aquinas even suggests that body is the 
product of soul, its expression or unfolding'.  Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, p. 242.  Robert Pasnau 
and Eleonore Stump also think that the soul is directly responsible for shaping the body: see Appendix 
I.   
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De anima to illustrate the intimacy of the union of body and soul.475  This image does 
not imply, Aquinas explains there, that an individual soul physically shapes the 
matter into which it is infused, making the body in that sense.  Aristotle does elsewhere 
state, however, that the soul is the body's efficient cause, and Aquinas would apply 
this idea in two ways.  First, a father's soul (insofar as it is responsible for generating 
the virtus formativa) is the efficient cause of his progeny's body.476  Second, each soul is 
the efficient cause of its own body insofar as it is the root of all that body’s movements 
and vital functions.477   
The first way in which soul is body's efficient cause is irrelevant to the 
resurrection.  It is Aquinas’s understanding of the soul’s role as the body’s efficient 
cause in the second sense that lies behind the comment from his Sentences commentary 
quoted above.   
The comment, in fact, comes from a passage in which Aquinas is discussing the 
integrity of the resurrected body, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the body's 
material identity.  And God, of course, will be the agent of the reconstruction of 
individual bodies at the resurrection.   
As is clear from the context, then, what Aquinas is saying at that particular 
juncture in his Sentences commentary is that an individual body, as reconstructed by 
God, will be reintegrated in proportion to the soul with which it is reunited, precisely 
insofar as that soul is the root of all that body's movements and vital functions.  All 
this means is that the body will rise with all of its parts.  All of those bodily parts in 
which the soul's powers were made manifest in mortal life should rise.  Even if not all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 Cf. above, p. 44. 
476 The objection reads, 'Quod configuratur alicui, constitutur ex actione eius cui configuratur: sicut 
cera quae configuratur sigillo, accipit hanc configurationem ex impressione sigilli' and the response, 
'Quod autem decimo obiicitur, corpus animae configurari, et ob hoc animam sibi corpus simile 
praeparare... Similiter enim et omnis materia suae formae configuratur: non tamen haec configuratio 
fit ex actione generati, sed ex actione formae generantis'.  SCG II, 88-89, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 
13, pp. 540, 543.  Cf. the Aquinas's account of human generation above, chapter 3, section 3.  
477 'Ad sextum dicendum, quod philosophus non dicit animam, efficientem esse causam corporis, sed 
causam unde est principium motus, in quantum est principium motus localis in corpore, et augmenti 
et aliorum huiusmodi, ut ipsemet exponit ibidem'.  QDP, q. 3, a. 10, ad 6, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 
3, p. 206.   
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of those parts will remain in use (the intestines will be defunct, for example), still, their 
presence will exhibit the soul’s manifold powers as the body's efficient cause.478    
2.4. The Soul as One of Two Essential Principles 
There is one final facet to Aquinas's analysis of formal continuity across death 
and resurrection, which will in fact lead us directly to a consideration of postmortem 
material continuity.  This is his account of the forma totius, the humanity or essence that 
each human possesses. 479   Objections in each of Aquinas's treatments of the 
resurrection state that this form would seem to be destroyed at death, with the 
separation of body and soul, and cannot therefore return the same in number.480   
Aquinas's response reveals that the Aristotelian axiom on continuity and identity 
from De generatione et corruptione does not apply as usual in this particular case, since the 
humanity, essence, or the 'form of the whole' that each human has, is not some form 
distinct from the rational soul entering into their metaphysical make up.  'Humanity', 
Aquinas explains, signifies 'body' and 'soul' as, respectively, the formal and material 
essential principles of the human species, considered in isolation from the individual 
features characterising particular humans.481    
His explanation goes as follows: what is restored in a case of resurrection is not 
'humanity' as such, but an individual human that possesses humanity.  Socrates, Aquinas 
account of the resurrection states, has two 'essential principles': this matter, and this 
form, or soul.  They are his essential principles (remembering that Socrates's essence, 
strictly speaking, comprises those aspects of his nature which he shares with all other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1, response, ad 1 and ad 2.   
479 See above, pp. 115-6. 
480 CT I, c. 154, SCG IV, 80, Quod. XI, q. 6, arg. 4, In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg. 2.  
481  'Nam in ratione humanitatis includuntur essentialia principia hominis sola cum praecisione 
aliorum. Cum enim humanitas dicatur qua homo est homo, manifestum est quod omnia de quibus 
non est verum dicere de eis quod homo sit homo, ab humanitate praeciduntur'.  CT I, c. 154, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 140.  Cf. passage beginning, 'De humanitate vero, non est intelligendum 
quod sit quaedam forma consurgens ex coniunctione formae ad materiam, quasi realiter sit alia ab 
utroque...', SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 253; and passage beginning, 'forma totius 
[or humanitas]... est totum resultans ex compositione formae et materiae , comprehendens in se 
utrumque'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 2 Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, p. 636 (my insertion).   
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humans), because in virtue of his possession of them Socrates contains the universal 
human components 'body' and 'soul'. 
But Socrates's particular matter and form are also, of course, his 'individual 
principles' (Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2), or the constituents of his particular 'truth of 
human nature' (Summa Theologiae I, q. 119, a. 1).  Aquinas writes, in his work on the 
resurrection in the Compendium Theologiae, that Socrates's particular matter and form 
constitute what it is to be Socrates.  That is to say, if Socrates could be defined (and as 
an individual he cannot be), his particular matter and form, or his individual 
principles, would be that in terms of which he would be defined.482   
This last point helps Aquinas to explain what will be required and what will 
suffice such that the Socrates that is resurrected by God is numerically the same as 
the mortal Socrates.483  Socrates's same 'humanity' is restored, or the universalisable 
aspects of his composite nature are restored, in virtue of the reunion of his body with 
his soul at the resurrection, then what it is to be Socrates in particular, the 'truth of 
human nature' in Socrates, is restored by the reunion of his form and his matter, 
precisely.484  (As noted already, a diversity of accidental forms in the mortal and risen 
Socrates will not make a difference to his identity).  If, on the other hand, one of 
Socrates's essential principles (or components of the 'truth of human nature' in 
Socrates), either his matter or his form, should be different at the resurrection, then 
Socrates will not be the vary same individual (idem numero).485   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 'In Sorte vero aut Platone includitur haec materia et haec forma, ut sicut est ratio hominis ex hoc 
quod componitur ex anima et corpore, ita si Sortes definiretur, ratio eius esset quod esset compositus 
ex iis carnibus et iis ossibus et hac anima'.  CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, p. 141 (my 
emphasis).     
483 Philip Lyndon Reynolds notes that in Aquinas's commentary on First Corinthians (1 Cor. 15:53), 
which dates from 1265-68, Aquinas tacitly concedes that if a human's particular matter and form could 
be reunited naturally (which they cannot), the result would be a numerically different human being.  
The resurrected body needs to be repaired by divine power.  Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 424-5.    
484 Pasnau and Stump disagree over whether the disembodied soul alone can, according to Aquinas, 
accurately be considered an individual human being: see Appendix II.  
485 'Cum igitur humanitas non sit aliqua alia forma praeter animam et corpus, sed sit aliquid 
compositum ex utroque, manifestum est quod eodem corpore reparato, et eadem anima remanente, 
eadem numero humanitas erit' and with respect to the body’s accidental corporeal form, Aquinas 
writes: 'Unde licet non eadem numero redeat, identitas subiecti non impeditur, ad quam sufficit unitas 
essentialium principiorum'.  CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42 p. 141 (my emphasis).  Cf. 
also 'Unde patet quod et homo redit idem numero in resurrectione, et humanitas eadem numero, 
propter animae rationalis permanentiam et materiae unitatem'.  SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
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3. Postmortem Bodily and Material Continuity 
It is time now to turn to Aquinas's account of the postmortem continuity of the 
individual body's remains, which would become so highly controversial in the decade 
following his own death in 1274.  The discussion will start with Aquinas's 
philosophical account of the corpse and postmortem bodily decay, and then go on to 
set out both his innovative and speculative and innovative work on the continuity of 
the material particular to individual bodies across death and resurrection, and his 
treatment of postmortem bodily continuity in the cases of Christ and the saints.  
In only a few places across his works does Aquinas discuss the composition of the 
corpse in any detail.  For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, human death is a moment of 
radical substantial change.  At the moment of human death, the body's accidental 
dispositions which, so to speak, 'hold' the soul in matter, 486  corrupt, and the 
individual body undergoes dissolution.487  Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that the 
word 'body' (in the sense of living body) is applied only equivocally to the material 
which remains: it has lost its substantial form, and therefore no longer belongs to the 
same species as the living body.488   
Yet, again along with Aristotle, Aquinas certainly thinks that there is material 
continuity of some sort between living body and corpse.  The material remains of an 
individual human body, since they are no longer the appropriate material subject for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
XIII, 15, p. 253; 'ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiritur ydemptitas principiorum 
essencialium; unde, quodcunque principiorum essencialium, etiam in ipso individuo variatur, necesse 
est etiam ydemptitatem variari'.  Quod. XI, q. 6, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 1, pp. 160-1; 
'Unde nihil prohibet hominem resurgentem esse idem animal numero.  Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit 
idem numero, sufficit quod principia essentialia sint eadem numero; non autem requiritur quod 
proprietates et accidentia sint eadem numero'.  QDA 19 ad 5 (a discussion of whether the soul's 
sensitive powers remain in it after its separation from the body), Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 24, 1, p. 
166 (my emphasis).  Aquinas's Sentences commentary does not use the technical language of 'essential 
principles' when discussing this point, simply saying that at the resurrection of an individual there will 
be the same body, and the same soul, and therefore of necessity the same humanity: 'quia ergo in 
resurrectione idem numero corpus erit, et eadem numero anima rationalis, erit de necessitate eadem 
humanitas'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 2, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, p. 636.   
486 'dispositiones... quoddamodo tenent formam in materia...'.  QDP, q. 3, a. 9, arg. 17, Opera Omnia 
(ed.) Busa, vol. 3, p. 204.  
487 'discedente anima, corpus dissolvitur'.  SCG II, 58, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 13, p. 410  
488 'ita anima est forma substantialis viventis corporis, et ea remota non remanet corpus vivum nisi 
aequivoce'.  In DA II, lect. 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 45, 1, p. 75.    
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a rational soul, can no longer be properly or strictly referred to as an organic body 
(that is, as comprising heterogeneous human body parts), or as 'flesh and bone' (as 
comprising homogenous body parts), it is true.  But these remains continue to 
comprise a mixture of the elements.  Aquinas writes, in his commentary on Aristotle's 
discussion of proper matter at Metaphysica VIII.5, that 'the elements' are the matter of 
the dead body.489  And even this is not to say that the material principle loses all of its 
complexity at the instant of bodily death.  Aquinas, of course, holds that the material 
principle is in potency to forms only in a certain order, and this is true in all cases of 
substantial change, whether they are more readily characterised as generation, or as 
corruption.490  The process of dissolution and decomposition that bodily remains 
undergo is gradual, requiring several intermediary forms to be acquired and lost.491   
Aquinas dwells on the dissolution of complex composite substances again in his 
commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysica VII.16, and in doing so suggests one other way 
of framing material continuity between living body and corpse.  At Metaphysica 
VII.16, on the composition of substances, Aristotle had explained that even if the 
material parts of animals might seem to be substances in their own right, they in fact 
exist only in potency for as long as the composite is a naturally continuous whole.492  In 
his commentary on this passage, Aquinas supposes that when a whole substance is 
dissolved, its material constituents, which were previously only in a state of potency in 
their own right, take on an actuality of their own.  He gives an example.  When the 
elements earth, air, fire and water are in a compound, they exist in it only potentially.  
Yet, after the compound dissolves, each element becomes an actually existing thing 
in its own right, and is no longer a mere part of something else.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 'vivum non est materia mortui, sed sunt elementa'.  In Met. VIII, lect. 4, n. 1751 (ed.) Cathala, p. 
506.  
490 See above, p. 130-1 and n. 350.  
491 'Similiter etiam ex parte corruptionis sunt multae formae mediae, quae sunt formae incompletae: 
non enim, separata anima, corpus animalis statim resolvitur in elementa; sed hoc fit per multas 
corruptiones medias, succedentibus sibi in materia multis formis imperfectis, sicut est forma corporis 
mortui, et postmodum putrefacti, et sic inde'.  In DGEC, I, lect. 8, n. 3 (60), Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 
3, p. 292.   
492 Met., 1040b5ff (ed.) Vuillemin-Diem, p. 163-4, passage beginning, 'Manifestum est autem quod 
substantiarum esse existimarum plurime potestate sunt, et ipse partes animalium; nichil enim 
separatum ipsorum est.  Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia materia omnia, terra, ignis, et aer'.  
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In a much more complex composite substance such as an organic body, Aquinas 
continues, parts of matter are 'formally distinct'.  Presumably, he is here referring to 
the fact that an organic body's quantitative structure renders its parts distinct from 
one another.  Such highly developed and differentiated material parts are 'close to 
being actual', or might be described as being in a state of 'potentiality close to 
actuality'.  But they remain in potency before the natural dissolution of the 
composite.493  As we will see in chapter 5, the Dominican Robert of Orford, trying to 
make sense of Aquinas's thought on postmortem bodily at Oxford in the early 1280s, 
would follow this particular framework. 
Aquinas refers to the least complex material level, beyond which dissolution 
cannot continue, as praeiacens materia.  As Reynolds has explained, the word praeiacens 
is not easy to translate (praeiacere is 'to lie in front of'), but 'pre-existing' works in this 
context: praeiacens materia is the matter that is 'primitively formed in relation to a 
higher form or substance'.494  Aquinas himself describes praeiacens materia as prime 
matter informed by the elemental forms, the very simplest forms in nature.  Since the 
material principle is always informed, and therefore always found in proportion to 
particular forms, however simple, resolution can never in fact continue in such a way 
that all that remains is a completely featureless prime matter.495   
3.1. The Continuity of the Matter Particular to Individual Bodies 
Aquinas thinks that each individual body will be reconstructed from the praeiacens 
materia that formerly belonged to it at the resurrection.  This matter will have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 'Quando autem ea, quae ponuntur partes, fuerint separata abinvicem dissoluto toto, tunc quidem 
sunt entia in actu... Sicut patet de terra et igne et aere, quae quando sunt partes corporis mixti, non 
sunt actu existentia, sed potentia in mixto; cum vero separantur, tunc sunt in actu existentia, et non 
partes... Quamvis enim omnes partes sint in potentia, tamen maxime poterit aliquis opinari partes 
animatorum et partes animae esse propinquas, ut fiant actu et potentia, idest ut sint in potentia 
propinqua actui.  Et hoc ideo, quia corpora animata sunt corpora organica habentia partes distinctas 
secundum formam; unde maxime sunt propinqua ad hoc quod sint actu... Sed tamen quamvis istae 
partes animae et animatorum sint propinquae actui, nihilominus sunt omnia in potentia, quando 
totum fuerit unum et continuum per naturam'.  In Met. VII, lect. 16, nn. 1633-1634, 1636 (ed.) M. -R. 
Cathala, pp. 472-3.  
494 Reynolds, Food and the Body, p. 405.  
495 'praeiacens autem materia in quam corpora mixta resolvi possunt, sunt quatuor elementa, non 
enim potest fieri resolutio in materiam primam, ita quod sine forma existat, quia materia sine forma 
esse non potest'.  ST III, q. 75, a. 3, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 165.  
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dispersed, consumed by other animals, and even other humans, and incorporated 
into their bodies.496  In the case of those humans who will die only in the final 
conflagration, their matter will be resolved instantly into praeiacens materia.  Aquinas 
therefore identifies the 'ashes' (cineres) from which it was commonly held that human 
bodies would be reconstituted at the resurrection, with praeiacens materia.497  There is 
no natural inclination in the ashes that were formerly united to a particular soul, to 
be reunited to that soul once more.  Bonaventure had thought this,498 but Aquinas 
regards the notion as frivolous (frivolus).  Nonetheless, he maintains that matter is 
ordained to be rejoined to its own soul by Providence: God will reconstruct each 
individual body from the same matter that subsisted in it in life.499  Following 
Augustine, Aquinas thinks that in cases of cannibalism, the person in whom the 
'shared' matter was first animated has the prior claim to it.500   
If not enough matter is available in an individual case, God will make up the 
deficit.501  With respect to last this point it is absolutely crucial to note that Aquinas 
does not mean to imply that any matter will do for a particular body at the 
resurrection.  To make up the difference, God will have to effect a transmutation in 
some other matter such that that matter becomes the particular matter belonging to 
that particular body.  Whereas natural agents are limited to effecting change in 
things by means of introducing some form or other, Aquinas holds, God can alter 
matter itself.502   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, sc. 1.  
497 See In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 3, and In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 2. 
498 Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, pp. 243-4.  
499 'dicendum est, quod in cineribus illis nulla est naturalis inclinatio ad resurrectionem, sed solum ex 
ordine divinae providentiae, quae statuit illos cineres iterum animae conjungi; et ex hoc convenit quod 
illae partes elementorum iterato conjungantur, et non aliae'.  In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, 
response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 633.  
500 CT I, c. 161, SCG IV, 81, In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, ad 3- ad 5.  Cf. Reynolds, Food and the 
Body, pp. 391-5 for further discussion of Aquinas's treatment of the cannibalism problem.   
501 'ita etiam si quid materialiter defuit, Deus supplebit'.  CT I, c. 160, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 42, 
p. 143.  Cf. SCG IV, 81, and In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, qc.1, response.  
502 This point is heavily alluded to in Aquinas’ work on the resurrection, in which he writes that 
resurrection can only happen by divine power because natural agents are limited to effecting formal 
change.  See SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 252: 'operatione naturae hic fieri non 
possit, ut corpus reparetur ad vitam, tamen virtute divina id fieri potest.  Nam quod natura hoc facere 
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And so we reach the crux of the problem of postmortem bodily continuity: what 
is it that accounts for the continuing identity of the praeiacens materia particular to each 
individual body across that body's death and resurrection?  Since Aquinas thinks that 
quantitative structure is the only natural form capable of introducing distinctions into 
matter, it is not surprising that he should look to quantitative structure in order to 
explain the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies.   
In his account of resurrection at Summa contra Gentiles IV, 81, Aquinas writes that 
the matter belonging to an individual body remains, across death and resurrection, 
'under the same dimensions, from which it had the characteristic of being individual 
matter'.503  At Compendium Theologiae I, c. 154, he writes that it is easy (de facili) to see 
how a body can be restored numerically the same by God.  Even the very least of 
things, Aquinas reminds his reader, fall under the purview of divine Providence.  It is 
clear (manifestum est) that the matter of this human body, whatever form it might 
receive after human death, does not escape divine power and knowledge.  And this 
matter remains the same in number, insofar as it is understood as existing 'under 
dimensions, according to which it can be called this matter, and is the principle of 
individuation'.  Since this matter remains the same, since God will repair the same 
individual body from it, and since it will be united to the same soul, the individual 
human, body and soul, will rise again the same in number (idem numero).504  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
non possit, ideo est quia natura semper per formam aliquam operatur'.  It is bought out in full when 
Aquinas discusses the material change involved in transubstantiation at ST III, q. 75, a. 4.  The third 
objection states that two 'signate matters' are diverse: it is not possible for the bread’s particular matter 
to become the particular matter whereby Christ’s body is individuated: 'duae materiae signatae sunt 
secundum se divisae, utpote existentes principium materialis divisionis. Ergo non potest esse quod 
haec materia panis fiat haec materia qua individuatur corpus Christi'.  Aquinas's reply is that, 
although natural agents are limited to actions which result in formal change alone ('unde nullum agens 
naturale vel creatum potest agere nisi ad immutationem formae'), God’s power of acting is infinite and 
extends to all being, so he can change an entire substance, both form and matter: 'virtute agentis finiti 
non potest forma in formam mutari, nec materia in materiam.  Sed virtute agentis infiniti, quod habet 
actionem in totum ens, potest talis conversio fieri'.  ST III, q. 75, a. 4, arg. 3, response, and ad 3, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, pp. 167-8.  
503 'materia etiam manet, quae tali formae fuit subiecta, sub dimensionibus eisdem ex quibus habebat 
ut esset individualis materia’ SCG IV, 81, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 15, p. 252.  Quod. XI, q. 6, ad 2 
has it that matter 'under terminating dimensions' makes for the resurrected body's numerical identity: 
'sed una materia secundum quod est sub dimensionibus terminantibus ipsam, facit idem numero'.  
Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 1, p. 161.  
504 'Cum enim supra ostensum sit quod omnia, etiam minima, sub divina providentia continentur, 
manifestum est quod materia huius humani corporis, quamcumque formam post mortem hominis 
accipiat, non effugit neque virtutem neque cognitionem divinam: quae quidem materia eadem 
numero manet, inquantum intelligitur sub dimensionibus existens, secundum quas haec materia dici 
	   	   	  181 
But things are very far from clear: there is an obvious gap in this account of 
postmortem material continuity.  As has already been noted, Aquinas maintains, in 
these same analyses of the general resurrection, that the particular quantitative 
structure belonging to an individual human body corrupts, along with all of the other 
accidental forms belonging to that body, when the individual human being corrupts 
at death, with the separation of body and soul.505  The general Aristotelian principle 
in operation here is, of course, that a substance is ontologically prior to its accidents, 
and Aquinas explicitly subscribes to this principle throughout his career.506  So how 
can any quantitative structure remain in matter across the corruption of the bodily 
substance whose property it is? 
Before an attempt is made to speculate on the thinking behind these later 
explanations for the continuity of matter particular to individual bodies, Aquinas's 
earlier treatment of the same problem in Book IV, d. 44 of his Sentences commentary 
should be addressed, too.  It employs different terminology from the later two 
accounts, and has obscurities of its own.   
The relevant, carefully phrased objection states that bodily death (and subsequent 
decay) is a resolution of the body into the elements (or, in other words, praeiacens 
materia).  Aquinas points out that these portions of elemental material retain none of 
the complexity proper to matter in a living body and therefore have nothing in 
common with the matter in the formerly living body, except inasmuch as both 
presuppose prime matter.  But all other portions of the elements have the level of 
prime matter in common with that formerly living body, too.  And nobody would 
claim that an individual body reformed from just any portion of the elements would 
be the same in number as it was in mortal life.  So it would seem that an individual 
body cannot return numerically the same at the resurrection, even if it is reformed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
potest, et est individuationis principium.  Hac igitur materia eadem manente, et ex ea virtute divina 
corpore reparato humano, nec non et anima rationali, quae cum sit incorruptibilis, eadem manet 
eidem corpori unita, consequens fit ut homo idem numero reparetur'.  CT I, c. 154, Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII, 42, p. 140 (my emphasis).    
505 See above, text cited at n. 470.  
506 'esse accidentale non praecedat substantiale'.  In Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) 
Busa, vol 1, p. 26; 'Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter... 
Unde impossibile est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante 
formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam'.  ST I, q. 76, a. 6, response, Opera omnia 
iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 229. 
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from that very portion of elements into which it was resolved.507  To overcome this 
difficulty, as he is well aware, Aquinas needs to build an account of the continuity of 
matter as the matter particular to an individual body.  
Aquinas's response to this objection, however, is far less transparent than his 
careful presentation of the problem at hand.  He argues that what is understood to be 
in matter before a substantial form arrives can really remain after that form’s 
separation, according to the principle that if you remove what is posterior, what is 
prior can remain.  Then he introduces the authority of Averroes' De substantia orbis 
and commentary on Physica I.  Averroes says, Aquinas writes, that before the 
reception of a substantial form in matter we should understand (intelligere) matter to be 
divided by 'indeterminate dimensions' (dimensiones non terminatae) in order that it can 
receive different forms in different places.  So, he continues, after the separation of 
that form (the soul in this case), these indeterminate dimensions really remain the 
same.  He then claims that matter existing under these indeterminate dimensions, 
whatever substantial form it might receive, retains a greater identity the particular 
human body that was generated from it than any other matter existing under any 
other substantial form.  The matter belonging to a particular body can therefore be 
identified at the resurrection and returned to it.508   
There is much here that requires further explanation.  As noted above, Aquinas's 
own referent for 'indeterminate dimensions' is not the absolute, or unqualified, body 
that Averroes describes in the works that Aquinas cites here in his Sentences 
commentary.  That is to say, it is not an accidental structure, with a potential kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 'corpus humanum usque ad elementa post mortem resolvitur, ut supra dictum est.  Sed illae partes 
elementorum in quas corpus humanum resolutum est, non conveniunt cum corpore humano quod in 
ea resolutum est, nisi in materia prima, quomodo quaelibet aliae elementorum partes cum praedicto 
corpore conveniunt.  Si autem ex aliis partibus elementorum corpus formaretur, non diceretur idem 
numero.  Ergo nec si ex illis partibus reparetur, corpus erit numero idem'.  In Sent. IV, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, 
qc. 1, arg. 3, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.   
508 'Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod intelligitur in materia ante formam, remanet in materia 
post corruptionem: quia remoto posteriori, remanere adhuc potest prius.  Oportet autem, ut 
Commentator dicit in 1 Physic., et in Lib. de substantia orbis, in materia generabilium et 
corruptibilium ante formam substantialem intelligere dimensiones non terminatas, secundum quas 
attendatur divisio materiae, ut diversas formas in diversis partibus recipere possit; unde et post 
separationem formae substantialis a materia adhuc dimensiones illae manent eadem; et sic materia 
sub illis dimensionibus existens, quamcumque formam accipiat, habet majorem identitatem ad illud 
quod ex ea generatum fuerat, quam aliqua pars alia materiae sub quacumque forma existens; et sic 
eadem materia ad corpus humanum reparandum reducetur quae prius ejus materia fuit'.  In Sent. IV, 
d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 3, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 635.  
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existence, informing all of prime matter, ontologically prior to any substantial form 
and therefore constituting a real formal medium between any substantial form and 
prime matter.   
Again, Aquinas's referent for 'indeterminate dimensions', in places other than this 
discussion of the resurrection, at least, is simply a particular accidental form 
belonging to a particular bodily substance, considered with everything belonging to it 
apart from its precise spatial limits at any particular time.509  Granted that in a few 
discussions touching upon the reception of form in matter early on in his career 
(including in his major discussion of the topic in his commentary on Boethius's De 
Trinitate), Aquinas does refer to the need to 'understand' or 'presuppose' (considere, 
praeintelligere, intelligere) that matter is divided by 'indeterminate dimensions' in order to 
receive a substantial form in a particular place,510  he never suggests that this 
accidental structure is really or ontologically prior to its substance, or is a formal 
medium between substantial form and matter, or, in other words, is anything other 
than an individual accidental form already belonging to a substance.  In these 
passages, Aquinas is simply picking apart the order of our understanding of how 
individuation works.  Of course, the individual soul's creation in the individual 
human body happens at the very same moment at which the virtus formativa introduces 
into matter the accidental forms that are dependent on the completed human 
substance for their existence, including the body's quantitative structure that divides 
its matter from other matter. 
In later discussions touching upon individuation and the reception of substantial 
form in matter, Aquinas abandons this complicated explanatory move, along with its 
associated vocabulary, presumably because both were superfluous to his 
requirements.  Nor does Aquinas, in any of his general accounts of the generation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 See above, p. 164-5, and n. 451.  
510 'Sed impossibile est in materia intelligere diversas partes, nisi praeintelligatur in materia quantitas 
dimensiva ad minus interminata, per quam dividatur, ut dicit Commentator in libro de substantia 
orbis, et in 1 Physic., quia separata quantitate a substantia, remanet indivisibilis, ut in 1 Phys. 
philosophus dicit'.  In Sent. II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 133; (my 
emphasis)  'Divisio autem non accidit materiae, nisi secundum quod consideratur sub dimensionibus 
saltem interminatis: quia remota quantitate, ut in 1 Physicor. dicitur, substantia erit indivisibile'.  In 
Sent. II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 214 (my emphasis).  In Aquinas's 
commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, 'indeterminate dimensions' are said to be 'praeintellectas in 
materia'.  In BDT, part 2, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII , 50, p. 126.  For further 
explication of this point, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomae Aquinas, pp. 364-5.  
	   	   	  184 
and corruption of substances, articulate any concept of an absolute or unqualified 
body in matter, ontologically prior to any substantial form, which could map onto 
what Averroes meant by 'indeterminate dimensions'.511   
 So Aquinas's argument for the continuity of particular matter across death and 
resurrection in his Sentences commentary does not work, and this is because he is 
trying to draw upon Averroes' authority without committing himself to the 
Commentator's full position.  That is, Aquinas is trying to use Averroes' idea that 
there is a corporeal structure which remains after substantial corruption as 
authoritative support for what he wants to say about the postmortem continuity of the 
matter belonging to individual bodies, but without explicitly and in principle 
accepting the Commentator's innovative notion that it is possible for there to be an 
accidental structure in matter ontologically prior to substantial form.   
Averroes', 'indeterminate dimensions', again, are not merely understood to be in 
matter before it receives a new form.  That corporeal structure is really there as a 
medium between matter and substantial form, and is really distinct from any 
individual body's particular accidental structure.  The intellectual tension in 
Aquinas's early account of the continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies 
is clear.  By the time he came to write his Summa contra Gentiles, the formulation, and 
terminology, of his explanation for continuity of the matter particular to individual 
bodies had changed.512     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 In this connection, modern scholars disagree over the implications of an early discussion at In Sent. 
I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, in which Aquinas claims that corporeity is the first form received in matter.  See 
Appendix III.  
512 Aquinas employs the same problematic form of argument, namely that the structure that is merely 
understood to be in matter before substantial form can really remain after its departure, in a discussion of 
transubstantiation in his Sentences commentary, asking whether anything can be generated from the 
sacramental species.  See In Sent. IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 
485, passage beginning, 'quicquid autem intelligitur in materia ante adventum forma substantialis, hoc 
manet idem numero in generato et in eo ex quo generat; quia remoto posteriori oportet remanere 
prius: dimensiones autem illae interminatae...'.  This argument was simplified and improved in the 
Summa Theologica, by which point in his career Aquinas had eschewed the confusing terminological 
distinction between 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' dimensions.  There, he refers instead simply to 
'dimensive quantity' as that which miraculously takes on the property of matter, from which something 
might naturally be generated: 'melius videtur dicendum quod in ipsa consecratione miraculose datur 
quantitati dimensivae panis et vini quod sit primum subiectum subsequentium formarum.  Hoc autem 
est proprium materiae.  Et ideo ex consequenti datur praedicatae quantitati dimensivae omne id quod 
ad materiam pertinet'.  ST III, q. 77, a. 5, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 12, p. 200.  
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Neither in the Summa contra Gentiles, then, nor in the Compendium Theologiae, does 
Aquinas make reference to any kind of priority in 'understanding' or otherwise, of 
any quantitative structure in connection with the soul's initial reception in matter.  His 
argument is simply that the structure that individuates the matter of a particular 
human body can in some sense persist across the corruption of the bodily substance 
that is supposed to be its ontological support.  And he now refers to the structure that 
is supposed to persist across substantial corruption simply as 'dimensions'.  In his 
mature writings, then, Aquinas's solution to the problem of the continuity of the 
matter particular to individual bodies is still very far from transparent.  But the very 
basic point that he is getting at, at least, is fairly easy to appreciate: again, 
quantitative structure is the only thing that can introduce distinctions into matter, so 
if there is a natural explanation for the postmortem continuity of the matter 
particular to individual bodies, then quantitative structure must be the key to it.   
If the problem of accounting for the continuity of the matter particular to 
individual bodies pushed Aquinas to the very limits of his thinking on the nature of 
matter, then it is possible at least to speculate on the direction in which his thinking 
was still moving his mature accounts of the postmortem continuity of the matter 
particular to individual bodies.   
When Socrates dies, the particular quantitative structure belonging to his body 
corrupts as a whole: this structure was dependent, for its continued existence, on the 
continued existence of the composite substance Socrates.  Nonetheless, the 
mathematical entities that comprised this structure, its parts, or 'dimensions', remain 
in a potential or virtual, if not in an actual way, in the matter that formerly belonged 
to his body, or Socrates' 'individual matter'.  They thus serve as traces, in matter, of 
Socrates' whole, actual, three-dimensional, bodily structure.  Elements of any 
quantitative structure always occupy a particular position and so are radically 
individual.513  The parts of what was Socrates' bodily structure remain positioned in 
his matter, allowing it to be tracked by God across any sequence of substantial 
changes.  The structure of Socrates' body, as a whole, survives only in the mind of 
God, who alone can therefore perceive the traces of this structure in matter, identify 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 See above, p. 147 and n. 408.  
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the matter particular to Socrates' body, and then reform that body the same as it was, 
by returning particular matter to particular places within it.   
However obscure, this was Aquinas's best shot at an alternative to Augustine's 
atomist account of material continuity and bodily resurrection, within the framework 
of an Aristotelian physics that had dispensed with atoms.514  Admittedly, there are 
theoretical difficulties even with this very speculative summary of Aquinas's position.  
Aquinas does not think that the chain of material continuity in the individual will, at 
the resurrection, simply pick up where it left off at death: as indicated, he thinks that 
the material from which an individual body is generated will rise in it, but does not, 
in theory at least, hold that all or indeed any of this matter must still subsist in the body 
at the end of its life.515  
Even if Aquinas does not mention Averroes' work in either of his mature accounts 
of resurrection, his attempt to work out the consequences of the doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body for the nature of matter does seem to have consistently 
pushed him in the direction of violating, or at least partially violating, as Averroes 
himself had, the principle of the ontological priority of substance to accident.  That is 
to say, it does seem that in his work on the general resurrection Aquinas was moving 
tentatively towards the idea that matter in itself was or could become invested with 
structural principles, at least in the case of the matter that had belonged to human 
bodies.  
It was suggested in the general introduction that Aquinas failed to be upfront 
about the extent to which he was moving towards a position in any way similar to 
Averroes' on matter in his later work on resurrection, not only because of the 
contemporary association of the Commentator's name with the unorthodox position 
that there was a single intellect for all humans, but also because the Aristotelian 
conceptual apparatus with which Aquinas generally worked, in which a completed 
substance is prior to any accident, created a drag effect on his ability to develop and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Cf. Reynolds, Food and the Body, pp. 413-4: 'No less than an atomist, Thomas believes that matter 
follows uninterrupted tracks through corruption and generation.  This part goes here, and that part 
goes there.  Some of the matter in this Parisian raindrop may once have been fire in Africa.  But all 
things, Thomas says, even the least of them, are in the purview of divine providence'.      
515 ibid., pp. 390-1.  
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express new ideas that were in conflict with it.  Aquinas was never quite able to 
openly and clearly to make the intellectual break that was necessary in order to 
explicitly develop a theory of substantial change that would allow him to give the full 
and clear account that wanted to give for the continuity of the matter particular to 
individual bodies across their death and resurrection.  
When Aquinas stopped referring to Averroes in the context of discussing 
resurrection, then, he was not necessarily rejecting thereby the value of the 
Commentator's ideas and insight.  Quite to the contrary, it would be more accurate 
to say that Aquinas's developing ideas on matter and quantitative structure were 
inspired by and close to Averroes', but that his articulation of them had not yet reached 
a level of clarity, or conviction, comparable to that found in the Commentator's 
work.   
3.2. Christ's Dead Body and Saints' Relics 
Aquinas does not integrate his speculative thinking on the postmortem continuity 
of the matter particular to individual human bodies into his work on the topic of 
postmortem bodily continuity as it arose in other theological contexts: specifically, he 
does not introduce it in the cases of Christ's dead body and of saints' relics. 
Aquinas's position on the identity of saints' relics is expressed in simple terms.  
Asking himself whether saints' relics are worthy of worship at Summa Theologiae III, q. 
25, a. 6, he responds to an objection which points out that saints' relics belong to a 
different species to their living bodies, and suggests that, therefore, they are unworthy 
of worship.  In his reply, Aquinas agrees that a saint's dead body is indeed formally 
different from his or her living body.  Yet it is the same thing in another way, he 
continues, due to the identity of its matter (identitas materiae), which is destined to be 
reunited with its soul.516  Saints' dead bodies should be venerated, not on their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 'corpus mortuum alicuius sancti non est idem numero quod primo fuerit dum viveret, propter 
diversitatem formae, quae est anima, est tamen idem identitate materiae, quae est iterum suae formae 
unienda'.  ST III, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 11, p. 284.  
	   	   	  188 
account as dead objects, but for the sake of the souls to which they were united, and 
for the sake of God whose ministers the saints were.517   
The question of the identity of Christ's dead body, however, was exceptionally 
complicated.  Aquinas addressed it at several points during his career.  Notably, he 
was pushed to explain his position further in three separate quodlibetal disputes 
during his second Parisian regency (1268-72), demonstrating the uncertainty with 
which his novel theory of the composition of human nature, together with the new 
account of postmortem bodily continuity that it entailed, was initially met.  
By emphatically ruling out that there could be any distinct corporeal substantial 
form continuous in the body across the separation of its soul at death, and by 
claiming that there was concrete material continuity between the body living and 
dead, but without offering a truly penetrating analysis of the composition of the dead 
body, Aquinas had opened up a new area of intense theological debate regarding the 
precise nature of Christ's dead body.   
At Advent 1269 (Quodlibet II, q. 1, a. 1), then, Aquinas was asked whether Christ 
was the same man in the three days of his death (in triduo).  At Lent 1270 (Quodlibet III, 
q. 2, a. 2), he was asked whether Christ’s eye after His death was an ‘eye’ only 
equivocally speaking (in clear reference to Aristotle’s De anima II.1518).  Finally, at 
Lent 1271 (Quodlibet IV, q. 5), Aquinas was asked whether the body of Christ as it was 
affixed to the cross, and as it lay in the tomb, was the same in number.  Jean-Luc 
Solère's recent close study of these various discussions has debunked the old view that 
there was a shift in Aquinas's position on the continuity of Christ's body living and 
dead between the first two of these quodlibetal disputes on the one hand, and the last 
of them and his final exposition on the same question at Summa Theologiae III, q. 50, a. 
5, on the other.519   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 'corpus insensibile non adoramus propter seipsum, sed propter animam, quae ei fuit unita, quae 
nunc fruitur Deo; et propter Deum, cuius fuerunt ministri'.  ST III, q. 25, a. 6, ad 2,  ibid.  
518 See above, p. 80 and n. 187. 
519 J. -L. Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb? On the metaphysical and historical interest of some strange 
quodlibetal questions', in C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages.  The Thirteenth Century, 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 526-58, at pp. 549-56.  
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Aquinas, then, emphasises that Christ's death was a true human death, just as He 
was truly human.520  At the moment of His death Christ's body underwent the 
substantial corruption necessarily attendant on its separation from His soul.  In 
contrast to other human bodies, however, it was preserved from any dissolution 
beyond this.521  This, Aquinas explains, was the meaning of Psalm 15.10: 'nor will 
you give your holy one to see corruption'.522  So Aquinas insists on the same formal 
discontinuity between Christ's living and dead body as one would find across any case 
of human death.  Considering just the components of Christ’s human nature, only 
insofar as they are components of that nature, His immortal soul is absolutely the 
same across death and resurrection but His body is the same only with respect to its 
matter (secundum materiam).523   
And so, the material remains of Christ are only equivocally human, and the eye in 
the tomb was only equivocally an eye.  Neutralising his colleagues' objections, 
Aquinas argues that this must be the case regardless of whether there is one 
substantial form in Christ's body nature, the soul (a position which, Aquinas notes, 
seems to be more in harmony with the truth), or more than one, namely a distinct 
corporeal substantial form.  In both cases, the soul is in some sense the form of the 
body, and therefore, when the body undergoes a true human death, it loses an 
essential principle, specifically the form placing it in the human species.  This means, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520 'dicendum, quod etsi Christus non sit purus homo, est tamen verus homo, et mors eius fuit vera 
mors; unde quidquid est verum de homine in quantum est homo, et de morte hominis, totum est 
verum de Christo et de morte eius'.  Quod. III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 
247.  Aquinas and his contemporaries agreed that it is not correct to say that Christ was human or a 
man in the three days of his death: a human is body and soul united.  This premise was a rare point on 
which Aquinas and his contemporaries completely disagreed with Peter Lombard, who had held that 
the union of Christ’s body and soul was not necessary for the survival of His humanity across death 
and resurrection.  J. -L. Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb?', p. 530. 
521 See, on this last point in particular, Quod. III, q. 2, a. 2, response and ST III, q. 50, a. 5, response.   
522 Cited by Aquinas at Quod. IV, q. 5, response.  
523 'de Christo in triduo mortis... loqui possumus... quantum ad naturam humanam; et hoc dupliciter.  
Uno modo quantum ad totam naturam, quae humanitas dicitur: et sic Christus non fuit homo in 
triduo mortis, unde nec idem homo... aut quantum ad partem humanae naturae: et sic anima quidem 
fuit omnino eadem numero, eo quod non est transmutata secundum substantiam; corpus vero fuit 
idem numero secundum materiam, sed non secundum formam substantialem, quae est anima.  Unde 
non potest dici quod simpliciter fuerit idem numero, quia quaelibet differentia substantialis excludit 
idem simpliciter; animatum autem est differentia substantialis; et ideo mori est corrumpi, non alterari 
tantum.  Dicendum est ergo, quod fuit secundum quid idem, secundum quid non idem: secundum 
materiam enim idem, secundum formam vero non idem'.  Quod. II, q. 1, a. 1, response, Opera omnia 
iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, pp. 211-2 (my emphasis).   
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precisely, that Christ's dead body was only equivocally a human body, and His eye 
was only equivocally an eye, according to either position on the composition of human 
nature.  Indeed, Aquinas notes, to deny that Christ's body underwent true 
corruption, and lost an essential principle, would be heretical.  Here, Aquinas has in 
mind the heresy of Gaian, which was a version of Monophysitism that taught that a 
single nature resulted from the union of God and man in Christ, such that that 
nature including Christ's bodily nature was incorruptible.  Whatever one's position 
regarding the number of substantial forms entering into the nature of the body, it 
would in fact be heretical to say that Christ's body did not also lose an essential 
principle: it would be heretical, in other words, to say that Christ's dead body 
remained unequivocally human, that his dead eye remained unequivocally an eye, or 
that his corpse was formally exactly the same as His living body.524  
What made Christ's death a particularly complicated case was that doctrine 
dictated that, notwithstanding any necessary difference obtaining between Christ's 
living body and its material remains on account of its death, Christ's body as it lay in 
the tomb, was still absolutely (simpliciter) identical to, or the same in number as, His 
living body.  Theologians commonly held that the hypostatic union of Christ’s 
divinity to His humanity, once effected, could not be undone: if Christ's divinity did 
not remain united to His humanity after His death, then at least it remained united 
to the components of that nature, His body and His soul.525  This idea in itself 
implied absolute identity between Christ's body living and dead.  Furthermore, the 
absolute identity of Christ's body in the tomb with His living body was attested both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 'Dicendum quod aequivocum et univocum dicitur secundum definitivam rationem eamdem, vel 
non eamdem.  Ratio autem definitiva cuiuslibet speciei sumitur a forma specifica ipsius.  Forma autem 
specifica hominis est anima rationalis; unde remota anima rationali, non potest remanere homo 
univoce, sed aequivoce tantum... ita nec dicitur oculus nisi aequivoce; et hoc indifferenter, sive 
praesupponatur alia forma substantialis in corpore ante animam rationalem, ut quidam volunt; sive 
non, ut magis videtur consonum veritati.  Quodcumque enim essentialium principiorum subtrahatur, 
iam non remanebit eadem ratio speciei, unde nec nomen univoce dicetur.  Solo autem hoc modo 
anima recedente remaneret corpus humanum et partes eius secundum eamdem rationem speciei, si 
anima non uniretur corpori ut forma; set tunc sequeretur quod nec per unionem animae esset 
substantialis generatio, nec per separationem corruptio.  Quod quidem ponere in corpore Christi est 
haereticum.  Dicit enim Damascenus in III libro quod:... Incorruptible autem secundum insipientem Iulianum 
et Galanum corpus domini dicere secundum primum corruptionis significatum ante resurrectionem, impium'.  Quod. III, 
q. 2, a. 2, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 246.  (editor's italics; my emphasis).  Aquinas 
also criticises Gaianism at Quod. IV, q. 5, response, and ST III, q. 50, a. 5, response.  For further 
commentary on passage, including Aquinas's critique of Gaianism, see Solère, 'Was the eye in the 
tomb?', pp. 544-8.  
525 J. -L. Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb?', p. 530.  
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in the Creed,526 and in scripture.527  In fact, Aquinas would use the unbroken union of 
Christ's unchanging divinity to His material remains in order to provide the 
necessary metaphysical support for the continuing, unconditional numerical identity 
of His body living and dead.   
There is a crucial technical piece of vocabulary to be introduced at this stage.  
Scholastic theologians used the word supposit (suppositum) to refer to any 
independently existing, or better, non-assumed, individual nature.  In every instance of 
human nature other than Christ's, the suppositum is simply the individual human 
substance, body and soul.  In the case of Christ, however, the suppositum is the divine 
person of Christ, which assumed an individual human nature.528   
Aquinas argues, at Summa Theologica III, q. 50, a. 5, that Christ's dead body, 
although it lacked a soul, therefore lacked life, and thus was not essentially or 'totally' 
(totaliter or simpliciter) the same in the tomb, still it was absolutely (absolute) identical to 
His living body, due to its unbroken union to the person of Christ: it was sustained by 
the same individual subject, or suppositum.  'We say that something is absolutely the 
same', Aquinas writes, 'because it is the same in respect of its supposit'.  The dead 
body of any other human does not remain united to any permanent supposit, and so 
does not remain the same absolutely, but only relatively (secundum quid), that is to say, 
with respect to its matter (secundum materiam), but not its form (secundum formam).529  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 'divinitas non fuit separata nec ab anima nec a corpore: quod patet ex symbolo fidei, in quo de filio 
Dei dicitur, quod sepultus est et descendit ad inferos'.  Quod. II, q. 1, a.1, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis 
XIII, 25, 2, p. 211 (editor's italics).   
527 Aquinas cites Matthew XII.40: 'Dicitur enim Matth. XII, 40: sicut fuit Ionas in ventre ceti tribus diebus et 
tribus noctibus, ita et Filius hominis in corde terrae, set non fuit alius Filius hominis in corde terrae nisi Filius 
hominis qui loquebatur super terram'.  Quod. II, q. 1, a.1, arg 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 
211 (editor's italics).  
528 See R. Cross, 'Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation', The 
Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 60 (1996), pp. 171-202, esp. p. 177.  
529 'Dicendum quod hoc quod dico simpliciter, potest dupliciter accipi.  Uno modo, quod simpliciter 
idem est quod absolute... Et hoc modo corpus Christi mortuum et vivum simpliciter fuit idem numero.  
Dicitur enim aliquid esse idem numero simpliciter, quia est supposito idem.  Corpus autem Christi 
vivum et mortuum fuit supposito idem, quia non habuit aliam hypostasim vivum et mortuum, praeter 
hypostasim Dei verbi... Alio modo, simpliciter idem est quod omnino vel totaliter.  Et sic corpus 
Christi motruum et vivum non fuit simpliciter idem numero.  Quia non fuit totaliter idem, cum vita sit 
aliquid de essentia corporis viventis, est enim predicatum essentiale... unde consequens est quod 
corpus quod desinit esse vivum non totaliter idem remanet', 'dicendum quod corpus mortuum 
cuiuscumque alterius hominis non remanet unitum alicui hypostasi permanenti, sicut corpus mortuum 
Christi.  Et ideo corpus mortuum cuiuscumque alterius hominis non est idem simpliciter, sed 
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Aquinas thus decouples the question of Christ's dead body's substantial nature, on the one 
hand, from the question of its numerical identity, on the other.530  The former question 
does not consider the suppositum or person of Christ at all, and has to do with the 
components of His human nature just insofar as they are components of that human 
nature, a nature that undergoes a true human death.531  And the absolute identity of 
Christ’s dead body with His living body, founded upon its unbreakable union to the 
very same suppositum, trumps completely the natural substantial difference in that body 
resulting from its true death: the body of Christ as it hung living on the cross and lay 
dead in the tomb, Aquinas therefore writes, was unconditionally the same in 
number.532   
Not totally, and yet absolutely the same: that, in sum, was Aquinas's necessarily 
complicated solution to a particularly involved theological balancing act that 
demanded that he maintain both that Christ's dead body was transformed in death, 
and yet that remained unconditionally His body.  
Conclusions  
Aquinas thought that the resurrection of an individual human body would 
involve, quite literally, the location and reintegration of the material particular to it 
by God, so he worked hard to produce a theory of bodily identity which both 
faithfully followed Aristotle's, on the one hand, and preserved the idea that the 
individual body's material continuity was crucial to its continuing self-identity, on the 
other.  He reached the conclusion that, during body's mortal lifetime, an unbroken 
material continuum, albeit one that underwent gradual augmentation, diminution, 
wastage and replacement, was necessary in order to guarantee that that body 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
secundum quid, quia est idem secunum materiam, non autem idem secundum formam'.  ST III, q. 50, 
a. 5, response and ad 1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 11, p. 484. 
530 Solère, 'Was the eye in the tomb?', p. 547. 
531 'Sic igitur corpus Christi post mortem est simpliciter idem secundum substanciam que est ypostasis, 
non autem secundum substanciam quae est essencia vel natura.  Univocatio autem et aequivocatio 
non respicit suppositum, sed essenciam vel naturam, quam significat diffinitio'.  Quod. III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 
1, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 247.  
532 'oportet nos ponere ydemptitatem secundum suppositum in corpore Christi appenso cruci et posito 
in sepulcro... oportet nos ponere veram differentiam mortis et vitae.  Sed quia prima unitas maior est 
quam secunda differentia, dicendum est, quod est idem numero corpus Christi appensum cruci et 
iacens in sepulcro'.  Quod. IV, q. 5, response, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 25, 2, p. 327.  
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remained the same thing.  The accidental form in the body responsible for its relative 
independence from the soul, that gave it its organic structure, and which 
individualised its matter, namely dimensive quantity, was the same form that 
supported the continuing identity of the body's matter.  
Aquinas clearly thought that an individual body's matter remained the same 
thing in a real and concrete sense after its soul departed at death, and that that 
individual matter, the material aspect of the 'truth of human nature' in that 
individual, retained its identity whatever the sequences of substantial changes for 
which it might serve as the substratum over the period separating that body's death 
from its resurrection.   
He is so consistently masterful in reconciling philosophical authorities, both with 
the requirements of the faith, and with one another, that it comes as a surprise when 
the philosophical conclusions that Aquinas presents appear to be anything less than 
perfectly internally coherent and thoroughly worked-out in advance.  Yet this is 
precisely the state of affairs that the interpreter of his work on postmortem bodily 
continuity, and in particular in his work on the continuity of the matter particular to 
individual bodies across death and resurrection, faces.  Here Aquinas was required to 
innovate in an area in which the best available scientific theory by common 
consensus, Aristotle's, had almost nothing to offer.  He was pushed to his intellectual 
limits: there are significant unresolved tensions in Aquinas's account of postmortem 
material continuity, as he struggles to put in clear terms what he evidently wants to 
say.  
Aquinas had already wrought a complete overhaul in the contemporary 
understanding of the basic composition of human nature, in order to bring it into 
much closer alignment with the implications of the doctrine of bodily resurrection.  
The theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, he argued, was the only 
available theory of the composition of human nature that could guarantee that each 
soul would be reunited with the matter particular to it own body at the resurrection, 
and was the only theory that could guarantee the continuity of the body's substantial 
form across death and resurrection: that form just was the immortal soul.   
On reflection, perhaps it is not such a great surprise that the details of the new 
theory of postmortem bodily continuity that was tied to Aquinas's innovative theory 
	   	   	  194 
of human nature were left less than exhaustively explored, and that not every 
potential future objection was already accounted for.  In the event, Aquinas's late 
thirteenth-century Franciscan critics would find a way to argue that the theory of the 
unicity of substantial form in humans could provide no concrete account whatsoever of 
postmortem bodily continuity.  The next chapter will explore three Dominicans' very 
different responses to this challenge.  
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Supporting data. 
CHAPTER 5 
POSTMORTEM BODILY CONTINUITY IN 
DOMINICAN THOUGHT (1277-1286): THOMAS OF 
SUTTON, ROBERT OF ORFORD, AND RICHARD 
KNAPWELL 
Introduction 
'It should be considered that, in order that the identity of the human 
body be preserved at various points in time, each party of opinion 
imputes error to the other with respect to the faith.  For just as those 
who posit many forms put it to the contrary party of opinion that their 
position cannot safeguard the fact that the body of Christ living and 
dead was the same in number, so, on the contrary, those who posit a 
single form in a human put it to their adversaries that their position 
cannot safeguard the fact that, after the general resurrection, the 
bodies of those who rise should be the same in number as they were 
before death'.533 
The above summary of the thirteenth century's defining debate on the 
composition of human nature is taken from the Dominican Thomas of Sutton's De 
pluralitate formarum, written in Oxford in 1278.  On the one side were the (mostly 
Dominican) advocates of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 'Considerandum est quod, ut salvetur identitas corporis humani in diversis temporibus, utraque 
pars opinantium imponit alteri errorem in fide.  Sicut enim ponentes plures formas imponunt Christi 
vivum et mortuum opinioni contrariae, quod non potest salvari quod corpus fuerit idem numero, ita e 
converso ponentes unam formam in homine imponunt adversae parti quod non potest salvari quod 
post resurrectionem generalem corpora resurgentium sint eadem numero quae prius fuerunt ante 
mortem'.  Thomas of Sutton, De pluralitate formarum (hereafter DPF), part 8, ad 9 (ll. 1-25) in Thomas 
Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), vol. 7: Aliorum 
Medii Aevi Auctorum Scripta, p. 576. 
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humans.  On the other side were the (mostly Franciscan) advocates of an alternative 
kind of theory that posited a plurality of substantial forms in a human being, 
including, crucially, a corporeal substantial form distinct from the rational soul.  The 
topic of bodily identity, and particularly of postmortem bodily continuity, was central 
to the debate, and the primary weapon wielded by each side was the accusation that 
the other side's position led to false theological consequences.  Pluralists initiated the 
debate, arguing that Aquinas's theory of human nature could provide no account of 
the identity of Christ's dead body, or indeed the relics of saints, because it could not 
provide for the continuity of any bodily substantial form across the separation of the 
soul.  Defenders of Aquinas's philosophy argued that pluralist theory ran into deep 
difficulties when it came to giving an account of the identity of individual bodies at 
the general resurrection.  There were accusations of heresy from both sides, and, on 
30 April 1286, in the presence of a special council of bishops convened at the church 
of St. Mary of the Bow in London, the Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury John 
Peckham condemned the theory that the rational soul is the only substantial form in 
a human being, along with several of its heretical consequences, as he saw them at 
least, in the area of postmortem bodily continuity.534  Peckham himself advocated a 
pluralist theory of human nature, and had opposed several of Aquinas's philosophical 
positions when Aquinas's opposite number as Franciscan regent master at Paris 
during (1269-71).535  
The above, not surprisingly, is a rather simplified summary of what would 
become a deeply complex dispute: the surviving record of theological writings from 
the period covered by this chapter, when read closely, tells us that the scholastic 
debate over whether there was one substantial form in a human being or more than 
one was far from being a simple clash of two already statically defined visions of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 For the condemned articles see Registrum epistolarum fratris Johannis Peckham archiepiscopi cantuariensis 
(hereafter Registrum), 3 vols. (ed.) C. T. Martin (London: Longman, 1882-5), vol. 3, pp. 922-3; the final 
article reads, 'Octavus est, quod in homine est tantum una forma, scilicet anima rationalis, et nulla alia 
forma substantialis; ex qua opinione sequi videtur omnes haereses supradictae'.  
535 On Peckham's life and career, see Boureau, Théologie, science et censure and D. L. Douie, Archbishop 
Peckham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).  For a summary account of his Quodlibeta and comments on 
his opposition to Aquinas's philosophy during his regency at Paris, see G. J. Etzkorn, 'Franciscan 
Quodlibeta 1270-1285 John Peckham, Matthew of Aquasparta and Roger Marston' in Schabel (ed.), 
Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages.  The Thirteenth Century, pp. 135-41. 
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composition of human nature advocated by two opposed camps of theologians, 
focussing on a mere two theological topics.   
However, the main goal of the present chapter's discussion is not to retread 
ground already carefully covered by the most recent study of this seminal scholastic 
debate, namely Alain Boureau's Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle: le cas de Jean 
Peckham (1999),536 even if the more detailed outline of the debate to be presented in 
the remainder of this introduction is indebted to Boureau's research.  Boureau's 
magisterial book traces the major intellectual developments in the dispute over the 
consequences of Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a 
human being up to 1286, and analyses the form of and grounds for the 
condemnation, and the career and character of John Peckham.  It should remain the 
first point of reference for any reader particularly interested in the contribution of the 
highly original secular master Henry of Ghent, the evolution of whose thought on the 
composition of human nature during 1276-86 culminated in the development of a 
'dimorphic' theory that posited a single substantial form in every other kind of 
material being, but two substantial forms in a human.537  And any researcher 
interested in the way in which the involved issue of transubstantiation figured in the 
debate, into the orbit of which were drawn several theological topics which 
demanded an account of bodily continuity, including original sin and the 
incarnation, should also begin with Boureau.538  
This final chapter necessarily has a rather more modest aim.  It will supply a 
detailed discussion on a topic for which Boureau does not make much room at all: 
the early reception of Aquinas's work on the composition of human nature, the 
individual body, and bodily identity in Dominican thought, specifically, during 1277-
86.  More precisely, it will closely examine the different ways in which three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536 Other discussions of the debate are: Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des 
Formes; D. A. Callus, 'The Problem of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell, O. P.', in Mélanges 
offerts a Étienne Gilson (Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), pp. 125-60; D. A. Callus, The Condemnation of St Thomas at 
Oxford: a paper read to the Aquinas Society of London on April 24th 1246 (Oxford: Blackfriars, 1946); Richard 
Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction, pp. 9-44; E. Gilson, 
History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 416-20.  
537 Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, esp. pp. 118-27, 302-9.  Cf. also J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical 
Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1981), pp. 329-35.   
538 Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 127-34. 
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Dominicans at Oxford, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, 
defended and interpreted Aquinas's work in these areas in their respective responses 
to pluralist criticism.  As far as the theological issues involved in the debate are 
concerned, there is space to cover only two in any depth, namely the two issues in the 
area of postmortem bodily continuity identified as crucial by Thomas of Sutton, 
which remained central to the debate: the identity of Christ's corpse, and bodily 
identity at the general resurrection.  
Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, as will become 
clear, developed wildly divergent accounts of the individual human body and of 
postmortem bodily continuity, notwithstanding the fact that they worked at close 
quarters to defend Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans 
against the same pluralist criticisms.  Significant differences between their respective 
accounts of the composition of human nature emerge as soon as one descends from 
the level of their mere acceptance of the theory that the soul is the only substantial 
form giving existence to the human being, to the level of their underlying 
justifications and reasoning. 
After engaging with the detail, the chapter will conclude by taking a step back 
and reflecting on the nature of the so-called 'early Thomistic school'.  As indicated, 
Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell have been grouped 
together under this banner by Frederick Roensch and Francis Kelley,539 who have 
both worked closely on the reception of the theory of the unicity of substantial form 
in humans in these Dominicans' writings.  The works of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of 
Orford and Richard Knapwell from 1277-86, it is true, can provide only a snapshot 
of the early writings produced by members of the Dominican Order in defence of 
Aquinas's new theory of the composition of human nature.  Even so, it is certainly 
justifiable to ask how, exactly, historians can speak meaningfully of the beginnings of a 
Thomistic school with Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, 
given that their works display no formally common understanding of what one of 
Aquinas's central theses entailed.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539 See above, p. 31 and n. 40. 
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With the exception of Richard Knapwell's Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, to be 
discussed at the end of the chapter, the texts of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford 
and Richard Knapwell to be examined here do not fall into any ordinary genre of 
scholastic writing.  They are polemical works rather than Sentences commentaries, 
philosophical commentaries, Quaestiones disputatae or Quodlibeta.  In fact, very little else 
survives of the theological writings of any of these authors from the period covered by 
this chapter.540  So, of course, both the relevant ideas in Aquinas's own works, and the 
layer of pluralist criticism that had been added to those ideas, to which Thomas of 
Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell were immediately responding, 
furnished the intellectual context from which their own arguments and 
interpretations emerged.  That intellectual context will be sketched out in this 
extended introduction, but first, why were the chronological limits of the present 
chapter's discussion set at 1277-86?  
If the condemnation of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans on 
30 April 1286 provides a natural chronological terminus ad quem, then it was the 
condemnation and censure of certain positions in philosophy and theology in Paris 
and Oxford in March 1277 that gave to the deep controversy that would surround 
Aquinas's theory of human nature and its theological implications its critical impetus.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 For lists of the surviving works of these authors in manuscript or printed edition, along with 
documented works that are not known to survive, see R. Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great 
Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 487, 567-8, 682-4.  There is one 
manuscript containing Quaestiones on the Sentences ascribed to 'Thomas Anglicus', which might have 
been Thomas of Sutton's work, and might have originated from 1277-86.  Thomas of Sutton's major 
surviving theological writings, his Quodlibeta and Quaestiones Ordinariae, along with his critique of Books 
I-III of Robert Cowton's Sentences commentary and of Book IV of Scotus's, were written after 1286.  
Robert of Orford's Sentences commentary does not survive.  His Quodlibeta, an extended attack on 
Henry of Ghent, and his critique of Giles of Rome date from 1289-93 and 1288-91 respectively; cf. A. 
P. Vella, Robert of Orford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford in the late Thirteenth Century 
(unpublished B. Litt. dissertation, Oxford Univ., 1946), MS. Bodleian B./M. Litt. c. 30), pp. 18-20, 
and Robert d'Orford, Reprobationes dictorum a fratre egidio in primum sententiarum (ed.) A. P. Vella, Les premières 
polémiques thomistes (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1968).  In addition to the works of Richard 
Knapwell to discussed in this chapter, we have his 'notes' (Notabilia) on the first book of the Sentences 
from 1273-7 which have been used to trace the early development of his thought on the unicity of 
substantial form (see M.-D., Chenu, 'La première diffusion de Thomisme à Oxford.  Klapwell et ses 
"notes" sur les Sentences', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 3 (1928), pp. 185-200), 
another Quaestio disputata, and a single Quodlibet (dating from 1284-5) comprising 29 questions, 
including a short discussion of individuation.  On this Quodlibet, see comments in Friedman, 
'Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, CA. 1260-1330', pp. 418-9, and Pickavé, 'The Controversy over 
the Principle of Individuation in Quodlibeta (1277-CA. 1320)', both in Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta 
in the Middle Ages.  The Fourteenth Century, pp. 59-60, 418-9.  
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The Franciscan William de la Mare wrote his famous Correctorium fratris Thomae,541 
containing the key pluralist critique of the theory and its consequences for 
postmortem bodily continuity, with reference to these condemnations.  And it was 
only after March 1277, in response to these condemnations and to de la Mare's text, 
that Dominicans began to write extended tracts for the purpose of defending 
Aquinas's philosophy of human nature, reporting of theologians dividing themselves 
into two opposed groups, each openly accusing the other of heresy.  
This is not to say that the Correctorium fratris Thomae began the scholastic debate 
surrounding the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its 
consequences full-stop; it is simply to say that the evidence we have from before 
March 1277 suggests that the debate was previously largely confined to the 
schoolroom.  It will be recalled from the previous chapter that Aquinas himself, 
although he had maintained his position on the identity of Christ's dead body openly 
and without censure until his death in 1274,542 had been pushed to clarify it in 
quodlibetal disputes.543   
Aquinas's own explanations, then, did not dispel the evident uncertainty among 
his contemporaries at the Parisian Theology faculty regarding the implications of his 
new theory of human nature.  In the mid-1270s (Van Steenberghen defends the 
dating 1273-76),544 the Dominican scholar Giles of Lessines wrote from Paris to 
Albertus Magnus, asking for his pronouncement on several positions that that were 
being put forward by certain masters of high repute and 'attacked in several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 The first redaction of the Correctorium fratris Thomae (hereafter CFT), to which all of the Dominican 
writings discussed in this chapter were responding, is edited along with Richard Knapwell's response, 
Quare, in Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare", (ed.) P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes, 1 (Kain: Le 
Saulchoir, 1927).  The second redaction of the Correctorium (1282-85) dropped 9 articles to do with 
Aquinas's Sentences commentary, and added a further 25.  A recent discussion of the second redaction is 
A. Olivia, ‘La deuxième rédaction du Correctorium de Guillaume de la Mare: les questions 
concernant la I Pars’, Archivum Franciscum Historicum (2005), pp. 423-64.  de la Mare probably followed 
Peckham as Franciscan regent master in Theology at Paris from 1271-2.  His Sentences commentary 
borrowed extensively from Peckham's, whilst showing a far more respectful attitude to Aquinas's work 
than the Correctorium fratris Thomae.  On his career and writings, see H. Kraml, 'William de la Mare' in 
P. W. Rosemann (ed.), Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 
pp. 228-38.   
542 Cf. discussion of the old debate on this point in Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 71. 
543 See chapter 4, section 3.2.  
544  F. Van Steenberghen, Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale (Louvain: Publications 
Universitaires, 1974), pp. 454-6. 
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assemblies', including the position that Christ's body dead in the tomb was not 
absolutely the same as His body when it was suspended from the cross, but only in a 
certain sense (secundum quid).  The wording of this position reflected the quodlibetal 
question that Aquinas had debated at Lent 1271.  Albertus Magnus replied that it 
was temerarious for any philosopher to speak of the nature of Christ's dead body; no 
philosopher should say too much on this topic, because it did not fall under human 
reason.545   
The new generation of theologians at Paris, their interest in the topic ignited by 
Aquinas's innovatory work on the composition of human nature, displayed no such 
qualms.  As Boureau points out, it was Henry of Ghent, in his Quodlibet I, q. 4 (1276), 
who made the first recorded link between Aquinas's theory that the soul is the only 
substantial form in a human being and the controversial idea that a new substantial 
form might have been introduced into Christ's dead body.  This supposed 
consequence of Aquinas's theory of human nature would subsequently become 
crucial to de la Mare's critique of the theory.  Henry of Ghent explained that the 
introduction of a new 'form of corruption' (forma putredinis) into Christ's corpse would 
have contradicted Psalm 15.10,546 and entailed that Christ's dead body underwent an 
extreme and therefore profoundly unfitting kind of dissolution.547  
Turning to the censures of March 1277, as is well established, it was in Oxford, 
and not in Paris, that the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans was 
publicly condemned, or rather was widely perceived to have been publicly condemned.  
Robert Wielockx's careful unpicking of the events of that turbulent month in 
university life, however, has demonstrated that the theory came close to being 
condemned in Paris, too.  The 219 erroneous positions apparently being taught at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545 'Articulos quod proponunt magistri in scolis Parisius, qui in philosophia maiores reputantur... eos 
tamen in multis congregationibus impugnatos...', 'Quod autem XIV° ponitur, scilicet quod corpus 
Christi iacens in sepulcro et suspensum in cruce non sit idem numero simpliciter, sed secundum quid... 
Sed de corpore Christi loqui per philosophiam temerarium est, eo quod rationi humanae non 
subicitur... De hoc tamen non multum loqui est philosopho'.  Albertus Magnus, De quindecim 
problematibus (ed.) P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et L'Averroïsme Latin au XIIIme siècle, vol. 2, Les Philosophes 
Belges, VII (Louvain: L’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'université, 1908), pp. 29, 51.  
546 See above, p. 189. 
547 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I (ed.) R. Macken (Leiden: Brill, 1979), I, q. 4 (Utrum corpus Christi in 
sepulcro, separata anima ab eo, habuit aliquam formam substantialem superinductam), esp. solutio, pp.14-7; cf. 
Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 83-5, 118-20.   
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the Parisian Arts faculty that were condemned by bishop of Paris Stephen Tempier 
with the cooperation of a commission of theologians on 7 March 1277548 touched 
upon Aquinas's position that individuation is by matter549 but did not include the 
theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans. 550   Nonetheless, in the 
Correctorium fratris Thomae, William de la Mare claims that masters at Paris condemned 
both positions.551  In the case of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in 
humans, Wielockx argues, de la Mare is very probably referring to an incident for 
which two further witnesses survive: the first redaction of Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet 
X, q. 5 (1286) and John Peckham's Archiepiscopal register from Canterbury.   
The same commission of theologians, then, was reconvened by Tempier twice 
more during March 1277: first to censure the Augustinian friar Giles of Rome's 
Sentences commentary (including the position that 'in any composite there is only one 
form'),552 and afterwards to consider a further set of theological propositions, among 
which was the position that the rational soul is the only substantial form in a human 
being.  According to Henry of Ghent's memory of these events, the Franciscan papal 
legate in Paris Simon de Brion, present in these discussions, condemned this position 
'although not publicly' (licet non publice) and all but two of the Theology masters 
(presumably the two Dominicans) voted to censure the theory.  This time, however, 
Tempier delayed pronouncing a condemnation in order to seek approval from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 The latest major edition with commentary on these condemnations is D. Piché with C. Lafleur, La 
Condamnation Parisienne de 1277 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999), replacing R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles 
condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1977).   
549 The censors had the nature of angels in view.  'Quod, quia intelligentie non habent materiam, deus 
non posset plures eiusdem speciei facere', a. 81 (43), 'Quod deus non potest multiplicare indiuidua sub 
una specie sine materia', a. 96 (42), Piché with Lafleur, La Condamnation Parisienne, pp. 104, 108; cf. 
Hissette, Enquête, pp. 82-7. 
550 The notion that the intellect was not in any way the act or essential perfection of the body was 
condemned, with the theory of the unique intellect for all humans in view.  'Quod intellectus non est 
actus corporis, nisi sicut nauta nauis, nec est perfectio essentialis hominis', Piché with Lafleur, La 
Condamnation Parisienne, a. 7 (123), p. 82; cf. Hissette, Enquête, pp. 199-201 and Boureau, Théologie, science 
et censure au XIIIe siècle, pp. 72-3. 
551 'Haec positio de unitate formae substantialis reprobatur a magistris...', 'Supponendo autem quod in 
homine et in coeteris animatis non est alia forma prater animam sicut opinatur, tenet consequentia; 
sed suppositio falsa est, et a magistris Parisius condemnata', de la Mare, CFT, a. 31 and a. 32 (ed.) 
Glorieux, pp. 129, 145 (and see a. 11, p. 60 for de la Mare's reference to the condemnation of 
individuation by matter in connection with the problem of the nature of angels).  
552 'In quolibet composito est una forma', Giles of Rome, Apologia (ed.) R. Wielockx, Aegidii Romani 
Opera Omnia III.1 (Firenze: Olschki, 1985), a. 48, p. 59. 
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Curia.  The process was halted during the period of papal interregnum during May-
November 1277, at which time Peckham was lector there.553   
On 18 March 1277 in Oxford, however, the Dominican Archbishop Robert 
Kilwardby, with the cooperation of an assembly of regent and non-regent masters, 
went ahead with placing a prohibition on the teaching and assertion of certain 
positions in natural philosophy.  Some of these were obviously related to the theory 
of the unicity of substantial form in humans and Aquinas's position on substantial 
change, including the notion that a body living and dead is the same thing only 
equivocally, or in a relative sense (secundum quid).554  Kilwardby's half of a subsequent 
correspondence with the Dominican Archbishop of Corinth Peter of Conflans (then 
resident at the Curia), justifying why he had targeted certain of the articles, leaves no 
doubt either as to the fact that the prohibition was being perceived as a direct attack 
on the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, or as to Kilwardby's view 
that the theory was dangerous to the faith.  It is not clear from the text of the 
prohibition whether Kilwardby had the case of Christ's dead body, in particular, in 
his sights on 18 March.  Nor did his apologia include any direct comment on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X (ed.) R. Macken (Leiden: Brill, 1981), critical apparatus at p. 127, 
passage beginning 'Loquendo autem de damnatione per sententiam magistrorum...' and critical 
apparatus at p. 128, passage beginning, 'Iam... 10 annis, cum quidam notati fuerunt Parisius quasi 
posuissent quod in homine non esset forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis'; Peckham, Registrum (ed.) 
Martin, vol. 3, p. 866, passage beginning, 'Causam vero opinionum bonae memoriae fratris Thomae 
de Aquino'; Giles of Rome, Apologia (ed.) Wielockx, editor's introduction, pp. 81-8, 213-9; R. Wielockx, 
'A Separate Process against Aquinas.  A Response to John F. Wippel' in J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma, 
magistra mundi: itineraria culturae medievalis: mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l'occasion de son 75e anniversaire 
(Louvain-la-Neuve : F.I.D.E.M., Collège Mercier, 1998), pp. 1009-30; R. Wielockx, 'Procedures 
contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d'Aquin' Revues de sciences philosophiques et theologiques 83 (1999), pp. 
293-313.  These last two articles respond to the respective arguments of Wippel and J. M. M. H. 
Thijssen, who find the evidence for a separate procedure against Aquinas's theses, beyond the Giles of 
Rome procedure, uncompelling.  Cf. J. F. Wippel, 'Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: A 
Separate Process Against Aquinas?', Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 44 (1997), pp. 117-
36; J. M. M. H. Thijssen, '1277 Revisited: A new Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of 
Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome', Vivarium, 35 (1997), pp. 72-101.    
554 'Item quod corpus vivum et mortuum est equivoce corpus, et corpus mortuum secundum quod 
corpus mortuum sit corpus secundum quid', a. 13 (In Naturalibus).  Also condemned In Naturalibus were 
the ideas that (a. 2) a form corrupts into nothing absolutely, and the related idea (a. 3) that there are 
no 'active potencies' in matter; that (a. 7) that when the intellective soul arrives at the human embryo 
the vegetative and sensitive souls corrupt; that (a. 12) the vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls are 
a simple form; and that (a. 16) the intellective soul is united to prime matter in such a way that that 
which precedes it corrupts to the level of prime matter (usque ad materiam primam).  This last position is 
an inference incorrectly drawn from Aquinas's theory of substantial change: Aquinas did not hold that 
corruption to the level of prime matter ever naturally occurred.  (See above, p. 177 and n. 494).  For 
the full list of articles In Grammaticalibus, In Logicalibus and In Naturalibus, see Chartularium Universitatis 
Parisiensis (eds.) Denifle and Chatelain vol. 1, n. 474, p. 558-9. 
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prohibited position on postmortem bodily continuity just mentioned, or on the 
composition of Christ's corpse.555   
Now, the ideas from Aquinas's own writings that would become most relevant to 
the debate were covered in some detail in chapters 3 and 4.  Those chapters set out 
how Aquinas's thought on the individual body, bodily identity, and postmortem 
bodily continuity was shaped by certain presuppositions about the composition of 
human nature related, in particular, to the doctrine of the general resurrection.  
We will begin to set out the intellectual backdrop for the Dominican writings to 
be discussed in this chapter by revisiting Aquinas's work on the general resurrection, 
and by isolating the origins, in particular, of the counter-attack that Thomas of 
Sutton reports to have been launched by defenders of Aquinas's theory of human 
nature, against its pluralist critics.  For Aquinas, as was explained, the notion of 
resurrection implied an essential and most intimate union between the soul and matter 
in the human individual, so that it would make sense to say that a soul could be 
reunited only to the matter that had formerly belonged to its own body at the 
resurrection: in Aquinas's view, each soul bore a unique relationship, or commensuratio 
to its own matter.  And so, he reasoned, the doctrine of resurrection demanded that 
the soul be the only substantial form in a human being, because any intervening 
corporeal substantial form would render the union between a particular soul and 
particular matter merely incidental.  More to the immediate point, Aquinas asked 
how, if there were some additional, corruptible substantial form in an individual human 
body, that form, and therefore that body could return identical at the resurrection.  
Here, it will be remembered, he had in mind the Aristotlelian axiom on continuity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 Kilwardby's apologia is edited in two parts.  The first justifies the prohibition of certain of the 
articles, beginning by explaining that they were not condemned as heresies, but their reading, teaching 
and dogmatic assertion was prohibited because some were clearly false, some deviated from 
philosophical truth, some were close to intolerable errors, and some were unacceptable according to 
the faith.  F. Ehrle, 'Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des 13. 
Jahrhunderts', Archiv für Literatur-und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, 5 (Freiburg: Herder, 1889), pp. 614-
32.  The second part deals directly with the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans 
("positio de unitate formae"), which Kilwardby explains was not on the list of prohibited articles, but is 
still a foolish opinion ('fatuus positio') and against the faith ('contra fidem'), and if followed 
pertinaciously, should be reproved as erroneous ('temeritas illa... si comitaretur pertinacia, esset 
tamquam erronea reprobanda').  A. Birkenmajer, Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der 
mittelalterlichen Philosophie, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 20 (Münster: Verlag der 
Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1922), pp. 60-4. 
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and identity from De generatione et corruptione: a substance, once corrupted, could never 
return as exactly the same individual.556   
The topic of the general resurrection was not raised by de la Mare in his 
Correctorium fratris Thomae,557 even though the Parisian censure of 7 March 1277 had 
drawn attention to this Aristotelian axiom and its implications for an account of 
bodily resurrection: among the 219 condemned articles was the position that 'a 
corrupted body cannot return, or rise again, the same in number'.558   
The very earliest surviving Dominican contribution to the debate surrounding 
the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological 
implications post 1277, Giles of Lessines' De unitate formae (written in Paris, during July 
1278),559 highlights, as the particularly unfitting consequence of pluralist theory, that 
it would appear to be incompatible with the doctrine of the general resurrection.  De 
unitate formae, whilst it responds to arguments contained within de la Mare's 
Correctorium, is also in part a direct response to Robert Kilwardby's apologia in reply to 
Peter of Conflans.  Kilwardby had briefly discussed the general resurrection when 
justifying why he had prohibited the teaching of the ideas that 'a form corrupts into 
nothing, absolutely', and that the 'vegetative, sensitive, and intellective souls are one 
substance'.  He had explained that it is necessary to posit rationes seminales in matter, or 
certain principles from which corruptible substantial forms are drawn out of matter, 
and into which they corrupt, in order to support the continuity of corruptible bodily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556 See above, pp. 17-18, and n. 21; chapter 3, section 1 and subsections; and chapter 4, section 2.2.  
557 de la Mare does briefly discuss the scriptural account of Christ's resurrection at John 2.19, but only 
to make an point about His body's immediate postmortem bodily continuity.  See passage beginning 
'Item, tertio, quia repugnat Sacrae Scripturae. Ioann.2: Solvite templum hoc'.  de la Mare, CFT, a. 31 
(ed.) Glorieux, p. 131.  
558 'Quod non contingit corpus corruptum redire idem numero, nec idem numero resurget', Piché with 
C. Lafleur, La Condamnation Parisienne de 1277, a. 17 (215), p. 84; cf. Hissette, Enquête, p. 308 and 
Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 91.  
559 De unitate formae (hereafter DUF) is edited: Giles of Lessines, De unitate formae (ed.) M. de Wulf, Les 
Philosophes de Moyen Âge, 1 (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1902).  See 
editor's introduction, pp. 79-81 on the dating of De unitate formae, and pp. 57-89 on Giles of Lessines' 
career and other works.  Roensch, Early Thomistic School, pp. 89-90 also gives a biographical summary 
for Giles of Lessines.  
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forms across death and resurrection.560  The Franciscan Bonaventure, of course, had 
also made use of rationes seminales in matter in this way in his own work on bodily 
continuity across death and resurrection.561   
If Giles of Lessines means to criticise Kilwardby's account of the general 
resurrection in De unitate formae, then he does so only implicitly.  He argues simply 
that the additional substantial form that the pluralists posit human body would 
corrupt into nothing after bodily decay (in nihilum): the resurrected body would have 
to be 'reconstructed' with a different corporeal form would not, therefore, be the 
same in number as the mortal body.  He points out that only the theory of the unicity 
of substantial form in humans, according to which the immortal soul is the individual 
body's only substantial form, can guarantee that body's formal identity at the 
resurrection.562  Thomas of Sutton puts forward a criticism of pluralist theory that is 
broadly similar in his De pluralitate formarum, as we will see.  
The power of this elegant criticism of the pluralist position is attested by the fact 
that it riled pluralist opponents of Aquinas's philosophy.  The Franciscan Roger 
Marston, a former pupil of Peckham when at Paris, debated his Quodlibet IV as regent 
master at Oxford in Lent 1284. 563   He points out (q.9) that 'certain people' 
temerariously argue that corruptible bodily forms cannot be drawn out of, or 'educed 
from' the same from matter at the resurrection even by divine power (specifically 
citing Christ's resurrection), and therefore fall into error: he himself advocates the 
position that there are rationes seminales in matter, to support the continuity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 See passage beginning 'Item, sicut in corruptione simplicium perit forma', and passage beginning 
'Deinde vero, cum corrumpuntur ea, quorum sunt actus', in Ehrle 'Der Augustinismus und der 
Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts', pp. 615, 627.  
561 See above, p. 167-8 and n. 459. 
562 Passage beginning 'Inde si corpus mortuum incineratur, constat quod non manet eadem forma 
corporis', and ending 'et identitas numero praecipue salvatur in resurrectione, tam ex parte formae 
corporis, quae in vivente est anima, quam ex parte animae, quae eadem numero manet non corrupta', 
Giles of Lessines, DUF, pt. 3, ch. 3, III (ed.) de Wulf, p. 66.   
563 Marston's Quodlibeta date from 1282-4.  For an overview of their content, see Etzkorn, 'Franciscan 
Quodlibeta 1270-1285' pp. 143-9.  On Marston's life and works, see Roger Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor 
(eds.) G. F. Etzkorn and I. C. Brady (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1994), editors' 
introduction, pp. 6-47.  
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individual corruptible bodily forms across death and resurrection.564  Furthermore, 
Marston argues (q.27) that God could reconstruct any individual body the same as it 
was in mortal life, even if none of the material particular to it remained.565  John 
Peckham himself, in a letter to the Chancellor and Masters of Oxford dated 7 
December 1284, recalls his utter outrage at hearing that certain defenders of the 
'erroneous' theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human had 'tumbled 
into a pit of such subversion' as to have made the particular argument, verbally and 
in writing, that 'if a human had any substantial form besides the rational soul, the 
corrupted human body could not be repaired the same in number, even 
miraculously'.566   
On what grounds, conversely, did pluralists initially attack Aquinas's theory of the 
unicity of substantial form in humans and its consequences?  Returning again to 
Aquinas's work on the individual body, it will be recalled that, in addition to an 
intimate union of soul and body in human nature, Aquinas took it that the 
resurrection implied the relative independence of the body from the soul as a 
component of the human being: the body in its own right was an essential part of 
human nature, and each human individual would be incomplete without his or her 
own material part.  As Thomas of Sutton suggests in his summary of the debate, and 
as will be evident, too, from what has already been set out regarding the debate 
surrounding Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans up to 
1277, the pluralist critique of the theory would focus on Aquinas's account of the 
body's independence from the soul, and particularly on his account of the body's 
postmortem independence from the soul.  
Aquinas himself, of course, had suggested that the material part in any human 
being was a complex and highly differentiated material subject, suitable for a rational 
soul: the soul's 'proper matter'.  He thought that material part in a human individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564 Marston, Quodlibet IV, q. 9 (Utrum vegetativa et sensitiva in Christo sint eductae de materia) (eds.) Etzkorn 
and Brady, p. 385.  
565 Marston, Quodlibet IV, q. 27 (Utrum per generativam vel nutritivam aliquid transeat de alimento in id quod 
resurget), ad 1 (eds.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 427.  
566 'subiunximus nos quosdam istius erroris temerarios defensores in tantae subversionis foveam 
corruisse, ut dixerunt scilicet et scripserint, "quod si homo haberet aliam formam ad anima rationali, 
non posset corpus hominis corruptum, idem numero etiam per miraculum reparari"'.  Peckham, 
Registrum (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, p. 866.  
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admitted of a unique complexity, or 'capacity', proportionate, of course, to its own 
soul.  He grounded the relative independence of the material part in each human 
individual from their soul, moreover, on a corporeal form that give to the body's 
matter its organic structure and individualised that matter.  This was not a substantial 
form, but an accidental form, or property of the individual bodily substance; Aquinas 
called this accidental form 'dimensive quantity' (quantitas dimensiva).567 
But Aquinas did not supply his account of the postmortem bodily independence 
from soul, or, in other words, the identity of the material remains of any human 
individual, with much technical detail at all.  He had stated that any corpse, 
including the remains of any saint, was formally different from the individual human 
body that had corrupted into it, but was the same with respect to its matter (secundum 
materiam).568  But what did it mean, exactly, for the living body and corpse to be the 
same secundum materiam?   
In the context of his discussions of the general resurrection, it is true, Aquinas had 
accounted for the identity and continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies 
across death, bodily decomposition and dispersion, and resurrection, by advancing a 
speculative argument inspired by the Commentator Averroes' work on matter.  In 
the case of each body, Aquinas had suggested, traces of the individualised 
quantitative structure formerly belonging to it would remain in the matter particular 
to it.  But he did not back up this account with any detailed explanation of the 
metaphysical status of these structural elements in matter, and neither did he tie this 
analysis together with his discussions of postmortem bodily continuity in other 
contexts.   
In the case of Christ, Aquinas had held that His dead body was not totally 
(totaliter) the same as His living body considering just His human nature: it had 
undergone a true human death, and so was formally different, if materially the same 
across this change.  He had also argued that Christ's dead body was absolutely 
(simpliciter) the same as His living body: with Christ, unlike with any other human 
being, the ultimate (or non-assumed) metaphysical subject, or supposit (suppositum) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567 See above, chapter 3, esp. sections 2, 3.2 and 4.  
568 See above, chapter 4, section 3.  
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was not of course His individual human nature itself, but instead His very divine 
person, which had assumed that individual nature and remained inseparably united 
to it.  Aquinas grounded the absolute numerical identity of Christ's material remains 
on their continued union to the same divine supposit or subject.569  But in any case, 
again, what exactly did it mean for Christ's dead body to be the same secundum 
materiam as His dead body?   
Every Dominican tract produced in defence of Aquinas's philosophy and its 
consequences for Christ's corpse during 1277-86 was responding to arguments 
contained within William de la Mare's Correctorium fratris Thomae on this topic.  
Composed in Paris, as indicated, during or soon after March 1277,570 the Correctorium 
was a wide-ranging critique of some 117 positions drawn from across several of 
Aquinas's works, but it was dominated by an attack on the theory of the unicity of 
substantial from in humans and other theses directly related to it.  The crucial article 
for the purposes of this chapter's discussion is article 31, devoted to attacking the 
precise position that 'in a human being there is only one substantial form', along with 
several of its theological consequences.571   
William de la Mare's interpretation of Aquinas's position that Christ's corpse was 
the same as His living body secundum materiam, but formally different, was simple: 
either Christ's corpse was a featureless prime matter alone, an absurd conclusion, 
because then it would not have been a body at all, or (following Henry of Ghent's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 See above, chapter 4, section 3.2, esp. pp. 191-2. 
570 On the dating of the Correctorium fratris Thomae see Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 75.  
571 'Quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis', de la Mare, CFT, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 
127-35 (the direct target of de la Mare's critique here is Aquinas, ST I, q. 76, a. 3).  Including a. 31, at 
least 22 articles in the Correctorium fratris Thomae are directly related to Aquinas's theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans.  On Christ's corpse, see also a. 107 ('Quod corpus Christi in triduo quoad 
aliquid non fuit idem quod prius').  In addition, see esp. a. 32 ('Quod nulla dispositio accidentalis 
praeexistit in materia ante inductionem formae substantialis'); a. 90 ('Quod anima unitur materiae 
corporali sine medio'); article 98 ('Quod anima vegetativa, sensitiva et rationalis sunt una substantia in 
homine'); and a. 102 ('Quod impossibile est plures formas substantiales esse in eodem').  The position 
that the soul communicates to the composite its only act of existence (esse) is criticised in articles 52, 86, 
and 114.  Individuation by matter and Aquinas's denial of matter/form composition in the human 
soul and in angels are targetted at articles 8, 10, 11, 12, 28, 29, 30, 88, 100, 113, 115.  Aquinas's 
thought on the role of matter in generation, including his denial that matter is the seat of rationes 
seminales, is targetted at articles 27 and 85. 
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suggestion in his Quodlibet I, q. 4) it had a new corporeal form.  Either way, it could 
not be the same thing as His living body.572   
The related pluralist argument that it would follow from Aquinas's philosophy 
that the relic was not really the saint's body was not found in the Correctorium fratris 
Thomae, but entered the debate in its early stages nonetheless.  Concern for the 
implications that certain philosophical positions being taught at the Arts faculty in 
Paris might have for the cult of the dead was evident in the condemnation of 7 
March 1277: on the list of 219 censured articles was the position that 'it is not 
necessary to care for those who are to be buried'.573  The Augustinian friar Giles of 
Rome points out in his De gradibus formarum, which, written in Rome after Christmas 
1277 and before Easter 1278,574 is the earliest surviving treatise from any scholar 
defending the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans,575 that the very 
greatest difficulty in the scholarly debate over the composition of human nature has 
arisen because of the Aristotelian notion that corpse is only equivocally, or in name, 
and not really flesh and bone.  He adds that this position seems, to the ears of the 
faithful, to be a 'great error', because it implies both that Christ's dead flesh was not 
really flesh, and that the bones of saints are not really bones.576  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 'si autem illius corporis Christi non fuisset alia forma substantialis quam intellectiva, postquam fuit 
separata, remansit prima materia sola vel alia forma substantialis introducta. Ex quibus sequitur quod 
non fuit idem corpus numero... Si enim remansit sola materia, non erat corpus; ergo nec idem corpus 
numero, materia enim prima non est corpus... Si vero propter hoc dicatur quod alia forma 
substantialis... introducta, sequitur ex hoc quod Corpus Christi vivum et mortuum non fuit idem 
numero; ubi enim est alia forma substantialis, ibi et aliud corpus'.  de la Mare, CFT, a. 31 (ed.) 
Glorieux, pp. 129-30.   
573 'Quod non est curandum de sepultura', Piché with Lafleur, La Condamnation Parisienne, a. 155 (204); 
cf. Hissette, Enquête, p. 294, and Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 90.   
574 Giles of Rome's De gradibus formarum also circulated under the title Contra gradus et pluralitates formarum.  
On its dating, see Vella, Robert of Orford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford, p. 42 and 
Callus, 'The Problem of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell', p. 125.  
575 Giles of Rome had been Aquinas's pupil, and accepted the theory that the soul is the only 
substantial form in a human only after some hesitation, criticising it in his Errores philosophorum (c. 
1270).  See Giles of Rome, Errores philosophorum (ed.) J. Koch (tr.) J. O Riedl (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1944), I, 11, p. 8.  The modern discussion over how far Giles of Rome's philosophy 
deviates from Aquinas's focus on the former's understanding of the relationship between essence and 
esse.  See Gilles de Rome, Theoremes sur l'etre et l'essence (ed. and trans.) S. Mercier (Paris: Les belles lettres, 
2011), editor's introduction, esp. pp. 84-98. 
576 'Difficultatem maximam facit in proposito equivocatio que videtur consurgere circa carnes et ossa 
vivorum et mortuorum, quia recedente anime secundum philosophum non remanet caro nisi 
equivoce, et os nisi equivoce... secundum hoc via philosophi magnam errorem generat in auribus 
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So what account of postmortem bodily continuity could Aquinas's defenders 
develop, based on his texts?  In order to counterpoint and clarify the distinctiveness 
of the approach of Aquinas's Dominican defenders to their respective analyses of the 
relative independence of the individual body from the soul, and of its continuity 
across the soul's separation, it will be essential to explore in slightly more detail the 
position of his pluralist critics. 
The Correctorium fratris Thomae itself was foremost an analytical critique, and did 
not offer a particularly detailed, positive, pluralist account of postmortem bodily 
continuity.  Of course, all of the Franciscan pluralist theories of the late thirteenth-
century were worked out in response to Aquinas's work, so the development of a range 
of alternatives that could match Aquinas's in the refinement of their metaphysical 
underpinning necessarily took time.577  For now, it is important to grasp only two 
very simple assumptions that lie behind William de la Mare's argument in article 31 
of the Correctorium fratris Thomae, and are common to all of the pluralist accounts of 
postmortem bodily continuity that we do have from the period 1277-86.  
First, as will probably be obvious from what has already been explained, these 
pluralist works assume that continuity of a bodily substantial form is necessary to 
support any concrete bodily continuity, be it across the soul's infusion, or its 
separation.  Second, on a closely related and more technical note, in order that there 
can be at least one other substantial form entering into human nature in addition to 
the soul, such pluralist accounts assume that a substantial form can admit of an 
incomplete or partial nature in itself, and can itself communicate an incomplete act of 
substantial being, such that, in the case of bodily forms, one form can be in potency 
to another.  In stark contrast, of course, Aquinas had thought that each substantial 
form communicated an absolute act of substantial being (esse), and was the absolute 
defining principle in any composite, such that there could only be one substantial 
form in any one individual determining its nature.578  In article 31 of the Correctorium 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fidelium, quia ex hoc sequitur, ut videtur, quod caro christi mortua non esset vera caro; relique etiam 
sanctorum, ut eorum ossa non erant vera ossa'.  Giles of Rome, De gradibus formarum, pt. 2, ch. 4, 
printed in Expositio domini Egidii Romani super libros de anima cm textu.  De materia celi contra Averroim.  De 
intellectu possibili.  De gradibus formarum (Venice, 1500), f. 99vb (my punctuation).  For Aristotle’s position, 
see above, p. 80 and n. 187.  
577 Cf. Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 70.   
578 See above, pp. 107-8. 
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fratris Thomae, then, de la Mare explains that the soul does not give to the composite 
human all of its being (esse), but perfects the nature of the forms which precede its 
infusion.  As the 'essential complement' (essentiale complementum) of those forms, the soul 
converges with them, completing their being (esse), to give a unified nature.579  A 
corporeal form, then, can continue in its own existence across the infusion and the 
separation of the soul.  As de la Mare puts it, the difference 'animated' does not affect 
the substantial nature of the body: in death the body undergoes corruption only 
insofar as it is alive, not insofar as it is a body.580  
Only three major examples of Franciscan pluralist theories survive from the 
period before the appearance of Richard de Mediavilla's De gradu formarum (c. 
1286).581  There is Pierre de Jean Olivi's characteristically highly original theory, 
found in his 'Summa of questions' on Book II of the Sentences (c. 1278, Narbonne).  
Olivi posited six different forms in a human being and two kinds of matter (physical 
matter and spiritual matter).  His work had little influence on other thinkers beyond 
one of his own pupils, and would not have been known at Oxford.582  Then, there is 
Peckham's own account of human nature in his Quodlibet IV, q. 11 (Rome, 1277 or 
1278),583 a discussion of the identity of Christ's dead body, which was known at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Passage beginning, 'verum est quod non dat illud esse totum quod datur per formas praecedentes'.  
de la Mare, CFT, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 134.  
580 Passage beginning, 'animatum non est differentia substantialis corporis ut corpus est sed in 
quantum vivum'.  de la Mare, CFT, a. 107, (ed.) Glorieux, p. 407.  
581 edited in Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes.   
582 For further discussion see Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 76-7.  The relevant questions are 
edited: Pierre de Jean Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum, vol. II (ed.) B. Jansen, (Quaracchi: 
ex typographia collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924): see q. 50 (Utrum in corpore humano sit aliqua forma 
substantialis praeter animam) and q. 51 (An sensitiva hominis sit a generante), pp. 23-198.  For Olivi's account of 
bodily continuity across the arrival and separation of the soul, see q. 50, ad 3, p. 37, passage 
beginning, 'Corpus ergo humanum, cum advenit sibi anima, non debet dici quod fiat aliud ens...'.  For 
his account of Christ's dead body, see q. 50, responsio, pp. 32-3 esp. passage on p. 33 beginning 
'Praeterea, materia prima, in quantum talis, non est corpus'.  On Olivi's 'Summa of questions' on I-IV 
Sentences, originating in a series of disputations between the late 1270s and 1290s, see Friedman, 'The 
Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320', p. 60, and n. 49; S. Piron, 'Les oeuvres perdues d'Olivi: essai de 
reconstitution' in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 91 (1998), pp. 361, 368-70, 373-4.  For summary 
biographical details, see A. Boureau and S. Piron (eds.) Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298): Pensée scolastique, 
dissidence spirituelle et société (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1999), editors' introduction, p. 9.  
583 John Peckham, Quodlibeta Quatuor (ed.) F. Delorme (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1989), 
Quodlibet IV, q. 11 (Utrum oculus dicitur de oculo Christi vivo et mortuo univoce vel aequivoce), pp. 196-202, which 
criticises Aquinas's position as frivola et inanis (p. 198).  Peckham's view is that a corporeal substance 
remains the same in number and essence across the soul's separation at death, but that its mode of 
existence changes.  For further discussion see Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 176-8.  
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Oxford during this period.584  Finally, there is Roger Marston's account of the 
composition of human nature in his Quodlibet II, q. 22 (Lent, 1282), the only major 
Franciscan account of human nature to emerge from Oxford during the period 
covered by this chapter.  It is more technically refined than Peckham's account, and 
will be briefly summarised here, both to further illustrate the two basic elements of 
the pluralist position noted above, and because it is likely that Richard Knapwell had 
Marston's version of the pluralist theory directly in view when he composed his 
Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, to be discussed at the end of this chapter.    
Roger Marston, in his Quodlibet II, q. 22, then, develops a theory of human nature 
positing that, in addition to the soul, there is a single bodily substantial form in each 
human that is educed from matter in their generation.  This single form has different 
'grades' within it, according to the different grades of substantial being (esse) it 
acquires over the process of the body's 'ennoblement' during generation.  Each grade 
remains when the next grade is acquired; the form acquires a more noble being (esse) 
at each stage; and the arrival of the soul further perfects the bodily form that persists 
across its infusion.585  When the soul separates at death, since the bodily form 
remains, the body remains the same in number as before, even though it has lost 
some of its substantial being, namely that which it had from the soul.  And so, 
Marston points out, this theory of human nature preserves the identity of Christ's 
dead body.586  If, however, Marston explains in an echo of the Correctorium fratris 
Thomae, the soul were the only substantial form in a human, then a human would 
comprise the intellectual soul and mere prime matter.  And when Christ died a new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 Knapwell responds to Peckham's critique of Aquinas's position in his Quaestio disputata de unitate 
formae.  See passage beginning, 'si obiiciatur quod ex hoc quod consequens est'.  Richard Knapwell, 
Quaestio disputata de unitate formae (hereafter QDUF), responsiones ad argumenta, ad 29 (ed.) Kelley, p. 
88. 
585  'rationes superius tactae non cogunt negare pluralitatem formarum, quamvis probabiliorem 
credam opinionem quae dicit unam formam in quolibet individuo habentem gradus diversos 
secundum esse diversa substantialia acquisita per transmutationem et nobilitationem formae quae 
generatione non corrumpitur, sed manet acquisitio nobiliore esse', 'Nam corpore humano organizato 
et disposito infunditur intellectiva per cuius adventum perficitur et non destruitur forma praecedens'.  
Marston, Quodlibet II, q. 22 (Utrum creatura possit aliquid producere de nihilo), ad argumenta (eds.) Etzkorn 
and Brady, pp. 273-4.  Cf. commentary in Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 217-9.  
586 'idem corporis Christi vivi et mortui vere salvatur secundum istum modum dicendi quem teneo.  
Non enim, separata intellectiva, corrumpitur... sed eadem numero manet quae prius, corrupto tamen 
aliquo eius esse substantiali.'  Marston, Quodlibet II, q. 22, ad argumenta, (ed.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 
274.   
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form would have been introduced into His dead body, such that it would not have 
been really be the same thing as His living body.587  Marston simply cannot see how 
Christ's body living and dead can be the same body without having the same form.588   
Giles of Lessines, in De unitate formae, explored a way in which the robust pluralist 
account of postmortem formal continuity in the body could be matched, even if the 
soul were posited to be the only substantial form in a human being.  Doing so, he 
made of the use of the framework for bodily continuity across substantial change that 
Aquinas had set out in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysica VII.16.589  Robert 
of Orford's own account of postmortem bodily continuity would bear some 
similarities to Giles of Lessines'.   
In De unitate formae, Giles of Lessines argues that the body living and dead is 
indeed the same only secundum materiam, but that the form of the corpse emerges from 
the matter that is left behind at the soul's separation, and is not something introduced 
as if extraneous to the system.  The material subject of a rational soul is not mere 
prime matter, he explains, but the soul's proper matter, in a state of proximate potency to 
a rational soul, in which several 'disposing potencies' can be found.590  Though the 
mind readily conceives some formal medium between the soul and matter, he goes 
on to explain, in reality it is this complex material subject itself that mediates its own 
union to the soul.591  On the separation of the soul in any case of human death, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 'Et in hoc discrepat haec opinio a quibusdam ponentibus tantum unam formam, ita tamen quod 
semper, adveniente posteriore, corrumpitur prima... Ideo dicunt quod in homine est tantum 
intellectiva et materia prima.  Et istis accidit difficultas de identitate corporis Christi vivi et mortui... 
Nam... mortuum alia forma sibi dante corporeitatem corpus fuit et ideo sequitur necessario quod 
aequivoce praedicatur corpus de corpore Christi vivo et mortuo'.  ibid., p. 273.  
588 'non video quomodo posset esse idem corpus nisi haberet eandem formam'.  Marston, Quodlibet IV, 
q. 11 (Utrum sit idem numero corpus Christi mortuum et vivum), responsio (ed.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 389.  
589 See above, pp. 177-8. 
590 'Si ergo anima rationalis adveniat corpori organizato, iam eidem advenit ut forma materiae, et ut 
actus potentiae, non tollitur ratio subiecti quam habet a materia, in quantum in potentia proxima erat 
a huiusmodi formam'; '[Forma] Habet tamen relationem ad materiam suam propriam sicut ad 
subiectum in quo recipitur per modum inhaerentiae' (my insertion); 'in natura hoc aliquid constitutur 
ex materia una et forma una et quicquid est ante adventum formae est ad unitatem materiae 
pertinens, quamvis in ipsa aliquando plures potentiae disponentes reperiantur magis in uno quam in 
alio' (the way in which matter is disposed will differ from species to species).  Giles of Lessines, DUF, 
pt. 2, ch. 3, p. 30, and ch. 7, and pt. 3, ch. 4, ad I (ed.) de Wulf, pp. 52, 67-8.  
591 'hoc est quod supposuimus in isto capitulo, formam scilicet per se uniri materiae sine medio 
efficiente unionem, tamen aliquo modo posse uniri per medium disponens et praeparans ad unionem.  
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form of the corpse that emerges was 'formerly as matter to another form', namely the 
soul, which kept it in a state of potency; it was in a state of 'ultimate potency' to the 
'corrupt form', or the form of the corpse.592  The corpse as a whole is different from 
the living body: it has a new substantial form (albeit one originating from the living 
body's matter) and a new individual act of being.593   
With Christ, however, there was a much greater identity between His corpse and 
His living body than in any other case of human death, on account of the identity 
and unity of the divine supposit that remained inseparably united to His corpse.594  
His body was united to the divinity as a part of human nature, or, in other words, 
through its relationship to His soul, as the subject of His soul, Giles explains.  His 
body remained that same material subject in number even when dead, albeit 
deprived of His soul.595  
This was just one possible mode of response to the pluralists, however, and, as 
indicated, each of our three Dominicans working at Oxford during 1277-86 would 
come up with his own account of the individual body and its postmortem continuity.  
Of the three, only Richard Knapwell would revive Aquinas's central idea that the 
body's relative independence within the human individual was grounded upon the 
accidental form dimensive quantity, which gave to the body its physical structure.  
Knapwell, moreover, would break new ground by recognising the significance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Quod tamen medium per intellectum et rationem habet rationem formae, sed per veritatem et rem 
habet rationem materiae secundum quod materia dicitur subiectum respectu formae', Giles of 
Lessines, DUF, pt. 2, ch. 3 (ed.) de Wulf, p. 30.   
592 'Unde, cum per separationem animae corrupitur animatum esse ab hoc corpore... illud quod erat 
in potentia ultima respectu formae corruptae fit iam actu et rationem verae formae habens', 
'introducta est forma dans esse hoc aliquid, quae prius erat ut materiam ad aliam formam'.  Giles of 
Lessines, DUF, pt. 3, ch. 5, I and III (ed.) de Wulf, pp. 82, 86.  
593 'hoc corpus mortuum... constet ex materia et forma propria, quae dat sibi aliquid esse et 
individuum.  Sed huiusmodi forma non potest esse anima; quare iam numero differt in hoc respectu a 
corpore vivo'.  Giles of Lessines, DUF, pt. 3, ch. 5, III (ed.) de Wulf, p. 85.  
594 'identitas et unitas suppositi manet in corpore Christi mortuo et vivo talis, qualis non invenitur in 
aliis hominibus... secundum fidem nostram inseparabiliter facta est unio Christi et toti animae et toti 
corpore... et ideo cum idem suppositum sit idem numero, relinquitur maior identitas quare corpus 
Christi mortuum et vivum, quam aliorum hominum'.  ibid., pp. 85-6.   
595 'Nam idem corpus numero dicimus, secundum quod rationem habet subiecti unius, in eo quod 
subicitur formae uno modo et in eo quod subicitur privationi alio modo; unde per relationem ad 
unam formam dicitur unum numero, et per relationem ad illam formam unita est divinitas ipsi.  Non 
enim unita est divinitas corpori Christi quia corpus est, sed quia pars est et subiectum naturae 
humanae, cui subicitur per animam rationalem Christi, cuius adhuc manet subiectum, ipsa separata in 
morte'.  ibid., p. 87.  
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Aquinas's speculative work on the postmortem continuity of a quantitative structure 
in the matter particular to individual bodies.  He would develop a full natural 
philosophical account of such a structure, and he would do this by way of a 
theological discussion which drew together, in a way that no other Dominican 
contribution the debate hitherto had, the two major theological issues implicated in 
the dispute over the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its 
consequences: the immediate postmortem continuity of Christ's body, on the one 
hand, and the general resurrection, on the other.   
Why were Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell selected 
as representatives of those who defended Aquinas's theory of the unicity of substantial 
form in humans during 1277-86?   
Since it was in Oxford that the theory of the unicity of substantial form in 
humans was perceived to have been publicly censured, at least implicitly, it was at 
Oxford, in particular, that Dominican leaders felt the need to manage the reception 
of Aquinas's philosophy.  Following Kilwardby's promotion to become Cardinal-
Bishop Porto with residence at the Curia in March 1278, the Dominican General 
Chapter in June dispatched two visitators to the English province, to punish with 
privation from office and exile any Dominican found to be bringing scandal to the 
Order by detracting from Aquinas's writings.596  There is no record of any scholars 
having been punished, although the provision of the 1279 General Chapter that no 
improper or irreverent talk about Aquinas or his works would any longer be tolerated 
suggests that cooperation was not immediately universal.597  In any case, by 1279, the 
new generation of Dominican bachelors in Theology at Oxford had already jumped 
to the defence of Aquinas's intellectual legacy, and Oxford swiftly became the de 
facto intellectual centre of this project.  John Peckham's aggressive stance, following 
his promotion to become Archbishop of Canterbury on 29 January 1279, ensured 
that the defence of Aquinas's intellectual legacy at Oxford remained an urgent task.  
Peckham believed that Kilwardby had explicitly prohibited the teaching of the theory 
of the unicity of substantial form humans, though he had never himself seen the list of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum, vol. 1 (ed.) B. M. Reichert, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum 
Praedicatorum Historica, 3 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1898), p. 199. 
597 ibid., p. 204.  
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prohibited articles.  Having renewed Kilwardby's prohibition on 29 October 1284, 
Peckham made it clear, in a subsequent letter to the University dating from 10 
November, that Aquinas's theory of human nature was his particular target, citing its 
supposed theologically dangerous consequences for Christ's corpse and saints' 
relics.598 
It was against this background of sustained pressure from outside the schoolroom, 
then, that Richard Knapwell and Robert of Orford produced the two earliest and 
longest, not to mention the only two complete surviving point-by-point Dominican 
responses to William de la Mare's Correctorium (dubbed the 'Corruptorium' by 
Dominicans), called Quare (1278) and Sciendum (1282-83), respectively, after their 
incipits.  These tracts, along with Thomas of Sutton's De pluralitate formarum, make up 
three of the six earliest surviving tracts of certain attribution written in whole or in 
large part with the objective of defending the theory of the unicity of substantial form 
in humans and its theological consequences.599  These writings are therefore an 
obvious starting point for a discussion of the early interpretation of the theory by its 
defenders.  Two of the remaining three early defences of the theory, Giles of Lessines' 
De unitate formae and the Augustinian Giles of Rome's De gradibus formarum, have 
already been cited.  The latter will be discussed again in the next section, in relation 
to Thomas of Sutton's De pluralitate formarum, which makes reference to it.  The last of 
the six earliest works defending Aquinas's theory of human nature is a Tractatus de 
formis written by John of Paris (in Paris, before 1283),600 which will not be discussed 
further here, since there is no room at present to take on another Dominican thinker, 
with another take on Aquinas's theory of human nature, in any depth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598  'Unum vero illorum expresse notavimus articulum, quorundam dicentium "in homine esse 
tantummodo formam unam".  Notavimus, inquam, pro eo quod ex ipso sequitur, ut putamus, nec 
corpus Christi fuisse unum numero vivum et mortuum, nec aliqua sanctorum corpora tota vel 
secundum partes aliquas in orbe existere vel in urbe'.  Peckham, Registrum (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, p. 841.   
599 The early fourteenth-century Stams. catalogue attributes a tract 'de unitate formarum' to the 
Dominican William Hothum that might have been written when he lectured in the Sentences at Oxford 
(1278-80), before becoming the Dominican provincial prior in England (1282-7), but this tract does 
not survive.  Sharpe, Handlist, p. 778; T. Kaepelli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum, 4 vols. (Rome: Ad S. 
Sabinae, 1970-1993), vol. 2, p. 102, n. 1502.  There is also a tract 'De unitate formae' by Robert of 
Orford that is not known to survive; cf. Vella, Robert of Orford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at 
Oxford, pp. 23-4, where the tract is dated either before 1278 or after 1284; Sharpe, Handlist, p. 568; 
Kaepelli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum, vol. 3, p. 326, n. 3538.   
600 Kaepelli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum, vol. 2, p. 518, n. 2562.  
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With the three Dominican candidates selected, two further texts complete the set 
that will be examined here.  There is Richard Knapwell's mature interpretation of 
the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, his Quaestio disputata de unitate 
formae (1285), which contains his theory of postmortem material continuity and 
provided the direct provocation for the condemnation of the theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans on 30 April 1286.  An anonymous tract entitled De natura 
materiae will also be included on the grounds of its close connection to Robert of 
Orford's Sciendum and because it contains a discussion of the general resurrection.  
There is very good reason to attribute De natura materiae to Robert of Orford: the 
account of the composition of human nature in it is barely distinguishable from that 
in Sciendum and Robert of Orford incorporates passages from it verbatim into 
Sciendum.601  
Beyond the chapter's purview are the three other surviving Dominican responses 
to William de la Mare's Correctorium, which are all incomplete. 602   William of 
Macclesfield is the likely author of the third English Correctorium corruptorii, known as 
Quaestione (probably composed during 1284),603 which in fact stops at article 30 and 
therefore does not tackle the critical article 31 or the topic of postmortem bodily 
continuity; then there is John of Paris's Circa (1283 or 1284);604 and finally, there is 
Ramberto de' Primadizzi of Bologna's Apologeticum veritatis (1286-88).605  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601 Cf. Kelley, 'The Egidian Influence in Robert of Orford's Doctrine on Form', pp. 92-4. 
602 For an overview of the five Dominican Correctoria corruptorii see M. D. Jordan, 'The Controversy of 
the Correctoria and the Limits of Metaphysics', Speculum, 57 (1982), esp. pp. 292-8, and n. 3, which cites 
a vast bibliography detailing the previous seventy years of research on these texts, including works by 
Hödl, Mandonnet, Ehrle, Glorieux, Creytens and Pelzer.  The dating (though not the sequence) of the 
Correctoria given by Jordan is currently under review, cf. Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 79, n. 76: 
the dating of Quare and Sciendum adopted here follows Boureau's.  
603  Le correctorium corruptorii "Quaestione": texte anonyme du ms. Merton 276 (ed.) J.-P. Müller, Studia 
Anselmiana, 35 (Rome: Herder, 1954).     
604 Le correctorium corruptorii "Circa" de Jean Quidort de Paris (ed.) J.-P. Müller, Studia Anselmiana 12-13 
(Rome: Herder, 1941).   
605 Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptorium (ed.) J.-P. Müller, Studi e Testi, 108 (Vatican: Bibliotheca 
apostolica vaticana, 1943).  
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1. Thomas of Sutton: De pluralitate formarum (1278) 
Thomas of Sutton's De pluralitate formarum, composed in 1278, is the earliest 
substantive and systematic contribution that we have from any Dominican at Oxford 
to the debate surrounding the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and 
its theological consequences.606  Thomas of Sutton was still a bachelor in theology 
when he wrote it; he incepted as master in theology at Oxford c. 1291-93, and died 
sometime after 1315.607  In the prooemium to De pluralitate formarum, Thomas of Sutton 
states that he aims to strengthen common arguments against the 'sophistry' 
(cavillationes) of his opponents, and to dissolve false arguments that have taken hold of 
their thinking, rather than to introduce new arguments into the debate.608  The 
account of substantial change and the individual body that he uses to do this, 
nonetheless, is his own.  
The metaphysical vision of human nature and the individual body that Thomas 
of Sutton gives in De pluralitate formarum deviates from Aquinas's in several crucial 
respects,609 but the simplest way in which to distil Thomas of Sutton's distinctive 
position is as follows: he puts such strong emphasis on the close union between 
matter and the soul in human nature that he radically undermines the relative 
independence of body from soul.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Knapwell's Quare (1278) depends on De pluralitate formarum, hence the latter is also dated to 1278.  
Thomas of Sutton's authorship of this treatise, which has been printed more than once among genuine 
works of Aquinas, was confirmed by MS. Assisi 118.  See Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis in Libros 
Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione.  Continuatio per Thoma de Sutona (ed.) Kelley, introduction, pp. 2-3, n. 
3.  It circulated in 9 MSS, also under the titles Contra pluralitate formarum and De unitate formae.  Kelley, 
The Thomists and their Opponents at Oxford, p. 64. 
607 On the chronology of Sutton's career, see Friedman, 'Dominican Quodlibetal Literature', pp. 423-
6; Thomas of Sutton, Quaestiones Ordinariae (ed.) J. Schneider (München: Verlag der Bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), editor's introduction, pp. 45-57.  The best up to date 
bibliographical summary for Thomas of Sutton is found in H. Goodenough Gelber, It Could Have Been 
Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300-1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 59-
61, n. 3.  
608  Passage beginning 'nec tamen oportet novas adducere rationes'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, 
prooemium, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 570.   
609 Zavalloni notes a deterioration of Aquinas's teachings in De pluralitate formarum in his Richard de 
Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes, p. 286. The present study agrees with Gilson's more 
neutral assessment that Thomas of Sutton agrees with the conclusion that the soul is the only 
substantial form in humans but not on all counts with Aquinas's reasoning.  Gilson, History of Christian 
Philosophy, p. 419. 
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De pluralitate formarum begins with and is dominated by an extended philosophical 
critique of the pluralist position.  Crucially, it is in the context of this philosophical 
critique, rather than in the context of reflection on the theological problems at stake 
in the debate, that Thomas of Sutton sets out his own theory of the composition of 
human nature.  Only the final, and shortest, section of the tract, from which 
summary of the debate quoted at the beginning of the chapter is taken, deals directly 
with the theological consequences of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in 
humans.  By the time his argument reaches this stage, as will become clear shortly, 
Thomas of Sutton has left himself with very little room in which to develop a 
convincing account of postmortem bodily continuity.  The critique that he presents 
of the consequences of pluralist theory for the general resurrection, however, is rather 
more successful.  
Thomas of Sutton, then, strongly endorses Aquinas's view that there can only be 
one substantial form in a single human being, and therefore in an individual human 
body, because substantial form is what gives any composite its act of existence (esse), 
and because unity is a transcendental characteristic of, or is interchangeable with, 
being: two substantial forms therefore necessarily result in two distinct things.610  As 
Thomas of Sutton puts it, any existing thing has the characteristic of existing 
absolutely, and being one or a unity absolutely, from the same component, namely its 
substantial form.611  He explains that essence and act of existence (esse) are related as 
potency and act respectively.  This means that if there were some substantial form 
distinct from the soul entering into the nature or essence of the body, prior to the 
soul's arrival, then this form would give to the body an absolute act of substantial 
existence, and so no additional further form could enter into the same human essence 
such that it should comprise both body and soul.  The soul, instead, would be an 
accidental form, arriving at a body already unconditionally in act.612   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610 See above, pp. 106-7. 
611 'ab eodem res habet quod sit ens simpliciter, et quod sit unum simpliciter... sed a forma 
substantiali... habet quod sit ens simpliciter... ergo ab eadem habet unitatem simpliciter'.  Thomas of 
Sutton, DPF, pt. 3 in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 574, ll.1-25. 	  
612 'Praeterea, omne quod advenit rei subsistenti et consequitur esse substantiale, non potest esse de 
essentia rei; quia tota essentia rei intelligitur ut principium susceptivum ipsius esse.  Comparatur enim 
essentia ad esse sicut potentia ad actum.  Tota ergo essentia rei sive substantia praeintelligitur ipsius 
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In Aquinas's own account of the composition of human nature, it will be 
remembered, potency and act operated on two levels.  Not only was essence in 
potency to its act of existence (esse); within the composite essence itself, additionally, 
matter was in potency to the substantial form that communicated to the composite its 
act of existence.  For Aquinas, of course, the material part or principle made a crucial 
contribution to human nature or the human essence: in the human being unified by 
a single act of existence, the soul perfected and 'exceeded' matter, but matter 
completed the very nature of the soul in return.613  And each individual human's 
soul, along with the individual act of existence that it communicated to the 
composite, was individuated in his or her particular matter.614   
The metaphysical model of human nature that Thomas of Sutton presents in De 
pluralitate formarum, in contrast, effectively collapses the human essence into the soul, 
and the individual body into the individual soul.  It is very difficult to see, according 
to Thomas of Sutton's own account of human nature, how the material part in a 
human being can make any distinct contribution to their individuality.  
Endorsing a passage from Averroes' commentary on the Metaphysica in support of 
his anti-pluralist claim that the body simply cannot exist without the soul, Thomas of 
Sutton states, then, that body and soul are not two distinct things.615  He points out 
that the 'organic body' that Aristotle took to enter into the unified, composite human 
nature is a body already informed by a soul.616  The material part of human nature is 
not, for Thomas of Sutton, what Aquinas had called 'common' or 'proper' matter: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
esse.  Non ergo quod advenit rei subsistenti est de essentia rei.  Erit ergo per accidens', 'Et praesertim 
de anima... sequitur quod sit accidens, cum ponatur advenire corpore constituo in esse per aliam 
formam'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 2 in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 573, 
ll.75-100, 125-150.   
613 See above, pp. 108-9, 134-5. 
614 See above, chapter 3, section 4.  
615 'Et hoc magis expresse dicit idem Commentator in 8 Metaph., in fine, quod corpus et anima non 
est duo diversa, et corpus non existit sine anima'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 2 in Thomas Aquinas, 
Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 573, ll.200-25.  
616 'Tamen si consideremus corpus in actu per ipsam animam, tunc ipsum corpus sic consideratum est 
potentia respectu animae, et secundum quod ipsa dat esse vivum et sensivitum et sic deinceps: et sic 
loquitur Philosophus in 2 de anima, cum dicit, quod ex corpore et anima fit unum, sicut ex potentia et 
actu: et similiter quando dicit ibi quod anima est actus corporis'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 1, in 
Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 571, ll.75-175.  
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matter in a differentiated state appropriate for the human species.617  Neither, for 
Thomas of Sutton, does the material part of human nature admit of what Giles of 
Lessines would call a complex or proximate potency, in distinction from prime matter, 
which was understood to be in potency to all forms indiscriminately.618  Thomas of 
Sutton, in contrast to each of the two other Dominicans, would have it that the 
proximate subject of all forms immersed in matter is prime matter, and that prime 
matter is in a state of immediate potency to the soul.619  
Furthermore, Thomas of Sutton thinks that it is the soul that individuates matter, 
rather than vice versa.  He reaches this conclusion by conflating the two kinds of 
unity that Aquinas thought to obtain within a human being: first, the transcendental 
unity which is interchangeable with being, or the unity in virtue of which soul and 
matter are one human being; second, the unity which is the principle of number, or 
in other words the unity which consists in the physical indivision of a material thing 
from itself and its physical division from other material things.  For Aquinas, it was 
this second kind of unity that was relevant to the individuation of a material thing, or 
its distinction from other bodies, and matter insofar as it was subject to the structural 
form dimensive quantity was responsible for individuation.620   
Thomas of Sutton writes, in contrast, that it is in the nature of substantial form to 
'divide and distinguish' the composite to which it belongs from any other 
composite:621 just as it is in virtue of its substantial form that the composite has its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 See above, pp. 113-5, 131-5. 
618 See above, pp. 214, n. 590. 
619 'reliquitur quod materia prima sit potentia immediata respectu animae'; 'sic ergo oportet quod 
omnes formae materiales sint ejusdem generis, eo quod omnes habent idem susceptivum proximum, 
scilicet materiam primam'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 1, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, 
vol. 7, p. 571, ll.150-75, 200-25.  
620 See above, p. 148 and n. 409. 
621 'de ratione formae est quod actu dividat seu distinguat illud cuius est, ab omni alio'.  Thomas of 
Sutton, DPF, pt. 3, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 574, ll.1-25. 
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existence as one thing comprising matter and form, so it is that matter is called 'this 
thing' in virtue of its substantial form.622  
In De pluralitate formarum, Thomas of Sutton describes the continuant of substantial 
change as a matter which is 'nec quantum, nec quale' and so on, which was the standard 
scholastic description of featureless prime matter. 623   With this account of the 
individual body and substantial change, then, he appears to have played directly into 
the hands of de la Mare and the pluralists: what positive explanation can Thomas of 
Sutton possibly give for postmortem bodily continuity?  
 Reflecting on why it is that a living body should corrupt into a dead body and 
nothing else, Thomas of Sutton glosses Aristotle's account of proper matter at 
Metaphysica VIII.5, which contained the statement that the dead body came from the 
living body as naturally as night from day.624  The significant idea that Aquinas had 
taken from this passage was that there was a certain order within matter, which meant 
that substantial forms could be acquired in it only in a certain sequence.  Thomas of 
Sutton's own reading of Metaphysica VIII.5, in contrast, makes no reference to matter 
at all, and rejects both Aristotle and Aquinas's position that matter represents necessity 
in natural change (that is to say, certain material conditions need to be in place in 
order for a certain change to take place).625   
Thomas of Sutton cites Aristotle's text, then, in support of a theory that he had 
developed: there is a 'natural order' between the substantial forms which follow one 
another in substantial change, Thomas of Sutton thinks, such that a certain substance 
is necessarily generated when a certain other substance corrupts in nature: when the 
soul leaves the body, the form of a corpse simply follows it naturally in matter.  And 
even if all of the living body's accidental forms corrupt, similar accidental forms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 'habetur a commentatore 2 de amina, qui dicit sic: compositum non dicitur unum nisi per unitatem 
existentem in forma.  Materia enim non dicitur hoc nisi per formam'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 3, 
in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 574, ll.25-50.  
623 'id ex quo est generatio, et id ex quo est corruptio, est substantia in potentia tantum; nec est actu 
quid, nec quantum, nec quale et sic de aliis.  Tale autem non est aliquid, nisi materia intellecta sine 
forma omni'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 2, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 573, 
ll. 275-300.   
624 See above, pp. 80-1.  
625 See above, pp. 46, 50-51, 131-2.   
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necessarily appear immediately in the corpse: this is because their counterparts in the 
living body were only corrupted per accidens, or due to the corruption of their subject, 
and not in virtue of meeting their contrary.  Thomas of Sutton wants to argue, 
additionally, that matter is already 'sufficiently disposed' to receive the new set of 
accidental forms.626  This last statement, rather confusing in the context of what has 
already been explained, brings into view the gap created in an account of substantial 
change that drastically diminishes the role that the material continuant has to play: 
how can matter remain disposed, if all that persists across substantial change is a 
featureless prime matter, in potency to all forms indiscriminately?  
Thomas of Sutton explicitly rejects Averroes' position that an accidental 
quantitative structure can persist in matter across any case of substantial change, on 
the grounds of the Aristotelian axiom that substance is ontologically prior to 
accident.627  In fact, this criticism of the Commentator, together with Thomas of 
Sutton's entire account of human nature and postmortem bodily continuity, 
represented a drastic about-turn from his position in his earlier commentary on 
Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione.  In this earlier work, we find him advocating a 
pluralist position in the context of an extended comment on Aristotle's concept of 
symbola.628  When discussing the reciprocal transformation of the elements in De 
generatione et corruptione, Aristotle had referred to the features common to the two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 'Ad sextum dicendum quod in morte animalis quaedam forma imperfecta inducitur in materia...  
Est enim ordo naturalis inter animam et talem formam, ita quod abjectionem animae a materia 
necesse est talem formam sequi in eadem.  Unde philosophus dicit in 8 Metaph. quod ex vivo fit 
mortuum sicut ex vino fit acetum, et sicut ex die fit nox'.  And on the necessary appearance of certain 
accidental forms in the dead body, 'advertendum est quod in omni corruptione necessarium est quod 
illis accidentibus secundum quae non est transmutatio nisi per accidens, scilicet ad corruptionem 
subjecti, subito similia accidentia adveniant in eo quod generatur, ex hoc enim quod praeexistant in eo 
quod corrumpitur, disposita est materiam sufficientier ad eorum receptionem'.  Thomas of Sutton, 
DPF, pt. 5, ad 5 and ad 6, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7 p. 575, ll. 150-225 (my 
emphasis).   
627  'Sed quia magis tenendum est quod subjectum dimensionum et aliorum accidentium 
consequentium sit substantia in actu, eo quod substantia in actu praecedit naturaliter accidens in actu; 
ideo dicendum quod illa accidentia non manent in corpore vivo et mortuo eadem numero'.  Thomas 
of Sutton, DPF, pt. 5, ad 5, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 575, ll. 125-150.  
628 The form of argument that Thomas of Sutton adopts here, which infers the existence of a distinct 
corporeal form from sensory evidence, became a pluralist model argument that was common in the 
work of the Franciscans Olivi, Richard de Mediavilla, and William Ockham.  See Olivi, Quaestiones in 
secundum librum sententiarum, vol. II (ed.) Jansen, q. 50 (Appendix), ad 3, p. 66, 'Si autem in corpore 
mortuo remanet idem situs et positio et figura partium quam habebant ante mortem: oportet quod 
remanet eadem quantitas ac per consequens eadem corporietas'; A. Fitzpatrick, 'Richard de 
Mediavilla on the Resurrection of the Body' in Studi Francescani, 107 (2010), pp. 89-123, at 98-9; M. 
McCord Adams, William Ockham, vol. 2, pp. 648-50.   
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elements on either side of a transformation, according to the Latin translation, as 
symbola ('hot' was a symbolum in the case of the transformation from fire to air, for 
example).629  Scholastic theologians would apply the concept of symbola to all other 
cases of substantial change, and refer to any accidental features that were shared by 
the substances on either side of a case of substantial change as symbola.   
Thomas of Sutton had argued in his direct commentary on this passage, then, that 
a living and freshly dead body look the same because they really share common 
accidental forms, which remain the same in number across the soul's separation.630  
These common accidents, one of which is quantitative structure, or 'indeterminate 
quantity' (quantitas indeterminata), remain identical across substantial change because 
their subject, a generic bodily substantial form, also remains.631  He had cited 
Averroes' De substantia orbis in support of this analysis.632  Francis Kelley supposes, in 
the introduction to his edition of this commentary, that Thomas of Sutton changed 
his stance towards Averroes' theory of bodily continuity because the Dominican had 
'finally understood the incompatibility of the Averroist doctrine and the unity of form 
thesis'.633  It would be more accurate to say simply that, in De pluralitate formarum, 
Thomas of Sutton rejected the pluralist thesis, whilst continuing to uphold the principle 
of the ontological priority of substance to accident, without making a particular 
exception for a quantitative structure in matter, an exception which the 
Commentator had made, and which Aquinas appeared to be trying to make in his 
work on the general resurrection. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629 Passage beginning, 'Quecumque quidem enim habent simbolum ad invicem'.  Aristotle, DGEC 
331a24ff. (ed.) Judycka, p. 59. 
630 Passage beginning, 'Preterea ostendendo hoc sic: si ex ictu fulfuris vel alio casu subito, moriatur 
homo et equus, videmus corpus hominis similis figure esse post mortem et ante'.  Expositionis D. Thomae 
Aquinatis in Libros Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione.  Continuatio per Thoma de Sutona (ed.) Kelley, p. 140.  
631  'Manifestum est autem quod dimensiones accidunt communiter omnibus generabilibus et 
corruptibilibus.  Oportet igitur quod consequantur genus commune omnibus tanquam suum 
subiectum.  Et hoc genus est corpus...', 'Corpus autem prout est subiectum quantitas indeterminate, 
precedit naturaliter illam quantitatem, sicut subiectum naturaliter precedit suum accidens... Et ideo 
necesse est ut quantitas indeterminata semper manet eadem numero in onme generatione, quia 
semper manet suum subiectum'.  ibid., pp. 141-2.  
632 Passage beginning, 'Averroys enim ponit rationabiliter quod huiusmodi accidentia communia 
remanent eadem numero.  Dicit enim in libro de Substantia Orbis'.  ibid., p. 140.   
633 ibid., editor's introduction, p. 13. 
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Turning directly to Thomas of Sutton's discussion of the theological implications of 
his account of postmortem bodily continuity, the Dominican simply wants to 
maintain that the matter that persists in a dead body can meaningfully be called the 
same as the matter that subsisted in the living body, even if this idea is in tension with 
the idea that all that persists across any case of substantial change is prime matter.  He 
argues that a saint's dead body is rightly held in the highest veneration both because of 
its material identity with the saint's living body (this material identity, Thomas of 
Sutton protests, is 'manifest'), and because its substantial and accidental forms are left 
as relics of the saint's living body, or, better of the saint's soul (because they succeed 
that soul in the order to nature, rather as children are 'relics' of their parents) which 
exists in a state of joy in the company of the Angels.634   
Thomas of Sutton does not tackle head-on the awkward idea that a new 
substantial form might have been introduced into Christ's dead body, however.  He 
merely argues (along lines established by Aquinas635) that, whatever one's position on 
the number of substantial forms in a human being, Christ's dead body cannot have 
been formally the same as His living body, because it underwent a true death.636  The 
identity of the matter in Christ's body, along with the continuing identity of the 
divine supposit to which that matter is inseparably joined, must therefore between 
them suffice to safeguard the numerical identity of Christ's dead body with His living 
body, even if it was formally different (because it was not alive), and therefore in that 
sense not totally the same, in the three days of His death.  Although he has provided 
no particularly concrete account of postmortem bodily continuity in De pluralitate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 'Si igitur non manet eadem forma corporis post mortem... sequitur quod corpus Petri est naturae 
alterius.  Sed enim ad omnia quae apparent in corpore et sunt ex separatione animae Petri, ibi sunt 
reliquiae, scilicet corporis vivi.  Manifestum est enim quod materia est eadem numero quae prius. 
Forma etiam, licet alia sit, tamen, propter separationem animae, ibi relinquitur tamquam quaedam 
reliquia, ut ita dicam, animae separatae.  Similiter et omnia accidentia relinquuntur similia... et ideo 
dignum est quod corpora sanctorum in magna veneratione habeantur ab hominibus, quia sunt 
reliquiae eorum quorum animae laetantur cum Angelis'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 7, ad 9, in 
Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.75-100.  
635 See above, p. 190 and n. 524. 
636 'si autem post separationem animae mansisset corpus idem secundum formam quae prius, jam 
idem corpus non fuit solutum post mortem proprie loquendo'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 8, ad 9, in 
Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 577, ll.150-75. 
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formarum, then, Thomas of Sutton clearly thinks this argument is a good enough reply 
to pluralist criticism regarding the identity of Christ's dead body.637  
Evidently conscious, even so, that he has offered a rather thin account of 
postmortem material continuity in this discussion of Christ's corpse, Thomas of 
Sutton refers his reader onward to a more robust account of postmortem bodily 
continuity given by 'some masters' (aliqui magistri).  Nobody contests the notion, he 
repeats, that the body's matter remains the same in number across its death.  The 
further account to which he refers can explain how the body, just as the material part 
of the human individual, remains structured and organised after its death, not as 
composed of different things, but with a certain relation to its formal determinations 
(cum tali modo se habendi): in this sense, according to this account, the dead body really 
remains the same as the living body.638 
The account in question is found in Giles of Rome's De gradibus formarum, which 
works better as a counterpoint than as an addendum to Thomas of Sutton's rather 
intellectually barren treatment of the topic of postmortem bodily continuity.639  Giles 
of Rome had developed the idea that the matter in an individual human body is 
composite in itself insofar as it admits of a certain mode or manner of bearing a 
relation to something else (modus se habendi), or in other words insofar as it is composed 
for something (huic), if not from different things (ex hiis).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637 'dicendum quod corpus Christi vivum et mortuum est idem numero propter identitatem hypostasis, 
licet eandem formam non habeat vivum et mortuum...  Cum enim vita sit aliquid corporis vivi, 
consequens est quod corpus quod desinit esse vivum non totaliter idem remaneat.  Manet tamen idem 
numero secundum suppositum.  Non enim habuit aliam hypostasim vivum et mortuum praeter 
hypostasim verbi Dei.  Est etiam idem secundum materiam, licet non secundum formam.  Et 
advertendum est quod ista identitas corporis secundum suppositum et secundum materiam sufficere 
debet adversariis ad identitatem formalem, quia hoc necessario debent illi dicere qui ponunt formam 
corporis esse aliam ab anima'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 7, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia 
(ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.25-50. 
638 'Potest autem hoc idem salvari faciliter, ponendo, sicut aliqui magistri ponunt, quod hoc nomen 
corpus, prout significat partem materialem hominis, non includit in sua significatione formam, sed 
significat materiam prout conjuncta est quantitati tali et naturae tali, et organisata ita... et sic 
significata materia non est aliud quam materia.  Non enim est aliud compositum ex diversis, sed est 
materia quae est simpliciter cum tali modo se habendi.  Quia igitur nulli dubium est quin materia 
fuerit eadem numero ante mortem et post, planum est quod corpus fuit idem accepta significatione 
hujus nominis corpus, non solum per communem modum loquendi, sed per existentiam rei'.  Thomas 
of Sutton, DPF, pt. 8, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 7, p. 577, ll.200-250.  
639 For further commentary on Giles of Rome's thoought on postmortem bodily continuity in the case 
of Christ, see C. König-Pralong, 'Corps, cadavre matière. Autour de Gilles de Rome, Henri de Gand 
et Dietrich de Freiberg', Quaestio, 7 (2007), esp. pp. 344-9.  
	   	   	  228 
This composition in matter, Giles of Rome explains in De gradibus formarum, is the 
result of matter's union with accidental forms.  When matter is joined to the structural 
form quantitas, for example, the result is a certain modus se habendi, or determination in 
matter, such that matter is extended and has, in itself, organic parts.  The extended 
parts of this composite matter are really distinct from the extended parts of the 
structural form.  Composite matter, Giles of Rome emphasises, consists of nothing 
beyond the essence of matter itself.  So if we use the word 'body' to refer to just the 
material part of the human composite, considered in distinction from any accidental 
or substantial form, including the quantitative structure for which (huic) it is 
composed, it is composite matter that is being referred to.640   Again, the terms 'flesh' and 
'bone', when applied just to the material part of the human, refer to composite matter 
as it bears a relation to all of the physical qualities appropriate to flesh and bone: 
softness, hardness and the like.641  Composite matter is what Giles of Rome refers to 
as proximate or 'close' (propinqua) matter (equivalent to 'proper' matter) as opposed to 
prime matter.642  
At the crux of Giles of Rome's account of postmortem bodily continuity is the 
idea that the individual body's composite matter retains much of its complexity across 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 'Verum est quod superius dicebatur, quod sola materia potest quid compositum dicere et, ut quid 
compositum nominat, potest corporis nominationem suscipere... Semper enim remanet dubium 
quomodo materia extensa et habens partes, que quodammodo quid compositum nominat, potest 
dicere solam materiam, cum sola materia, ut videtur, quod compositum nominare non possit.  Ad 
huius difficultatis intelligentiam, valet illa communis distinctio quod duplex est compositio: ex his et 
huic... Manifestum est quidem quod sola materia nullo modo potest dicere quid compositum ex his, 
quia, omne quod ex his realiter componitur, habet in se duo componentia que realiter differunt... 
materia extensa ergo, licet solam materiam nominet, dicit tamen quid compositum non ex his sed 
huic, quia dicit quod compositum quantitati... aliquid resultat in materia ex eo quod coniungit 
quantitati et forme, quia materia de se est indeterminata et inextensa; coniuncta vero quantitati 
determinatur et extenditur.  Et quia alius modus se habendi..., ut est extensa, competit materie ex eo 
quod coniungitur quantitati... materia extensa dicit quid compositum huic, ut quid compositum 
quantitati'.  Giles of Rome, De gradibus formarum, pt. 2, ch. 2, f. 99ra (my emphasis and punctuation).   
641 'Hiis viis de levi apparet quod significatur nomine carnis et ossis... cum altera pars compositi in 
animalibus non dicat materiam quocumque modo sumptam, sed materiam et extensam et 
organicatam et affectam per debitas qualitates physicas, huius materia prout erat affecta alia et alia 
qualitate physica, aliud et aliud sortitur vocabulum: ut affecta per duritiem et alias qualitates debitas 
nominabitur os, affecta vero per molliciem et per alias qualitates debitas vocabitur caro'.  ibid., pt. 2, 
ch. 3, f. 99vb (my punctuation).   
642 'Ex hoc autem patere potest quod materia sic accepta, ut dicitur corpus aut caro aut os, non est 
materia sumpta secundum se.  Et sic differt materia prima et proxima: ita quod si consideretur materia 
secundum suam essentiam solum, prout non est organicata secumdum aliquam dispositionem 
partium, nec est affecta per aliquam qualitatem, sic accipiatur ut est prima, et hoc modo est una in 
omnibus habentibus eam.  Sed si sumatur materia ut est organicata et extensa, sic potest dici corpus... 
secundum quod est altera pars compositi'.  ibid., pt. 2, ch. 4, f. 100rb (my punctuation). 
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bodily death, because the living body and the corpse really share identical accidental 
forms, or symbola, even if they share no substantial form in common.  To make this 
argument, he draws upon an account of the corpse from Avicenna's scientific 
encyclopedia known in Latin by the title Sufficientia (but without citing Avicenna's 
authority).  Giles of Rome explains, following Avicenna, that some accidents 'hold 
themselves' (tenent se) 'from', or are grounded in, the material part of the composite (ex 
parte materie), whilst others 'hold themselves from' the (substantial) formal part (ex parte 
forme).  Avicenna had cited the blackness of an Ethiopian's skin, scar tissue, and bodily 
extension as accidents that are ex parte materiae, and hope, joy and the ability to laugh 
as accidents that are ex parte formae, in humans.643   
Giles of Rome concludes that it is probable that the symbola shared by the living 
and dead body that are ex parte materie can remain the same in number in the living and 
dead body, especially since matter is the principle of individuation (and therefore the 
very basis for the individuality of those accidental forms).644  The physical accidents 
of flesh and bone all hold themselves ex parte materiae, and with these symbola 
remaining the same in number across death, the dead body's matter really retains the 
very same composition, or modus se habendi, in relation to those accidents.645   
This brief reference to Giles of Rome's work is the closest that Thomas of Sutton 
comes to offering a positive and constructive account of postmortem bodily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 'Horum autem accidentia... sunt... quaedam que consequuntur materiam ut nigredo ethyiopis et 
cicatrices vulnerum et extensio stature.  Sunt enim quaedam que consequuntur formam sicut spes et 
gaudium et potentia ridendi et cetera in hominibus... Que vero consequuntur ex parte materiae 
aliquando remanent post forma, sicut cicatrices vulnerum, et nigredo ethyopis post mortem'.  
Avicenna, Sufficientia, Bk I, ch. 6, in Opera Philosophica, Venise, 1508, repr. (Louvain: Edition de la 
bibliothèque S.J., 1961), f. 17r, B.  Cf. Giles of Rome, De gradibus formarum, pt 2, ch. 5, f. 100va, 
passage beginning, 'Nam licet materia ut subiecta sic forme sit causa omnium accidentium que fiunt in 
ea, ut dicit primo physicorum, aliqua tamen accidentia magis tenent se ex parte materiae et alia vero 
magis ex parte formae'.   
644 For Giles of Rome's thought on individuation, see L. Peterson, 'Cardinal Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) 
(b. 1468; d. 1534) and Giles of Rome (b. ca. 1243/47; d. 1316)' in Gracia (ed.), Individuation in 
Scholasticism, esp. pp. 434-7.  
645 'Cum ergo dicitur qualitas simbola non manet idem numero in re corrupta et generata, ut quidam 
volunt, hoc intelligendum est de qualitate simbola se tenente ex parte formae, et non de qualitate 
simbola se tenente ex parte materiae... si simbola se teneat ex parte materiae, cum materia sit 
individuacionis principium et maneat idem numero, probabiliter, ut videtur, poterit sustineri quod, 
quantum ad individuationem et quantum ad identitatem materialem, huiusmodi proprietas poterit 
eadem numero remanere... manet.. realiter eadem quantitas simbolica se tenens ex parte materia.  Et 
quia mollicies et alia accidentia physica quibus affecta materia nominat caro tenent se ex parte 
materie, poterunt eedem realiter remanere'. Giles of Rome, De gradibus formarum, pt. 2, ch. 5, f. 100vb 
(my punctuation).    
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continuity in De pluralitate formarum.  Of course, the two accounts are mutually 
incompatible: Thomas of Sutton himself would deny both that any accidents remain 
the same in number in the body across its death, and the notion that there can be any 
complexity on the part of the individual body's matter in itself. 
Finally, there is Thomas of Sutton's analytical critique of the consequences of 
pluralist theory for bodily identity at the resurrection.  He presents this critique as 
one commonly put forward by defenders of Aquinas's philosophy, rather than as one 
that he has developed independently.  In short, he sets out an argument of the sort 
that irritated Roger Marston,646 that is to say, an argument designed to demonstrate 
that it would be absolutely impossible, even for divine power, to reconstruct, in each 
case, the very same bodily form that previously corrupted into matter, even if that 
form somehow remained in matter after its decomposition.647   
Such a form would have to return, Thomas of Sutton explains, by being drawn 
out of matter.  However, he goes on, if a form were to be educed from and received 
by matter in this way, then matter would individuate it.  (There is a clear tension 
between this last comment and Thomas of Sutton's suggestion that it is form that 
individuates matter, so it is important to bear in mind at this stage in the analysis that 
this argument on the resurrection probably did not originate with him).  The bodily 
form, so the argument goes, would be individuated anew at the resurrection, despite 
the fact that divine power would be the agent of its reconstruction: it is not the agent 
that individuates the form; it is matter, as the principle of individuation.648  There 
would, therefore, be a contradiction, impossible to produce even for God, that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646 See above, pp. 206-7.  
647 'Certum enim quod talis forma si esset, esset corruptibilis.  Impossibile est ergo quod ipsa eadem 
numero redeat in resurrectione generali etiam miraculose'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 7, ad 9, in 
Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.25-50.  
648  '[Talis forma] Redibit ergo per eductionem de materia... Licet igitur ejus eductio ponitur 
miraculosa per virtutem divinam immediate, educentem, tamen individuatio ejus est naturalis.  
Individuatio enim talis formae non attribuitur agenti, sed materiae, quae est principium 
individuationis. Cum igitur ponatur quod materia de novo recipiat formam illam, sequitur quod 
materia novam ipsius individuationem causet, et per consequens aliam unitatem numeralem ab illa 
quam prius habuit... Ergo forma quae ponitur redire eadem numero, non esset eadem numero'.  
Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 8, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.1-
50.  
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supposed bodily form would be both the same in number, and different in number.649  
Furthermore, Thomas of Sutton continues, if God were, instead, simply to repair an 
individual body from nothing, this would not be resurrection, but rather a divine 
production of bodies: resurrection is precisely of that which perished and which remains 
afterwards, at least in its parts.650   
In the face of this argument, Thomas of Sutton suggests, the pluralists can choose 
one of two options, admitting defeat either way.  They can choose to maintain their 
pluralist position whilst abandoning the idea that the identity of a corporeal form is in 
fact necessary for bodily identity, in which case their objection regarding the formal 
identity of Christ's dead body collapses.  Or they can accept along with Thomas of 
Sutton's group (or 'with us'), that the incorruptible soul is the body's only substantial 
form, in order that the formal identity of the resurrected body be preserved: they can 
argue, that is to say, that from the very same principles, both formal (the soul) and 
material, each human body will be reconstructed the same in number at the 
resurrection.651  
These last comments again bring to the surface the tension between Thomas of 
Sutton's account of the individual body, on the one hand, and commonly held 
theological presuppositions, on the other.  Just as he wants to argue that Christ's body 
remains materially the same in come concrete sense across His death, Thomas of 
Sutton also wants to endorse the traditional view that each body will be resurrected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 'Includit enim contradictionem... Si igitur forma rediret, necessario esset alia numero a priori; et ita 
esset eadem numero, et non eadem numero secundum essentiam, quae includat contradictionem'.  
Thomas of Sutton, DPF, pt. 7, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.25-
50.    
650 'Secus autem esset, si poneretur quod Deus adnihilaret aliquod totum compositum et illud postea 
repararet.  Illud enim posset reparari idem numero, quia, non esset nova individuatio formae per 
novam receptionem ejus in materia... sed esset ipsius formae individuatae cum sua materia reparatio...  
Dato quod illa forma quae corrupta erat rediret miraculose eadem numero, adhuc secundum istam 
viam non esset proprie loquendo corporum resurrectio futura, sed esset corporum proprie productio.  
Resurrectio enim est ejus quod cecidit, quod manet postea, saltem secundum suas partes'.  Thomas of 
Sutton, DPF, pt. 8, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.25-50. 
651 'Aut igitur concedant quod ad identitatem corporis secundum numerum non requiritur quod 
habeat eandem formam per quam sit corpus, et tunc cessat ista de corpore Christi objectio.  Aut 
dicant nobiscum quod corpus hominis est corpus per animam, et quod ipsa propter suam 
incorruptibilitatem manebit eadem numero et eidem materiae corporali unietur respective; et sic ex 
eisdem principiis tam formali quam materiali resurget idem corpus numero'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, 
pt. 7, ad 9, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (ed.) R. Busa, vol. 7, p. 576, ll.50-100.  
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from its own matter, even though he elsewhere denies that a individual body's matter 
makes a distinct contribution to its individuality.  
It is certainly possible that the gap between Thomas of Sutton's theological and 
philosophical thinking in De pluralitate formarum, manifest in the very layout of the 
treatise, was due to his only recently having progressed to study Theology.  A swift 
glance towards those of his works he produced as master in Theology over a decade 
later reveals that his mature thought on the composition of human nature was much 
closer to Aquinas's. 652    In his Quodlibet I, q. 21, debated very soon after his 
promotion, Thomas of Sutton points to dimensive quantity as the 'radical principle of 
individuation' in a material substance.653  And, in his Quaestiones Ordinariae q. 18, we 
find Thomas of Sutton arguing that each human soul is distinct due to a certain 
'proportion' or intrinsic difference that it receives from the body in which it comes 
into being (accipit a corpore quandam proportionem), and that each soul retains its 
proportion its own body after bodily death, in the same way that the impression of a 
seal remains on wax after the seal is removed.654  
2. Robert of Orford's Sciendum (1282-83) and the anonymous De 
natura materiae  
Robert of Orford completed Sciendum,655 his response to William de la Mare's 
Correctorium fratris Thomae, when still a bachelor in Theology.  He became regent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652 On the dating of these works, see Thomas of Sutton, Quaestiones Ordinariae (ed.) J. Schneider 
(München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), editor's introduction, pp. 45-
54.  
653 Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibeta (ed.) M. Schmaus (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1969), I, q. 21, response, see esp. pp. 140-1.  For commentary on this quodlibet, see 
Pickavé, 'The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in Quodlibeta (1277-CA. 1320): A Forest 
Map', pp. 60-3. 
654 Thomas of Sutton, Quaestiones Ordinariae (ed.) J. Schneider, q. 18, ad 19, p. 519.  
655 Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Sciendum" (hereafter Sciendum) (ed.) P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques 
thomistes, II (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1956).  Robert of Orford declared that he had 
written a response to the Correctorium fratris Thomae in his later writings against Giles of Rome and 
Henry of Ghent.  On the attribution of Sciendum to Robert of Orford, and for a brief comparison of the 
content of Sciendum with that of these later texts, see the extended discussion in Vella, Robert of Orford 
and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford, pp. 78-88.  
	   	   	  233 
master in Theology at Oxford in the late 1280s or early 1290s, and died in 1293.656  
During his regency, he composed an "anti-Quodlibet", a question-by-question 
refutation of Henry of Ghent's Quodlibeta I-XIV.  Given Henry of Ghent's interest in 
the topic, this work surely contains Robert of Orford's mature reflections on 
postmortem bodily continuity; it must be set aside now nonetheless, and reserved for 
a further study.657  
In the context of his reply to article 31 of the Correctorium fratris Thomae, Robert of 
Orford develops an account of the composition of human being that could hardly be 
more different from the one that Thomas of Sutton gives in De pluralitate formarum.  It 
is the product of a completely different, explicitly conciliatory, approach to the 
debate with the pluralists.  Discussing the theory of the unicity of substantial form in 
humans again elsewhere in Sciendum, Robert of Orford states his general intention to 
resolve the differences between the competing theories of human nature rather than 
to oppose the one to the other; he will, he says, respond in an original way (meo modo) 
to de la Mare.658  The result is a hybrid of Aquinas's and a pluralist theory of the 
composition of human nature, which radically emphasises the independence of body 
from soul, on the one hand, at the expense of the unity of the human being, on the 
other.  The treatment of the general resurrection in De natura materiae, which was 
probably written by Robert of Orford, again represents an attempt to find a middle 
ground between Aquinas's and pluralist thinking: it certainly does not fit into the 
pattern of argument already established by Giles of Lessines and Thomas of Sutton.  
Robert of Orford begins article 31 of Sciendum by setting out a crucial distinction 
that he will go on to use to explain the body's postmortem continuity.  In any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656 Robert of Orford was also known as Robert of Colletorto or Robert of Torto Collo.  For a 
summary account of his life and works, see Robert d'Orford, Reprobationes dictorum a fratre egidio (ed.) Vella, 
editor's introduction, pp. 9-24; Vella, Robert of Orford and his Place in the Scholastic Controversies at Oxford, 
pp. 1-27; Roensch, Early Thomistic School, pp. 41-4.     
657 This 'anti-Quodlibet' is preserved in two manuscripts.  See brief comments in Friedman, 'Dominican 
Quodlibetal Literature, CA. 1260-1330', pp. 420-2; and Vella, Robert of Orford and his Place in the 
Scholastic Controversies at Oxford p. 89.  See also F. E. Kelley, 'Two Early English Thomists: Thomas 
Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent', The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 45 (1981), pp. 
345-87, for Robert of Orford's responses to Henry of Ghent on the distinction between essence and 
esse, the distinction between the soul and its faculties, and the creation of matter without form.  
658  'principalis intentio in hoc opusculo est magis solvere quam opponere [...] et meo modo 
respondissem'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 90bis (Utrum anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetibilis sint una 
substantia in homine) (ed.) P. Glorieux, p. 314.  
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composite of matter and form, Robert of Orford explains, using Boethian 
language, 659  there are two things to consider: first, what it is (quod est), or its 
composition from matter and form, on the one hand, and second, that which makes it to 
be what it is (quo est).  That which makes something to be what it is efficiently is its agent 
cause.  That which makes something to be what it is formally is the substantial form 
giving it its act of existence (esse).660   
Aquinas's gloss on this Boethian distinction had underlined, further, the difference 
between, on the one hand, the substantial form that was quo est for any composite, 
and, on the other hand, esse, the act of existence communicated to the composite by 
its substantial form.661  Again, for Aquinas, substantial form (as a component of the 
human essence), and esse were related as potency and act respectively.  Robert of 
Orford, in contrast, does not explore, at least not in Sciendum, the relationship 
between the substantial form giving to the composite its act of existence, and the act 
of existence itself.  
Robert of Orford, then, applies this distinction between quod est and quo est 
directly to the body.  The rational soul is quo est with respect to the body: the soul gives 
the body its act of existence, just as it gives to the whole human being a single act of 
existence.  Robert of Orford refers to the soul as the 'form of the whole' (forma totius) 
in the human individual.  Robert of Orford's referent for forma totius is therefore 
different from Aquinas's, which was the human being's composite essence.662  Robert 
of Orford argues, along lines that are by now broadly familiar, that there can only be 
one substantial form in any composite that gives it the totality of its substantial esse; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Cf. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 421.  
660 'sciendum quod in omni re composita ex materia et forma est duo considerare, scilicet quod est et 
quo est.  Quod est, est ipsum suppositum subsistens compositum ex utroque; quo est, est forma.  Sed 
hoc contingit dupliciter: vel quo est effective vel quo est formaliter; quo est effective est ipsum efficiens 
sive potentia effectiva cui assimilatur effectus; quo est formaliter est forma ipsius effectus.  Forma igitur 
est principium essendi euis cuius est forma, non effectivum sed formale... principium essendi 
simpliciter... est forma substantialis...'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 137-8.    
661 Cf. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 421.  
662 See above, p. 114-5, and cf. Kelley, 'The Egidian Influence in Robert Orford's doctrine on Form', 
p. 87, which corrects Roensch, Early Thomist School, pp. 223-4, on this point.  
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that the composite substance is unified by its act of being; and that more than one act 
of 'total' substantial being would give more than one substance.663  
The extent of the deviation of his own account of the composition of human 
nature from Aquinas's, however, becomes clear when Robert of Orford explains that 
the soul does not enter into what the body is (quod est): the individual human body, as 
Robert of Orford explains in article 31 of Sciendum, consists of matter and several 
'partial' corporeal substantial forms, or forms of parts.  In the same article, and 
elsewhere in Sciendum, Robert of Orford refers to just one corporeal form or corporeitas 
in each human, which he calls a 'form of the part' (forma partis), or 'partial' substantial 
form, to distinguish it from the soul as forma totius.664  The body's partial substantial 
forms, or forms of parts, Robert of Orford writes, do not give esse to the body in their 
own right; they participate in the esse that the soul, as the form of the whole human, 
gives.665   
Robert of Orford narrowly avoids the pluralist label by arguing that there can 
only be one form in any human, the soul, that gives esse to it, and furthermore that this 
form endows the human with a single, complete or 'total', act of substantial being: the 
other 'partial' substantial form or forms in the body do not communicate any act of 
being, or esse, in their own right.  According to Robert of Orford, furthermore, it is 
still in virtue of the form of the whole, the soul that gives existence to the human 
being, and not in virtue of any of the partial substantial forms, that all of the terms 
describing the human being's substantial nature are predicated of it.  It is in virtue of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663 'Si loquamur de esse substantiale totali et de forma quae dat esse substantiale totale, sic impossibile 
est esse plures formas in una re... illa substantia esset non unum totum sed plura tota, quod est 
implicatio contradictionis, nam una re esset plures res'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) 
Glorieux, p. 138.   
664 Cf. Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 and a. 114 (forma partis); a. 52 (formae partium and forma partis); a. 
86 (corporeitas, quae fuit forma partis); and a. 107 (forma corporeitatis prout corpus est pars) (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 
139, 203, 311, 335, 341. 
665 'Huiusmodi igitur formae substantiales partiales sunt plures in toto... Quae tamen non dant aliquod 
esse impediente forma totius, sed participant forma totius'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) 
Glorieux, p. 138.  
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one form, he writes, and not from several forms, that we say that the human being is 
'human', 'living', 'animal' and 'body'.666  
And so, whereas Thomas of Sutton, in De pluralitate formarum, had effectively 
collapsed the human nature into the soul, Robert of Orford radically separates the two 
parts of the human essence.  The latter writes that each of the two essential parts of 
human nature, body and soul, has its own, discrete essence or nature, with its own 
form (or 'essence of form').  The two essential parts of human nature, one material 
the other immaterial, are united only insofar as they share a single act of being (esse), 
according to Robert of Orford:667 body and soul do not penetrate one another's very 
natures within the unified human essence, as they did in Aquinas's account of it.  
Robert of Orford explains, then, that the rational soul does not perfect prime 
matter directly, as the pluralists claim in their own rendering of the theory of the 
unicity of substantial form in humans, but only 'in' its proximate matter (analytically 
speaking, inasmuch as proximate matter presupposes prime matter), which is an 
organic body with an optimal complexion.668  The individual body is constructed in 
utero (its agent cause being the formative power taking its origin from the father's 
soul669) through a necessary sequence of stages of development.  Citing Averroes' idea 
that the material principle possesses several habilitates, or potencies,670 Robert of 
Orford explains that matter has an 'amplitude' (amplitudo) intrinsic to it, in virtue of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666 'praedicamenta substantialia... non sumuntur a diversis formis sed ab una et eadem forma; cum 
enim pars non praedicatur de toto, oportet singula praedicamenta accipi a forma totius non a forma 
partis... a forma partis non potest sumi praedicamentum quod dicit totum quod est in re... Ab una 
forma... habet homo quod sit homo et animal et vivum et corpus, non a diversis'.  Robert of Orford, 
Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 139.   
667 'in homine enim est considerare duas partes essentiales, scilicet corpus et animam, quae differunt 
secundum essentiam tamen conveniunt in uno esse; et ita in homine sunt duae essentiae formarum, 
partium scilicet essentialium, sed nonnisi unum esse'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 29 (ed.) Glorieux, 
pp. 132-3.   
668 'anima intellectiva non est perfectio materiae primae absolutae, ut ipsi obiciunt, sed corporis mixti 
optime complexionati, in quo est considerare materiam primam; materia enim proxima praesupponit 
materiam remotam et non e converso.  Anima igitur perficit materiam primam in materia proxima, id 
est corpore organico...'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 143-4.  
669 'illa forma partis non est ab anima generati in hominibus, sed ab anima generantis'.  ibid., p. 139.  
670 'in [materia] est amplitudo ad multas formas et diversas [...] Unde, secundum Commentatorem, 
materia primum habilitatem habet ad formas elementares, et post ad formas mixtorum... deinde 
specierum perfectarum...'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 29 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 131. On habilitates in 
Averroes' work on matter, see above, p. 55, and n. 126. 
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which it is in potency to different forms in a certain order.  According to Robert of 
Orford, these habilitates are not the pluralists' rationes seminales, conceived as active 
potencies or principles of forms,671 but passive and receptive potencies, or 'inclinations' 
or appetites for the different material forms.  He does adopt pluralist language, 
however, in claiming that these forms are 'educed from' the potency of matter by the 
agent of generation.672  
Christ's body, then, can be considered with respect to quod est or quo est.  Christ's 
soul is quo est as far as His body is concerned, and this is separated at His death.  It is 
the separation of the soul, and the body's complete loss of the substantial esse that the 
soul gave to it, that makes Christ's bodily death a true case of corruption in Robert of 
Orford's view.673  The pluralist Roger Marston's account of Christ's corpse, as we 
saw, supposes that the body loses just some of the substantial act of being it had when 
alive.   
But, Robert of Orford continues, if we consider Christ's body with respect to what 
it is (quantum ad id quod est), it is a body composed of His matter and the bodily form 
(the substantial 'form of the part') corresponding to it.  This forma partis survives the 
separation of the soul, and so, with respect to what it is, any individual body can 
survive in its totality and remain the same in number living and dead.674  Of course, it 
bears repeating, Aquinas's own position was emphatically not that the body could 
survive, in its totality, across the separation of the soul: the soul was the body's only 
substantial form and entered into its very nature.  In any case of human death other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671 On rationes seminales as active potencies in matter, see Donati, ‘The Anonymous Commentary on 
the Physics in Erfurt, Cod. Amplon. Q. 312 and Richard Rufus of Cornwall’, pp. 288-99.  
672 'Quod vero dicit Commentator materiam esse unam secundum substantiam, plures secundum 
habilitates, pro nobis est; habilitates enim vocat potentias naturales passivas sive receptivas, sive 
inclinationes seu appetitus naturales materiae ad diversas formas quae per virtutem agentis educuntur 
de potentia materia'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 85 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 303.  
673 'dicendum quod corpus Christ potest accipi dupliciter: vel quod est vel quo est: quo est, in quantum 
anima facit hominem, est forma totius; et istam formam amittit corpus cum per mortem separatur 
anima.  Unde dicit Thomas, in quaestionibus De Anima, quaestione I, in solutione 14 argumenti, 
corpus dicitur corrumpi in quantum deficit ab illo esse quod erat sibi et animae commune; cum enim 
mors sit corruptio, corruptio autem simpliciter sit amissio alicuius formae substantialis, oportet dicere 
si Christus fuerit vere mortuus quod veram substantialem formam amiserit per mortem'.  Robert of 
Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 139.  
674 'Si autem loquamur de corpore Christi quantum ad id quod est, sic est corpus compositum ex 
materia sua et forma sibi correspondente; et sic mansit idem numero vivum et mortuum'.  ibid.   
	   	   	  238 
than Christ's, Robert of Orford thinks, this bodily form remains the same in number 
up until the point at which putrefaction sets in.675  In Christ's case, His body was 
preserved from decay by divine power, 676  and the unbroken hypostatic union 
ensured that there was a greater unity and identity between His body living and 
dead, than in any other case of human death.677   
Like Giles of Lessines, then, Robert of Orford thinks that the form of the corpse 
should not be understood as a form somehow newly introduced into the system.  He 
correctly notes, in article 31 of Sciendum, that Aquinas himself never made the claim 
that a new form was introduced into any dead body.678  Again like Giles of Lessines', 
Robert of Orford's analysis echoes the framework for bodily continuity that Aquinas 
had set out in his commentary on Metaphysica VII.16.  When in the living body, 
Robert of Orford explains, the forma partis is in a state of 'potency, close to act' (potentia 
propinqua actui) with respect to its own esse.679  The bodily form's own prospective act 
of being should be understood as something impeded by the esse which the soul gives, 
according to Robert of Orford:680 when the soul departs, the form, or forms, of the 
body that were in a state of potency close to act 'advance' into act (vadunt in actum).681  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 86 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 310.  
676 Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 144.  
677 'Tamen aliam unitatem praeter unitatem formae partis est reperire in corpore Christi vivi et 
mortui, quae unitas non est in corpore vivo et mortuo alterius hominis, et haec est unitas suppositi, 
quae est maior unitate formae partis'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 86 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 310 (cf. also 
a. 31, p. 141).   
678 'Ad illud quod dicunt quod alia forma substantialis fuit introducta, dicendum quod non, nec 
unquam invenitur hoc Thomas dixisse de corpore Christi'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) 
Glorieux, p. 141.   
679 'esse enim quod corpus habet a forma partis remanet post separationem animae, quod quidem esse 
non habuit in composito... sed remanente esse quod participabat ab anima, est in potentia propinqua 
actui respectu esse proprii'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 114 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 341.  Cf. above, p. 
178. 
680 'forma autem corporis unde corpus est... corpori vivo non dedit esse in actu, impediente forma 
totius; sed forma totius ablata, et ita soluto impediente, forma partis dabit esse in actu et fiet in ratione 
formae totius'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 86 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 310.   
681 Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 142. 
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What was previously the forma partis in the human being, then, succeeds to become 
the dead body's forma totius.682   
Of course, one key difference between Giles of Lessines' account of the individual 
body and postmortem bodily continuty and Robert of Orford's is that the latter posits 
that the corpse's form already subsisted in the living body as a substantial form, albeit a 
'partial' one: for Giles of Lessines, the corpse's form is still a new form; for Robert of 
Orford it is not.  Robert of Orford still wants to maintain, following Aquinas, that the 
dead body remains the same as the living only materially.  He points out that, when 
still alive, 'the part', matter and corporeal form, is material within the whole, or bears 
a material relationship to the soul or forma totius.683  
Now, the very brief treatment of the general resurrection that is included in De 
natura materiae is closely related to article 29 of Sciendum, a discussion of individuation 
in which Robert of Orford sets out the role that dimensive quantity plays in the 
individuation of material things.  Aquinas himself, of course, had grounded the 
relative independence of the body within the human being upon the accidental 
structuring form dimensive quantity, rather than on any substantial form: dimensive 
quantity was the most closely related accident to substance in Aquinas's view.684  Robert 
of Orford gives quantitative structure a clear role in individuation, too, as the only 
form capable of physically dividing matter: he explains that quantitas dimensiva is the 
'intrinsic, sine qua non' cause of individuation in a material thing, alongside matter as 
the 'intrinsic, per se' cause of individuation.685   
In the same article, Robert of Orford outlines the relationship between the body's 
quantitative structure and its corporeal 'form of the part'.  Doing so, he reproduces a 
passage from chapter 4 of De natura materiae, which explains that dimensions, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682 'non introducitur nova forma quia hoc natura non intendit; sed remota forma totius, forma partis 
quae prius forma partis erat fit forma totius, quia corpus quod fuit pars animalis viventis, separata 
anima, est quoddam totum in se ab alia forma quam ab anima quae prius erat forma totius'.  ibid.  
683 'Et quia pars est materia respectu totius, ideo respiciendo formam totius non manet nisi idem 
corpus materialiter, vivum et mortuum'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 86 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 310.    
684 See above, p. 123.  
685   Passage beginning, 'Causa individuationis est causa limitationis formae ad materiam 
determinatam'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 29 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 124 (cf. also a. 11, p. 67, passage 
beginning, 'Materia autem habere partem, non est intelligere nisi prout est sub dimensionibus').  
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quantitative structure, 'follow' matter 'in order to' this corporeal form, or 'draw their 
origin' (trahunt originem) from corporeal form686 (it is not temporal, but ontological 
posteriority that is being implied here).  The discussion in Sciendum article 29 then 
diverges slightly from the text in De natura materiae and explains that, given this, when 
the soul is separated, the body's new forma totius gives this same accidental quantitative 
structure a new act of existence.687 The analysis in De natura materiae, however, 
continues beyond the point of bodily decomposition, and develops into a discussion 
of the general resurrection.  
This discussion is highly compact, and rather out of place in De natura materiae, 
which otherwise confines its discussion to a purely philosophical plane.  As indicated, 
the account of the general resurrection in De natura materia bears some similarities to a 
pluralist account of resurrection: the author treats the accidental quantitative 
structure (referred to simply as dimensiones) belonging to an individual body like a 
pluralist's corporeal form.   
So there are three principles, according to the author of De natura materiae, that 
need to return the same to an individual body at the resurrection, in order for its 
numerical identity to be safeguarded: the soul, the body's matter, and its structure 
(dimensiones).  Aquinas, of course, had thought that only two principles needed return 
to each resurrected human: their individual matter (which traces of the individual 
body's accidental structure simply served to mark out for resurrection in their body) 
and their individual soul.  The reason why an individual's structure needs to return 
numerically the same, the author of De natura materiae notes, is precisely because of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686  Passage beginning, 'Sciendum igitur est quod dimensiones sunt quaedam accidentia quae 
consequuntur materiam in ordine ad formam quae primo nata est in materia induci.  Haec autem est 
forma corporis'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 29 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 131.  Cf. De natura materiae (ed.) J. 
M. Wyss (Louvain: éditions E. Nauwelaerts, 1953), pp. 111-2.  
687 'Forma igitur corporis secundum quod corpus est pars humanae naturae, quia non dat esse non 
causat dimensiones, sed est in potentia ut causet... ita quod separata anima causabit dimensiones actu 
et dabit esse actu'.  Robert of Orford, Sciendum, a. 29 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 133.  This excerpt summarises 
Robert of Orford's basic argument, and will suffice for present purposes.  The discussion from which it 
is taken concerns the correct application of the Averroan vocabulary of 'indeterminate' and 
'determinate' dimensions to an analysis of natural bodies.  After rejecting the way in which Averroes 
himself applied this vocabulary, Robert of Orford suggests that quantitative structure is 'indeterminate' 
whilst the bodily form upon which it follows is forma partis, and then becomes 'determinate' once this 
bodily form succeeds to become forma totius in the corpse.  
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role in individuation.688  The author's implicit argument would appear to be that the 
individual body's corporeal form can be reconstructed, identical, from its matter, 
only because of the continuity of an individualised and individuating quantitative 
structure in that matter.  
After its bodily subject decomposes, then, an individual bodily structure is 
'reduced' (redigi) into the body's matter and remains in it in potency, and crucially, 
only with respect to the divine agent.  This avoids the false result (according to the 
axiom on continuity and identity from Aristotle's De generation et corruptione) that the 
same structure, and therefore the same body, could return naturally.689  So God can 
'educe' a structure that is numerically the same for each body, the explanation 
continues, and when the same matter, the same structure (and presumably, therefore, 
the same corporeal form individuated by that structure) and the same soul are 
reunited, the same individual human being will rise again.690  
This short aside on the topic of the general resurrection is out of place in De natura 
materiae, not only because it is a treatment of a theological topic, but also because it 
contains certain ideas that are rather inconsistent with assertions that the author 
makes elsewhere in the tract.  In chapter 1 of De natura materiae, the author had 
argued that matter is the principle of individuation, and that quantitative structure 
merely indicates the individual to the senses by locating it in space and time:691 if 
Robert of Orford did author De natura materiae, then he had clearly changed his mind 
on individuation by the time he came to write Sciendum.  Moreover, the author had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 'Ex quibus patet quod idem homo numero resurget et non alius, cum omnia principia sua eadem 
numero redeant ad invicem.  Anima enim humana simpliciter eadem numero manet post mortem... 
Materia etiam eadem manet, cum materia sit incorruptibilis.  Easdem etiam dimensiones necesse est 
manere in materia nonnisi in potentia... quia aliter non foret idem numero individuum, cum 
dimensiones agant ad individuationem'.  De natura materiae, ch 4 (ed.) Wyss, p. 116.  
689 'Manifestum est etiam subiecto eodem [i.e. the corporeal form] manente et durante, dimensiones 
easdem manere et, ipso corrupto, redigi in materiam eamdem, de qua iterum eaedem numero educi 
non possunt per naturam...  si tamen per miraculum educuntur eaedem numero, natae sunt ad 
eumdem actum animae accipi...  Easdem etiam dimensiones necesse est manere in materia nonnisi in 
potentia, aliter agens physicum easdem numero produceret, quod falsum est.  Manent ergo in potentia 
materiae eaedem numero respectu agentis divini'.  ibid. (my insertion).   
690 'et ideo ex eadem materia et eisdem dimensionibus cum anima eadem erit idem homo qui resurget 
et non alius'.  ibid.  
691 Passage beginning, 'Ad hanc igitur divisionem formarum non requiritur in materia dimensio'.  De 
natura materiae, ch. 1 (ed.) Wyss, pp. 92-3, and editor's commentary, p. 67.   
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devoted chapters 2 and 3 of De natura materiae to an examination of Averroes' work on 
the continuity of quantitative structure across substantial change only in order to 
disprove the notion that such a structure could remain in matter.692   
The philosophical account of the composition of human nature that Robert of 
Orford set out in article 31 of Sciendum was clearly shaped by a consideration of how 
an account of the identity of Christ's corpse might be given.  The author of De natura 
materiae, however, who might well have been the same Dominican scholar at a slightly 
earlier stage in his career, did not let a consideration of the general resurrection drive 
his philosophical analysis of matter itself, even if he evidently realised the relevance of 
that particular theological topic to an account of the nature of matter.  The pattern 
was similar with Thomas of Sutton's De pluralitate formarum: that treatise, too, was the 
work of a new bachelor in Theology still unaccustomed, it would seem, to allowing 
theological considerations to fundamentally inform his analysis of the natural world.  
It is no coincidence that Richard Knapwell's Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, to 
be discussed next, is, on the one hand, the only Dominican text discussed in this 
chapter to have been composed by a master in Theology, and, on the other hand, the 
only Dominican text both to offer a unified response to the problems of the identity of 
Christ's dead corpse and the general resurrection, and, in this very context, to set out 
a detailed natural philosophical analysis of postmortem bodily and material 
continuity.   
3. Richard Knapwell: Quare (1278) and the Quaestio disputata de 
unitate formae (1285)  
Richard Knapwell's two major contributions to the debate surrounding Aquinas's 
theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological implications 
were written at either end of his career as a theologian.693  He wrote Quare, the 
earliest surviving point-by-point response to William de la Mare's Correctorium fratris 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 ibid., pp. 67-9.   
693 For a biographical summary, see Roensch, Early Thomistic School, pp. 34-9.   
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Thomae, whilst still a bachelor of theology.694  His Quaestio disputata de unitate formae was 
composed after he had incepted as master in Theology in 1284-85.  It is the only 
Dominican work on the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans and its 
theological consequences that survives from Oxford from the period separating 
Peckham's first formal attempt to prevent the theory of the unicity of substantial form 
in humans being taught at Oxford, on 29 October 1284, and the Archbishop's 
condemnation of the theory in London, on 30 April 1286.  It would be Knapwell's 
last theological work.  Not only was the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae the proximate 
target of the condemnation, Peckham also excommunicated Knapwell on the same 
day, effectively ending the Dominican's career.   
Quare and the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae have different objectives.  In article 
31 of Quare, Knapwell aims to demonstrate that no heresy follows from Aquinas's 
position on the composition of human nature, and moreover that pluralist theory 
cannot evade Aquinas's criticism of it. 695   As Francis Kelley has pointed out, 
Knapwell would rely, elsewhere in Quare, upon arguments from Thomas of Sutton's 
De pluralitate formarum and another tract written by Thomas of Sutton at around the 
same time, De productione formae substantialis,696 in order to complete his philosophical 
criticism of certain aspects of the pluralist position, including the pluralist account of 
substantial change.697  Nonetheless, the account of postmortem bodily continuity in 
the case of Christ that Knapwell offers in Quare is his own.  It is brief: Knapwell says 
just enough in article 31 of Quare to meet his stated objective, and certainly does not 
venture beyond it.  Since his short treatment of the topic in Quare is compatible with 
the penetrating account of postmortem bodily continuity that Knapwell would later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
694 Quare is edited along with de la Mare's Correctorium fratris Thomae in Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare" 
(hereafter Quare) (ed.) P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes 1 (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927).  On 
Knapwell's authorship of Quare, see Knapwell, QDUF (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction, pp. 18-23.    
695 'Nostrum autem in proposito erit ostendere quod nullum inconveniens vel haeresis sequitur ex illa 
positione [i.e. the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans], et quod isti, per suas 
responsiones, argumenta fratris Thomae non evadunt'.  Knapwell, Quare, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 135 
(my insertion).   
696 De productione formae substantialis is edited: S. Włodek, 'Thomas Sutton, de productione formae 
substantialis', Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 46 (1979), pp. 127-75.  
697 Expositio D. Thomae Aquinatis in Libros Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione Continuatio per Thoma de 
Sutona (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction, pp. 2-12.  
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refine and set out in his Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, the two texts will be dealt 
with together here.  
In the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, Knapwell's stated objective, at least, is more 
conciliatory.  The precise question is whether, according to the faith, one ought to 
posit that several substantial forms belong to the essence of human nature united to 
the Word.698  Knapwell explains that great minds have disagreed over this question, 
with each party to the debate arguing that the other's position is against the faith.  He 
intends, he says, to take a 'middle way' (media via), to demonstrate that neither 
position on the composition of human nature contradicts the faith, and to do this 
without asserting anything that is doubted by either side, and without prejudice to 
any better argument or theory.699  The Quaestio gives a comprehensive account of the 
philosophical and theological arguments on either side of the debate, but is 
dominated by a discussion of postmortem bodily continuity.  Knapwell sets out and 
refutes 39 arguments in favour of the pluralist position.  Of these, 11 concern 
postmortem bodily continuity, of which 8 of directly concern Christ's corpse.  He sets 
out explains a further 32 arguments in favour of the theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans, without refuting them.  The responsio section of the 
Quaestio disputata contains an extended discussion of the general resurrection.   
On closer inspection, however, Knapwell's Quaestio disputata de unitate formae 
contains ideas and arguments that were undoubtedly deeply provocative within the 
context of the debate as it had hitherto developed.  In this Quaestio disputata Knapwell 
is not, as Robert of Orford was in Sciendum, attempting to reconcile Aquinas's and 
pluralist philosophy, by finding a way to provide an account of postmortem bodily 
continuity on pluralist terms: that is to say, finding a way to give an account of formal 
continuity between living body and corpse.  In the course of pursuing his own 'middle 
way', Knapwell in fact intentionally and carefully dismantles the framework that de la 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 'Quaestio est utrum secundum fidem de essentia humanae naturae verbo unitae oporteat ponere 
plures formas'.  Knapwell, QDUF (ed.) Kelley, p. 49.   
699 'Circa istam quaestionem magni contrario modo senserunt.  Quidam enim ponunt quod ponere 
unam formam in humana natura Verbi unita fidei contrariatur.  Alii vero affirmant quod in eadem 
plures formas substantiales contra fidem sit.  Nos vero hac vice media via indecentes, vias utrorumque 
intendimus declarare, quibus intellectis, nec hii nec illi aliquid contra fidem dicere apparebunt.  Hoc 
tamen fiet, nihil eorum quae circa hanc materiam vertuntur in dubium asserendo nec meliori 
sententiae aliqualiter derogando'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 66.     
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Mare had constructed for the debate on postmortem bodily continuity in his 
Correctorium fratris Thomae.   
It is not just that, under the pretext of finding a 'middle way' between Aquinas's 
and pluralist philosophy, Knapwell pulls the rug from beneath the most basic 
pluralist argument in the debate: that the continuity of a substantial form in the corpse 
is necessary to support any continuing identity between living body and corpse.  Neither 
is it simply that he points out, in addition, that both parties should focus simply on 
explaining material continuity, and that both should accept the account of the 
postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies that he himself 
has developed through building upon Aquinas's most speculative thinking in this 
area.   
More than this, the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae contains an attempt to 
completely unravel the pluralists' philosophical account of postmortem bodily 
continuity, full-stop.  Knapwell puts forward an argument to demonstrate that the 
pluralists cannot posit the identity of any substantial form in the body across its death, 
in any meaningful way, after all: according to Knapwell, the pluralist position, like the 
position of those who follow Aquinas, entails that the form of the corpse is numerically 
different from the form of the living body.   
The way in which Knapwell is able to reach this surprising interpretation of the 
consequences of pluralist theory will be explained below.  For now, it is enough to 
note that, when he reinterprets the consequences of pluralist theory for postmortem 
bodily continuity in this way, Knapwell is in fact staying true to his stated objective to 
show that neither theory of human nature contradicts the faith.  (He is just not giving 
an interpretation of the pluralist theory that any pluralist would recognise as 
accurate).  As we will see, Knapwell thinks that in order to preserve that Christ 
underwent a true death it is in fact necessary to posit that a new substantial form was 
introduced into Christ's dead body, but he also thinks that both sides can argue that 
Christ's dead body was absolutely the same thing as His living body despite the 
introduction of this new substantial form into it.    
Now, given that the main focus of his intellectual energy in Quaestio disputata de 
unitate formae is upon developing an account of the postmortem continuity of 
individual bodies' matter, it is no surprise that Richard Knapwell, in contrast to 
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Thomas of Sutton, provides an account of the individual human body that 
emphasises its relative independence from the soul within the human being.  He does 
this, moreover, without compromising the unity of the human being, as Robert of 
Orford had.   
Like both Thomas of Sutton and Thomas Aquinas, Richard Knapwell would 
emphasise that the unity of the human being, body and soul, is guaranteed only if the 
soul is the body's only substantial form.  If the soul were to arrive at a body already in 
act by another form, he notes, then the human being, body and soul, would be a 
mere 'aggregate' of two things.  The act of existence of any thing is 'outside' (extra) its 
essence or quiddity (quidditas) and is the 'ultimate perfection' of that quiddity: a soul 
following a corporeal form that was already perfected by an act of existence would 
not be able to enter into the same essence or quiddity with that body.700   
But unlike Thomas of Sutton, and like Thomas Aquinas, Knapwell would also 
emphasise that the material part of human nature is in a differentiated state of potency: 
according to one argument that Knapwell puts forward in favour of the theory of the 
unicity of substantial form in humans, the human essence is a unity comprising both 
the soul and the matter that is in an appropriate state of potency for the soul.  The 
'essence' of the body, Knapwell writes, is a 'proper potency with respect to the 
soul'.701   
In the concrete, just as Aquinas had, Knapwell grounds the relative 
independence of the individual body within the human being upon the accidental 
form giving to the body its physical structure: dimensive quantity.  In the Quaestio 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 'Item, si corpus haberet formam ante unionem animae, illa forma ex qua est substantialis esset 
corpori principium existendi per se... et sic natura humana esset ex duobus in act existentibus.  Et per 
consequens non esset una nisi per aggregationem... Actus quicumque existendi est ultima perfectio 
quidditas illius cuius est actus.  Cum enim actus existendi quidditas substantiae sit extra ipsam 
quidditatem, necesse est quod illud quod naturaliter sequitur esse sit extra quidditatem eamdem.  Ergo 
ex hoc ipso quod corpus ponitur ante animam habere actum existendi, ex consequenti negatur habere 
potentiam ad animam tamquam ad aliquid pertinens ad eius quidditatem vel essentiam'; 'Item, ab 
eodem habet aliquid esse et unitatem.  Unum enim sequitur ens.  Cum ergo a forma unaquaque res 
habeat esse, a forma etiam habet unitatem.  Si ergo in homine ponatur plures formae substantiales, 
homo non erit unum ens sed plura'.  Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 2, and arg. 
17 (ed.) Kelley, pp. 56, 61.     
701 'Item, ex anima et corpore Christi fiebat unum per essentiam.  Ergo mutatio per quam facta est 
separatio animae a corpore attingebat ipsam essentiam corporis quae erat propria potentia respectu 
animae'.  Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 24 (ed.) Kelley, p. 63.   
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disputata de unitate formae, he puts forward an argument, in favour of the pluralist 
position, which states that it is necessary to posit a distinct substantial form in the 
individual body as the metaphysical support for its basic corporeal features, including 
its extension.702  Knapwell confirms that dimensive quantity is the only form capable 
of giving extension to matter and dividing it into parts, and that the human body's 
dimensive quantity is not somehow produced by the body to which it belongs.  It is, 
of course, constructed by the power of the agent of the body's generation, the virtus 
formativa in paternal semen.703  In Quare, in the context of a discussion of angelic 
individuation, Knapwell gives an account of the properties of dimensive quantity that 
equip it for the role of individuating material things that is very close to that which 
Aquinas's gives at Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, a. 2.704  
Finally, clarifying his position on the proper signification of 'body' elsewhere in 
Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, Knapwell outlines and rejects Giles of Rome's 
position that the body as the 'other part' of human nature (that is, the part that is not 
the soul) is simply matter itself, insofar as it possesses a certain internal organisation 
and complexity resulting from its relationship to the various accidental forms that are 
found within it.705  Knapwell argues that the acquisition of these characteristics 
would presuppose a composite of matter and substantial form in act; he does not 
understand how matter per se and alone can be understood as possessing the 
structural features and complexion proper to a human body.706  According to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
702 Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro pluralitatem formarum, arg. 11 (ed.) Kelley, p. 51.  
703 'dicendum quod sicut nulla forma substantialis dici potest cuius est formam extendere neque 
effective neque formaliter, ita nec anima, quoniam quantitas dimensiva qua formaliter corpus 
extenditur quantumcumque non efficitur per virtutem corporis eiusdem, sed per virtutem generantis'.  
Knapwell, QDUF, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 11 (ed.) Kelley, p. 79.  Cf. argumenta pro unitate 
formae, arg. 28, p. 65: 'Distinctio materiae per partes fit per quantitatem dimensivam'; and for 
Knapwell's account of human generation, see responsiones ad argumenta ad 1- ad 6, pp. 74-7.  
704 See esp. Knapwell, Quare, a. 10 (ed.) Glorieux, pp. 56-7, passage beginning, 'Distinctio enim 
secundum numerum praesupponit divisionem secundum quantitatem'. 
705  'corpus sumitur pro altera parte humanae naturae... secundum quosdam... est solummodo 
humanae naturae principium materiale... ipsa scilicet materia eius... secundum esse quod habet in 
habitudine ad dimensionem qua extenditur et organizationem et complexionem qua afficitur et 
terminatur.  Ponunt enim quod... sic materiae corporis humani extensa vel affecta... nihil aliud est 
quam ipsa eius essentia'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 7 (ed.) Kelley, p. 77.   
706 'quoniam dimensio et organizatio ac sequens complexio subiectum actu compositum requirit, non 
intelligo qualiter materia per se sola possit intelligi dimensificata... cum qualitates primae ex quarum 
adequatione resultat complexio...'.  ibid.   
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alternative position that Knapwell endorses, when applied correctly to the 'other part' 
of the human being, the word 'body' in fact signifies the material part of human 
nature, entering (in the appropriate state of potency, we may assume) into 
composition with the soul or 'human form', but only insofar as human nature's various 
material properties follow ontologically upon that form.707  In Quare, responding to the 
pluralist notion that the body is mere prime matter according to Aquinas's 
philosophy, Knapwell singles out dimensive quantity as the particular accidental 
form in virtue of which this 'other part' of human nature is called the 'body'.708  
Turning, now, to Knapwell's discussion of postmortem bodily continuity in the 
responsio section of the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, the Dominican master 
introduces a theological premise upon which both parties to the debate have to 
agree, which in fact concerns not only the general resurrection, but also the identity 
of saints' relics.  Reflecting on this premise, Knapwell argues, both parties should be 
able to see that what the faith ultimately demands, precisely, is a philosophical 
account of the continuity of the matter particular to each individual body: the question 
of the continuity or non-continuity of any substantial form is irrelevant to the 
continuing identity of the corpse's remains beyond a certain point of decay.  
All can agree, then, that according to the faith the souls of the saints have a 
‘natural appetite’ or desire to be reunited with their own matter, however changed 
(quantumcumque mutatam) the state of that matter might be.709  Evidently, Knapwell 
points out, this appetite, in each case, cannot be accounted for by the substantial 
form under which those remains currently subsist, since in every case that is simply 
the form of ‘ashes’ (forma cineris).  It must therefore be that saints' souls are naturally 
drawn to the matter particular to their individual bodies itself.710  The selection of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707 'Et ideo secundum hoc [nomen corporis] non significat nisi partem humanae naturae materialem, 
quia non significat compositum ex materia et humana forma, nisi inquantum ipsam consequuntur 
dispositiones ac proprietates humanae naturae materiales'.  ibid., pp. 77-8 (my insertion).  
708 'Haec ergo natura tota', that is, the composite of matter and the soul, 'prout ipsam consequitur illa 
quantitas dimensiva, dicitur corpus'.  Knapwell, Quare (ed.) Glorieux, a. 31, p. 138.  
709 Cf. Aquinas's position, above, p. 109 and n. 269. 
710  'Animae sanctorum appetitum habent naturalem ad suam materiam quantumcumque mutatam.  
Ratio autem huius appetitus non est forma cineris in materia corporum sanctorum introducta, sed 
materia ipsa quae et prius erat in corporibus eorum dum animabus uniebatur.'  Knapwell, QDUF, 
responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 67.  
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particular theological premise is shrewd, and not only because it allows Knapwell to 
deal with the two issues of the general resurrection and the identity of saints' relics at 
the same time.  It also provides a clear riposte to Roger Marston's defensive 
argument in his Quodlibet IV, from the previous year, noted above: Marston, in effect, 
had argued that the faith did not in fact demand an account of the continuity of every 
human individual's material remains beyond bodily decay.711  
Working from the premise that each saint's soul desires reunion to its own matter, 
Knapwell gives his own natural philosophical account of the postmortem continuity 
of the matter particular to individual bodies, finding his own way, that is, to fill in the 
outline of the account of material continuity that Aquinas had handed down in his 
own work on the general resurrection.  
Knapwell explains that the matter particular to each saint's body must, for its 
part, retain the same 'distinction and numbering' (distinctionem eamdem ac numerationem), 
or individuality, which it had in their living body, however many intervening 
substantial forms it has served as the subject for since that body's decomposition.  So 
how does the particular matter formerly belonging to an individual saint's living body 
retain its individuality and identity?  There are no distinctions within the essence of 
matter itself, so matter cannot account for its own 'distinction and numbering'.  
Dimensive quantity, Knapwell writes, is the principle of matter's divisibility and 
partibility.712  His conclusion, more precisely, is that the matter that was particular to 
a saint's living body retains its individuality even under the form of ashes because it 
retains the same 'nature of dimensive quantity' (natura quantitas dimensiva) that it had in 
the saint's living body.713  So what is the 'nature of dimensive quantity'? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711 See above, p. 207.  
712 'Materia sive pars materiae in qua succedunt sibi duae formae substantiales est una numero, divisa 
et distincta ab aliis materiae partibus quibuscumque oportet.  Quod esse non potest solum ratione suae 
essentiae in qua convenit cum materia quacumque.  Ergo oportet quod in illa essentia materiae quae 
successive informatur illis formis remaneat illud quod est principium divisionis et partibilitas. Haec 
autem est quantitas dimensiva'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 67.  
713 'Cum ergo singulae animae singulas materias appetant per naturam, manifestum est quod in 
membris illis sub forma cineris manet natura quantitatis dimensivae eadem quae prius erat in 
corporibus vivis.  Alioquin distinctionem ac numerationem quam prius materiae illae non retinerent.  
Nec per consequens animae easdem partes materiae quas prius informabant et non alias appeterent 
per naturam, cuius oppositum tenet fides'.  ibid., pp. 67-8. 
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According to Knapwell, the 'nature of dimensive quantity', or the structural 
element responsible for particularising the material remains of any individual saint 
(or indeed any human), is not an accidental form in act.  Nor is it a kind of medium, 
or metaphysical layer, intervening between matter and any substantial form, even 
though it ontologically precedes substantial form in matter.714  Knapwell conceives 
the 'nature of dimensive quantity' in any particular part of matter, rather, as the 
particular property of that part of matter, and as subsisting, in itself, in a state of 
potency, just as the matter whose property it is, is in a state of potency just in itself.715  
According to Knapwell, the 'nature of dimensive quantity' in any particular part of 
matter is equipped for the continuous work of distinguishing that part of matter from 
any other matter, across any sequence of substantial changes, because it is naturally, 
or of itself, individualised: in Knapwell's terms, it is naturally ‘individuated and 
indivisibly numbered’, or has 'material unity' in itself.716 
What is the relationship between the 'nature of dimensive quantity', or the 
structural principle in a particular part of matter, on the one hand, and the 
accidental corporeal form in act, to which Knapwell refers simply as 'dimensive 
quantity', belonging to the individual body in which that matter currently subsists, on 
the other?  As the particular part of matter to which it belongs is brought into act, or 
'perfected' by a particular substantial form, Knapwell thinks, so the particular nature 
of dimensive quantity, or structural principle, possessed by that particular part of 
matter is in turn 'perfected' by 'terminations'.  These 'terminations' are the actual 
structural features belonging to the particular accidental quantitative structure that is 
appropriate for the particular natural entity defined by that very substantial form:717 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 'Sciendum tamen quod natura quantitatis dimensivae, licet... praecedat formam substantialem in 
materia, non tamen est illud mediante quo forma substantialis unitur eidem'.  ibid., p. 68.  
715 'natura dimensionis sic accepta non est actus sed potentia.  Unde dicitur quod non oporteat quod 
habeat subiectum sibi proprium ens in actu.  Sed satis videtur suae naturae ut naturam materiae quae 
similiter est in potentia consequatur, utpote quaedam proprietas eiusdem'.  ibid., p. 69.  
716 'quantitas dimensiva... semper manet eadem cum materia cuius est proprietas, eadem remanente.  
Et hoc satis est probabile, cum quantitas dimensiva habeat in sui natura unde individuetur ac 
indivisibiliter numeretur... Naturae vero aliarum materialium formarum non habent ex se unitatem 
materialem'.  ibid., p. 70.    
717 'sicut eadem essentia materiae perficitur per diversos terminos substantiales, sic eadem natura 
quantitatis dimensivae perficitur per diversas terminationes consequentes diversas formas 
substantiales'.  ibid., p. 69.  
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this structure will be the physical structure of a human body, if the substantial form is 
a soul.   
Knapwell explains, further, that these structural features in act or 'terminations' 
are extraneous to the very essence of dimensive quantity.  So whilst the actual 
individual structures in which it is perfected vary across a sequence of substantial 
changes, the nature of dimensive quantity in any particular part of matter, or the 
principle of those structures, in itself remains the same thing: just as the essence of the 
matter that serves as the substrate for this sequence of substantial changes remains 
the same, even though it is in a state of proper potency to each substantial form in 
turn, so, too, the nature of dimensive quantity is the same across those changes, even 
though it is in a state of proper potency to different sets of actual corporeal structural 
features or 'terminations' in turn.718 
From one angle at least, the nature of dimensive quantity appears to serve a 
similar purpose to the formal principles that pluralists posited in matter, or rationes 
seminales: in generation, corporeal forms of one sort or another 'unfold', so to speak, 
from each kind of formal principle in matter.  We are left to wonder what account 
Knapwell might have given of the material identity of the mortal body across growth 
and material exchange given that, according to this account of substantial change, the 
structural principles from which a individual's particular bodily structure unfolds 
would appear be rooted in the very matter from which their body was originally 
generated.   
In any case, for the purpose of constructing of an account of postmortem bodily 
continuity, Knapwell's 'nature of dimensive quantity' has a certain advantage over a 
pluralist's ratio seminalis: it is naturally individual, whereas the pluralist's ratio seminalis, 
supposedly the metaphysical support for the continuity of individual bodily substantial 
forms, was not.  And the 'nature of dimensive quantity' serves quite a different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718 'terminus quantitatis dimensivae est extra essentia eiusdem.  Et ideo variato termino, remanet 
totum quod ad essentiam quantitas dimensivae pertinet', 'Ita scilicet quod sicut essentia materiae 
manet cum formis diversis respectu quarum est in potentia propria, sic natura dimensionis quae est 
potentia propria respectu harum terminationum manet eadem in eisdem.  ibid., pp. 69, 70.  Francis 
Kelley, in his commentary on this passage (editor's introduction, p. 38), suggests that there is a 'fatal 
flaw' in Knapwell's argument because he is arguing that the nature of dimensive quantity is 'at one and 
the same time numerically one and numerically several'.  All Knapwell seems to be trying to say here 
is that the nature of dimensive quantity in any part of matter, numerically one in itself, can be brought 
into act in different structures in a succession of substances. 
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purpose, of course, to a pluralist's ratio seminalis in the context of a discussion of 
resurrection: the former is posited simply to account for the continuity of the matter 
particular to individual bodies across death and resurrection.  Knapwell does not 
address directly the theory of rationes seminales in his Quaestio disputata de unitate formae.  
His explicit argument is simply that both sides in the dispute must be in agreement 
regarding the role that the 'nature of dimensive quantity' has to play in an account of 
postmortem bodily continuity.719   
This account of the continuity of quantitative structure across substantial change, 
particularising parts of matter and serving as the basis for their continuing identity, 
differs from Averroes', even though Knapwell cites Averroes' De substantia orbis for 
authoritative support,720 and uses Averroes' vocabulary in his own analysis: at one 
point in this discussion of postmortem material continuity the 'nature of dimensive 
quantity' is described as 'indeterminate' (interminata) in itself.721  For Averroes, of 
course, 'absolute body' or 'indeterminate dimensions' was or were a layer of 
quantitative structure extending across prime matter (and thus extending prime 
matter), and rendering it divisible, and did constitute a real medium intervening 
between matter and substantial form.  For Averroes, this structure was also a really 
distinct thing from the various particular accidental forms belonging to individual 
bodies.722  Knapwell, as just explained, envisages a direct relationship of potency and 
act linking, respectively, the principle of corporeal structure that is a property of a 
particular part of matter, and the concrete corporeal structure that is the particular 
accidental form belonging to the substantial body in which that very matter is 
currently subsisting.  Sylvia Donati's research into Physics commentaries produced 
around this time by Arts masters at Oxford has revealed a similar tendency in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 'consideranda sunt quaedam in quibus necesse est habent tam hii quam illi convenire.  Quorum 
primum pertinet ad naturam dimensivae quantitatis'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 67.   
720 ibid., p. 67.   
721 'natura quantitatis dimensivae eatenus qua terminata est, formam substantialem consequitur, quam 
tamen praecedit alio modo interminata'.  ibid., p. 69.   
722 See above, chapter 2, section 4.2 and subsections, esp. 4.2.1. .  
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work to analyse dimensive quantity into a compound of act and potency in order to 
explain the partition of matter.723  
Knapwell's account of the continuity of matter as particular across any case of 
substantial change is very similar to that in Averroes' Physica commentary, however, 
in that what both thinkers ultimately provide is a natural philosophical account of the 
continuity of particular parts of matter in themselves.  What Aquinas had pointedly 
attempted to do in his mature work on the resurrection, in contrast, was to outline an 
explanation for the continuing identity of the matter particular to an individual body 
across death and resurrection, not simply as particular, but precisely as the matter 
belonging to that very individual body.  Aquinas had suggested that what remained 
in the matter particular to an individual body after its death were precisely the traces of 
the accidental quantitative structure that had belonged to an individual body when it 
was alive: his own explanation in his work on the resurrection went no further than 
that.   
Aquinas and Knapwell are both ultimately trying to give an account of 
postmortem material continuity that is equivalent to Augustine's atomist account.724  
Analogously, then, whereas Aquinas simply discusses where the atoms formerly 
belonging to an individual body go after bodily decay, and goes no further, Knapwell 
offers a full natural philosophical account of those atoms themselves: the nature of 
them; their path before and after becoming incorporated into a particular human 
body; and the way in which they actually comprise different organic structures in 
different bodies in succession. 
Now, Knapwell wants to explain the appetite of each soul to be reunited with its 
own matter in terms of the continuing particularity of that matter itself, and yet he 
thinks that any part of matter is potentially particular to a number of different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 'The third main issue in the commentators' discussion of indeterminate dimensions does not 
originate from Averroes' treatment of this topic... but seems to be an original contribution of our 
authors... Most commentators imply appeal to a general metaphysical rule... Typical of our 
commentators is to extend this principle to dimensive quantity, by maintaining that that actual 
dimensions require as their counterpart a potentiality in the category of quantity.  Such potentiality is 
identified by the commentators with indeterminate dimensions'.  Donati, 'The Notion of Dimensiones 
Indeterminatae in the Commentary Tradition of the Physics in the Thirteenth and in the Early 
Fourteenth Century', pp. 211-2.  
724 See above, pp. 15-16. 
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individual bodies in turn.  Why should the link between any particular soul and any 
particular part of matter be especially strong?  Knapwell's analysis, of course, does 
not preclude that two or more souls could desire reunion to the same matter.  
Theologians had long debated the outcome of situations resulting from cannibalism, 
where matter was 'shared' by two bodies in turn, discussing where the shared matter 
would ultimately go at the resurrection, and developing rules for assigning priority to 
one body over another.725 
Moving on in the direction of Knapwell's discussion of the identity of Christ's 
corpse in particular, it is worth pointing out that the commentaries of Daniel Callus, 
Francis Kelley, and Alain Boureau on this Quaestio disputata have all given credence to 
Knapwell's claim to be trying to find middle ground between Aquinas's and pluralist 
theory, based on this account of postmortem bodily continuity and further comments 
that Knapwell makes in the remainder of the responsio section of the Quaestio disputata 
de unitate formae.726   
In the responsio, it is true, Knapwell continues to adopt a conciliatory tone, and 
moves on to discuss bodily continuity across substantial generation in general.  If 
both parties must agree that the 'nature of dimensive quantity' remains in matter 
across substantial change, then they also agree, Knapwell explains, that there are 
symbola or common accidental qualities on either side of any case of substantial 
change, and that the presence of these symbola can explain why a certain substance is 
so readily transformed into a certain other substance.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 Reynolds, Food and the Body, see pp. 304-5 (on Albertus Magnus), 313-4, 343-4 (on Bonaventure) 
and 391-5 (on Aquinas). 
726 Callus writes of Knapwell, 'He does not attack the pluralist position... His purpose is to show that 
pluralist theory is not the only means of safeguarding the Catholic faith', 'Knapwell tries to reconcile 
the two conflicting theories, but his solution is almost purely verbal'.  Callus also quotes a passage from 
the reportatio version of the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, wherein Knapwell recalls in his responsio 
that Kilwardby himself posited that matter was invested with a quantitative structure, albeit along with 
corporeal form as the subject for that structure.  Callus, 'Richard Knapwell and the Problem of the 
Unity of Form', pp. 140, 147-9.  Kelley writes, 'There can be little doubt at least that he saw his 
approach in this Quaestio as constructive, as a step forward towards bridge building, but without undue 
compromise'.  Knapwell, QDUF (ed.) Kelley, editor's introduction, p. 34.  Boureau's position moves 
between detecting 'la construction de zones intermédiaires de compromis', on the one hand, and 
'quelque tromperie dans le compromis de Knapwell', on the other hand, in Théologie, science et censure, 
pp. 213, 322 (see pp. 209-13 for Boureau's commentary on Knapwell's Questio disputata, which relies on 
Kelley's).  
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At this stage in his argument, Knapwell simply points out that the two parties 
disagree with respect to the precise way in which they understand the events of 
substantial change.  Those who posit several forms in the same substance say that the 
very same corporeal form remains across substantial generation and corruption, 
along with the same structure or dimensive quantity, and the same symbola or 
accidental qualities in number although they undergo a change in the 'grade' of their 
nature.  Those who posit a single form in any composite say that the nature of 
dimensive quantity remains, though 'terminated' in act in a new way (aliter terminata); 
that other accidental qualities, or symbola, are numerically different on either side of a 
case of substantial change, but are still very close in the 'grade' of their nature to their 
counterparts belonging to the substance on the other side of the substantial change; 
and that even if there is no bodily form that actually remains across substantial 
change, one can still say that a less perfect substantial form virtually persists when a 
more perfect form is acquired, because the qualities proper to the more perfect form 
are very close in the 'grade' of their nature to the qualities that follow the less perfect 
form.727  These differences notwithstanding, Knapwell invites his audience to 'see 
how closely these two ways run together'.728    
Knapwell might well present pluralist theory in these uncontroversial terms in the 
responsio section of the Quaestio disputata de unitate formae.  But the rest of the argument 
regarding postmortem bodily continuity in the Quaestio disputata, comprising not only 
the relevant arguments that Knapwell puts forward in favour of the theory of the 
unicity of substantial form in humans, but also his subsequent responses to various 
pluralist arguments regarding the issue of the immediate identity of the corpse, 
amounts to the complete pulling-apart of the pluralist position on this topic.  
Knapwell's direct and extended exposition on the identity of Christ's corpse in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727 See the extended discussion beginning, 'Primi volunt quod sicut quantitas dimensiva remanet 
eadem numero in generato et corrupto, sic eadem forma corporea'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) 
Kelley, responsio, pp. 72-3; see also editor's introduction, pp. 39-40, and cf. commentary in Callus, 
'The Problem of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell', pp. 146-8.  Knapwell's text is somewhat 
ambiguous regarding whether symbola can remain across substantial change according to the theory of 
the unicity of substantial form.  The present analysis agrees with Callus's judgement that Knapwell 
means to say that symbola cannot remain the same in number.  Kelley disagrees, based on his opinion 
that Knapwell at one juncture means to endorse Giles of Rome's position on the continuity of symbola 
across substantial change.    
728 'Ecce quam prope et vicino concurrunt viae supra dictae'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, 
p. 73.   
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Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, in fact, is found only in the section in which he 
responds to specific pluralist arguments.   
The first thing to point out with regard to Knapwell's position on Christ's corpse 
is that he evidently agrees with the arguments of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas of 
Sutton that both parties to the debate must say that there is a formal difference in 
Christ's body living and dead, in order to safeguard that He underwent a true death.  
But Knapwell, both in Quare and in the Questio disputata de unitate formae, confidently 
goes further than either of these other two Dominicans.  In article 31 of Quare, that is 
to say, Knapwell positively accepts that Christ's human nature would not have 
undergone the dissolution or mutation of a true death unless a new form were 
introduced into His body.  In the Quaestio disputata, he repeats this argument.729  It 
does not follow, Knapwell goes on to explain in Quare, that Christ assumed a new 
nature in death: from the moment He was incarnated He assumed a nature that was 
mortal, to be transformed in death and repaired in resurrection.  And, besides, the 
new form in His dead body is not per se assumable into the hypostatic union.730   
The next thing to say is that, as already indicated, Knapwell refuses to admit that 
there is any significant philosophical difference between the pluralist account of the 
identity of the corpse and that offered by the advocates of Aquinas's theory that the 
soul is the only substantial form in a human being.  Knapwell sets out an argument in 
favour of the pluralist position, then, that says that if there is only one substantial 
form in a human being, living and dead flesh are not the same thing in number, and 
therefore it is not the same flesh, in the case of any human individual, which lives, is 
buried, and rises again.731  His response is designed to demonstrate that, whether one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729 'corpus Christi... tamen in morte non esset solutum nisi per animae separationem et alterius formae 
inductionem fuisset mutatum...' Quare, article 31, p. 138; Et sic ad hoc quod salvetur vera mors Christi, 
necesse est ponere quod aliquam substantialem formam induci novam per veram mutationem 
corporis Christi in morte'.  Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 22 (ed.) Kelley, p. 
63. 
730 'Et licet corpus sit mutatum per mortem, non tamen sequitur quod in morte novam naturam 
assumpserit, tum quia illa forma substantialis in morte inducta non est per se assumptible, tum quia 
natura sic fuit in principio suae incarnationis assumpta, videlicet mutabilis ac mortalis, tandem per 
mortem mutanda et per gloriam resurrectionis reparanda'.  Knapwell, Quare, a. 31 (ed.) Glorieux, p. 
135.  
731 Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro pluralitate formarum, arg. 20 (ed.) Kelley, p. 52.  
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posits one substantial form in a human being or more than one, the form of the body 
living and dead is not the same form in number.732   
According to Knapwell's rendering of their position, the pluralists posit that there 
is a corporeal form of the same nature in the body living and dead but that this 
nature changes according to its 'grade' across death.  He probably has Roger 
Marston's version of the pluralist theory, recently articulated in Quodlibetal debate, 
in mind.733  But the pluralists also have to admit, Knapwell continues, that the 
individual subject of this form, or supposit (suppositum), is different, too, because the 
living and the dead individual, the human and the non-human individual, are clearly 
different individual subjects or substances.  If this simply looks like a more technical 
way of saying that bodily death is a case of substantial change, then the conclusion 
that Knapwell wants to draw, at least, is clear and uncompromising: if a form differs 
according to the grade of its nature, and has a different supposit or belongs to a 
different individual substance, then it it necessarily individuated anew, or counted as a 
different individual form (numerari).734  
We now arrive at Knapwell's positive account of the identity of Christ's dead body, 
the content of which, given what has just been established, will come as no surprise.  
In Quare, Knapwell's argument had simply been that Christ's dead body was not 
totally the same, on account of being formally different (a requirement of the faith, as 
just explained), and yet was absolutely (simpliciter) the same on account of its 
continued subsistence in the same supposit, the divine person of the Word.735  In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
732 'dicendum quod sive ponamus in homine plures formas sive unam. non potest dici ut videtur quod 
forma vivi et mortui sit simpliciter una tantum numero'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsiones ad 
argumenta, ad 20 (ed.) Kelley, p. 82.  
733 See above, pp. 213-4. 
734 'Videmus enim quod forma quae potest habere diversos naturae gradus, licet non numeretur 
propter solam suorum graduum diversitatem, necesse tamen habet numerari ubi habet diversum 
gradum et diversum suppositum... Sed qui ponunt eiusdem naturae formae corporalem in vivo et 
mortuo necesse habent ponere - quod et dicunt - quod natura differat secundum gradum in eisdem, et 
non tantum secundum gradum sed secundum suppositum, quoniam aliud est suppositum vivum et 
mortuum; homo et non-homo'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 20 (ed.) Kelley, pp. 
82-3 (my emphasis).   
735 'corpus Christi mortuum et vivum est idem numero simpliciter, prout simpliciter dicitur quod nullo 
addito dicitur, id est absolute, et hoc propter unitatem suppositi divinae personae sive Verbi quo 
subsistebat.  Non fuit tamen idem simpliciter prout simpliciter dicit idem quod totaliter; tunc enim non 
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Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, in a lengthy response to the pluralist argument, again 
recently stated by Roger Marston in Quodlibetal debate, that, in order for Christ's 
dead body to be the same in number as His living body it must have had the same 
substantial form in number,736 Knapwell, this time around, is able to give a much 
fuller account of the continuing identity of Christ's corpse.  
He notes that the crucial difference between Christ's dead body and any other 
human corpse is that the material remains of Christ remain in the same supposit: their 
ultimate individual metaphysical subject, to which they remain inseparably united, is 
the subsisting Word.  Christ's dead body did have the same matter in number, the 
same nature of dimensive quantity, though brought into act in a slightly different 
bodily structure (aliter terminata), and a similar complexion, even if it was formally 
different, on account of having either a new substantial form or what the pluralists 
call a new 'grade' of form.  But it was rather (potius) because it remained in the same 
supposit that it remained absolutely the same body as His living body.737  Hammering 
Knapwell's point home is one particularly provocative argument that he advances in 
favour of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans: even if Christ's 
body had undergone complete corruption and been reduced to ashes in the tomb, it 
would still have been His same body, on account of its continued union to the 
Word.738 
Knapwell concludes his response to this pluralist argument regarding the identity 
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fuisset mutatam nec per consequens mortuum, quod haereticum est dicere'.  Knapwell, Quare, a. 31 
(ed.) Glorieux, p. 135.  
736 Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro pluralitate formarum, arg. 29 (ed.) Kelley, p. 54.  For Marston's 
position, cf. above, n. 588. 
737 'De corporibus mortuis aliorum dicendum quod poni non potest.  Quoniam nulla opinio ponere 
potest quod forma corporis vivi et mortui in aliis, eodem supposito remanere potest.  Propter quod in 
corpore Christi vivo et mortuo non solum remanebat eadem materia numero et eaden natura 
quantitatis dimensivae, aliter tamen terminata, et eadem natura complexionis in gradu alio... sed una 
cum hoc - omnia ista cum gradu formae vel forma in morte Christi inducta, in eodem supposito 
remanebant... non solum ratione materiae et quantitas dimensivae... nec ratione organizationis et 
complexionis... sed potius ratione Verbi subsistentis in omnimoda identitate cum corpore vivo et 
mortuo, simplicter debet dici corpus unum'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsiones ad argumenta, ad 29 
(ed.) Kelley, p. 88.   
738 'Corpus autem Christi erat per naturam mutabile tam vivum quam mortuum.  Et si corpus eius 
mortuum fuisset ulterius in cinerem mutatam, adhuc ut prius Verbo Dei fuisset unitum, et per 
consequens corpus Christi extitisset'.  Knapwell, QDUF, argumenta pro unitate formae, arg. 21 (ed.) 
Kelley, p. 62.  
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posit to remain in the corpse cannot in fact be absolutely the same in number as it 
was in the living body, and since neither party in the dispute therefore holds that the 
form in Christ's corpse was really the same (or had the same 'grade' of its nature) as 
the form of his living body, the difference between the two parties in fact comes down 
to a mere difference in the use of words.  Those who subscribe to the theory of the 
unicity of substantial form in humans are willing to call the form of the corpse (or 
'grade' of form) a 'new form'; the pluralists deny that it is a new form.739  
Taking in the complete argument that Knapwell presents in his Quaestio disputata 
de unitate formae, then, it is very difficult to sustain the view that his stated intention to 
find a 'middle way' between the two theories of human nature is genuine.  Rather, 
the treatment of postmortem bodily continuity in this Quaestio appears carefully 
calibrated to prove that pluralists have to abandon their longstanding position, as set 
out in de la Mare's Correctorium, and repeated more recently by Roger Marston, the 
most significant Franciscan scholar of Knapwell's generation at Oxford.   
In sum, it is worth repeating, the pluralist position was that the continuity of some 
substantial form is necessary across death in order to sustain the continuing identity of 
the living body with the corpse, and that the faith therefore demanded a pluralist 
theory of human nature in order to preserve the identity of Christ's dead body.  
Quite to the contrary, Knapwell argues in his Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, 
doctrine demands both that a new substantial form be introduced into Christ's corpse, 
and that the pluralists have to subscribe to the particular account of postmortem 
material identity that he has developed, in place of their account of postmortem formal 
continuity.  In addition to this, Knapwell argues, quite aside, in fact, from the 
particular demands of the faith, pluralist theory simply cannot provide the account of 
formal continuity that the pluralists claim it can.   
Along with the theory that the soul is the only substantial form in a human being, 
four of the articles condemned by John Peckham on 30 April 1286, in particular, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
739 'in nullo videtur fidei derogare si gradus formae de novo inducatur in morte Christi in corpore eius 
- quod secundum ponentes unam formam in composito est novam formam corporis induci... Nec est 
plus dicere inter opiniones istas, nisi quod isti gradum formae substantialis novum vocant 'novam 
formam' propter rationem praedictam, quod alii negant.  Unde videtur in re convenire quoad hoc, 
quod non fuit idem gradus naturae in forma corporis vivi et mortui.  Sed hii, istam diversitatem gradus 
dicunt formalem, illi autem non'.  Knapwell, QDUF, responsio (ed.) Kelley, p. 89.  
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reflected the account of Christ's dead body given in Knapwell's Quaestio disputata de 
unitate formae.  The first condemned article was that Christ's dead body possessed no 
substantial form that was the same as any it had when alive;740 while the second was 
that a new substantial form, a new species or nature, was introduced into His dead 
body, meaning (according to the text of the condemnation at least), that Christ would 
have been some additional, 'unnamed species' after His death. 741   The fifth 
condemned article was that Christ's dead body was numerically identical to His living 
body, but only on account of the identity of its matter and of 'indeterminate 
dimensions', the relationship of these to the immortal soul, and their continued 
existence in a hypostatic union to the Word.742  The sixth was that the dead body of 
any human or saint, before its decomposition into the elements and the scattering of 
its material into the wind, is the same in number as the living body that corrupted 
into it only in a certain sense (secundum quid), namely on account of their shared 
matter and because of an accident that they share in common, that is, quantity; 
absolutely (simpliciter) the living body and corpse are different in species and in 
number (that is, they differ formally).743  There is another record of the condemned 
articles, in the Annals of Dunstable, which attributes the condemned articles directly 
to Knapwell.744   
Before stepping back and bringing this chapter's long discussion to its conclusion, 
a historiographical point should be raised, specifically regarding Caroline Walker 
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740 'Primus articulus est, quod corpus Christi mortuum nullam habuit formam substantialem eandem, 
quam habuit vivum'.  Peckham, Registrum (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, p. 922.   
741 'Secundus est, quod in morte fuit introducta nova forma substantialis, et nova species, vel natura, 
quamvis non nova assumptione vel unione Verbo copulata; ex quo sequitur, quod filius Dei non fuerit 
tantum homo, sed alterius speciei innominatae'.  ibid. 
742  'Quintus est, identitatem fuisse numeralem corporis Christi mortui cum eius corpore vivo, 
tantummodo propter identitatem materiae et dimensionum interminatarum, et habitudinis ipsarum 
ad animam intellectivam, quae immortalis est.  Esse insuper identitatem numeralem corporis vivi et 
mortui ratione existentiae utriusque in eadem hypostasi Verbi'.  ibid.  
743 'Sextus est, corpus cujuscunque sancti vel hominis mortuum, antequam sit per putrefactionem 
mutatum in auras vel elementa, non esse idem numero cum corpore eius vivo, nisi secundum quid; 
scilicet ratione materiae communis, sicut sunt unum, quae invicem transmutantur, ut caro et vermis, 
et ratione accidentis communis, scilicet quantitatis.  Simpliciter autem esse diversum corpus mortuum 
a vivo, specie et numero'.  ibid., pp. 922-3. 
744 Roensch, Early Thomistic School, pp. 180-1, 195-6.  
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form in humans.  As indicated, Bynum's influential narrative supposes that Aquinas's 
work on the composition of human nature was condemned because it had inherently 
scandalous consequences: de la Mare, in other words, was right.745  Boureau's 
Théologie, science et censure has already done much to tacitly correct this narrative: the 
public condemnation of a major theory openly developed in the work of a highly 
respected theologian, Boureau emphasises, should be viewed prima facie as highly 
unusual.746  More to the point, Boureau highlights the implicit and explicit lack of 
support for the condemnation from Theology masters at both Oxford and Paris at 
the time.  
Aquinas's uncompromising new theory of the composition of human nature, 
along with the dawning realisation that it had far-reaching consequences for the way 
in which any theological question touching upon the human body would 
henceforward be framed, had provoked a strongly conservative reaction amongst 
certain masters at Paris and Oxford in 1277, it is true.  But before 1286, both 
Theology faculties had absorbed the shock, and had returned to their default setting 
of encouraging open debate on all theological issues.  In the mid 1270s, as we saw, 
Albertus Magnus had been deeply hesitant over whether philosophers should even be 
enquiring about the composition of Christ's dead body.  In 1276, Henry if Ghent had 
thought it deeply unfitting to suggest that a new substantial form might have been 
introduced into Christ's dead body.  By 1285, Richard Knapwell was not only insisting 
that a new form should have been introduced into Christ's corpse, he was also openly 
speculating as to what would have been the consequences for the identity of Christ's 
dead body had it decomposed completely.747   
Masters at Oxford repeatedly ignored Peckham's attempts to obtain from them a 
copy of Kilwardby's prohibited articles,748 whilst an anonymous pamphlet circulated 
at the University, poking fun at the Archbishop by recommending that he observe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745 See above, pp. 35-7. 
746 Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 14.   
747 Boureau points out that Knapwell's strongly naturalistic approach would have appeared deeply 
unfitting to Peckham, no longer at the cutting edge of theological debate.  ibid., pp. 212-3.  
748 Peckham, Registrum (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, pp. 852-3, 862-3, 944-5.  
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the 'single form of silence'.749  By proceeding with the condemnation of 30 April 1286 
in the presence of a council of bishops in London, without having consulted a council 
of university masters about the censure of one of their scholars, Peckham gravely 
contravened contemporary practice at the Universities.750   
Knapwell gained the sympathy of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines in 
Paris as he made his way to Rome to appeal his excommunication.  The two secular 
masters not only heavily criticised the manner of the condemnation,751 they also 
explicitly rejected its terms in Quodlibetal debates in Advent 1286.  Godfrey of 
Fontaines rejected it outright,752 whilst Henry of Ghent accepted that the condemned 
positions followed from the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans, but 
denied that the theory was heretical and opposed the position behind the 
condemnation that there should be absolute, rather than (in some sense) relative, 
identity between living body and corpse.753  In these same Quodlibetal questions, 
both masters also mention a letter signed by 12 masters of Theology at Paris in 
response to the Oxford condemnation, denying that the theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans had ever been censured as heretical or erroneous at Paris.  
This followed the re-examination of the theory during the process of the 
rehabilitation of Giles of Rome between April 1285 and April 1286, which would 
seem to have resolved any remaining uncertainty regarding the case surrounding 
Aquinas's philosophy of human nature overhanging from March 1277.754   
Peckham publicly condemned the theory of the unicity of substantial form in 
humans as heretical in 1286, then, from an isolated and reactionary position: the 
pursuit of the theory's condemnation had become a personal obsession.  Boureau 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749 Peckham reports this pamphlet to the Bishop of Lincoln in a letter dated 1 June 1285: 'Demum 
unicam nos voluit tenere formam silentii loquax ipse'.  ibid., p. 900.  Cf. Boureau, Théologie, science et 
censure, pp. 224-5. 
750 On the procedure adopted by Peckham, see Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 16, 19-20.   
751 ibid., pp. 16-17, 301.  
752 ibid., p. 302. 
753 ibid., pp. 309-10. 
754 ibid., p. 298.  On this letter and the rehabilitation of Giles of Rome, see also Giles of Rome, 
Apologia, (ed.) Wielockx, editor's introduction, pp. 219-223.  
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suggests that the Archbishop was driven not only by partisan feeling and professional 
jealously directed against Aquinas, but also, perhaps, by a particular obsession with 
postmortem bodily continuity, provoked by an incident in which he had witnessed 
the bleeding corpse of a former subordinate with whom he had had an altercation, 
the bishop Thomas of Cantilupe.755 
Unluckily for Knapwell, by the time his appeal came to be heard in 1288, 
Honorius IV, who had overseen the rehabilitation of Giles of Rome, had been 
replaced by Nicholas IV, the former Franciscan Minister General Jerome of Ascoli.  
Unsympathetic to the Dominican's cause, the new pope imposed perpetual silence on 
Knapwell who, according to the Annals of Dunstable at least, ended his days in Bologna 
later that year having torn out his eyes in misery.756   
Conclusions    
The accounts of the individual body and postmortem bodily continuity that were 
developed by Giles of Lessines, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard 
Knapwell in defence of Aquinas's theory of the composition of human nature, as we 
have seen, could diverge significantly from Aquinas's thought and from one another, 
in doing so could respond to basic Aristotelian and Averroan concepts in very 
different ways, and, furthermore, could be vastly different in respect of their temper 
and precise objective.  The further correction that the present study offers to Bynum's 
narrative of the reception of Aquinas's philosophy, as indicated at the very outset, is 
that there was no single 'Thomist solution to the identity problem', which 'packed' the 
identity of the human individual into their soul.757   
Giles of Lessines and Robert of Orford both developed strong accounts of 
postmortem bodily continuity with the clear aim of matching the pluralists on that 
score.  And whilst both Thomas of Sutton and Giles of Lessines attacked pluralist 
theory on the grounds of its false consequences for bodily resurrection, neither 
Dominican positively suggested that the individual's soul alone could account for his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755 Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, esp. chapters 4 and 7.  
756 Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 294. 
757 See above, p. 37.  
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or her identity at the resurrection.  Richard Knapwell focussed his attention on the 
postmortem continuity of the matter particular to individual bodies, and developed a 
new scientific account in this area, which, in its own right, is a great example of the 
way in which reflection on a difficult theological problem could provoke 
philosophical innovation.  As we saw in chapter 4, Aquinas himself had not quite 
been able to make the breakthrough that was required, in order to be able to openly 
and explicitly develop a natural philosophical account of the nature of matter that 
squared with his convictions regarding individual bodies' material continuity across 
death and resurrection.   
What, finally, should be made of the idea that the works of Thomas of Sutton, 
Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell studied here represent the output of an 
'early Thomistic school'?   
There is no need to jettison the notion that these three Dominicans belonged to 
the same intellectual school, despite the evident heterogeneity in the detail of their 
thought on human nature, as long as, following Stephen Marrone's lead, we suppose 
that in the Middle Ages genuine intellectual schools, real intellectual 'lines of 
consanguinity', were primarily defined, not in doctrinal terms, but instead in terms of 
'ideological disposition and politics'.758    
There was, undeniably, a political colouring to the debate regarding the theory of 
the unicity of substantial form in humans and its theological consequences during 
1277-86, which was given its critical impetus, after all, by a Franciscan text written in 
part with the objective of highlighting the connection between certain positions 
condemned in Paris in March 1277 and the teachings of a famous Dominican 
theologian.759  Not all of Aquinas's defenders were Dominican, and not all of his 
critics Franciscan.  What we have clearly seen over the course of this chapter's 
discussion, nonetheless, is the beginnings of a situation in which the public accusation 
that a philosophical position could lead to false theological consequences was 
becoming a weapon in the broader institutional rivalry between the Franciscan and 
Dominican Orders.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, pp. 13-17, quotation from p. 17.   
759 Iribarren, '"Responsio secundum Thomam" and the Search for an Early Thomistic School', p. 296.  
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The impact that Aquinas's intellectual contribution had made on Dominican 
corporate identity was such that, in the view of the General Chapter of 1278, to 
criticise Aquinas was to bring scandal to the Order.  Peckham was accused by 
Dominicans at Oxford of criticising 'the opinions of the Order insofar as they are the 
opinions of the Order' and of deliberately seminating discord between the 
Franciscans and the Dominicans,760 whilst the Dominican provincial prior William 
Hothum (even if, according to Peckham, he may not have himself advocated the 
theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans761) pointed out to Peckham that it 
would cause serious harm to the Order if a member of another order were to attempt 
to correct Aquinas's teachings.762  Evidently, Dominicans at Oxford were beginning 
to see the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans as an emblem of their 
insitutional identity.763    
As we saw above, Marrone suggests that where the ground shared in common by 
members of an intellectual school is as much political as intellectual, the identity of an 
intellectual school fundamentally consists rather less in the exact substance of the 
teachings propounded by the individuals within it than in the intentions and 
motivations, conscious or unconscious, of those scholars, and in the reactions of their 
audience.  In the course of ordinary theological debate, when scholastic disputes over 
relatively abstruse metaphysical points were not accompanied by public acrimony, 
therefore, it would still be the case that any argument that a scholar might put 
forward for or against an idea or theory, even without naming a precise opponent, 
would allow his audience to identify his allegiance.764   
The debate over the composition of human nature discussed in this chapter was 
of course highly unusual in respect of its openly politically charged nature.  The basic 
intention and motivation behind the polemical Dominican works under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760 Peckham, Registum (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, pp. 841, 867 
761 ibid., p. 866.  
762 We know this from a speech made by Hothum to the Congregation of the masters of Oxford on 24 
November 1284, recorded in the Registrum Johannis de Pontissara Episcopi Wyntoniensis vol. 1 (ed.) C. 
Deedes (London: Canterbury and York Society, 1915), pp. 307-8 (reprinted in Callus, 'The Problem 
of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell', pp. 30-1, n. 22).  
763 As suggested in Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 320.   
764 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, vol. 2, p. 572.  
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consideration here was in full view and the allegiance of their authors was clear.  
They all adopted, though in differing ways, the theory that the soul is the only 
substantial form in a human being and sought to defend it, and, through defending it, 
to defend the reputation of their Order.  
Furthermore, Marrone points out that an author's political affinity, though it 
would still leave him room in which to manoeuvre, would ultimately direct him 
towards a 'limited range of doctrinal options'.765  Thomas of Sutton, Robert of 
Orford and Richard Knapwell not only subscribed to the idea that the soul is the 
only substantial form in a human being that gives to it its existence, they all clearly 
identify themselves as followers of Aquinas by emphasising, in words obviously 
reminiscent of Aquinas's, that the psychosomatic unity of the human being is 
preserved according to that very theory, and only that theory.  An additional, explicit 
expression of political allegiance was their common adoption of Aquinas's knock-
down argument in the most contentious area of the entire debate: Thomas of Sutton, 
Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell all agreed that the absolute continuing 
identity of Christ's material remains should be explained in terms of the continued 
union of His body to the divine supposit, an argument rejected by Franciscans.   
Beyond these areas of doctrinal agreement in open allegiance to Aquinas and the 
Dominican Order, Aquinas's Dominican defenders shared a particular intellectual 
posture.  John Peckham famously asserted in a letter of 1285 to the Bishop of Lincoln 
that the teachings of the Franciscans and Dominicans in all debatable things had 
become mutually opposed, since the Dominicans had filled the house of God with 
idols by relying exclusively upon philosophical doctrines, whilst his own side in the 
debate remained true to the teachings of Augustine and the other saints.766  In fact, 
pluralist arguments explicitly relied just as much on interpretations of various 
Aristotelian and Averroan concepts as did those of Aquinas's defenders, and, of 
course, neither pluralist nor Aquinas's philosophy posed any inherent danger to the 
faith.  But even so, Peckham had put his finger on something significant.767   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 ibid.  
766 Peckham, Registrum (ed.) Martin, vol. 3, pp. 871-2.  
767 Cf. comment in Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, vol. 1, p. 14. 
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We find Roger Marston self-consciously adopting a reactionary posture whilst 
putting forward his theory that corporeal forms are educed from principles or rationes 
seminales in matter, stating 'I believe that the doctrine of antiquity, approved by my 
teachers, is completely true'.768  (He backs up his position, in the next breath, with 
additional proofs from Aristotle and Averroes).  Conversely, we find Thomas of 
Sutton and Richard Knapwell self-consciously upholding the theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans and the account of substantial change that goes with it as 
intellectually superior, precisely, that is, as the improved theory that correctly 
represents the thought of Aristotle and Averroes.769  When developing his pluralist-
mirroring idea that there are potencies in matter from which forms are drawn out, 
Robert of Orford chooses to describe these potencies in Averroan language, as 
habilitates, rather than as rationes seminales.  
Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, then, had a 
common a political allegiance to their Order, an attendant shared motivation to 
advocate Aquinas's theory of the composition of human nature (however they 
expressed it), and a common intellectual posture, all in fact defined in opposition 
(however intense in each individual case) to their Franciscan pluralist adversaries.  
They can meaningfully be delineated as members of a distinct intellectual school, 
additionally, because they were part of the same community of discussion.  That is to 
say, whatever their original interpretation of Aquinas's theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans might be, each of these Dominicans was engaged in the 
same discussion of the ways in which Aquinas's theory of human nature could or 
could not, and should or should not, be interpreted, a precise point which, in itself, did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768  'Credo igitur doctrinam antiquitatis approbatam magistrorum meorum penitus veram esse, 
videlicet quod forma diminuta sit in materia quam agens promovet successive ut tandem sit forma 
completa'. Marston, Quodlibet IV, q. 9, response (ed.) Etzkorn and Brady, p. 384.   
769 At the outset of De pluralitate formarum Thomas of Sutton pointedly states his intention as 'rationes... 
auctoritatibus sciliter philosophi et sui commentatoris... confirmare'.  Thomas of Sutton, DPF, 
prooemium in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, p. 570.  Cf. the prologue to Thomas of 
Sutton's De productione formae substantialis: 'De productione formae substantialis in esse sententiam 
solemnem priorum doctorum tamquam principium ab initio habitam, posteriores tamquam 
impossibilem respuunt, quam tamen priores propter consuetudinem, quae est altera natura quantum 
ad immutabilitatem, non reliquunt et sic sibi invicem contradictunt'.  Włodek, 'Thomas Sutton, de 
productione formae substantialis', p. 142.  Knapwell inserts an article to Quare as an addendum to 
article 31 (also entitled 'Quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis'), in which, borrowing 
some of Thomas of Sutton's arguments, he states that pluralist theory has various philosophically 
unsound implications 'secundum doctrinam Aristotelis et Commentatoris'.  Knapwell, Quare, a. 48 (ed.) 
Glorieux, p. 206.    
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not much bother Aquinas's pluralist critics (at least not during the period covered by 
this chapter).  Aquinas's critics, with a caricature of his position on human nature in 
hand, simply went about developing alternatives.770  In all these ways, then, Thomas 
of Sutton, Richard Knapwell and Robert of Orford did comprise a genuine 'early 
Thomistic school' during 1277-86.   
As is well-known, the Orders' governing bodies legislated in response to this 
controversy, seeking to create a situation in which the intellectual divide between 
their university scholars could be solidified and their respective institutional identities 
could be bolstered by the development of mutually opposed theological traditions.771  
The 1282 Franciscan General Chapter already decreed that only the Order's most 
talented students should study Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, and then only with de la 
Mare's corrections actually set into the text, so that they would not be led astray by 
Aquinas's errors.772  The Dominican General Chapter of 1286, convened five weeks 
after the condemnation, set down that every friar as far as he was able should devote 
himself to the study, promotion and defence of Aquinas's teachings on pain of 
removal from office.773   
The question of the unicity or plurality of substantial forms in humans not only 
had an obvious potential to divide scholars into two opposed camps, it also, of course, 
had repercussions for the whole gamut of major theological topics relating to the 
human body, its composition, and its continuity.  But what real impact did this 
legislation, effectively compelling scholars to hold either position on human nature, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 This is to borrow from Mikołaj Olszewski's discussion of the Thomistic school at the turn of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in his Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of 
the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis 
(Aschendorff: Verlag, 2010), p. 339: 'they formed a community of discussion... The interest in 
questions pertaining to the right or wrong interpretation of Aquinas's texts - interesting only to 
Dominicans, but not to others who focussed instead on solutions of issues outside Aquinas's 
conceptions - is able to serve as a criterion for distinguishing the Thomistic school from others'.    
771 Cf. Friedman, 'The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320', pp. 116-8. 
772 P. G. Fussenegger (ed.), 'Definitiones Capituli Generalis Argentinae, Celebrati anno 1282', Archivum 
Franciscanum Historicum, 26 (1933), pp.127-40, at p. 139, n.2. 
773 Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum, vol. 1 (ed.) Reichert, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum 
Praedicatorum 3, p. 235.  On the legislation discussed in this paragraph see also M. Burbach, 'Early 
Dominican and Franciscan legislation regarding St. Thomas', Medieval Studies, 4 (1942) pp. 145-9 and 
Hinnebusch, The History of the Dominican Order, vol. 2, pp. 154-5.    
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have on the Orders' respective intellectual traditions beyond, that is, the initial period 
of their mutual opposition in the late-thirteenth century?  
Did the institutional politics of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders in fact 
leave a lasting imprint on their scholars' metaphysical conceptions of the body, 
operating as a significant limiting factor upon the ways in which they would 
approach and treated theological problems associated with bodily composition and 
identity?  Did Franciscan and Dominican scholars themselves continue to adopt a 
self-consciously partisan approach to these problems?  
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EPILOGUE 
On Christmas day, 1462, presiding at a packed papal Curia, Pope Pius II 
witnessed a curious scene.  Franciscans and Dominicans were engaged in furious 
debate over whether or not, during the three days of His death, the blood that Christ 
had shed at the passion had remained united to His divine person.  It was freezing, 
the Pope recalls, and yet the friars on both sides were sweating, so great was their 
eagerness to defeat their opponents.   
A public scandal had been building since Easter that year, when, in Brescia, the 
Franciscan James of the March had been accused of heresy by the local Dominican 
inquisitor, James of Brescia, because he had preached that Christ's shed blood had 
become separated from His divinity.  In the weeks and months that followed, 
Dominicans and Franciscans lined up in opposition to one another, preaching their 
opposed positions and exchanging accusations of heresy, trying to draw their listeners 
to their own side.  When it became clear that the dispute could not be resolved 
locally, it was brought before the Pope.   
Actually, the position of neither party contravened papally approved doctrine, 
and several at the Curia judged that the question was purely academic and of no 
great theological import.  And, revealingly, Pius's memoirs tell us that the issue at the 
crux of the debate was whether or not Christ's blood could be properly understood to 
enter into the 'truth of human nature'.  
Almost two centuries after the condemnation of the theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans in 1286, then, Franciscans and Dominicans were once 
again fiercely debating postmortem bodily continuity; once again, either side of the 
argument could be justified perfectly well without prejudice to the faith; and once 
again, at the root of the dispute, were conflicting accounts of the metaphysical 
composition of human nature.  According to the Dominicans (subscribing to the 
theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans), Christ's body was matter to His 
soul, all of the matter in His body, or, better, all of His proper matter belonged 
intimately to His human nature: it remained united to His divine person.  According 
to the Franciscans, informed by a pluralist theory of human nature, Christ's body was 
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a substance in its own right, with its own form, and Christ's blood was contained in 
His body in the same way that water is contained in a vase: it became separated from 
Him when shed.774 
There are at least two other occasions between 1286 and 1462, involving the two 
mendicant Orders, in which we can detect the use, as a weapon in inter-order rivalry, 
of the accusation that the other Order's position on the composition of human nature 
had false theological repercussions.  On both of these occasions, we see again 
Dominicans on the offensive against Franciscans.  
First, there is the case of Franciscus Baiuli, the Franciscan who preached the 
same position as James of the March in Barcelona over a hundred years earlier, in 
1351, only to be tried for heresy by two successive Dominican inquisitors.  The first 
of these two inquisitors, named Pontius, preached against Baiuli's opinion and was in 
turn charged with erroneous views by certain Franciscans in front of the vicar of the 
bishop of Barcelona.775 
The second case, more subtle, certainly, is the approval by the Council of Vienne 
in 1311-12 of the position that, within the human nature assumed by Christ, the 
rational soul is per se and essentially the form of the body.776  This came after a careful 
examination of the writings of the Franciscan Pierre de Jean Olivi, at the request of 
the leadership of his own Order.  Sylvain Piron has pointed out that the inclusion of 
a general statement on the union between body and soul in the Council's decrees was 
almost certainly the work of the two Dominicans on the commission of theologians 
appointed to assess Olivi's orthodoxy.  This statement was less a reproval of Olivi 
(who had not denied that the soul was the form of the body), Piron argues, than a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774 On this debate, see. A. Fitzpatrick, 'Mendicant Order Politics and the Status of Christ's Shed 
Blood', Historical Research, 85 (2012), pp. 210-27, esp. 213-4, 221-3 on the technical arguments from 
either side; C. W. Bynum, Wonderful Blood. Theology and Practice in Late Medieval Northern Germany and 
Beyond (Philapeldhia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 120-5.  
775 Bynum, Wonderful Blood, pp. 113-4.  
776 'aperte cum sancta matre ecclesia confitemur, unigenitum Dei Filium... partes nostrae naturae 
simul unitas, ex quibus ipse in se verus Deus exsistens fieret verus homo, human videlicet corpus 
passibile et animam intellectivam seu rationalem, ipsum corpus vere per se et essentialiter 
informantem, assumpsisse...'.  Decreta of the Council of Vienna, 1: Fidei catholicae fundamento, in N. P. 
Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils vol. 1: Nicaea I to Lateran V, (London: Sheed & Ward, 
1990), p. 360.      
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Dominican attempt at point-scoring, harking back to the late thirteenth-century 
debate on the composition of human nature.777   
Be that as it may, the position approved at Vienne is perfectly compatible with a 
pluralist theory of human nature (it does not require that the soul should be the only 
form in the body).  It is true that, in the event, the vast majority of subsequent 
medieval commentaries on Aristotle's De anima interpreted the Vienna decree as an 
endorsement of the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans.  But 
Franciscans wrote hardly any of the commentaries on De amina from the period 
immediately following the Council of Vienna, and the Franciscan interpretation of 
the Vienna decree, detectable, instead, in Sentences commentaries, was (not 
surprisingly) that the approved account of the union of body and soul was compatible 
with a range of philosophical positions.778  
The natural extension of the present study would be an investigation into how the 
dynamics of the longstanding inter-order rivalry between the Dominican and 
Franciscan Orders, and in particular the legislation through which the Orders sought 
to build up their respective institutional identities by way of the promotion of distinct 
intellectual traditions,779 actually affected the thought of their scholars on theological 
and philosophical questions relating to the composition of human nature, and, more 
specifically, individuality and bodily identity, between 1286 and 1462 (and even 
beyond).   
Recent research on Dominican intellectual developments at the turn of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries suggests that the historian who would attempt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
777 'Le fait que deux des trois derniers maîtres de la commission aient été dominicains (Guillaume de 
Peyre Godin et Bérenger de Landorre), n'est sans doute pas étranger à l'approbation par la bulle Fidei 
catholise fundamento de la doctrine de l'âme rationnelle, forme du corps humain.  Ce paragraphe du 
décret conciliaire ne constitue en effet pas tant une réprobation d'Olivi qu'un point marqué par le 
camp thomiste dans la vielle polémique sur l'unité de la forme substantielle'.  S. Piron, 'Censures et 
condamnation de Pierre du Jean Olivi.  Enquete dans les marges du Vatican', Melanges de l'Ecole 
francaise du Rome, 118 (2006), p. 347 (author's italics).  On the process against Olivi at Vienna see also 
D. Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976), pp. 73-80.   
778 See de Boer, The Science of the Soul, pp. 40-1 and W. Duba, 'The Souls after Vienne: Franciscan 
Theologians on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, CA. 1315-1330' in P. J. J. M. Bakker, 
S. W. de Boer and C. Leijenhorst (eds.), Psychology and Other Disciplines.  A Case of Cross-Disciplinary 
Interaction (1250-1750) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 171-249.     
779 See above, p. 268. 
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this ambitious project should expect to become swiftly immersed in an ocean of 
circumstance and detail. Plainly, among the earliest defenders of Aquinas's 
philosophy, Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard Knapwell, there was 
no continuous understanding of precisely what the theory of the unicity of substantial 
form in humans entailed with respect to the composition of human nature, 
individuality, and bodily identity.  And there is no reason to suppose that the 
intellectual developments become any tidier as further generations of Dominican 
theologians weigh in.   
Looking beyond the work of Thomas of Sutton, Robert of Orford and Richard 
Knapwell from 1277-86, we have already seen how, in the creative thinking of the 
Dominicans John of Paris and Durandus of Pourçain (and, we may suppose, other 
Dominicans too), the theory of the unicity of substantial form in humans is turned on 
its head: body is absorbed into soul, rather than, as in Richard Southern's 
characterisation of Aquinas's thought, serving as the very basis of the soul's being.780   
In turning Aquinas's theory of human nature upside down in this way, these two 
Dominicans, in effect, find a way to turn the Franciscan interpretation of Aquinas's 
theory of the composition of human nature (namely that it reduced the material part 
of human nature to a featureless prime matter), to the Dominican advantage: if body is 
packed into soul, then there is no need to bother with any of the complex objections 
regarding bodily identity at the resurrection that turned on cases of cannibalism.  We 
saw in the general introduction that John of Paris was censured for his innovative 
account of bodily identity at the resurrection.  We also saw that, by the second 
decade of the fourteenth century at the latest, when Durandus was writing, 
theologians of his own Order no longer considered it a particular theological priority 
to uphold a literal interpretation of resurrection, according to which God would 
gather together the material particular to each body (an interpretation which had 
been traditional in treatments of the general resurrection from Augustine to 
Aquinas).  Debate in this particular theological area, it would appear, had moved on.  
Even so, there is every reason to think that John of Paris and Durandus represent only 
one strand of Dominican thinking on resurrection and bodily identity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780 See above, pp. 150-1. 
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The general picture of Dominican intellectual developments into the fourteenth 
century becomes yet more complicated as, moving on from William de la Mare's 
Correctorium fratris Thomae, Dominicans take on new interlocutors, actively seeking to 
correct errors in the works of other scholars, who are not in every case Franciscan.   
Robert of Orford goes on to produce critiques of Book I of Giles of Rome's 
Sentences Commentary and Henry of Ghent's Quodlibeta (both composed during 1289-
93); Thomas of Sutton, critiques of the Franciscans Robert Cowton and John Duns 
Scotus's Sentences commentaries (after 1312). 781  Mikołaj Olszewski's recent 
comparative study of the prologues to the respective Sentences commentaries of the 
Dominicans James of Metz (c. 1300-03) and Hervaeus Natalis (c. 1309) 782 
demonstrates that these two Dominicans are primarily engaged with refuting the 
positions of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines on the 
scientific status of theology, and show almost no interest in the Franciscan position, 
or in John Duns Scotus's view that theology is a practical science, in particular.783   
Indeed, the major intellectual struggle of Hervaeus Natalis's career would be an 
intra-order conflict, during the campaign for doctrinal uniformity that he led (as 
Dominican Minister General from 1318) whilst also mounting a campaign for 
Aquinas's canonisation, which eventually succeeded in July 1323.  Durandus of St. 
Pourçain, as indicated above, 784  was targetted by Hervaeus and other leading 
Dominican intellectuals of his time, over certain departures that he had made from 
Aquinas's thinking.  Capitular legislation enacted at Saragossa in 1309 had reinforced 
the requirement that scholars should determine according to Aquinas's teachings,785 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781 Friedman, 'The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320', pp. 118-24.   
782 On the dating of these commentaries, see ibid., pp. 69-70.  
783 Olszewski, Dominican Theology at the Crossroads (full citation above, n. 770), pp. vii-viii, 335.  Olszewski 
considers his 'most important discovery' to be the 'direct and strong independence of Hervaeus' 
prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences to that of James', even though Hervaeus Natalis was one of 
James of Metz's severest critics.  Olszewski notes that this discovery complicates the distinction that 
historians of Thomism at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are accustomed to 
drawing between disciples of Aquinas, represented by Hervaeus, on the one hand, and dissidents, 
represented by James of Metz and Durandus of St. Pourçain, on the other.  
784 See above, p. 39. 
785 'Volumus et districte iniungimus lectoribus et sublectoribus universis quod legant et determinent 
secundum doctrinam et opera venerabilis doctoris fratris Thomae de Aquino et in eadem scolares suos 
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and it was in the context of increasing concern about Durandus's deviations that the 
Dominican General Chapter at Metz in 1313 decreed that Aquinas's teachings were 
the 'common opinion' of the Order, bringing in the provision that no friar should be 
sent to Paris unless he had first studied Aquinas's teachings for at least three years.786   
Isabel Iribarren's close study of what was at stake ideologically in this long conflict 
(1308-25), which focussed upon Trinitarian theology, adds yet another layer of 
complexity to this broad-brush view of the dynamics of Dominican intellectual 
developments in the early fourteenth century.   This conflict was far from being a 
simple clash between a pre-defined and monolithic 'Thomism' and Durandus's 
rebellious 'anti-Thomism'.787  Iribarren explains that the brand of 'Thomist' thought 
on the Trinity promoted by Hervaeus Natalis combined a standard interpretation of 
Aristotelian metaphysics, with, crucially, insights incorporated from John Duns 
Scotus's thought, intended to strengthen the Dominican intellectual tradition by 
bringing it up to date with the very latest metaphysical innovations.  Durandus's 
thinking was similarly doctrinally eclectic, making conceptual borrowings from 
Bonaventure, in fact, but was considered a threat precisely because it jettisoned 
several standard Aristotelian metaphysical assumptions.  And so the two competing 
theological trends in play in this long controversy, Iribarren argues, were 
Franciscan.788   
Russell Friedman characterises Thomism in the first fifty years after Aquinas's 
death as 'dynamic, evolving and creative'; Thomism '"retooled" itself in order to focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
informent, et studentes in ea cum diligentia studere teneatur'.  Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis 
Praedicatorum, vol. 2 (ed.) B. M. Reichert, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum, 4 (Rome: In domo 
generalitia, 1899), p. 38.    
786 'Cum doctrina venerabilis doctris fratris Thomae de Aquino sanior et communior reputetur, et 
eam ordo noster specialiter prosequi teneatur, inhibemus districte quod nullus frater legendo, 
determinando. respondendo, audeat assertive tenere contrarium eius quod communiter creditur de 
opinione doctoris praedicti, nec recitare aut confimare aliquam singularem opinionemcontra 
communem doctorum sententiam in his quae ad fidem vel mores pertinere noscuntur, nisi reprobando 
et statim obiectionibus respondendo... Nullus etiam ad studium Parisiense mittatur, nisi in doctrina 
fratris Thomae saltem tribus annis studuerit diligenter'.  ibid., pp. 64-5.    
787 The dispute is portrayed in this way in E. Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas. 
The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St Pourçain (New York and London: Routledge, 
2003), see esp. ch. 4, directly criticised in Iribarren, Durandus of St Pourçain, p. 284, n. 9.    
788 Iribarren, Durandus of St Pourçain, pp. 278-84.  
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on the newest and most challenging threats'.789  Evidently even the most ardent self-
proclaimed promoters of Aquinas's philosophy were more than comfortable making 
use of the intellectual tools that the Franciscans had to offer.  
Going back to the Orders' respective theories of the composition of human 
nature, and moving back in time to the late thirteenth century, we have already seen 
one example of the potential porousness of the lines between Dominican and 
Franciscan theories in this area, of course, with Robert of Orford's attempt to 
formulate a hybrid account of Aquinas's and pluralist metaphysics.   
To conclude, we can add Richard de Mediavilla to the mix as a Franciscan who 
sympathised somewhat with Aquinas's position on the composition of human nature.  
Mediavilla was the most significant Franciscan thinker between Bonaventure and 
Scotus, or, as Piron had put it, 'the only true master of quodlibeta within the 
Franciscan Order' at Paris during 1280-1300.  He is already known as a thinker who 
attempted to update Franciscan theology in line with certain of Aquinas's insights 
(Mediavilla rejected, for example, Bonaventure's theory that a special act of divine 
illumination is required to guarantee certainty in cognition).790  The suggestion that 
Mediavilla made any intellectual concessions to Aquinas's views in respect of the 
metaphysics of the body will come as a surprise, however, because, as briefly 
indicated in chapter 5, he was the author of De gradu formarum (c. 1286):791 the first 
major Franciscan tract devoted to setting out a positive pluralist theory of human 
nature and offering an exposition on the full range of theological points touched 
upon in the debate over the unicity or plurality of substantial form in humans.  
Nonetheless, in his Quodlibet II, qq. 14-15 (1284-87), asking, respectively, 
whether quantity, in the concrete, is something real beyond the substance to which it 
belongs (Utrum quantitas dicat rem aliquam ultra substantias cuius est quantitas, loquendo de re 
absoluta), and whether the reason why two bodies cannot coincide in the same place is 
'dimension' (Utrum causa precisa quare duo corpora non possunt esse simul sit dimensio), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
789 Friedman, ‘Dominican Quodlibetal Literature', p. 465.   
790 S. Piron, 'Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris, 1280-1300', in Schabel (ed.), 
Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages.  The Thirteenth Century, pp. 417-8. 
791 edited in Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes.   
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Mediavilla defends the crucial distinction that Aquinas had drawn in his own 
metaphysical account of the body between the body's substantial nature, on the one 
hand, and the accidental quantitative form giving to the body its organic structure, 
on the other.   
The Franciscan explains that it is indeed in virtue of a body's accidental 
quantitative structure, and not in virtue of its substantial form, that it is extended, 
continuous, divided into parts, and positioned in a certain place.  Arguing from the 
theological example of the transubstantiation, Mediavilla points out, in terms 
reminiscent of Aquinas, that the quantitative structure of the bread remains whilst its 
substance is transformed.792   
Although the substantial body has its numerical identity from its essence (and not 
from its continuous quantity, which gives it only an accidental kind of unity), 
Mediavilla argues, bodily substance (matter and substantial form), just in itself, it not 
something extended, but simply something capable of extension; in itself is not 
something with physical parts in its own right, but something with the potential to 
have physical parts;793 in itself, the substantial body does not admit of the soliditas in 
virtue of which it is in one place and excludes others from that place.  It is in virtue of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 'Respondeo quod quantitas dicit re absoluta alia a substantia cuius est quantitas... Per theologiam 
sic probo propositum.  Videmus enim quod in sacramento altaris remanet quantitas panis sine 
substantia panis... arguo sic secundum philosophum primo physicorum: quantitati debetur partibilitas 
secundum se; qualitate vero secundum accidens...  Quantitas est quoddam accidens substantie cuius 
est accidens'.  Richard de Mediavilla, Quodlibet II, q. 14, response, printed in Sacratissimi Theologi Ricardi 
de Mediavilla, In primum-quartum Sententiarum questiones persubtilissime (Tria recognita quodlibeta, etc.) (Venice, 
1507-9), vol. 3, ff. 17rb-va.  Cf. above, pp. 119 and 121, for dimensive quantity in Aquinas's 
discussions of transubstantiation.  
793 Mediavilla puts forward the view with which he disagrees, 'Ponenda est opinio illorum qui tenent 
partem contrariam, que talis est: quod quantitas super substantiam cuius est quantitas non addit nisi 
modum se habendi in ipsis partibus, qui modus se habendi est ut pars sit extra partem... scilicet ut 
habens partem extra partem non discontinuitas ab invicem... ratio eorum est quod si quantitas diceret 
aliquid super corpus quod est substantia, tunc posset intelligi substantia que est corpus praeter 
quantitatem...', and responds as follows, 'Substantia enim que est corpus per intellectum abstracta a 
quantitate non intelligitur ut quid extensum, sed ut quid extensible... Sed non est concedendum 
substantiam esse unam numero unitate substantiali per illam continuitatem, sed per essentiam suam... 
unitas autem in numero que debetur substantie continue per suam continuitatem: unitas est 
accidentalis... prius ordine nature est substantia possibilis ad habendam partem extra partem, et ex 
hoc est extensibilis actu habens partem extra partem extensivam vel continuam'.  Richard de 
Mediavilla, Quodlibet II, q. 14, response, ff. 17va-b.  
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the body's quantitative structure, or, as Medievilla puts it, 'the body which is quantity' 
that the substantial body has soliditas.794  
So even if Mediavilla was an obvious candidate, in the late 1280s, to produce a 
tract on the plurality of forms for the purpose of matching Dominican defences of 
Aquinas's philosophy, in towing the basic party line on the composition of human 
nature, he evidently still found room to incorporate some of Aquinas's insights into 
his thinking.  In his writings on the general resurrection in his Sentences commentary 
(revised by Mediavilla in the 1290s), indeed, Mediavilla again appears as one towing 
a party line with less than complete conviction.  That is to say, even if he includes a 
Bonaventuran-type solution that would pin the continuity of individual bodily 
substantial forms across death and resurrection upon formal principles in matter, 
Mediavilla seems rather unpersuaded of the efficacy of this kind of solution, and 
points to it only as an afterthought.795   
John Duns Scotus and William Ockham would disagree with Mediavilla's 
metaphysical account of the body, at least.  Both of these Franciscans would argue 
that matter and the substantial form inhering in it are divided into integral parts in 
themselves, rather than by way of quantity.796 
Whatever the innovations introduced by individual Dominican and Franciscan 
thinkers into their metaphysical conceptions of the body, and whatever the particular 
conceptual borrowings across party lines might have been, however, the situation we 
find in 1462 was one in which combatants on either side were utterly convinced of 
the truth of their own position, and yet completely unable to persuade their 
opponents of this.  Cumulatively, it would appear, the divergence between 
Dominican and Franciscan thinking on the metaphysics of the body and range of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794 'concludendum est... quod causa precisa quare duo corpora non possunt simul naturaliter esse, est 
dimensio secundum latum et longum et profundum, que vocantur soliditas, et alio nomine vocatur 
corpus quod est quantitas'.  Quodlibet II, q. 15, response, f. 18va 
795 Fitzpatrick, 'Richard de Mediavilla on the Resurrection of the Body', esp. pp. 108-23.  Mediavilla 
initially lectured on the Sentences during 1278-80.  See 'Friedman, 'The Sentences Commentary, 1250-
1320', p. 53.  
796 McCord Adams, Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist, pp. 14, 153-9.   
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doctrinal problems relating to bodily identity was significant. 797  Whatever the 
complexity on the surface, undercurrents of partisanship remained strong, and 
intellectually formative.   
The Middle Ages is a rich period in philosophical thinking on individuality and 
bodily identity, even from the standpoint of modern philosophy.  The vast bulk of the 
work remains to be done, in order to discover how that thinking was shaped by the 
intellectual politics of two begging orders.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 Friedman, 'The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320', pp. 100-15, takes the Orders' divergent views 
on predestination as a case study in how the 'theological traditions in the two largest mendicant orders 
colour the intellectual history of the time' (p. 106); p. 106, n. 58 cites the following works on the 
Orders' divergent thinking on other topics: on the status of theology as a science, F. -X. Putallaz, 
Figures franciscaines de Bonaventure à Duns Scot (Paris: Cerf, 1997), pp. 81-140; in the area of Eucharistic 
theology, D. Burr, Eucharistic Presence and Conversion in Late Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984); and on voluntarism and the freedom of the will, 
B. D. Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, D. C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1995).  Friedman's own major work on the Orders' divergent 
intellectual traditions is in the area of Trinitarian theology: R. L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the 
Medieval University.  The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and 
Dominicans, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2013).   
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APPENDIX I 
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOUL AND 
THE BODY'S ACCIDENTAL FORMS 
According to the readings of Aquinas on human nature offered by both Robert 
Pasnau and Eleanor Stump, the soul shapes the body.   Stump writes,  
'on Aquinas's account, the soul is what makes unformed prime matter 
into this human being by configuring prime matter in such a way that 
matter is this living animal capable of intellectual cognition.  In the 
resurrection of the body, by informing unformed matter, the soul 
makes unformed matter this human being again'.798   
As illustrated above in chapter 3, section 3, and confirmed in chapter 4, section 
2.3, it is Aquinas's view that it is the virtus formativa in paternal semen, as the efficient 
cause of the individual body, that gives to it its organic structure and accidental 
disposition.  
Citing ST I, q. 77, a. 6. (Utrum potentia animae fluant ab eius essentia), Robert Pasnau 
writes, in a similar vein to Stump,  
'The soul is responsible for all of what makes me be me, in the sense 
that my defining attributes, physical and mental, 'flow from' the 
soul'.799   
Aquinas does indeed state, at ST I, q. 77, a. 6, response, and ad 2, that the soul's 
powers flow (fluunt) from its 'essence', or nature, and even that the soul causes its own 
powers as an active principle (sicut principium activum), probably pointing to the fact 
that the soul is the efficient cause of those powers' operations (chapter 4, section 2.3).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798 Stump, 'Resurrection, Reassembly and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul', p. 170.   
799 Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, p. 389.  
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Aquinas does not say that the individual body's physical features directly flow from the 
soul, however.  What he says is that, by communicating existence to the composite 
human, the soul makes it possible that such accidents, which depends for their 
existence on the esse of their subject, can exist:  
'Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali 
quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, 
forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto.  Sed e converso, 
actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in 
forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab 
actualitate subiecti'.800   
John F. Wippel has examined at length Aquinas's work on the relationship 
between composite substances and their accidents.  Aquinas's usual argument is that 
accidents simply 'follow' on both of the principles of their subject, material and formal, 
either the principles of its species or its individual principles: when their subject is 
brought into being, those accidents are automatically and instantaneously given.  
Towards the end of his career in his Metaphysica commentary, Aquinas was content 
with the idea that an individual composite was merely a subject for (or a material 
cause of) its accidents.801  	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 ST I, q. 77, a. 6, response, and ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 246.   
801 See In Met. IV, lect. 1, n. 539, discussed in Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 
266, and pp. 266-75 for the full survey of Aquinas's thinking in this area.  
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APPENDIX II 
ON HUMAN NATURE AFTER DEATH 
Robert Pasnau and Eleonore Stump disagree regarding whether the disembodied 
soul alone can, according to Aquinas, accurately be considered an individual human 
being.  The reading of Aquinas's work on resurrection offered in this study agrees 
with Pasnau that it cannot: the immortal soul is only part of the human being.  
Pasnau therefore thinks that an individual human will have to recover a human body 
in order to be complete at the resurrection, even if, according to his own reading of 
Aquinas, it need not recover a body that is numerically identical to that which it had 
in mortal life.802  
Stump contends that an individual human being can remain, composed of soul 
alone, after bodily death.  She points out powerful theological arguments in Aquinas's 
work that are in tension with his own statement, discussed above in chapter 4, section 
2.4, that what it is to be Socrates comprises his individual matter as well as his soul.  
Aquinas explains at Summa contra Gentiles IV, 91, indeed, that the soul of an individual 
will receive rewards or punishments immediately on its separation from the body in 
accordance with its actions in the body.  The soul may see God in its disembodied 
state, descend to hell, or have its venial sins purged in purgatory.803  
This tension must be admitted, and the recovery of the body does seem to take on 
a secondary kind of importance in the afterlife if beatitude can be achieved without 
it.  The basic point made by the present study stands, however.  Aquinas's belief that 
an individual human will in fact recover a body reconstructed from the matter 
particular to it did fundamentally inform his thinking on human nature and bodily 
identity: in his work on the individuality and identity of the mortal human being, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, pp. 387-8, 393.   
803 Stump, 'Resurrection, Reassembly and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul', pp. 157-60, 168-9. 
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Aquinas makes matter and material continuity crucial to continuing self-identity.   
In this connection, indeed, there is a particular objection to be raised against 
Stump's analysis of Aquinas's philosophical thought on identity.  Stump's position is 
that, in Aquinas's view, 'constitution is not identity', hence, though not identical to 
just the soul, the human being can continue to exist composed only of the soul.   
Contrary to what Aquinas says about Socrates' identity in his work on 
resurrection, then, Stump supposes that, for Aquinas, an individual substance's 
identity does not consist in its constitution from its metaphysical parts, matter and 
form.  Her source for the theory that 'constitution is not identity' is the following 
passage from Aquinas's Metaphysica commentary:  
'in omnibus talibus oportet, quod ipsum compositum non sit ea ex 
quibus componitur... nec caro est idem quod ignis et terra... sic... caro 
non solum est ignis et terra... sed etiam est aliquid alterum per quod 
caro est caro'.804   
All this passage in Aquinas's Metaphysica commentary actually says is that a 
substance comprises not only its material constituents, but also a substantial form.  
Aquinas does not say or imply that he would extend the idea that 'constitution is not 
identity' to the metaphysical parts of substance, matter and form.  Stump's argument 
that, for Aquinas, 'constitution is not identity' has persuaded Jason Eberl and 
Christopher Brown.805   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 In Met. VII, lect. 7, n. 1674 (ed.) Cathala, p. 482.  See Stump, 'Resurrection, Reassembly and 
Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul', pp. 164-6, and Stump, Aquinas, pp. 50-3. 
805 J. T. Eberl 'Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings', The Review of Metaphysics, 58 (2004), esp. pp. 
337-8; C. M. Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus: Solving Puzzles about Material Objects (London: 
Continuum, 2005), esp. pp. 119-21.  
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APPENDIX III 
ON CORPOREITY AS THE 'FIRST FORM IN 
MATTER' 
In connection with the question of whether, following Averroes, Aquinas ever 
held that matter had its own corporeal form, scholars have debated the implications 
of a very early discussion of whether the soul is simple or composed of matter and 
form in Aquinas's Sentences commentary.806  Aquinas concludes that the soul is simple.  
Matter is found only in bodies, not in souls: all matter is contained under corporeal 
form.  He writes:  
'Ergo oportet quod prima forma substantialis perficiat totam 
materiam.  Sed prima forma quae recipitur in materia, est corporeitas, 
a qua nunquam denudatur, ut dicit Comment.  Ergo forma 
corporeitatis est in tota materia, et ita materia non erit nisi in 
corporibus'.807   
Some readers, then, have taken this to suggest that there is a substantial 'first' form 
of corporeity intervening between matter and any other form.  Notably, if Aquinas is 
suggesting this, his position here certainly does not match that of Averroes, for whom 
absolute body was an accidental, not a substantial form (see above, chapter 4, section 
4.2.4).  But it is not necessary to read this passage in that way.  This early passage in 
Aquinas's Sentences commentary can be read simply as saying that the first form in any 
matter (or the matter in any body), the substantial form of corporeity, is also the one 
and only substantial form in each body: the same, single, form which determines its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 The present study agrees in its interpretation of In Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 with Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 347-8.  For the other side of the argument, see Zavalloni, 
Richard de Mediavilla et la Controverse sur la Pluralité des Formes, pp. 261-6, and his references there to G. 
Thèry and M. Forest; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin Le “De Ente et Essentia” de S. Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 
1948), pp. 104-5$; M. McCord Adams William Ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame press, 
1987) vol. 2, p. 674.     
807 In Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, response, Opera Omnia (ed.) Busa, vol. 1, p. 26. 
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corporeal nature along with other aspects of its specific nature.  In other words, since 
each form in matter is a corporeal form, matter is not found without corporeity.   
The distinction between the nature of corporeity that is found in all matter, on 
the one hand, and other aspects of individual substances' specific natures, on the 
other hand, is purely analytical.  Aquinas makes this point in the following passage 
on the union of body and soul from his Summa Theologica, written at stage in his career 
at which no modern commentator would suppose that Aquinas subscribed to a 
pluralist theory of human nature, or think that Aquinas held that matter had a 
substantial form of its own.  Here again, Aquinas notes that all matter is found under 
the form of corporeity:  
'dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia consequentia 
corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde materia iam 
intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest intelligi ut distincta 
in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ulteriores 
perfectionis gradus. Quamvis enim eadem forma sit secundum 
essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus materiae attribuit, ut 
dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem rationis differt'.808   
 	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
808 ST I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 2, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, 5, p. 229.  
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